SIDDHĀNTABINDU

OF

MADHUSŪDANA

with the Commentary of

PURUSHOTTAMA

RITICALLY EDITED AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH
WITH INTRODUCTION, COMPARATIVE NOTES, ETC.

BY

PRAHLĀD CHANDRASHEKHAR DIVĀNJI, M. A., LL. M.
BOMBAY CIVIL SERVICE, JUDICIAL BRANCH

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FOREWORD.

I have much pleasure in placing before the public this humble effort of mine at interpreting and explaining a work on the Advaita philosophy of recognized merit.

A glance of the **General Table of Contents** will make it clear that this volume has been divided into two main **Sections, Sanskrit and English.** The first contains the **Text of the Siddhānta-bindu with the Commentary of Purushottama Saraswatī** called the **Bindusaṁdīpana** and certain **Appendices** and the second comprises **Explanatory and Critical Notes** and a **Translation** of the text in English and certain **Appendices.**

The text has been prepared from the following materials:—(1) A photostat copy of a MS. of the *Siddhāntabindu* purported to have been written in S'ake 1601 (A. D. 1679-80) and obtained from the MSS. Collection at the Oriental Institute, Baroda which is referred to in the foot-notes as क पुस्तकम्; (2) a similar copy of a MS. of the *Bindusaṁdīpana* stated to have been written in Saṁvat 1817 (A. D. 1760–61) obtained from the same institution which is referred to in the foot-notes as क$_1$ पुस्तकम्; (3) a MS. of both the works together appeared to have been written in Saṁvat 1840 (A. D. 1783–84) and obtained from the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute's MSS. Library at Poona which is referred to in the foot-notes as ख पुस्तकम्; and (4) another MS. of both of them together, purported to have been written in Saṁvat 1765 (A. D. 1708–09) and obtained from the same source which is referred to in the foot-notes as ग पुस्तकम्. All these MSS. are complete.

As several variations in readings, some important, others unimportant, were found between the Baroda and Poona MSS. of the text and the commentary it was found necessary to adopt one particular MS. of each as the basis of my text and mention the important variations found in the others, in the foot-notes. My choice for that purpose, has fallen on the Baroda MSS. because they are comparatively older than the Poona MSS. and because I found from the photostat copies in my possession that

they had been written more legibly and had comparatively fewer faults of penmanship. There are however certain places where I had to prefer the readings found in the one or the other of the Poona MSS. and in such cases I have stated in brief in the foot-notes the reasons for doing so.

I have divided the text into four parts, namely:— (1) उपोद्घातः (Introductory Remarks); (2) त्वंपदार्थनिर्णयः (Determination of the sense of the Term 'Twam'); (3) तत्पदार्थनिर्णयः (Determination of the sense of the Term 'Tat') and (4) तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थनिर्णयः (Determination of the sense of the Sentence 'Tattwamasi') for reasons which have been explained at p. 1 of the *Notes*. I have also sub-divided each of these parts into numerous paragraphs so that the reader who wishes to know the view of the author on any particular topi[c] may not have to wade through the whole work for that purpose.

The text contains numerous quotations from the princip[al] *Upanishads* obviously because, according to the Vedāntins gene[-] rally, they are the only source from which the true knowledge o[f] Brahma can be derived, some from the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarā[-] yaṇa which purport to systematise the teaching contained in thos[e] sacred texts and therefore form the nucleus from which the differen[t] doctrines of the S'aṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhwa, Nimbārka an[d] Vallabha schools have grown, from the *Bhāṣya* on the latter b[y] S'aṅkara because that was the principal work of the Advaita scho[ol] to which Madhusūdana Saraswatī belonged *and* from the numero[us] *other works* composed later on by the adherents of that schoo[l] from Sures'vara, who was the immediate pupil of the founder of th[e] school, down to Vidyāraṇya *i. e.* from those who flourished fro[m] the ninth to the fifteenth century of the Christian era, becau[se] some points which had not been touched directly by the found[er] of the school or had been treated by him only cursorily we[re] found thrashed out by these later Advaitins, each according to [his] own ability, and their views thereon were helpful to the author [in] elucidating the points which he wished to establish by this wo[rk] which though apparently a mere commentary is as good as [an] independent work. I am glad that I was able to trace all th[e] quotations, except a very few of them, to their sources and ha[ve] mentioned them in parantheses by the side of each quotati[on]

together with the portions or chapters of the works in which they occur. Some of these quotations being portions of Sūtras or verses, are not intelligible without knowing the context in which they occur in the original works. I have therefore given the remaining portions of them in the foot-notes thereunder. **An Alphabetical List of Quotations** has also been appended to the text so that if a reader wishes to find out where it occurs he can do so without difficulty. **A List of the Abbreviations** used in the text in order to indicate the sources of the quotations occurring in the text has also been appended at the end. I have found that some mistakes have unfortunately crept in in the text and the commentary for reasons which are common to most of the works published in India. I have therefore appended at the end of this section a **List of Corrections** and have to request the reader to make at least the important corrections from amongst them before proceeding to read the work.

The **Explanatory and Critical Notes** and the **Translation** in English of the text as printed in the preceding section have also been divided into parts corresponding to those of the text. The numbers of the appropriate pages of the text have been stated in English in the **Notes.** In the **Translation** the numbers of the corresponding pages of the text have been stated in Sanskrit at the end of each passage in order that they may not be confounded with the corresponding pages of the **Notes.**

The explanations in the **Notes** have been based principally upon those contained the following four commentaries on the *Siddhāntabindu*, namely :—(1) *Bindusaṁdīpana*, (2) *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, (3) *Laghuvyākhyā* and (4) *Binduprapāta*. Their merits and demerits will be found discussed and such information about their authors as was available to me, collected in the **Introduction.** Whenever I had an occasion to differ from any commentator, I have stated so, giving my reason or reasons for holding a different view.

The criticism in the **Notes** has been based upon my own study of the text and most of the other works of the author and other relevant works in English, Sanskrit and Gujrati. Besides explaining terms, sentences and passages, I have also given

summaries of the arguments of the author at convinient stages in order that the reader may be able to digest what may have been read over and follow what may come next.

The **Translation** follows the text closely as printed in the preceding section. In making it I have on the one hand avoided being slavishly literal and on the other taken very few liberties with the text, with the result that while one who cannot read and understand the text can read it through and gather the author's meaning from it as if the work had been originally written in English, one who would look upon it as a mere help towards understanding the text and would therefore expect to find from it passage for passage, sentence for sentence and even word for word, would rarely feel disappointed in his expectation. Wherever I have thought that some explanation in simple language was necessary for giving a clear idea of what the author meant, I have given it in a foot-note.

Very few abbreviations occur in this section. I have not therefore thought it necessary to append a list thereof to it.

In order to facilitate reference I have appended an **Index to the Notes** and a **List of Works Consulted and Referred to** for preparing them.

This volume unfortunately appears after the lapse of more than five years since its publication was announced but the delay has been due partly to the fact that the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press having several works on hand at the same time worked only at intervals, partly to the fact that the Benares and Poona editions of the work having come out with the commentaries of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Abhyaṅkara while the *Sanskrit* portion of this work was being printed, I thought it better with the approval of the Director of the Oriental Institute, to revise the **Notes, Preface** and **Introduction** and partly to the fact that my official duties were sometimes so pressing that I could not make progress in the work of revision for days together at times.

My sincerest thanks are due to the Government of Baroda for sanctioning the publication of this work in the *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, to the authorities of the Oriental Institute, Baroda and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona for lending MSS.

and such books as could be sent out from their Libraries, to Mr. Chintaharaṇ Chakravarti, M. A., Lecturer, Bethune College, Calcutta for kindly collecting for my sake and supplying very valuable local information regarding the author and the descendants of his brother Yādavāchārya, which has enabled me to give a geneological tree of the family from the time of Shahbuddin Ghori upto the present day, a period of more than 750 years, to Mr. K. Chattopadhyaya of Allahadad for supplying information as to some of the Northern India editions of some of the works of the author in his review of my article on **Madhusūdana Saraswatī; His Life and Works** which was published in Vol. VIII of the *Annals* of the Bhandarkar Research Institute and to Mr. N. C. Divanji, Superintendent, Travelling Libraries, Baroda State, for rendering much valuable assistance.

With these few prefatory remarks I place this volume in the hands of the public, expecting that those gifted scholars who may have occasion to review this work will keep an eye as much on its merits as on its demerits. When even such a profound scholar and teacher of Advaitism as the revered author of the *Siddhāntabindu*, has, while placing the work before his compeers, expected magnanimity from his critics by saying :—यद्दुष्टमिहास्ति यच्च दुष्टं, तदुदाराः सुधियो विवेचयन्तु—it is not too much for me, his humble interpreter, doing a little bit of service to the goddess Sarasvatī during spare hours, which are rare, to expect it from those hoary savants of Asia and Europe who have dedicated their whole lives to that service. Moreover the Advaita philosophy is so subtle and abstract and the method of exposition adopted in the works thereon is so intimately connected with the Nyāya system that even if a work thereon is couched in simple Sanskrit one is bound to meet with difficulties here and there in grasping the meaning intended to be conveyed by the author. This fact has been recognized even by the commentator Purushottama, who had the rare benefit of being a disciple of the learned author

of the *Siddhāntabindu*, when he has said :—बालार्थं विहितास्तथापि च गुरोः संदर्भगर्भा गिरो, बुध्यन्ते किल कैश्चिदेव सुचिराद्वृद्धैः समृद्धैरपि । I have however done my best to probe the mind of the author and hope that this my attempt to interpret it will be helpful to those interested in this science of sciences.

Bulsar, Dated
30th April 1933.

P. C. Divanji.

General Table of Contents.

Topical Contents of the Introduction.

Topical Contents of the Text, Notes and Translation.

Introductory Remarks.

Part I.

Determination of the Sense of the Term 'Twam'.

Part II.

Determination of the Sense of the Term 'Tat'.

Part III.

Determination of the Sense of the Sentence "Tattwamasi".

INTRODUCTION

It is the usual practice of the editors of Sanskrit works to acquaint their readers with the nature of the work they are editing, the author thereof, his date as far as it can be ascertained from reliable data, his place amongst the authors of the other works on the same subject, the subject-matter of the work in hand &c. This is especially necessary in the case of a work on Indian philosophy because its history is yet in a volatile state and it is such a subject that it is very difficult for a reader to follow the line of reasoning of an author without a previous general acquaintance with his views and the peculiarities of his style &c. Even the S′āstris of the old school who do editing work have for some years past seen the necessity of doing so. I therefore propose to discharge that duty as best as I can.

I

What is the Siddhāntabindu?

The *Siddhāntabindu*, or *Siddhāntatattwabindu* as it is called by some people, is a commentary on the *Das′as′lokī* also known as *Chidānandadas′as′lokī*, a small Stotra, consisting, as its name implies, of ten verses only whose reputed author was S′rī S′ankarāchārya, the founder of the Advaita school of the Vedānta philosophy. It appears that there are 3 other commentaries on that Stotra but this is the only one which has attracted the attention of scholars and that is due to its intrinsic merit. In the second of the four verses given at the end of that commentary[1] it is called a Nibandha (digest) and in the fourth it is stated that it had been prepared at the repeated request of Balabhadra who according to Purushottama was a pupil of the author and whose surname was Bhaṭṭāchārya. How far its contents justify that appellation will be examined after the contents thereof are analysed and reviewed. But whether it is or is not a digest it does not cease to be a running commentary on the Stotra above-mentioned. As a commentary it is very valuable in that besides explaining the meanings of the words and the verses as a whole the author goes behind them to ascertain the motive of the author in composing the Stotra and having done so, has interpreted the Stotra in the light of that motive. This has enabled him to consider many more points concerning the underlying doctrine than would otherwise have been possible for him to do.

II

Authorship of the Work.

There is no room for doubt as to who was the author of this work because there is sufficient internal evidence available on that point. Thus

1. *Sanskrit Section p.* ६२ *infra.*

in the second of the four verses given at the end of the work[1] it is distinctly stated that it had been composed by Madhusūdana Muni. His further identification is secured by the colophon wherein it is stated that it had been composed by "the illustrious Madhusūdana Saraswatī, a disciple at the revered feet of the revered and illustrious Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī, a peripatetic teacher of the order of Paramahaṁsas".[2] It is clear from this that the author of this work was a member of the order of Sannyāsis and a disciple of Vis'weswara Saraswatī.

III

Madhusūdana Saraswati Distinguished from other Madhusūdanas.

The fact that this author's name was Madhusūdana Saraswatī serves to distinguish him from other Madhusūdanas who have made contributions to the Sanskrit literature, but whose names do not end with the affix 'Saraswatī'. Mahāmahopādhyāya Abhyankar S'āstri states that there were in all twenty-five authors who bore the name Madhusūdana and that five thereout had the affix 'Saraswatī' applied to their names.[3] He has not however given the names of all of them. From Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum* one can gather the names of some 15 to 16 of them of whom only one had the affix 'Saraswatī', applied to his name. Under that name he has mentioned several works one of which is the *Siddhāntabindu*. We are not here concerned with the 20 other Madhusūdanas of the learned S'āstri or the 15 or 16 Madhusūdanas of the learned compiler of the *Catalogus Catalogorum* but with the Madhusūdana Saraswatī of the latter to whom he attributes the authorship of several other works besides the *Siddhāntabindu* and the 5 Madhusūdana Saraswatīs of the former amongst whom those works are divided, for our object is to ascertain the life-work of our own author.

IV

Author of the Siddhāntabindu Distinguished from other Madhusūdana Saraswatīs by Ascertaining his Other Works.

The works which Aufrecht has mentioned under the heading **Madhusudana Saraswatī** are:—(1) *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*; (2) *Advaitaratnarakṣ'aṇa*; (3) *Ātmabodha-ṭīkā*; (4) *Ānandamandākinī*; (5) *Rig-veda-jaṭādyashṭavikriti-vivaraṇa*; (6) *Krishṇakutūhala Nāṭaka*; (7) *Prasthānabheda*; (8) *Bhaktisāmānyanirūpaṇa*; (9) *Bhagawadgītāgūḍhārthadīpikā*; (10) *Bhagawadbhaktirasāyana*; (11) *Bhāgawatapurāṇaprathamas'loka-vyākhyā*; (12) *Bhāgawatapurāṇādyas'lokatraya-vyākhyā*; (13) *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā*;

1. *Sanskrit Section p.* ८२ *infra.*
2. श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीविश्वेश्वरसरस्वतीभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्यश्रीमधुसूदनविरचितः &c.
3. *Government, Oriental Series, Class A. No. 2—Introduction pp. 26–27.*

(14) *Rājñāṁpratibodhaḥ*; (15) *Vedastuti-ṭīkā*; (16) *Vedāntakalpalatikā*; (17) *S'āṇḍilyasūtra-ṭīkā*; (18) *S'āstrasiddhāntalesa-ṭīkā*; (19) *Saṁks'epa-s'ārīraka-sārasaṁgraha*; (20) *Sarvavidyāsiddhāntavarṇana* (? *Prasthāna-bheda*) and (21) *Harilīlā-vyākhyā*. The editors of the *Harilīlā-vyākhyā* seems to have copied out this very list with these amendments (1) that they have dropped (*a*) No. 8 (*Bhaktisāmānyanirūpaṇa*) obviously because it is the title of the first Ullāsa of No. 10 (*Bhagawdbhaktirasāyana*), (*b*) No. 12 (*Bhāgawatapurāṇādyas'lokatraya-ṭīkā*) apparently because if Madhusūdana Saraswatī had written a commentary on the first verse of the Bhāgawat Purāṇa (No. 11) it is impossible that he should again have written a second commentary on the first three verses of the same work; and (*c*) No. 20 (*Sarvavidyāsiddhāntavarṇana*) because even Aufrecht doubted whether it was not the same as No. 7 (*Prasthānabheda*[1]) and (2) that they substitute (*a*) *Subodhinī* for No. 9 (*Gūḍhārathadīpikā*) which is obviously wrong because that was the title of a commentary by S'rīdhara on the *Bhagawadgītā* published along with *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* in the Ānandās'ram Sanskrit Series (No. XLV) and (*b*) *Advaitasiddhi* for No. 1 (*Advaitabrahmasiddhi*) which is quite proper because the latter is the title of a later work by Sadānanda Yati and the printed editions (Advaitamañjarī Series, Nirṇaya Sāgar Press and Gujrātī Press) bear the former name and because the author himself has referred to that work in his other works by the same name[2]. The editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* seems to have copied out that list and that of the *Siddhāntabindu* in the Chaukhambā Sanskrit Series seems to have copied out that given in the latter. Thus we find that the following eighteen additional works are attributed to the author of the *Siddhānta-bindu*, namely:—(1) *Advaitasiddhi*; (2) *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa*; (3) *Vedānta-kalpalatikā*; (4) *Saṁks'epasārīraka-sārasaṁgraha* (5) *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*; (6) *Bhaktirasāyana* or *Bhagwadbhaktirasāyana*; (7) *Bhāgawatapurāṇa-prathamas'loka-vyākhyā*; (8) *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā*; (9) *Prasthānabheda*; (10) *Harilīlā-vyākhyā*; (11) *Ānandamandākinī* (12) *Ātmabodha-ṭīkā* (13) *Vedastuti-ṭīkā*; (14) *S'āṇḍilyasūtra-ṭīkā*; (15) *S'āstrasiddhāntales'a-ṭīkā*; (16) *Ashṭavikriti-vivaraṇa* or *vivriti*; (17) *Krishṇakutūhala Nāṭaka* and (18) *Rājñāṁpratibodhaḥ*. To these eighteen Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṇpati S'āstri added one more namely, *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a*. Prof. Modi of Bhāvnagar has included it amongst the works of the author of the *Siddhā-*

1. In Dr. R. L. Mitra's *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* there is a notice of a MS. of *Ātmabodha-ṭīkā* by Madhusūdana Saraswatī wherein the work *Ātmabodhārthaprakaraṇa* is described as *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasaṁgraha*. That appears to me to have been meant by Aufrecht. Even if that belief is not correct, it is not the name of an additional work of Madhusūdana Saraswatī but another name of *Ātmabodha*, a work of S'rī S'ankarāchārya.

2. *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa* (Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition) pp. 26 and 28; *Guḍhārthadīpikā* (Native Press edition) pp. 16 and 18.

ntabindu noticed in the Introduction to his translation of that work. There are thus 19 works in all which are attributed to our author. I will consider the claims of all of them to be included in our list.

(1) *Advaitasiddhi.*

As for the first thereout, namely *Advaitasiddhi*, it was first printed with the commentary of Brahmānanda in the Advaitamañjarī Series at Kumbhakoṇa. Another edition thereof was brought out by the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press and a third with a commentary in Hindi by a Brahmachāri was brought out a few years ago by the Gujrātī Press at Bombay. The last is at present before me. Relying upon it I say that the author has made obeisance in the second of the three introductory verses to three Gurūs, S'rī Rāma, Mādhava and Vis'wes'wara. The colophon again at the end of each of the four Parichchhedas thereof is to the following effect:—"Thus ends the......in the *Advaitasiddhi* composed by the illustrious Madhusūdana Saraswatī, a disciple at the illustrious feet of the illustrious Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī, a peripatetic teacher of the illustrious order of Paramahaṁsas"[1]. The *Siddhāntabindu* is also distinctly referred to therein as the author's own work five times in the first Parichchheda and once in the fourth[2]. The *Vedāntakalpalatikā* too which has been acknowledged in the *Siddhāntabindu* as the work of the author thereof[3] has been referred to in this work not less than six times[4]. Then again at the end of the third Parichchheda there is a verse wherein the author acknowledges his indebtedness to his Gurū of the name of Vis'wes'wara for having been able to keep the work free from faults and make it full of merits and in the second of the nine verses at the end of the work he acknowledges his indebtedness to Mādhava Saraswatī for having become versed in making out the meanings of the Scriptures. There can therefore be not the slightest doubt as to the author of this work being the same as that of the *Siddhāntabindu.*

(2) *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa.*

This work has been printed by the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press. In the concluding verse therein the author appears to have made obeisance to Vis'ewes'wara and the colophon at its end is almost the same as that at the end of the *Siddhāntabindu*, the only difference being that the word "Bhagawat" occurring in the latter before the word "Pūjyapāda" is absent from the former. Moreover the *Advaitasiddhi* is referred to therein six times

1. इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीविश्वेश्वरसरस्वतीश्रीचरणशिष्यश्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीविरचितायाम-द्वैतसिद्धौ &c.

2. *Gujrātī Press edition pp. 347, 411, 430, 464, 489 and 995.*

3. *Sanskrit Section pp. ७० and ७६ infra.*

4. *Gujrātī Press edition pp. 387, 392, 411, 634, 687 and 995.*

as the work of the same author.[1] The *Vedāntakalpalatikā* which has been acknowledged by the author as his own work in the *Siddhāntabindu*[2] and other works has been acknowledged here too as his own work[3].

(3) *Vedāntakalpalatikā.*

This work has been printed in the Princess of Wales Saraswatī Bhavan Text Series. As printed the colophon at its end omits the number of the "Stabaka" but I have no doubt that the word "Prathamah" ought to be there because the beginning and end of the work as printed correspond with those given in Dr. R. L. Mitra's *Notices of Sanskrit MSS. Vol. IV* at p. 34 and in the *India Office Catalogue Vol. IV* p. 768 in the colophon of both of which the said word does occur. Secondly, if the work as printed were complete we should have expected it to have been closed with the remark "Thus ends the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* &c" instead of "Thus ends the Stabaka in the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* &c" for a reason which is obvious. Thirdly, this work has been referred to six times in the *Advaitasiddhi*,[4] once in the *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa*[5], twice in the *Siddhāntabindu*,[6] twice in the *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā*[7] and once in the *Bhaktirasāyana*.[8] Few of these references can but most of them including those in the *Siddhāntabindu* cannot be identified from the printed work. Lastly, in the printed work itself there are promises of the treatment of particular topics in details later on.[9] These are not found to have been fulfilled in the subsequent parts thereof as printed. I therefore conclude that it contains the first stabaka only and is therefore an incomplete reproduction of the work as composed by the author. The same was the case with the *Bhaktirasāyana*. Until all the three Ullāsas were printed in the Achyuta Granthamālā there was no complete printed edition thereof and many people took the first printed Ullāsa to comprise the whole work. Complete MSS. of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* seem to be very rare for the catalogues which I have consulted contain mention of many MSS. of the first Stabaka only and one cannot be sure whether the others are of that only or of other Stabakas as well. I have not as yet been able to get any complete MS. and cannot therefore say how many Stabakas there are in all in that work and cannot state here how the colophons of the other Stabakas end. That in the printed work which

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1. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition pp. 9, 24, 26, 28, 37 and 44.*
2. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ७० *and* ७६ *infra.*
3. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 44.*
4. *Gujrati Press editon pp. 387, 392, 411, 634, 687, 995.*
5. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 44.*
6. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ७० *and* ७६ *infra.*
7. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition pp. 54 and 57.*
8. *Achyuta Granthamālā Series No. II p. 24.*
9. *Saraswatī Bhavan Text Series No. III pp. 17, 20, 21, 66, 75.*

is in the same words as that in the MSS. in the two catalogues above-mentioned except for the word "Prathamah" is as follows:—"Thus ends the Stabaka in the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* composed by Madhusūdana Saraswatī, a peripatetic teacher of the illustrious order of Parmahaṁsas". There is thus no mention of his Gurū Vis'wes'wara but the above reference in the other works to this and one to the *Siddhāntabindu* at p. 87 of the printed edition leave no doubt as to its being a work of the same author.

(4) *Sams'epas'ārīraka-sārasaṁgraha.*

This has been printed along with the original work itself in two volumes as No. XVIII of the Kās'ī Sanskrit Series. The colophon at the end of the first chapter thereof is exactly in the same words as that at the end of the *Advaitaratna* and the wording of those at the end of the other three chapters is also the same but with this difference that instead of the word "Pūjyapādas'ishya" after the word "Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī" there is the word "S'rīpādas'ishya" which makes no difference so far as our present purpose is concerned. Moreover the first line of the introductory verse no. 2 therein is the same as the corresponding line of the corresponding introductory verse in the *Advaitasiddhi*. There is thus a statement therein of S'rī Rāma, Vis'wes'wara and Mādhava being the Gurūs of the author. Lastly, although I have not been able to find any reference therein to any other work of the author or any direct reference thereto in any other work of his, I confidently believe that what the author means by saying in the *Advaitaratna* at p. 45 that the subject how Asambhāvanā of two sorts is removed has been dealt with in details elsewhere, is that he has done so in the 2nd paragraph at the beginning of the commentary on Chapter III of the *Saṁks'epa Sārīraka* and in the portion of the commentary on Chapter IV. thereof[1]. This work too must therefore be held to have been composed by the author of the *Siddhāntabindu.*

(5) *Gūḍhārthadīpikā.*

This is a very lucid and popular running commentary on the *Bhagawadgītā.* It has been printed by the Ānandās'ram Press of Poona along with the original work and another commentary by S'rīdhara. At the end of each chapter thereof there is a colophon in the same wording as that at the end of the commentary on the second, third and fourth chapters of the *Saṁksepa Sārīraka* *i. e.* to say, the author has therein acknowledged Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī as his Gurū. Secondly, the first line of the last of the 5 verses put in at the end of the work is the same as the correspending line of introductory verse no. 2 in the *Advaitasiddhi* and *Sārasaṁgraha*. Thirdly, although I have not been able to find any reference therein to any of the other works previously mentioned, I have found therein under B. G. VII. 16 and XVIII. 66 distinct references to *Bhagawadbhaktirasāyana*, a work

1. *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series* No. XVIII Vol. II pp. 145-47 and 357.

about which, as I shall later on show, there can be no doubt as to its being a work of the author of the *Siddhāntabindu.* I have also found it acknowledged by the author in the *Advaitasiddhi* as his own work[1]. This then adds one more valuable work to the list of the works of the same author.

(6) *Bhaktirasāyana or Bhagwadbhaktirasāyana.*

The first Ullāsa only of this work was once printed at Calcutta but recently all the three Ullāsas have been brought out by Goswāmi Dāmodar S'āstri in the Achyuta Granthamālā Series with a commentary of the author on the first Ullāsa and his own on the other two. Each Ullāsa thereof contains several Kārikās and on the first there is also a commentary in prose composed by the author himself. At the end of each Ullāsa there is a colophon to the following effect, namely:—"Thus ends......in the *Bhagawadbhaktirasāyana* composed by the illustrious Madhusūdana Saraswatī, a peripatetic teacher of the order of Paramahaṁsas"[2]. There is thus no mention in it of the name of his Gurū Vis'wes'wara but there is another strong internal evidence therein of its being the work of the same author and that is that in the commentary under Karikā 19 of Ullāsa I the reader is asked to refer for details as to how the mind can assume the form of an object, to the author's *Vedāntakalpalatikā*[3] and in that under Karikā 23 of the same Ullāsa he is asked to refer for details as to the way in which the knowledge of an object arises, to the author's *Siddhāntabindu.*[4] This is then the sixth additional work falling to the credit of our author.

(7) *Bhāgawataprathamas'loka-vyākhyā.*

This is a commentary on only the first verse namely, "Janmādyasya yatah &c." of the Bhāgawat Purāṇa and was published along with 10 other commentaries, 9 in Sanskrit and 1 in Hindi by Nityaswarūpa Brahmachāri of Vrindāvan in S. 1955 at pp. 27-31 of the first volume of his Bhāgawat Purāṇa. The author's intention seems to have been to write a commentary on either the whole work or a greater portion of it than one verse only because there is no colophon and because it is therein stated at the end:—"All the varieties of experiences of the sentiment of Bhakti have been stated by us in the *Bhaktirasāyana.* Some of them will be stated here also"[5]. This does not seem to have been done in the subsequent part of the work as printed. The reference to the *Bhaktirasāyana* shows that it is the work of the same author.

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1. *Gujrātī Press edition p. 744.*
2. इति श्रीपरमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीविरचिते भगवद्भक्तिरसायने &c.
3. *Achyuta Granthamālā Series No. II. p. 24.*
4. *Ibid p. 26.*
5. भक्तिरसानुभवप्रकारश्च सर्वोऽप्यस्माभिर्भक्तिरसायनेऽभिहितः। अत्रापि कियान्वक्ष्यते।

(8) *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā.*

The original stotra is reputed to have been composed by Pushpadantāchārya and was published with Madhusūdana Saraswatī's commentary by the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press. It appears from the last verse thereof that it had been orally recited by him and committed to writing by somebody else. Apparently it contains a eulogy of God S'iva but Madhusūdana Saraswatī has so construed the wording of all the verses thereof as to make them applicable both to that god and to Vishṇu. In the beginning of his commentary there is a verse containing an obeisance to his Gurū Vis'wes'wara and at the end there is a colophon to the following effect:—"Thus ends the commentary on *Mahimnastuti* composed by the illustrious Madhusūdana Saraswatī, a bee sitting on the lotus feet of the illustrious Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī of the illustrious order of Paramahaṁsas". Moreover in the portions thereof under verses 26 and 27 there is a distinct reference to the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and it is stated in the latter that it is the work of the same author and I believe that by the words "Anyatroktamasti tatsarvamatropasaṁhartavyam nyūnatāparihārāya", which occur therein, the author refers the reader to the concluding portion of the commentary on Verse VIII of the *Das'as'lokī*.[1] It must therefore be included amongst the works of our author.

(9) *Prasthānabheda.*

This work in the form in which it is printed by the Vāṇi Vilās Press does not seem from its colophon to have been composed by any Madhusūdana Saraswatī but some later student seems to have made it out of the commentary on Verse 7 of the *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā* with slight modifications here and there in order to give it the appearance of an independent work. Therefore though it contains much valuable information as to some of the Sāstras it does not make any addition to the number of works of our author.

(10) *Harilīlā-Vyākhyā.*

This is a commentary on the *Harilīlā* of Vopadeva which is, so to say, a key to the study of the *Bhāgawat Purāṇa.* It was printed at Calcutta in 1920 with an Introduction by two S'āstri's of Bengal. It is divided into twelve chapters corresponding to those of the Purāṇa and below the commentary on each of them there is a colophon to the following effect, namely:—"Thus ends the *Vivaraṇa* (exposition) of the......Skandha in the *Harilīlā* composed by the illustrious Vopadeva, made by Madhusūdana Saraswatī".[3] The name of the author's Gurū is thus missing from it. In

1. इति श्रीमतपरमहंसश्रीमद्विश्वेश्वरसरस्वतीचरणारविन्दमधुपश्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीविरचिता महिम्नस्तुति-व्याख्या संपूर्णा ।

2. *Sanskrit Section p.* ७६.

3. इति श्रीवोपदेवविरचितहरिलीलायां मधुसूदनसरस्वतीप्रणीतं......स्कन्धविवरणम् ।

the last of the six verses put in at the end of the commentary, there is also the same name of the author without any further information. There is also no reference in this to any other work of the same author nor is this work referred to in any of the works previously mentioned, so far as I am aware. Nor are there any other data from which it can be judged whether this Madhusūdana Saraswatī was or was not identical with the author of the *Siddhāntabindu* and the said other works. The learned editors of that work in the Calcutta Oriental Series have however treated it as his work without stating what grounds they had for doing so except that the name Madhusūdana Saraswatī was common to this and the other works. Prof. Modi of Bhāvanagar too has done so in the Introduction to his translation of the *Siddhāntabindu* relying probably on the said editors. Goswāmi Dāmodar S'āstri the learned editor of and the commentator on the second and third Ullāsas of the *Bhaktirasāyana* has also done so in his Introduction to the Achyuta Granthamālā Series No. II though without stating any reasons. I myself too did so when I wrote my article on "Madhusūdana Saraswatī; His Life and Works"[1]. But now when I apply the tests which I have applied to the previous works, I find that none of them applies to it. On the other hand Mm. Abhyankar S'āstri, who has composed a fresh commentary on the *Siddhāntabindu* and edited the said work along with it and an Introduction in Sanskrit, says[2] that there were five Madhusūdana Saraswatīs one of whom, a disciple of S'rīdhara Saraswatī was the author of this work and that he was different from the author of the *Siddhāntabindu*. But since he does not cite any reasons for that statement, and is himself doubtful about its correctness, it must be deemed to be of as doubtful authenticity as the implied opinion of the editors of *Harilīlā* and others, popular belief not being a sure test. Therefore the conclusion that can be drawn safely is that this is a work of Madhusūdana Saraswatī but that it is doubtful whether that individual is or is not identical with the author of our work.

(11) *Ānandamandākinī.*

This work is also on a similar footing. As printed in *Kāvyamālā*—2nd Guchchha it is a Stotra in 102 stanzas in S'ārdulavikriḍita metre couched in melodious and figurative language, containing a description of Gopālakrishṇa from head to foot and eulogizing his exploits upto the vanquishing and killing of Kaṁsa, composed on the basis of the story contained in the Bhāgawat Purāṇa. In the last stanza only the author gives his name as Madhusūdana and in the colophon the work is said to have been composed by Madhusudana Saraswatī, a devotee of the son of Nanda. There is no reference in it to any other work of the author and the nature of the work cannot even raise any such expectation. Mm. Abhyankar S'āstri says at page 27 of the Introduction to his edition of the *Siddhāntabindu*

1. *Annals of the B. O. R. I. Vol. VIII pp. 149-58.*
2. *Government Oriental Class A. No. 2, Introduction p. 27.*

that the *Ānandamandākinī*, *Krishṇakutūhala* and some Kāvyas and the commentaries on the *Harilīlā* and *Vedastuti* were the works of a Madhusūdana Saraswatī who was a disciple of S'rīdhara Saraswatī and therefore different from the author of the *Siddhāntabindu.* He does not give any reasons for that belief and it does not seem to have been well-founded because there is nothing in the *Ānandamandākinī* to show that its author was the son of Arundhati and Nārāyaṇa of the S'āṇḍilya Gotra and a disciple of Krishṇa Saraswatī as the author of *Krishṇakutūhala* Nāṭaka describes himself to be[1]. Nor is there anything in the *Harilīlā-vyākhyā* to establish the identity of its author with that of this Stotra. Hence this is one more work which cannot be definitely held to have or have not been composed by the author of the *Siddhāntabindu.*

(12) *Ātmabodha-ṭīkā.*

This work has not been published so far as I am aware. I have not also seen a MS. thereof. But I have found one noticed in Dr. R. L. Mitra's *Notices of Sanskrit MSS.* at No. 1677. In the colophon thereof given in it, it is stated that the commentary had been composed by Madhusūdana Saraswatī. It is not referred to in any of the first 8 works above-noticed or in the *Siddhāntabindu.* Mm. Abhyankar S'āstri has stated at p. 27 of his Introduction that the writer of this commentary was also the author of commentaries on *Advaitasiddhi, Siddhātabindu* and *Siddhāntales'a* but I have not known of any Madhusūdana Saraswatī having written commentaries on the first two works and cannot therefore make it the basis of any inference as to the authorship of this work. This is thus a third work which cannot be definitely held to be the work of our author.

(13) *Vedastuti-ṭīkā*, (14) *S'āṇḍilyasūtra-ṭīkā and* (15) *S'āstrasiddhāntales'a-ṭīkā.*

None of these three works has been published as far as I know nor have I seen a MS. of any of them. None of them is also referred to in any of the known works of our author. No opinion can therefore be expressed at present as to whether their authors were identical or different and whether the author of the *Siddhāntabindu* was identical with or different from them or any of them. As for the last, moreover I will show later on that it is not possible that the author of the *Siddhāntabindu* should have composed such a commentary.

(16) *Ashṭavikriti-vivaraṇa or vivriti.*

This work was published with a commentary at Calcutta in S'ake 1811 by S. S. Bhaṭṭcāhārya. In the first verse the author thereof says that he is a Maskarī i. e. a Sannyāsin of the name of Madhusaṁsūdana and a (spiritual) son of the illustrious Krishṇadwaipāyana. Beyond that he does not give any more information about himself in any part of the work

1. *Annals of the B. O. R. I.* Vol. XIII. p. 2.

or even in the colophon which merely says:—"*Thus ends the Ashṭavikritivivriti*". Thus this work is not even written by a man of exactly the same name as the *Siddhāntabindu* and the subject-matter thereof being quite different from those of the other known works of our author, it does not even deserve mention in the list of his doubtful works.

(17) *Rājñāṁpratibodhah.*

Although this work has been put down by Aufrecht under the name of Madhusūdana Saraswatī I have shown in the *Annals of the B. O. R. I.*[1] that the full name of the author thereof as appearing from a single available MS. thereof was Madhusūdanānanda Saraswatī and that he was a disciple of one Akhaṇḍānanda as distinguished from Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī. There is also no reference to this work in any of the first 8 works above-mentioned or in the *Siddhāntabindu* or *vice versā* and the nature of the work which I have explained in the said article at sufficient length excludes the possibility of there being any such. It is therefore definitely not a work of our author.

(18) *Krishṇakutūhala Nāṭaka.*

This work has been put down in Aufrecht's Catalogue under the name of Madhusūdana Saraswatī along with the *Siddhāntabindu, Advaitasiddhi* and others. It has not been published so far but I happened to examine a MS. thereof and have embodied the result thereof in our article which is published in the same journal.[2] I have stated therein that it is sufficiently clear from the biographical details to be found in the drama that though its author's name was Madhusūdana Saraswatī he was not a disciple of Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī but of one Krishṇa Saraswatī, and not a son of Purandarāchārya of the Kās'yapa Gotra but of Nārāyaṇa of the S'āṇḍilya Gotra. There is also no reference therein to any of the works of our author. Nor is there any to it in any of them. It can therefore be stated definitely that this is not a work of our author. Mm. Abhyankara S'āstri has stated in his Introduction to the *Siddhāntabindu*[3] that the author of this drama was also the author of the *Ānandamandākinī, Harilīlā-vyākhyā* and *Vedastuti-vyākhyā.* I cannot say anything definitely about the identity or otherwise of the authors of the two other works but can confidently state that there is no probability of the author of this drama being also the author of *Harilīlā-vyākhyā* because while the latter is identified by other students of Madhusūdana's works with the author of the *Siddhāntabindu, Vedāntakalpalatikā* and other works on the Vedānta philosophy there is positive evidence showing that the author of this drama was not identical with him. This work also should therefore be excluded from the list of the works of our author.

1. *Vol. IX. pp. 313–23.*
2. *Vol. XIII. pp. 1–16.*
3. *Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 2. p. 27.*

(19) *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a.*

This work was brought to light for the first time by Mr. Gaṇapati S'āstri of Trivendrum in 1921. He stated in his short preface to it that its author was the same Madhusūdana Saraswatī who is well-known as the author of many important works such as *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* and others but made no attempt to prove that statement. Prof. Modi has however examined it critically and having compared its contents with those of the *Siddhāntabindu, Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā,* and *Bhāgawataprathamas'loka-ṭīkā,* come to the conclusion that although there is no direct reference to any other work of our author in the said work, there are good grounds for holding that the author of those three works and that of *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a* were identical. I have thought over the question carefully in the light of the reasons given by him in support of his conclusion and referred to the particular passages in those works which he has compared and am glad to be able to agree with him fully in his said conclusion and add one more proof of the authors of the *Siddhāntabindu* and of this work being identical, namely that while stating the conclusion that authoritativeness consists in the capability to impart the knowledge of a thing with a purpose, which is not contradicted and is unknown, not in having the laying down of an injunction to do an act as an aim, the author has stated that this subject has been "treated in details elsewhere" and that is found done in the introductory passage of the latter work[1]. The tendency which the author displays in this work to give a Vedāntic colour to a subject pertaining to religion is also an additional ground supporting the same conclusion for the same tendency is observable in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇa* and *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā.* This work can therefore be safely included amongst the works of the author of the *Siddāntabindu.*

To sum up, the result of the scrutiny of the works going by the name of Madhusūdana Saraswatī is that out of the 20 works including the *Siddhāntabindu* above-referred to there are in all ten works which can safely be believed to have been composed by the same individual, namely:—(1) *Siddhāntabindu;* (2) *Advaitasiddhi;* (3) *Advaitaratnarakṣ'aṇa;* (4) *Vedāntakalpalatikā;* (5) *Saṁkṣ'epas'ārīraka-sārasaṁgraha;* (6) *Gūḍhārthadīpikā;* (7) *Bhagawadbhaktirasāyana;* (8) *Bhāgawataprathamas'loka-vyākhyā;* (9) *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā* (including the *Prasthānabheda* therein) and (10) *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a;* that there are three works namely:—(1) *Harilīlā-vyākhyā,* (2) *Ānandamandākinī* and (3) *Ātmabodha-ṭīkā* which though the works of a Sannyāsin of the same name cannot be confidently held to be the compositions of the same author, and that there are three more works, namely:—(1) *Rājñāṁ-*

1. *Cf. Trivendrum Sanskrit Series No. LXXIII p. 7 and Sanskrit Section p.* ३ *infra.*

pratibodhah, (2) *Krishṇakutūhala Nāṭaka* and (3) *Ashṭavikriti-vivriti*, about which it can confidently be said that they are not the works of the same author but of another Madhusūdana Saraswatī and that there are three works, namely:—(1) *Vedastuti-ṭīkā*, (2) *S'āṇḍilyasūtra-ṭīkā* and (3) *S'āstrasiddhāntales'a-ṭīkā* about whose authorship no opinion can be confidently expressed one way or the other. Such being the case, we shall take into consideration the first ten works and if necessary refer at times to the next three but ignore the remaining six. Out of the said ten, the first six, namely:—(1) *Siddhāntabindu*; (2) *Advaitasiddhi*; (3) *Advaita-ratnaraks'aṇa*; (4) *Vedāntakalpalatikā* (5) *Sārasaṁgraha* and (6) *Gūḍhā-rthadīpikā* are avowedly works on the philosophy of the Advaita school and the last four, namely:—(1) *Bhaktirasāyana* (2) *Bhāgawataprathama-s'loka-vyākhyā* (3) *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā* and (4) *Is'warapratipattiprakās'a* are apparently works on the Bhakti cult but in each of them the Advaita doctrine has been anyhow brought in and some one or another new feature thereof is explained in order to clear up doubts. That subject is an interesting and important one but before we turn to it we should get properly acquainted with the life-story of our author as far as it can be gathered from the materials at our command.

V

Biographical Sketch of the Author.

Although there is such a large number of works composed by this single individual, we do not find any other autobiographical details in any of them except the author's own name and the names of his preceptors. We have therefore to look to external sources for gathering such information as we can as to his place of birth, family of birth, the places where and the period for which he was educated, the place or places where he lived on joining the order of Sannyāsins, the number of years for which he lived &c. What some of those sources are has already been stated by me in my article published in Vol. VIII of the *Annals of the B. O. R. I.* at pp. 149-58. Since then I came to know that the learned editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* in the Saraswatī Bhawan Text Series, had also given a long biographical account of the author in his Introduction in Sanskrit. Such additional information as it contained was made use of in my "Reply to Criticisms" published at pp. 313-23 of Vol. IX of the *Annals* of the said Institute. Since then in 1928 the *Siddhāntabindu* was published at Benares with the commentaries of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda Saraswatī and an Introduction in Sanskrit by Trimbakrām S'āstri of Jamnagar. In that Introduction it was stated that there was a tradition that Madhusūdana Saraswatī was a South Indian Brāhman by birth and the account of his life given

in the Introduction to the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* which substantially agrees with that given in the Introduction to the *Harilīlā* was condemned as based on unfounded conjectures.[1] I myself too heard it from a Udāsin now dead, who had lived at Vrindavan, Lahore, Hardwar, Rishikesh and other places in the North for a number of years that Madhusūdana Saraswatī was believed in that part of India to be a South Indian Brāhman by birth and to have gone to and settled in the latter part of his life at Vrindavan. I am still of opinion that the tradition current in the learned circles in Bengal and at Benares is more reliable than the other for several reasons. Firstly, the latter tradition is found recorded, in (1) a work in MS. form called *Vaidikavādamīmāñsā* in the possession of Pandit Haridās Siddhāntavāgīs'a, a member of the same family, in which old materials, one of which is a work named *Bhavabhūmi-vārtā,* a history of Koṭālīpāḍā, composed by Rāghavendra Kavis'ekhara as early as A. D. 1667, have been made use of, (2) a *Kulapañjikā,* probably a family chronicle which is mentioned in the Introduction to the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* (3) more than one work of modern times *e. g.* the *Viswakosh* (Encyclopædia Bengalinica) and (4) the long and scholarly Introduction by Mr. Rājendranāth Ghosh to his edition of this author's *Advitasiddhi.* Secondly, whereas there is only a bare name of the one tradition we have in the other all the necessary details of the life of the author before and after renunciation upto death. Thirdly, whereas no South Indian Paṇḍit or scholar has come forward to say that the tradition relied on by me was unreliable for particular reasons, Mr. Chintāharan Chakravarti of Bethune College, Calcutta has come forward to confirm it with authorities of which I was not aware.[2] He says further that he and some well-known Paṇḍits of Bengal including Paṇḍit Haridās who is in possession of the MS. of the *Vaidikavādamīmāñsā,* take pride in cherishing the belief that they belong to the same family as the distinguished author of our work and that older people amongst them still offer Tarpaṇa in the name of Madhusūdana who is believed to be identical with our author. In kind response to my request he has also supplied me with a list of the members of the family who have had distinguished literary careers to his knowledge and thereout I mention the names of those whom I consider worthy of having their memory preserved. They are:—(1) Jayanārāyaṇ Tarkaratna, a veteran Naiyāyika who flourished in the nineteenth century, has left a work on Nyāya called *Tarkaratnāvalī* and was for some time a professor at the Government Ṭol (school) at Navadwīpa; (2) S'as'adhara Tarkachūḍāmaṇi who was a well-known orator and a Bengali author and exerted himself in order to defend the orthodox Hinduism against the attacks of the reformers in the press and on the platform, *Sādhanapradīpa* and *Dharma-*


1. *Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series No. LXV. Introduction p. 8.*

2. *Annals of the B. O. R. I. Vol. IX. pp.* 309–12.

vyākhyā being two of the works left behind by him as evidence of his fervour in the sacred cause of the ancient Hindu culture; (3) Kālīnāth Madhyastha, who, though not a great scholar, distinguished himself as a humorous critic of society, the work left by him being *Khaimārchanachandrikā*, a novel work in which an imaginary deity named Khaimā (the Great Eater) is depicted as visiting several rendezvous of society and exposing its foibles; (4) Sītānāth Siddhāntavāgīs'a, a specialist in Sanskrit grammer and a good poet who has brought out several works on Kalāpa Vyākaraṇa[1] and Vedic rituals some of which are:—*Kalāpa-taddhita-paris'ishṭa*, *Kātantra-saṁjīvanī*, a commentary on the *Kalāpavyākaraṇa* and *Purohitapradīpa;* (5) Haridās Siddhāntavagīs'a who has brought out editions of almost all the popular Kāvyas and Nāṭakas with Sanskrit commentaries of his own, has composed and published several new dramas and Smriti works in Sanskrit, some of which are:—*Virājasarojinī* and *Smritichintāmaṇi*, has also commenced to edit the Mahābhārata with a Sanskrit commentary of his own and a translation in Bengalī, some parts whereof have already been published, and is the same Pandit who is above spoken of as being in possession of the *Vaidikavādamīmāñsā*; (6) Kālipad Tarkāchārya, who is the author of several Kāvyas and Nāṭakas in Sanskrit, the names of those of them that are published being:—*Naladamayantīyam* and *Syamantoddhāra*, is also a writer of good lyric poetry and has edited several works on the Nyāya and Vais'eshika systems with Sanskrit commentaries, some of which are:—*Muktivāda of Gadādhara*, *Pras'astapādabhāshya with the Sūkti of Jagadīs'a* and *Bhāshāratna* of Kaṇāda Bhaṭṭāchārya, and was also the editor of the Sanskrit journal of the Sanskrit Sāhitya Parishad for about ten years ending with A. D. 1930; (7) Harihar S'āstri who was a professor in the Oriental Department of the Benares Hindu University, has to his credit a commentary of his own in Sanskrit on *S'abdakhaṇḍa*, a work on Navya-Nyāya which has been published recently, and wrote articles on philosophical subjects in Bengali journals such as the *Bhāratavarsha* and used to edit the *Vaṅgasāhitya*; (8) Kālīdās Vidyāvinoda who is the author of a Mahākāvya dealing with the life-story of S'ivāji, the founder of the Marāthā Empire. (9) Revati Mohan Kāvyaratna, who is the State-Purohit at Agartāla in Tipperāh Rāj. To these I add the tenth name of my informant Mr. Chintāharaṇa Chakravarti Kāvyatīrtha M. A., who is a lecturer in Sanskrit at Bethune College, Calcutta, and has rendered great services to the advancement of Sanskrit and Bengali learning by contributing articles on subjects connected with the literatures of the two languages to the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, *Indian Antiquary*, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, *Indian Historical Quarterly* &c. He wrote once that some of the descendants of

1. "Kalāpa Vyākaraṇa" means the system of grammar as revealed to God Kārtikeya on a peacock's tail. For details *vide* Belvalkar's *Systems of Sanskrit Grammer*.

the family could even trace their descent from Yādavānanda upto the thirteenth degree and being requested to supply me with the complete pedigree of at least one branch of the family to which he belonged, has sent that of his own which I give below:—



This way Mr. Chakravarti is only the tenth in descent from Yādavānanda but it is nevertheless proof of the pride of lineage spoken of by him and therefore in the absence of an equally positive proof of the other tradition must go to establish the reliability of that tradition. Fourthly, the river Madhumatī in the Faridpur District which Madhu-

sūdana was, according to that tradition, able to cross through the favour of God Varuṇa, while it was in an overflooded condition when he started on his journey to Benares for getting himself initiated into the order of Sannyāsins, is still believed to have received that name on account of the above miracle and the members of the family of the author still believe that they are immune from being drowned in that river owing to a boon conferred by that God on the said occasion. Moreover the memory of our author's father Purandarāchārya is found still preserved by a temple of his family goddess Daks'iṇāmūrti Kālī and a tank facing it. A popular reading room and library have also been founded in 1920 in the native village of our author and given the name "Madhusūdana Saraswati Mandir" in order to keep his memory green[1]. No such relics are preserved and no such memorials are known to have been raised in any part of Southern India. Fifthly, this tradition is substantially confirmed by Goswāmi Dāmodar S'āstri in his Introduction to his edition of the *Bhaktirasāyana* on the strength of an oral tradition narrated to him by his Guru Mm. Yadhunāth S'arma Bhaṭṭāchārya, a teacher of Navya-Nyāya at Navadwīpa (Naḍiā). Lastly, it is acknowledged as the only available source by another scholar, Prof. Modi of Bhavnagar in his Introduction to his translation of this work and is not attacked as unreliable by Mr. K. Chaṭṭopādhyāya who would, I believe, have done so surely if he had been convinced that the tradition as to the South Indian birth of Madhusūdana Saraswatī was more reliable than the other which I had made use of. Relying therefore upon that tradition as supplemented by other traditions, which are accepted by all as authoritative, I give the following brief sketch of our author's life.

His original name was Kamalanayana. That Kamalanayana was one of the four sons of Purandarāchārya of Koṭālipāḍā in the district of Faridpur in Eastern Bengal, the others being S'rīnātha, Yadavānanda and Vāgīs'achandra. Purandarāchārya was the sixth in descent from Rāma Mis'ra, a Kanojee Brāhman of the Kās'yapa Gotra who had migrated with other Brāhmans to Bengal and settled at Navadwīpa (Naḍiā) in the Burdwan district of Western Bengal owing to the religious persecutions of Emperor Shāhābuddin Ghori. Guṇārṇavāchārya, the father of Purandara again migrated from Navadwīpa to Yas'ohara in Eastern Bengal and Purandara again migrated to Kotālipāḍā in the Faridpur district and built there a house and a temple of Daks'iṇamūrti Kālikā. He gave education of a high order to his sons and Yādavānanda and Kamalanayana thereout turned out to be brilliant. The latter according to Goswāmi Dāmodar S'āstri studied Nyāya under Hari Rāma Tarkavāgīs'a who is identified with S'rī Rāma, the first of the three Gurus mentioned in the *Advaitasiddhi* and *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*. Some believe that this Hari Rāma was his Paramaguru i. e. Guru's Guru. He took Sannyāsa shortly after the completion of his study on realizing the futility of doing works for the sake of gain when the

1. *Ibid. pp. 310-11.*

chief of Mādhavpās'ā under whose protection his father lived declined to make a grant of a piece of land to his father in recognition of the attainments of his said two sons and repaired to Benares. There he came in contact with Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī who is referred to in 7 works of his as his Guru and got himself initiated into the fourth order and received the name Madhusūdana Saraswatī. Thereafter he studied the Vedānta works under Mādhava Saraswatī who is referred to in the *Advaitasiddhi* and *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* as his third Guru and again in the second to the fourth verses at the end of the former as the one through whose favour he became versed in the meanings of the Scriptures. While living at Gopāla Math on Chatuhshashṭhi Ghāt in Benares he established his reputation as a venerable saint and a profound scholar and composed the works above-noted which won for him a permanent and prominent place amongst the exponents and the defenders of the Advaita doctrine and attracted friends and followers. A prominent one from amongst his friends was the famous Hindi poet Tulsīdās and from amongst his followers, Purushottama Saraswatī whose commentary has been published in this Volume. Moreover Farquhar has narrated in an article entitled 'The Organization of the Sannyāsis of the Vedānta"[1], a tradition that he once felt much aggrieved on finding Sannyāsis killed by armed Fakirs who were protected from mob-violence and from government interference on account of their privileged position under the Moghal rule, because Sannyāsis could not resist their attacks or retaliate owing to their vow of Ahiṁsā (non-violence), and approached Emperor Akbar with a view to obtain protection for them, that Rājā Birbal who was present at the interview suggested that non-Brāhmans might be admitted into the order of Sannyāsis and allowed to bear arms, that Madhusūdana and the Emperor both agreed and the latter promised to give protection to such armed Sannyāsins from government interference on account of their sacred order, that thenceforth non-Brāhmans were admitted into seven of the ten sub-orders of Sannyāsis and that as a consequence thereof while in Southern India all the ten orders are reserved for Brāhmans, in Northern India only three namely, Tīrtha, Ās'rama and Saraswatī are reserved for them. It is not known when and for what reason this saint left Benares but it is found recorded that he left his mortal tenement at Hardwar at the advanced age of 107 years.

VI

Date of the Author.

The earliest attempt to fix the date of this author was, so far as I am aware, made by Lassen in his preface to a reprint of Schlegel's edition of the *Bhagawadgītā*. He believed that the Madhusūdana referred to by Mādhavāchārya in his *Dhātuvritti* was Madhusūdana Saraswatī, the author

1. *J. R. A. S. July 1925 pp. 479-86.*

of *Gūḍhārthadīpikā.* This belief was based on an opinion of Burnouf which as translated did not amount to more than a conjecture[1]. His view therefore that this author must have lived about the middle of the fourteenth century after Christ, based upon that belief was attacked by Mr. K. T. Telang in *A Note on the Date of Madhusūdana Saraswatī* published in *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*[2]. In that Note he not only rejected as unacceptable the date proposed by Lassen but also attempted to prove from internal and external evidence that the author of *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* must have flourished about the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. But he seemed to have fallen into other errors for he identified the Mādhava mentioned in the line "S'rīrāmavis'wes'waramādhavānām" with Mādhavāchārya, the author of *Jīvanmuktiviveka* and believed a tradition current in Southern India that this man once occupied the Gādi of the Math at S'ringeri. In 1920 Rāmājña S'arma Pāndey edited the author's *Vedāntakalpalatikā* with an Introduction in Sanskrit wherein he fixed his date between 1540 and 1623 A. D. I was not aware of those attempts to fix the date of this author till I penned my article on his life and works published in Vol. VIII of the *Annals of the B. O. R. I.*,[3] and therefore relying on certain other data then available I expressed the view that this author must have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century. Latterly I came to know them and in a subsequent article published in the same journal[4] showed why the view of Mr. Telang could not be accepted and that the most probable date was the one which I had suggested and which is in substantial agreement with that determined by the learned editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and with that suggested by a remark of Prof. Dās Gupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy.* Since then Mm. Abhyankar S'āstri has expressed a view based on a tradition current according to him amongst the learned people and at the seats of learning like Benares and in the South of India, that Madhusūdana being a contemporary of Jagannāth Paṇḍit, Khaṇḍa Deva Mis'ra, Gadādhar Bhaṭṭa, and Nages'a Bhaṭṭa must have flourished about the middle of the seventeenth century. He has tried to support that proposition by the conclusions arrived at by certain writers as to the dates of each of these five Paṇḍits and thereout as to Madhusūdana Saraswatī he says that he had referred to Appaya Diks'it's *Kalpataruparimala* by name[5]. This statement seems to have been made on the strength of a similar one made by Paṇḍit Bala Saraswatī in his *Note on Appaya Diks'it* in the Kumbhakona edition of the *Siddhāntales'asaṁgraha* on the basis of an alleged mention of the author of the *Parimala* in the *Advaitasiddhi.* The learned

1. *Journal of the B. B. R. A. S. Vol. X. No. XXX, foot-note under p. 370.*
2. *Ibid. pp. 368-77.*
3. *Vol. VIII. pp. 149-58.*
4. *Vol. IX. pp. 313-23.*
5. *Government Oriental Series, Class A. No. 2, Introduction pp. 25-26.*

editor of the *Siddhāntabindu* in the Chawkhambā Sanskrit Series has also taken as true all the facts relied on by the learned editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and has therefore in order to reconcile them with this fact, put the author in the beginning of the seventeenth century[1]. Goswāmi Dāmodar S'āstri, the learned editor of the *Bhaktirasāyana* with a commentary in the Achyut Granthamālā Series put him in the sixteenth century[2]. Mr. Chintāharan Chakravarti, has confirmed the date arrived at by me and the learned editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* on other solid grounds[3]. Lastly, Prof. Modi has on certain grounds one of which is the view of Mr. Telang above-mentioned, which according to him is confirmed by Dr. Winternitz, come to the conclusion that this author must have flourished between about 1495 and 1585, or 1490 and 1602 A. D[4]. Taking all these views into consideration it appears that opinions in the learned circles vary as to which date to assign to this author and that the earliest date that has been assigned to him is the middle of the fourteenth century and the latest the middle of the seventeenth.

As for the *terminus a quo* between those limits Mr. Telang had rightly stated that there being a distinct reference in the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* to the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* of Vidyāraṇya Swāmi, the author of the former cannot be placed earlier than the early part of the fifteenth century. The publication of the *Siddhāntabindu* and *Bhaktirasāyana* since then strengthens that view because there is in the former a quotation from the *Pañchadas'ī* though the name of the work or its author is not mentioned therein[5] and in the latter there is a distinct statement that the subject, namely that it is the mind that is the cause of the appearance of an object in a particular form has been treated even by Vidyāraṇya in the *Pañchadas'ī*[6]. In the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* too there is a similar mention of a work called *Pañchadas'aprakarnī* which is most probably none other than the *Pañchadas'ī*[7]. There is thus no doubt that our author must have lived after the *Pañchadas'ī* and *Jīvanmuktiviveka* came to be recognized as authoritative works. Now, Vidyāraṇya the author of these works was identical with Mādhava, a minister of King Bukka of Vijayanagar who is known to have ruled from 1350-79 A. D[8]. The said books must have most probably been composed by him after renunciation i. e. in the last quarter of the fourteenth century. Moreover there is no recorded tradition as to Vidyāraṇya having

1. *Chawkhamba Sanskrit Series No. LXV, Introduction p. 11.*
2. *Achyuta Granthamālā Series No. II p. 11.*
3. *Annals of the B. O. R. I. Vol. IX p. 311.*
4. *Introduction to the translation of the Siddhāntabindu pp. 21-27.*
5. *Sanskrit Section p. 38 infra.*
6. *Achyut Granthamālā Series No II p. 26.*
7. *Saraswatī Bhavan Text Series No. III p. 87.*
8. *Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature p. 275.*

come into direct contact with the living scholars of Benares and having brought his works to their notice as there is in the case of Appaya Diks'it[1]. I have already shown in my "Reply to Criticisms"[2] that the tradition as to Madhusūdana being a South Indian and having occupied the Gādi of the S'ringeri Math is not reliable. It is therefore reasonable to believe that about half a century at least must have elapsed after the composition of the said works when they found a place in Madhusūdana's collection of important works on the Vedānta philosophy and were deemed by him worthy of being drawn upon for the confirmation of his views. Our author's date must again be pushed even further than this, for according to the tradition recorded in the Introductions to the *Harilīlā* and *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, which is accepted by the editor of the *Siddhāntabindu* in the Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series he was a contemporary of Emperor Akbar and came in contact with him and according to the one availed of by Farquhar the admission of Ks'atriyas and Vais'yas into seven of the ten orders of Sannyāsins in Northern India such as Bhārati, Vana, Araṇya &c. was due to him and was the result of a suggestion made by Rājā Birbal in order to prevent the indiscriminate slaughter of Sannyāsins by armed Fakirs[3]. The said Emperor ruled India from 1556 to 1605 A. D. In order to be able to get an audience of the Emperor, this author must have earned a good name. The tradition recorded in the Introduction to the *Harilīlā* suggests also that the Paṇḍits of the court were so struck by his ability that one of them paid him the high encomium of being a man whose depth of learning could be gauged only by the Goddess of Learning. He must in order to be able to create such an impression have before that studied and digested all the S'āstras, which means that he must be at least middle-aged when in the third or fourth quarter of the sixteenth century he went to the said Emporer's court and must therefore have been born about the second half of the century. That substantially agrees with the conclusion previously arrived at by me and totally with that arrived at by the learned editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*. The author's connection with Mādhava Avilamba Saraswatī who was identified with Yādavānanda by the latter but who had better be identified with his son Mādhava, as proved by Mr. Chakravarti on the strength of the opinion of Mr. Nāgendranāth Vasu expressed in the *Vaṅger Jātiya Itihāsa* (A History of the Castes of Bengal)[4] also requires us to stick to that conclusion because Mādhava was patronized by King Pratāpāditya of Bengal who having fought with Akbar must be deemed to have flourished in the latter part of the sixteenth and the former of the seventeenth. Lastly, if the Madhusūdana acknowledged

1. Pandit Bala Saraswatī's *Note on Appaya Diks'it* in the Kumbhakoṇa edition of *Siddhāntales'a.*

2. *Annals of the B. O. R. I. Vol. IX. pp. 313-23.*

3. *J. R. A. S. July 1925 pp. 479-86.*

4. *Annals of the B. O. R. I. Vol. XI. pp. 192-93.*

in the *Sarvasiddhāntarahasya-vivaraṇa* by its author S'esha Gowinda, son of S'esha Krishṇa who was the Guru of Bhaṭṭoji Diks'it, as his Guru, is our author as he is believed to be by the editors of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and *Bhaktirasāyana* and was a co-student of and had in later life a debate with Gadādhara Bhattāchārya and was also a contemporary of Tulsidās the Hindi poet who composed *Rāmacharitamānasa*, as stated by the editors of the *Harilīlā* and *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and the Chaukhamba edition of the *Siddhāntabindu*, the same date must be held to be the true one, for Bhaṭṭoji Diks'it, Gadādhara and Tulsidās are known to have flourished in the reign of Akbar. Hence the *terminus a quo* pointed at by the references to the *Pañchadas'ī* and *Jīvanmuktiviveka* must be brought down to about the end of the second half of the sixteenth century.

This conclusion does not fit in with the stories in the *Nijawārtā* of the Vallabha sect which have been considered by Prof. Modi. But it appears from his own criticism in note 6 below p. 23 of his Introduction to be a record of legends made by some one having an imperfect knowledge, after the lapse of several years from the death of Vallabhāchārya. Moreover if these legends are true there ought to be some references to the tenets of the Vallabha sect in the writings of our author but none such have been pointed out as yet. It is not also possible that he should have gone to Prayag and should have been living there in the early part of his life because he must be about 25 years old at least when he left his father's house as he had by that time studied the other S'āstras and the works on Navya-nyāya like *Tattwachintāmaṇi* and as according to the *Vaidikavāda-mīmāñsā* he first repaired to Benares and got himself initiated into the fourth order and studied the principal works on the Vedānta philosophy there and *Bhaktirasāyana* to which there is a reference in Episode No. xxix actually presupposes the previous composition of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* which shows that its author had thoroughly digested the literature not only of the Vedānta but also of the other systems. A. D. 1490 to 1495 would therefore be a very late date of the birth of the author and supposing that he was at least 50 years old when he met Vallabhāchārya at Prayag in 1516 A. D., his birth-date would come to 1466 A. D., the Āchārya having lived for 15 years at Devars'i after leaving Prayag and died in 1531 A. D. This does not however seem to be true, for in that case he would be 90 years old even at the time of accession of Akbar to the throne of Delhi and the interview referred to by Farquhar must have taken place after the Emperor was well-settled in his position which did not happen for about 15-17 years more when Madhusūdana would, according to that calculation, be over 100 years old, an age at which a journey from Benares to Delhi, and that too in those days when there were no speedy and comfortable conveyances as we have them now, would hardly be undertaken. Then again his showing the *Advaitasiddhi* to the poet Tulsidās and the latter's showing his *Rāmacharitamānasa* to him would be impossible in that case, for in A. D. 1584,

which is the date of a MS. of the latter in the poet's own hand in the library of the Queen's College at Benares according to Paṇḍit Rāmājña, our author could not have been living, the longest life believed to have been enjoyed by him being that of 107 years and that must have been over in A. D. 1573 if he was born in 1466. A. D. The calculation based upon the pedigree made out from the materials supplied by the *Vaidikavādamīmāñsā* would also be upset if the date is pushed back to 1466 or even to 1490 or 1495. Lastly, Nrisiṁha Saraswatī alias Nrisiṁhās'rama was one of those who including Mādhava Saraswatī, who was the Guru of Madhusūdana Saraswatī, were overpowered by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in debate. This Sannyāsi has noted in his commentary *Subodhinī* on the *Vedāntasāra* that he had composed it in S'ake 1510 which corresponds with A. D. 1588. If A. D. 1490 is taken to be the birth-date of Madhusūdana then too he would be 98 years old in the year of the composition of *Subodhinī* of Nrisiṁhās'rama and so his Guru Mādhava would be still older by about 20 years at least and that is an age at which one cannot take part in a hot debate. I therefore leave the episodes in the *Nijavārtā* alone and hold A. D. 1540, the approximate date fixed by the editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, to be the proper birth-date of our author.

As for the *terminus ad quem* I think the date of the Baroda MS. of the *Siddhāntabindu* on which the text in this Volume has been primarily based to be the limit beyond which we cannot go. That date is S'ake 1601 corresponding with A. D. 1679. Further if that MS. had been made during the lifetime of the author then there is a possibility of his having lived beyond the said date. But that does not seem to be the case for the only evidence that we have of the period for which he lived is that contained in the Introduction to the *Harilīlā* based upon the *Vaidikavāda-mīmāñsā*, according to it he lived for 107 years and if as we have shown he was born about the end of the first half of the sixteenth century or about 1540 A. D. as Paṇḍit Rāmājña Pāndey has opined then he could not have lived beyond the end of the first half of the seventeenth century. This is confirmed from another source as well. Prof. Modi states in his Introduction at p. 24 that he has failed to find the reference to the author of the *Parimala* which according to Paṇḍit Bala Saraswatī existed in the *Advaitasiddhi*. I too have carefully gone through it in order to search for it and found that while there were several references to the *Kalpataru* there was none to the *Parimala* or its author. Moreover I thought at one time that Appaya Diks'it must have lived prior to Madhusūdana because in Aufrecht's *Catalogue* he is stated to be a fifteenth century author[1], Prof. Dās Gupta had also taken him to be a fourteenth or fifteenth century author and in the former again a commentary on his *Siddhāntales'a* had been found put down amongst the works of Madhusūdana Saraswatī. Mr. P. V. Kāṇe has however satisfactorily proved that Appaya Diks'it must have flourished in the latter half of the sixteenth and the first quarter of the seventeenth century[2].

1. *Catalogus Catalogorum Vol. I p. 22.*
2. *History of Sanskrit Poetics p. CXXX.*

This view substantially agrees also with those of Bhaṭṭa Atmārām Jayant Paṇḍit, author of *Brahmavidyāpatrikā* and Mm. Gangādhar S'āstri quoted in the *Note on Appaya Diks'it* of Paṇḍit Bala Saraswatī[1]. The latter himself relying upon a tradition that the Diks'it went to Benares in the latter part of his life and came in contact with Jagannāth Paṇḍit and died at Benares in the 72nd year of his age fixes his lifetime as A. D. 1587–1660. The only obstacle to a belief in this later date of the Diks'it is that Madhusūdana Saraswatī is reported to have written a commentary on his *Siddhāntales'a.* No such book has as yet been published. Aufrecht has mentioned that work under the heads 'Madhusūdana Saraswatī' and 'S'āstrasiddhāntales'asaṁgraha' with a query[2]. Prof. Modi too does not consider it possible that our author should have written a commentary on the said work. I on my part have on comparing the *Siddhāntales'a* of Appaya Diks'it with the *Siddhāntabindu* and *Advaitasiddhi* of our author found in the first work certain passages containing statements of views similar to those expressed by our Madhusūdana in the said two works[3]. True, the name of Madhusūdana is nowhere found mentioned specifically in that work and it is quite possible that the view above-referred to may not have been first propounded by him but it is equally possible that Appaya Diks'it's attention may have been drawn to them by the reiteration thereof in the said works of our author because he had already earned a good reputation at least at Benares in his lifetime by defending the Advaita doctrine against the attacks of the Mādhavas and Naiyāyikas, because Appaya Diks'it is reported to have gone to and resided at Benares and died there in the latter part of his life and *Siddhāntales'a* is most probably a product of that part. It is also significant that while there are traditions as to that writer having come in contact with Jagannāth Paṇḍit, author of *Rasagangādhara* and Bhaṭṭoji Diks'it, author of *Siddhāntakaumudī,* there is none as to his having come in contact with Madhusūdana Saraswatī. This can be accounted for in two ways, namely that our author had either left for Hardwar or died before the Diks'it went to Benares. The latter supposition seems more probable because the Diks'it had according to the tradition, come in contact with Jagannāth Paṇḍit who was a *protégé* of Asaf Jāh, a nobleman of the court of Shāh Jehān who ruled from 1627 to 1658 and had left Delhi for Benares in disgust on learning that Aurangzeb had thrown his father into prison[4] and must therefore have gone to Benares in or

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1. *Kumbhakona edition of the Siddhāntales'a, Introduction.*

2. *Catalogus Catalogorum Vol. I pp. 427 and 645.*

3. *Cf. Siddhāntales'a pp. 93-103 with the Sanskrit Section hereof p.* १४ *infra.*
  " " *147-49* " " " " ३८ "
  " " *292-93* " " " " ६७ "
  " " *325-26* " " " " २७-२८ "
  " " *330-31* " *Advaitasiddhi p. 889.*

4. Bala Saraswatī's *Note on Appaya Diks'it* in the Kumbhakoṇa edition of the *Siddhāntales'a.*

about the year 1660 A. D. while Madhusūdana could not have lived beyond 1647 A. D. Hence the *terminus ad quem* must be contracted to 1647 and that done we arrive at 1540 to 1647 as the lifetime of our author according to the materials now at our command.

VII

General Estimate of the Author's Life-Work.

Having ascertained the identity of the author and the particular period during which our author can most probably be deemed to have lived, we are now in a position to judge what was the task which he set before himself as his life's work and how far he met with success in his endeavour to accomplish it.

As to that we have already had occasion to ascertain what works he had composed, because that was the only one in which he could be distinguished from the numerous persons bearing the name 'Madhusūdana' and from the few thereout who had also the suffix 'Saraswatī' appended to their names. But the reader has so far been acquainted with the names of the works only. For our present purpose it will be necessary to probe deeper into them. Now out of the ten works which are ascertained to be decidedly our author's compositions, five namely (1) *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, (2) *Advaitasiddhi*, (3) *Advaitaratnarakś'aṇa*, (4) *Bhaktirasāyana*, and (5) *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a*, are independent works and the remaining five, namely (1)*Siddhāntabindu*, (2) *Sārasaṁgraha*, (3) *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*, (4) *Bhāgawataprathamas'loka-vyākhyā*, and (5) *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā* are commentaries on the works of previous authors. Out of the three which are of doubtful authorship, one namely *Ānandamandākinī* is an independent work and the remaining two, namely (2) *Harilīlā-vyākhyā* and (3) *Ātmabodha-ṭīkā* are commentaries on the works of previous authors. The first three again of the independent works and the first three of the commentaries are works intended avowedly to expound the doctrine of the Advaita school of the Vedānta system of philosophy. *Bhaktirasāyana* seems to have been specially composed in order to establish that those persons who according to the orthodox view are debarred from resorting to the works of the first type for their salvation have another way, namely Bhaktimārga, open to them and that just as the Vedānta doctrine can be expounded scientifically with the help of quotations from the Upanishads so the Bhakti doctrine also can be established scientifically with the help of quotations taken from the *Bhāgawatpurāṇa* and the *Bhagawadgītā*. *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a* is a work which, after establishing the authoritativeness of the Vedas for knowing the true nature of Saguṇa Brahma, setting forth the views of all the orthodox schools except that of the Sāṁkhyas as contrasted with those of the heterodox ones and that of the Sāṁkhyas and refuting that of the latter, particularly expounds the nature of that Brahma on the strength of the views

expressed with reference thereto in the *Muktāphala, S'ivatantra* and principally *Nrisiṁhaṭāpanīyopanishat.* This exposition seems to have been designed specially to establish that the *Pāñcharātra* doctrine of the Sātvata school is in perfect accord with the Upanished teaching as to the Upāsanā of Saguṇa Brahma in the form of Omkāra. This author's commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgawatpurāṇa* first mentions the interpretations of the said verse according to three schools, the Aupanishadas, Sātvata school of the Pāñcharātras and Alaṁkārikas and then on showing flaws in the Ārambha and Pariṇāma Vādas establishes that the Vivarta-vāda resorted to by the Aupanishadas for interpreting the verse is the only acceptable one. This does not exclude the possibility of Upāsanā because the Vivartavādins admit the existence of dulity upto the time of actual self-realization. The *Mahimnastotra* was originally composed by its author in praise to God S'iva. Madhusūdana has in his commentary interpreted the verses thereof in such a way as to contain eulogies of Hari i. e. Vishṇu as well as as Hara i. e. S'iva. Although the subject-matter of the Stotra is apparently Paurāṇic and the commentator has made a free use of the contents of the *S'ivapurāṇa* and *Vishṇupurāṇa* for explaining the meanings conveyed by the wording of the verses, he has also gone deeper than the surface to ascertain the esoteric meanings thereof and in doing so entered into long philosophical discussions and supported his reasoning by quotations from *the principal Upanishads, Bhagawadgītā, Patañjali's Yogasūtras* and other works. Out of the 36 verses contained in the Stotra as commented upon by our author the seventh has acquired a special importance owing to the principle enunciated therein and owing to the commentary thereon containing a descriptive catalogue of all the S'āstras known to the commentator and their division into three groups namely, those advocating the Ārambha-vāda (creation-theory), Pariṇāma-vāda (evolution-theory) and Vivarta-vāda (illusory appearance-theory) and a final expression of opinion that the advocates of the first two theories were not ignorant men but that they had propounded those theories in order to satisfy the conscience of those whose souls are not sufficiently developed to be able to realize the correctness of the Vivarta-vāda, lest they should otherwise join the heterodox camp and therefore that portion of the commentary has been taken out by some one of his admirers and given the name *Prasthānabheda* which term occurs in the commentary itself and was undoubtedly suggested by the expression "Prabhinne prasthāne" employed in the verse itself to designate the divergent doctrines. There is much similarity also between this interpretation and the burden of the teaching imparted through the commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgwatpurāṇa* and *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a.*

The facts that emerge in bold relief from these works of the author are:—(1) that he sincerely believed that the doctrine of the Aupanishadas or the Advaita school as propounded by S'ankarāchārya and developed by Sures'warāchārya and his other followers was the only one which could

be established by a judicious use of the Upanishad texts and sound reasoning and therefore made all the attempts within his power to establish that doctrine in all its bearings on life and experience by composing independent works like the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and *Advaitasiddhi* and commentaries like the *Siddhāntabindu*, and *Sārasaṁgraha*; (2) that his belief therein had not made of him a dry Vedāntin too proud of the doctrinal greatness of the Self to bend his head low even before the Supreme Soul; (3) that he had made a full use of the double aspect of Brahma, Nirvis'esha and Savis'esha or Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa or Nirguṇa and Saguṇa, postulated by S'ankara and by resorting to the distinction between Pāramārthic and Vyāvahāric Sattās not only made room in the Advaita doctrine itself for the doctrine of grace which was the special feature of the Bhakti cult but also made out a vindication thereof by establishing that the doctrine of the Sātvata Pāñcharātras was merely an adaptation of the Udgīthavidyā of the Upanishads to the changed popular beliefs (4) that the latter doctrine is as much capable of a scientific exposition as the Vedānta doctrine which had become synonymous with the Advaita doctrine so far as it relates to Sadyomukti (immediate absolution); (5) that he believed that the paths of Jñāna and Yoga were distinct and led to the same destination, namely self-realization, as established in the *Yogavāsis'ṭha*; (6) that though a Brāhmaṇa by birth and also by attainments, he was not such a social aristocrat as to believe that Brāhmaṇas alone could claim the proud privilege of being the worthy recipients of the highest kind of favour which the Almighty could confer on any human beings who worshipped him devoutly and selflessly, namely to open their eyes to the right view of life but a magnanimous soul who had realized the identity of the Self within his own body and those of the humblest of the humble and who believing that they had as much claim on his services as the members of his own class had expounded for their benefit the same doctrine in another form with slight variations through works like the *Bhaktirasāyana*, *Bhāgawataprathamas'loka-ṭīkā*, *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā* and *Īs'warapratipattiprakās'a*; and (7) that he was so well posted in all the Vedic, Tāntric and Paurāṇic lore that there was hardly any adverse view which he was not aware of, so great an adept in the art of debate that he found no difficulty in combating the views of the most stalwart champions of opposite views, whether orthodox or even heterodox and so thoroughly convinced of the truth of the Advaita doctrine that he was never dislodged from his cherished belief but always established its reasonablenees and acceptability, whether he was or was not permitted to make use of his sound knowledge of the *Upanishads*, according as his opponent was a believer or non-believer in their authoritativeness. His works thus show that he interpreted every human belief and activity in terms of the Advaita doctrine and there are traditions that he also lived upto it to such an extent that he was believed by those who came in contact with him and is believed by his admirers even to this day to have had Sākṣ'ātkāra (realization) of the true nature of the

Self. That was the result most probably of Upāsanā which according to him was an easy means to the attainment of the state of Samādhi (trance). The special object of his adoration was S'rī Krishṇa of Gokul and Vrindaban whom he believed to be Brahma in human form and to be the Highest Essence concievable by man[1] without whose adoration final absolution was impossible[2]. He was not unmindful of the fact that some Yogis visualized the Jyotiswarūpa of the Highest Essence but to that he was indifferent and had taken a special liking for the young Krishṇa moving about on the banks of the Jamna[3]. But great as his love for the Supreme Lord in that form was and much as he recommended devotion towards Him to the aspirants, he not only never lost sight of the Advaita doctrine according to which all duality is philosophically unreal but on the contrary looked upon the realization thereof as the very object of devotion towards Him[4].

The reader must have been curious to know what that doctrine, which had become the bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of the author and completely changed his whole outlook on life, a consummation which many aspire for but very few attain to, was. In order to acquaint him with that, I propose to carry him with me through the long but nevertheless highly interesting history of the Vedānta system of philosophy, of

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1. बृहदारण्यनिविष्टं विलुठितमाभीरवारनारीभिः ।
सत्यञ्चिदानन्दघनं ब्रह्म नराकारमालम्बे ॥ अद्वैतरत्न. पृ. १ ॥
पराकृतजगद्बन्धं परं ब्रह्म नराकृति ।
सौन्दर्यसारसर्वस्व वन्दे नन्दात्मजं महः ॥ गूढार्थ. पृ. ४०२ ॥
सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमद्वयसुखं यद्ब्रह्म गत्वा गुरुम्
मत्वा लब्धसमाधिभिर्मुनिवरैर्मोक्षाय साक्षात्कृतम् ।
जातं नन्दतपोबलात्तदधिकानन्दाय वृन्दावने
वेणुं वादयदिन्दुसुन्दरमुखं वन्देऽरविन्देक्षणम् ॥ सं. शा. सारसंग्रह. पृ. १ ॥
वंशीविभूषितकरान्नवनीरदाभात् पीताम्बरादरुणबिम्बफलाधरोष्ठात् ।
पूर्णेन्दुसुन्दरमुखादरविन्दनेत्रात् कृष्णात्परं किमपि तत्त्वमहं न जाने ॥ गूढार्थ. पृ. ४१८ ॥

2. यद्भक्तिं न विना मुक्तिर्यः सेव्यः सर्वयोगिनाम् ।
तं वन्दे परमानन्दघनं श्रीनन्दनन्दनम् ॥ गूढार्थ. पृ. २३२ ॥

3. ध्यानाभ्यासवशीकृतेन मनसा तन्निर्गुणं निष्क्रियं
ज्योतिः किञ्चन योगिनो यदि परं पश्यन्ति पश्यन्तु ते ।
अस्माकं तु तदेव लोचनचमत्काराय भूयाच्चिरं
कालिन्दीपुलिने तटे किमपि तन्नीलं महो धावति ॥ सैव. पृ. ३६२ ॥
केचिन्निगृह्य करणानि विसृज्य योग- (? भोग-)
मास्थाय योगममलात्मधियो यतन्ते ।
नारायणस्य महिमानमनन्तपार-
मास्वादयन्नमृतसारमहं तु मुक्तः ॥ सैव. पृ. ४१७ ॥

4. श्रीगोविन्दपदारविन्दमकरन्दास्वादशुद्धाशयाः
संसाराम्बुधिमुत्तरन्ति सहसा पश्यन्ति पूर्णं महः ।
वेन्दातैरवधारयन्ति परमं श्रेयस्त्यजन्ति भ्रमं
द्वैतं स्वप्नसमं विदन्ति विमलां विन्दन्ति चानन्दताम् ॥ सैव. पृ. ३०१ ॥

which it is an off-shoot, since the golden age in the history of Aryavarta in which our worthy ancestors were privileged to realize the noble ideal of plain living and high thinking.

VIII

Previous History of the Vedānta System.

The history of this system can be traced satisfactorily if we first understand the significance of the term "Vedānta" itself and know why it came to be associated with this particular system of philosophy.

(1) Significance of the term 'Vedānta'.

The term 'Vedānta' when used in the singular number, may according to the context mean either 'the aim of the Vedas' or 'the end of the Vedas'. S'ankarāchārya has used it also in the sense of an Upanishad text as in the compound word 'Prativedāntam' which occurs in his *Bhāshya on Brahmasūtra II. 3. 5. and III. 3. 1,* wherein the said word forms the second member of the compound. When however it is used in the plural number as 'Vedāntas' or as the first member of a compound such as 'Vedāntadars'anam' or 'Vedāntasiddham', a compound which occurs in the 10th verse of the *Das'as'lokī,* it invariably means 'the end of the Vedas'[1]. According to the orthodox view the 'Vedas' mean not only the Saṁhitās but also the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upanishads. The Upanishads thereout form, generally speaking, the end or the concluding portions of each such Veda and therefore the term 'Vedāntas' came to signify the Upanishad portion of a Veda, though as we have them now they do not always satisfy that test. Thus, for instance the *Īs'opanishat* forms the last *i. e.* fortieth Adhyāya of the *S'uklayajurveda Saṁhitā,* the *Brihadāraṇyakopanishat,* that of the *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa* of the same Veda, the *Chhāndogyopanishat* of the *Tāṇḍa Mahābrāhmaṇa* of the Sāmaveda, the *Aitareyopanishat* of the *Aitareyāraṇyaka* which is included in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* of the Rig-veda, and so on. Subsequently the system of philosophy which mainly depended upon these 'Vedāntas' for the exposition of their doctrine came to be designated as the Vedānta system. How this came to be will be clear later on.

(2) What is an Upanishad?

In order to know what an Upanishad is, it is necessary to know briefly what is a Saṁhitā, what is a Brāhmaṇa and what is an Āraṇyaka because we have to distinguish the works known as the Upanishads from those other classes of works comprised in the term 'Vedas'. A Saṁhitā thereout is a collection of Mantras (incantations) containing prayers,

1. *Vide Brihadāraṇyabhāshya-vārttika—Sambandhavārttika, verses 160, 161, 190, 230, 238, 315, 445, 477, 541, 561-62, 568, 709, 723, 898, 1081.*

formulas, songs or magic spells used at sacrifices such as the Dars'apūrṇamāsa, Agnishṭoma, Vājapeya, Vrātyashṭoma, As'wamedha, Rājasūya &c. which were performed by the Āryas in the Vedic period of Indian history. The Brāhmaṇas are works containing collections of the explanations or utterances of learned priests, the doctors of the science of sacrifice on several points of the ritual arising in the course of sacrifices, which are very often illustrated by old Gāthās *i. e.* traditional stories and Itihāsas and Purāṇas *i. e.* historical and mythological legends and which therefore include also discussions on points of grammar, phonetics, astronomy, cosmogony, geometry and other sciences. The Āraṇyakas are the forest texts containing "the mysticism and symbolism of sacrifice and priestly philosophy"[1] and were therefore tought by forest-dwelling hermits to those only who themselves also had adopted the forest-life. As distinguished from these three classes of works the Upanishads are those portions of the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas or Āraṇyakas which deal with the nature of the human soul, its relation to Brahma the first cause, the nature of the worldly phenomena, the evolution thereof, the ways of realizing the true nature of Brahma &c. The term 'Upanishad' is thus applied to those works which treat of Brahmavidyā *i. e.* the science of Brahma, the unknown cause of the universe. But that is its secondary meaning. Its primary meaning is Brahmavidyā itself.[2] In the *Upanishads* themselves it is found used in three different senses namely, (1) the secret significance of the mystic syllable Om! (2) the secret word *i. e.* to say, expressions and formulas known only to the initiated *e. g.* 'Tajjalān' and 'Satyasya satyam' which are designations of the Highest Essence; and (3) a secret text *i. e.* to say, a text containing an esoteric doctrine or secret knowledge[3]. The one idea common to all these senses is that of secrecy.

(3) *Secret of the Secrecy of the Upanishad Teaching and Time of its Origin.*

Agreeably to these senses here and there as in *Chhāndogya III. 11. 4. 6* we meet with words of caution against imparting a particular Vidyā to any one but the eldest son of or a disciple residing with the Guru. These ideas of mysticism and secrecy seem to have been associated with that term because there was a time in the history of India when the Upanishads were tought in an undertone to pupils sitting at a reverential distance but nevertheless beside (*Upa-ni-sad*) because the teaching contained therein was of such a character that if it were to be listened to by others not qualified for it, the social edifice of the Āryans was

1. *History of Indian Literature by Winternitz Vol. I as translated by Mrs. Kelkar, p. 233.*

2. *Brihdāranyabhāshya-vārttika, Sambandhavārttika, verses 3-7.*

3. *History of Indian Literature by Winternitz Vol. I. as translated by Mrs. Kelkar p. 244, foot-noot 2.*

likely to tumble down. In judging how far and of what age this could be true, we have to distinguish between the portions of the present Upanishads written by the compilers thereof and the old stories incorporated in them. When we do so and reflect over the difference between them we can draw the inference that the above kind of restriction must have been imposed in the age in which the Āryan society was reorganized in such a way as to divide its members into four castes, namely Brāhmaṇa, Ks'atriya, Vais'ya and Sūdra and into four orders, namely Brahmachārin, Grihasthin, Vānaprasthin, and Sannyāsin and that in the previous age of which we get an idea from the old stories i. e. to say, in the age in which the Brāhmaṇas and Ks'atriyas freely intermarried and the former did not think it derogatory to learn Brahmavidyā from the latter, conversations on that Vidyā took place freely in royal and sacrificial assemblies. Thus in *Chhāndogya V. 11 to 24* we are told that Prāchīnas'āla Aupamanyava, Satyayajña Paulushī, Indradradyumna Bhāllaveya, Jana S'ārkarāks'ya, Buḍila Ās'watarāswī conferred together on the nature of Ātmā and of Brahma, that when they could not come to a decision they went to Uddālaka Āruṇi and requested him to enlighten them but he replied that it was As'wapati Kaikeya, King of Kekaya who had then been thinking over that subject and that therefore they should go to him, that therefore they including Uddālaka repaired to the king and he after examining what each thought to be the place of the Vais'wānara, the soul in the state of waking in the human body, told them that whoever worshiped the Vais'wānara in the portion of the body from the crown of the head to the neck became happy. Similarly in *Brihadāraṇyaka II. 1.* Driptabālāki Gārgya goes to Ajātas'atru of Kās'ī and offers to teach him the nature of Brahma. The king expresses his joy at that offer remarking that now-a-days people run to Janaka for that knowledge. But when the former proceeds to do that he is outwitted by the latter and strange to say, instead of he imparting the knowledge to the king, is obliged to seek it from the latter and he readily complies with the request. The same story is found repeated with some variations in *Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇopanishat IV.* In *Chapter III* of the former Upanishad we are told that King Janaka of Videha offered a reward of one hundred cows to the horns of each of whom 10 gold coins had been tied, to whomsoever was versed in Brahmavidyā from amongst the Brāhmaṇas who had assembled at a sacrifice, that Yājñavalkya from amongst the Brāhmaṇas asked a pupil of his to drive away the cows to his hermitage, that thereupon several Brāhmaṇas challenged him to prove that he was versed in that lore, that a wordy warfare then ensued between Yājñavalkya on the one hand and the Brāhmaṇas including a woman named Gārgī Vāchaknavī on the other as to the nature of Ātmā and the former came out victorious. In *Chapter IV. 1 to 4* also of the same Upanishad we read of discussions between Yājñavalkya and Janaka as to the nature of Ātmā, the experiences in dreams, deep sleep, the region to which the soul goes on being freed from

the body &c. and that when the latter finds that the sage knows more than he himself had thought over or gathered from other thinkers, gets down from his throne, falls at his feet and implores him to accept him as his disciple and then the latter imparts him the desired knowledge. In *Chhāndagya V. 3* there is a story that S'wetaketu having gone to an assembly of the Pāñchālas, was there accosted with certain questions by a Ks'atriya named Pravāhaṇa Jaibali as to the journey of the soul after death, that he was unable to answer them, that he having returned to his father Uddālaka Āruṇi, told him how he had been non-plused there by his want of knowledge of an important subject, that the father himself not being aware of the proper answers to them went with the son to this same Ks'atriya and asked him to tell him the answers to those questions and that the latter then gave them so graphically as if he had himself seen souls in different grades of development passing to particular regions and being reborn as different kinds of men, animals &c., after remarking that the said knowledge had not till then passed to the Brāhmaṇas. This story is also found with a slight variation in words in *Brihadāraṇyaka VI. 2.* In *Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇopanishat* S'wetaketu is said to have been confronted with the same questions not by Pravāhaṇa Jaibali but by Chitra Gārgyāyaṇi and the answers given by him also differ materially. In the *Pras'nopanishat* too, we are told that six persons, Sukes'ā Bhāradwāja and others went to the venerable sage Pippalāda and with his permission each asked him one question turn by turn and that he answered them as stated therein. Some other instances also can be given but I think these are enough to show that in the age in which those sages lived, the knowledge of Brahma was imparted to an aspirant as freely as that of any other science of which the Āryans were then aware and that it must have been in a later age that this science was kept as a close preserve of a few Brāhmaṇas to be imparted only to those who were intimately connected with them as sons or resident students. It is difficult to state with accuracy at what particular period in the history of the Indian philosophy this must have happened. It can however be stated with some degree of probability that it may have happend at the time when the whole of the Vedic literature was collected and classified.

As to when this was done, there is a Paurāṇic tradition[1] that it was Vedavyāsa who did that in view of the fact that people had become less virile, short-lived and less intelligent in course of time. This Vyāsa is known to be a son of Satyavatī, a fisher-girl by the sage Parās'ara whose Smriti is held to be more authoritative than those of other Rishis in this age probably because it had been composed specially in view of the conditions prevailing in his time and those forseen by him. We learn from the *Mahābhārata* that this Vyāsa's mother Satyavatī later on married King Santanu of the Kuru race and had two sons by him named Chitrāñgada

1. Bhāgawatpurāṇa XII. 6. 46-50.

and Vichitravīrya, that the latter having died and Bhīshma, son of Santanu by Gangā, his former wife, having declined to beget sons on his wives by Niyoga, Satyavatī called Vyāsa, then an old Rishi, to do that work and that he came and begot three sons Dhritarāshṭra, Pāṇḍu and Vidura or Vidhura. We also gather from it that the original *Bhāratakathā* of which the present *Mahābhārata* is an expanded form, had been composed by him shortly after the great war and that almost all the Ks'atriya families had become extinct during that war, and can very well imagine from our experience of the recent world-war of 1914-18 that it must have made several Brāhmaṇa and Vais'ya families also extinct owing to its economic after-effects. It would not therefore be far from the truth to assume that just as Vyāsa collected together the Vedic Mantras from the few Dwijas who had surivived and prepared the four Saṁhitās, he or some other persons must have collected together, arranged and classified the various stories as to ceremonial observances, the ballads, the discussions on grammar, phonetics, astonomy, psychology, cosmogony, epistemology &c. which were till then remembered and edited them as Brāhmaṇas and Araṇyakas and set apart the Brahmavidyā portions thereof, which till then were tought to all students who had a desire to know the secret doctrine contained therein, for being tought confidentially only to those who had undergone a certain course of discipline and who could be trusted not to destroy the new social edifice which must have been built up with great care and after overcoming numerous difficulties because the theory underlying it was that "neither by works nor by progeny nor by wealth can immortality be secured but by renunciation alone" and because if it spread widely people would cease to have faith in the performance of sacrifices and domestic ceremonies and would cease to marry and strive for the acquisition of wealth. The lengthy discourses on the utility of Karma even to a man who strives for the realization of the Self contained in *Chapters 3 to 6 and 16 to 18 of the Bhagawadgītā*, which I believe must have been composed later than the original *Bhāratakathā* and incorporated into it when it was later on expanded into the *Mahābhārata*, show, when read between the lines, that the evil could not be checked completely and that a dire necessity had arisen for bringing the people to the right path by issuing instructions in the name of S'rī Krishna whom all orthodox people believed to be a manifestation of the Almighty. There being no direct reference in it to Buddhism or Jainism but there being frequent references to the doctrine and practices of the ascetic class, an indirect reference to those of the Chārvaka and the terms 'Sāṁkhya', 'Yoga', 'Brahma', 'Ātmā', 'Nirvāṇa' &c. having been used therein in senses different from the technical ones, I believe that it had been designed specially for weaning people from the paths of asceticism and agnosticism which had been chawked out and extended by the adherents of the Upanishad school and the Chārvāka School. It was thus a social necessity which was the cause of the restriction of the Upanishad teaching

to a select few and that was felt when owing to its wide diffusion the Āryan soceity was found to be on the way to disintegration.

(4) *Which Upanishads understood by the term 'Vedāntas'.*

The number of works that go by the name of the *Upanishads* is very large and some of them do not in fact even treat of Brahmavidyā. The question therefore arises whether it is all these works without exception that are taken as authorities on the Vedānta doctrine or a limited number of them only. In order to determine that it is necessary to give some idea as to the number of works that go by that name. Now, according to one of them, namely the *Muktikopanishat* the total number of the works included in the category of at some past time was 1180 out of which there were 21 pertaining to the Rigveda, 109 to the Yajurveda, 1000 to the Sāmaveda, and 50 to the Atharvaveda. This number seems to have been arrived at from the number of the S'ākhās of each Veda under the belief that each S'ākhā must have its own Upanishad. Whether this was actually true or not cannot be ascertained but even if it was it has no importance because all these works were not available and the author of the said Upanishad himself could collect together the names of 110 of them only though he says they are 108. Having done so he has put 10 of them under the Rigveda, 21 under the White Yajurveda, 32 under the Black Yajurveda, 16 under the Sāmaveda and 31 under the Atharvaveda[1]. In 1656 A.D. Prince Mahomed Dara Shakoh, the eldst son of the Emperor Shah Jehan, who was a great patron of the learned men of his time translated into Persian 50 Upanishads under the caption "Oupanekhat." A French scholar named Anquetil du Pperon by translating them into Latin made the scholars and philosophers of Europe living in the beginning of the ninteenth century familiar with that fountain-source of the philosophical literature of India. In 1895 Tukārām Tātyā, a Theosophist published a collection of 109 Upanishads though the title says that they are 108. The Nirṇaya Sāgar Press of Bombay brought out an edition of 108 Upanishads in 1913 and one of 112 in 1917. Lastly, Mahādev S'āstri of Adyar, Madras published between 1912 and 1923, collections of (1) *Sāmānya Vedānta Upanishads*, (2) *Yoga Upanishads*, (3) *Sannyāsa Upanishads* and (4) *Vaishṇava Upanishads* and intimated that collections of (5) *S'aiva Upanishads*, and (6) *S'ākta Upanishads* were in course of preparation. Keeping all these collections in view Dr. Winternitz says[2] that besides the fourteen previously mentioned by him, there are over 200 works going by the name of the Upanishads. All of these are not however parts of any Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa or Āraṇyaka, do not contain the same kind of doctrine and are not written in the same style. They are therefore divided into three groups, namely

1. *Muktikopanishat I. 11–14.*

2. *History of Indian Literature Vol. I as translated by Mrs. Kelkar p. 240, foot-noot 4.*

(1) those which are in the prose style, contain archaic forms and expressions and do not show any familiarity with any of the Paurāṇic gods or contain references to the Sāṁkhya and Yoga doctrines but only to the performance of sacrifices, the Upāsanā of Omkāra and the knowledge of the identity of the Ātmā with Brahma, namely the *Aitareya*, *Brihadāraṇyaka*, *Chhāndogya*, *Taittirīya*, and *Kaushītaki*, and *Kena* or *Talavakara*, (2) those which are written for the most part in verse and contain references to the philosophical theory of the Sāṁkhyas or the agnosticism of the Chārvākas, namely the *Īs'a*, *Pras'na*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Kaṭha*, *S'wetās'watara* and *Mahānārāyaṇa*. The above twelve together with the *Māṇḍukya*, and the *Maitrāyaṇīya* are considered authoritative for the purpose of tracing the history of the earliest Indian philosophy though the last two are not so old as the first twelve and are even considered to be post-Buddhistic.[1] Dr. Winternitz relying on Deussen[2] says that S'ankara has in his *Bhāshya on the Brahmasūtras* considered the first twelve only as sacred and authoritative texts but I have found on a cursory glance at the *Bhāshya* that he has also at certain places relied upon certain texts of the *Nārāyaṇa*, *Jābāla* and other Upanishads.[3] The *Muktikopanishat* on the other hand recommends a study of the *Māṇḍukyopanishat* only for attaining salvation and says further that if the realization of the Self does not take place on a study thereof, ten Upanishads, may be studied. These ten are undoubtedly the *Chhāndogya*, *Brihadāraṇyaka*, *Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*, *Īs'a*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Pras'na*, *Muṇḍaka* and *Māṇḍukya*.[4] It contains other recommendations also but with them we are not concerned. It is these ten and the *S'wetās'watara*, which I will later on show to be a later product, that are found frequently relied on for an exposition of the Advaita doctrine by S'ankara and his followers including Sures'wara and Madhusūdana Saraswati though occasionally we do meet with quotations from other Upanishads as the well such as the *Amritabindu*, *Jābāla*, *Nārāyaṇa*. They are also archaic in points of style and diction. It is therefore they which must be kept in view in ascertaining the philosophical doctrine of the early Vedic or pre-epic age.

(5) *The Doctrine underlying those Upanishads.*

The doctrine that can be found underlying the discourses and dis-

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1. *History of Indian Literature Vol. I. p. 239.* On this point see also *Belvalkar and Ranade's History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II Ch. III secs. 8 & 9 at pp. 87–90* wherein they speak of the discovery of some new Upanishads also, namely *Bās'kala, Chhāgaleya, Ārsheya and S'aunaka* (p. 87).

2. *System des Vedanta p. 32.*

3. *S'. B. on Brahmasūtra III. 3. 21; III. 3. 35 and III. 4. 17 and 20,* at *pp. 782, 784 876, and 884* respectively of the N. S. P. edition. Belvalkar and Ranade say in their *History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II Ch. III p. 87* that 13 of the Upanishads quoted from by S'ankara can be definitely identified.

4. *Muktikopanishat I. 26–29.*

cussions contained in those ten Upanishads is this:—The highest object of man's attainment is Brahma. This object can be secured by knowing what Brahma is. That can be known from a preceptor when humbly approached. When he is convinced of the pupil's burning desire to know the secret, he imparts it in words like these:—It should be the main endeavour of every human being to know Brahma for its knowledge puts an end to all the misery in the world. You need not go to any particular place or think of any particular time, past, present or future, for knowing what Brahma is. It is everywhere and at all times. But it is so subtle that the senses cannot visualize it, the mind cannot grasp it, the intellect becomes powerless to get a conception of it. It can and does however know itself and just as on the one hand it is found everywhere in the objects of the universe around us, it is also found in human beings and there in a greater state of purity than in the other creatures and mundane objects. It is in fact the Self of every human being. What an aspirant should therefore do is to try to know his real Self. Ordinarily man is apt to identity himself with the body or any of the senses or the mind or the vital breath. But as a matter of fact all these are objects as compared with it which is the subject and derive their power of performing their different functions from it. It is not also affected by the conditions of the body such as birth, childhood, adolescence, youth, maturity and death nor by the three states which one daily experiences, namely those of waking, dreaming and sleeping. It is however a witness of those conditions and states and gathers together the experiences gained therein through its instruments, the senses and the mind and quits the body when it is found no longer useful for gaining more experience and passes either by the path of the forefathers or of the gods to some other regions in space and when its merits are exhausted falls down through the air along with rain-water, takes the form of some kind of food and is reborn in another form. This cycle never ends for this hankering after happiness through finite objects is never stopped. The remedy for ending it lies in the individual's own hands and that is to discriminate between the true and the false, the infinite and the finite, cease to think of the latter as far as possible and to think more and more of one's true nature. That true nature consists of existence, knowledge and bliss. Here existence is not the existence of this or that object but existence in the abstract, knowledge does not mean knowledge of the finite objects but the principle of knowledge and bliss does not mean the happiness derived from the sense-objects which is short-lived and is invariably mixed up with misery but the unmixed and permanent happiness resulting from self-realization. The Self in this pure state exists not only in the human beings and all sentient beings but in all concievable objects, here, there and everywhere. In fact it is Brahma itself above spoken of. Unless their identity, which is the secret of the Upanishad teaching, is realized true knowledge cannot arise. This Ātmā or Brahma is not easily recognizable even by the initiated in the things external to one's body

without deep thinking as it is not so recognizable in the body itself. That thinking should be on the line that the stupendous forces of nature around us such as the sun, wind, ocean, stars, lightening, clouds, earth, &c. are not Brahma just as the body, the senses &c. are not the true Self of man; that they are only the products of the elements, light, water and earth, and space and air which help them to form a concrete object and like the human body are evanescent though their lives are of a longer duration than that of the latter. The power which they seem to have is not their own but of that Brahma which is inherent in them as it is inherent in the human body and is unaffected by their changing states just as it is not affected by the different states of the human body. Hence though these may appear to be distinct objects they are mere names and forms which spring from, having their being and move in and will finally he absorbed in Brahma. Thus there is in fact no diversity in this universe. The All is One and that is Brahma, the only reality. If one sees the slightest diversity in the universe and runs mad after any of the names and forms in the vain of hope of getting happiness, there is fear for him to fall into the ocean of misery. It is not the search for happiness, the desire for which is inherent in every sentient being that is the cause of misery but the search for it in the finite objects believing them to be the infinite, because Brahma itself is everlasting happiness and what sentient beings seek for even unconsciously in the finite objects is Brahma itself or one's own Self. The happiness that finite objects of this or the next world, however attractive and however long-lived they may appear to be, can give, is transitory and is invariably followed by misery in some form or another and does not put an end to the desire itself for happiness but keeps the soul unsatisfied and once there is separation from the object from which it is derived the soul is tormented by a fresh desire again to acquire that object or its like or better and make fresh efforts towards that end. If it is fortunately secured whether in this or the next life, it too is bound by its very nature to leave him panting and so the cycle of misery and happiness goes on endlessly. If on the other hand that inherent desire for happiness is sought to be satisfied by striving for the realization of the true nature of the Self or Brahma, seeing unity in diversity, the ocean of misery is crossed for on attaining that fountain-head of all happiness the bond of the heart, which owing to the presence of ignorance gives rise to desires, is broken, all doubts ss to how those desires can be fulfilled are removed, the propensity to action *i. e.* to work for the attainment of desires in the wrong direction is removed, and even the fruits of good and bad acts done in the previous births or the present are also consumed like a heap of cotton by the fire of knowledge. This knowledge is not dependent for its manifestation upon the triad of the knower, the thing to be known and the means of knowledge but is self-manifest and is the source itself from which that triad derives its power.

(6) *Interpretation of the Upanishads.*

The doctrine of the Upanishads as above set forth is not found in this coherent logical form in any of them but portions thereof only are found scattered throughout the principal ones above-mentioned. It would not however be reasonable to infer as has been done by some scholars of eminence such as Prof. Rādhākrishṇa[1] that the Upanishad seers themselves had not thought it out in all its component parts, because unless they had done so the ultimate result namely, that Brahma and Ātmā are identical when both are considered in their pure lights, which is summed up in the four great sentences, "That art thou", "I am Brahma", "This Self is Brahma" and "The Conscious Self is Brahma", and which has been so aptly summed up by Deussen in the following words, namely:—"The Brahman, the power which presents itself to us materialised in all existing things, which creates, sustains, preserves, and recieves back into itself again all the worlds, this eternal, infinite, divine power is identical with the Ātman, with that which after stripping off everything external we discover in ourselves as our real most essential being, our individual self, the soul",[2] could not have been arrived at. While interpreting the Upanishads it should be remembered that they are mere imperfect reports of discussions that took place on particular occasions between the sages of a by-gone age, passed down orally in different Vedic schools for several generations and then collected together by some enthusiast or enthusiasts for the benefit of future generations and in several cases supplemented by his or their own introductions and that such being the case, it cannot be expected that any of them should contain a complete, logically reasoned-out system like the Bhāshyas of S'ankara, Rāmanuja, Vallabh and others or even like the Dars'ana works of Jaimini, Bādarāyaṇa, Aks'apāda and others. If one is anxious to ascertain what the Upanishad sages thought to be the truth about existence, one must in the absence of better materials, catch the central idea which is found running through all the principal Upanishads and try to work it out in all its bearings with the help of the different texts which are found scattered here and there, following the Mīmāñsā rules of interpretation as was done by S'ankara, Rāmānuja, Madhwa and other commentators. It is true that some of the texts are so apparently irreconcileable that each of the holders of different views on points of details may have thought that his view was the only one which could be logically worked out of the Upanishads. All the followers of the Upanishads, technically called the Vedāntins, are however agreed on this point that the Upanishad sages have tought that the All-soul is identical with the individual soul and that this teaching though not set forth in a coherently logical form in any Upanishad in all its bearings on the two souls, can be sufficiently gathered from the discourses

1. *Indian Philosophy Vol. I p. 140.*

2. *Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads as translated by A. S. Geden, Edinburgh, 1906 p. 39 as quoted in the History of Indian Literature by Winternitz Vol. I as translated by Mrs. Kelkar p. 250.*

and discussions contained in the *Brihadāraṇyaka, Chhāndogya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Muṇdaka, Īs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Kaushītaki* and also *S'wetās'watara.* What they differ about is what is the nature of the unity meant by the Upanishads and that is only a matter of detail. The great Oriental scholars of the West who have applied their minds to this subject are also agreed on that point.[1]

(7) *Upāsanākāṇḍa of the Vedas in the Upanishads.*

The above doctrine represents only one side of the Upanishad teaching. It had its other side as well and that is discernible from those portions of the said works which are read by very few people and understood by still fewer. As to that it may be recollected that according to the Upanishad philosophy the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul means the realization of that identity. That realization can take place as the result of S'ravaṇa (study) aided by Manana (reflection) and Nididhyāsana (meditation). The reflection and meditation consist of extensive and intensive thinking over the different manifestations of the Supreme Soul in the universe and that of the individual soul in the human body. This itself is the Upāsanā (adoration) of the Supreme Soul. Without it, the individual cannot shake off his limitations and be actually one with him. This Upāsanā is of two sorts, namely (1) that of Brahma in the abstract and (2) that of Brahma as represented by any symbol. In the age of the older Upanishads none had conceived the idea of incarnations and therefore there was no idolatrous form of adoration in vogue. That form appears to have been introduced after S'rī Krishna began to be looked upon as a visible embodiment of the Supreme Soul and his images began to be prepared by his worshippers after his death.[2] But since it is not possible for all the aspirants to think of Brahma in the abstract some Upanishad sages thought it necessary to give Brahma a symbol and for that purpose cought hold of the first word that was uttered by the Almighty, namely Om! which was believed to be His visible symbol as being suggestive of the power of creation, preservation or destruction of the universe when considered in any of its parts and of Him as a whole when considered as a single syllable. The form of adoration thereof then in vogue was a loud chanting, from which it came to be known as the Udgītha. Another form of adoration that was resorted to was the contemplation of the Supreme

1. *Sacred Books of the East Series Vol. XV p. XXVII; Preface to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads p. VIII; Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads as translated by A. S. Geden p. 39; Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature p. 221; History of Indian Literature by Winternitz Vol. I as translated by Mrs. Kelkar pp. 249–50.*

2. *History of Indian Literature by Winternitz Vol. I as translated by Mrs. Kelkar p. 505 foot-note 3.*

Being in the various material forms of the forces of nature on the earth, in the heavens and in the mid-air. Other truth-seekers again concentrated their attention on the vital breath and yet others on the organ of speech or the mind or the Purusha in the right eye &c. These were so many experiments carried on by individual truth-seekers in the laboratories of their As'ramas and when they happened to meet together at a royal or sacrificial assembly they carried on discussions with reference to the results attained by them. When the results attained by any of them were accepted by any group of doctors, they came to be designated as Vidyās or methods of Upāsanā. We have thus in the Upanishads, Udgīthavidyā, Prāṇavidyā, Daharavidyā, Aks'aravidyā, Purushavidyā and so on. The first thereout when pursued in view of the Omkāra as an entire syllable constituted the Upāsana of Brahma and when the same was pursued in view of any of its component parts and the other Vidyās constituted the Upāsanā of some particular aspect of Brahma. The *modus operandi* of all of them consisted of the observance of certain rules of discipline such as restraint of the senses &c. and concentration and meditation. This itself is known as Adhyātma-yoga or Yoga in the *Kaṭhopanishat*,[1] Vijnāna, Dhyāna, Upāsanā and Sannyāsyoga in the *Muṇḍaka*[2] and Brāhmī Upānishat in *Kena*.[3] It is not identical with the Yoga of Patañjali for the ideal of those truth-seekers was higher than that of Patañjali in that while his was to realize the absolute nature of the Self as understood by the Sāṁkhyas, that of the former was to realize its identity with Brahma.

(8) *Rise of Asceticism.*

It may be recollected that it was a part of the course of self-realization to check the tendency of the mind to run after the objects of the world. Some of the seers were therefore of opinion that the said course could not gone through by those who had the care of a running household claiming their attention from time to time and that therefore one desirous of going through it should either commence it immediately after one's study of the Vedas is over or after the desires for progeny and wealth is satiated. Those who agreed with that view betook themselves to forests and applied their minds solely to the investigation of the world-and-life-problem. There were others again who believed that what the search for truth, knowledge and infiniteness stood in absolute need of was not physical renunciation of the world and all its objects, which is not completely possible so long as the soul is in the embodied state, but a change in one's angle of vision towords them which can be secured by a knowledge of that true nature of the Self and a sense of discrimination and that therefore if one's will is strong and one's life is moulded suitably one can, even while attending to one's worldly duties, follow the course of self-realization[4]. In course of time the adherents of the latter

1. *Kaṭha I. 2. 12; II. 6. 18.*
2. *Muṇḍuka I. 2. 13; II. 2. 7; III. 1. 8; III. 2. 1. and III. 2. 6-10.*
3. *Kena IV. 36.*
4. *Introduction to S'ankara's Bhāshya on the Bhagawadgītā p. 2.*

view became diminished and there was a time in the history of philosophic thought in India in which there were no persons to represent that view[1]. The men with ascetic leanings therefore dominated the Indian people by their self-resignation and influenced their thoughts and course of conduct by their ascetic poetry which consisted of legends of saints, aphorisms and also fables, fairy tales and moral stories[2] which had originated in the pre-Buddhistic age.

(9) *Sāṁkhya Doctrine of Kapila Muni.*

It appears from the *S'wetāswatara*, a later Upanishad,[3] that the sage Kapila who is considered the father of the Sāṁkhya system must have flourished and propounded his theory of the genesis of the world from Pradhāna, the primordial matter, consisting of the three Guṇas, Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas in a state of equipoise, acting under the direction of the Purusha, during the interval between the composition of the earlier and the later Upanishads. The *Bhagawadgītā* by calling Kapila from amongst the Siddhas (adepts)[4], a Vibhūti of the Supreme Soul and adopting his theory and trying to reconcile it with the Upanishad doctrine may well be taken to support that view.[5] The Sāṁkhya theory as appearing from that work is not atheistic but theistic. The fact however that the theory as originally propounded did make room therein for the existence of the Supreme Soul either as identical with the Purusha who in that case must be non-dual or as different from it as an individual soul is sufficiently clear from other ancient works such as *the S'wetās'wataropanishat,*[6] *Mahābhārata*[7] *and Charaka Saṁhitā.*.[8] The Sāṁkhya philosophy as tought by Kapila to his mother Devahuti[9] is also of a theistic character. It also seems that there was in existence an older work of the Sāṁkhya system named *Shashṭitantras'āstra* containing an exposition of the theory as originally propounded by this sage because a verse quoted by Vyāsa in his *Bhāshya on Yogasūtra IV. 13* has been said by Vāchaspati in his gloss thereon to have been taken from that very work.[10] It is probably the same work as is referred to by Bādarāyaṇa in *Brahmasūtra II. 1. 1.* which S'ankara says in his *Bhāshya* thereon[11] was called a 'Tantra', a term

1. *Bhagawadgītā IV. 1–2.*
2. *History of Indian Literature by Winternitz Vol. I. as translated by Mrs. Kelkar pp. 320, 405-22.*
3. *S'wetās'watara V. 2.*
4. *Bhagawadgītā, X. 26.*
5. *Ibid. VII. 12-14, XIII, XIV, XVII and XVIII.*
6. *S'wetās'watara V. 3. 14.*
7. *Mahābhārata XII. 219.*
8. *Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I pp. 212–13.*
9. *Bhāgawatpurāṇa. III. 25–33.*
10. *Ānandās'ram Sanskrit Series No. XLVII p. 184.*
11. *N. S. P. edition p. 433.*

which according to Vāchaspati's gloss thereon means a scientific treatise containing a discussion as to the means of attaining Moks'a (final absolution). It is also perhaps the same as the *Sāṁkhyas'āstra* in six chapters which is mentioned in *Prasthānbheda*[1] as having been composed by the revered sage Kapila. Further Vāchaspati says in *Bhāmatī* that Āsuri and Pañchas'ikha and other followers of the Sāṁkhya system composed Smritis on the line of Kapila's 'Tantra'[2] and we know it from the *Mahābhārata* that the doctrine as propounded by the sage Kapila was theistic and that it was Pañchas'ikha, a pupil of Āsuri who made it atheistic. The latter's pupil Īs'wara Krishṇa must then have by his *Kārikās* filled up the gaps in his Master's chain of arguments. Messers Belvalkar and Ranade also believe that the Sāṁkhya was originally theistic[3] and the same is also the opinion of Das Gupta.[4] We may therefore take it as certain that the Sāṁkhya theory as originally propounded was as above-stated.

The term 'Sāṁkhya' too had not till the date of the *Bhagawadgītā* acquired the technical significance which it did probably from the date of Īs'wara Krishṇa's *Kārikās*. Till then it signified 'knowledge'.[5] It may therefore be inferred that the sage Kapila was the propounder of a theory of knowledge whose principal feature was that the divine power referred to in the *S'wetās'watara* was Pradhāna i. e. to say, the three Guṇas in a state of equipoise, that when the equipoise is disturbed through the power of the Purusha coming in contact with it, there arises Mahat or Buddhi, from the latter, Ahaṁkāra and so on. It is this doctrine of the Sāṁkhya system not its subsequent development with which the Vedānta theory has something in common, that has been attacked by Bādarāyaṇa in *Brahmasūtra I. 1. 5 to 1. 4. 28, II. 2. 1 to 10 and II. 1. 1 to 11.*

(10) *Influence of that Doctrine on the Minds of Subsequent Thinkers.*

This doctrine seems to have had such a marvellous effect on the minds of the thinkers who followed its originator that it is found later on to have become the foundation on which the superstructure of the Hindu religion as it is prevalent now, is based. The principal feature of that religion is a belief in a male trinity, Brahmā, Vishṇu and Mahes'a, presided over by an overlord called Mahādeva or Nārāyaṇa or Ādinārāyaṇa or in a female trinity, Mahāsaraswatī, Mahālaxmi, and Mahākālī, presided over by Māyā or Mahāmāyā or Ādyas'akti, each trinity representing the Purusha of

1. *Mahimnastotra with Madhusūdana's Commentary (N. S. P. edition) p. 21.*
2. *N. S. P. edition p. 452.*
3. *History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II. pp. 449–50.*
4. *History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. pp. 212–13.*
5. *S'wetās'watara V. 2., VI. 13; Bhagawadgītā. II. 39; The colophon under that chapter, III. 3.; IV. 41–42; V. 4–5., XVIII. 13; S'ankara's Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra II. 1. 3. (N. S. P. edition p. 439).*

the Sāṁkhyas endowed with all the attributes of the Saguṇa Brahma of the earlier Upanishads and having bodies in which the Guṇas, Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas are respectively predominent. All the later Upanishads from the *S'wetās'watara* downwards seem to have been composed under the direct or indirect influence of this doctrine. The great epics also in their present form presuppose a knowledge, on the part of their authors, of the Purāṇa and Dharmas'āstra[1] literatures which had grown up under its influence. As already stated[2] the *Bhagawadgītā* which forms a part of the *Mahābhārata* contains evidence of a desire to assimilate it to the doctrine of the earlier Upanishads. Kapila's Sāṁkhya doctrine thus forms a connecting link between the earlier and the later Upanishads and between the literatures of the Vedic and post-Vedic ages.

(11) *Yoga in the Pre-Pātañjala Age.*

The sage Patañjali who composed the *Yogasūtrās* must have made his appearance on the Indian philosophical arena at a date considerably later than Kapila. His name is not found in any of the earlier Upanishads nor in any of the later ones which are recognized as authoritative such as *S'wetās'watara, Kaivalga, Jābāla, Maitrāyaṇi* and *Nrisimhatāpini.* This does not however mean that the Yoga as a means of salvation was unknown before his time. He himself says that what he has done is an Anus'āsana (systematization) of Yoga not the propagation of a new doctrine of Yoga[3]. During the period commencing from the time when the teachers who thought out the problems discussed in the later Upahishads, flourished and ending with that in which Vyāsa, the author of the *Bhagawadgītā*, flourished, the practice of Yoga appears to have been traditionally transmitted from teacher to pupil in several schools of which we get a glimpse from the *Bhagawadgītā* which styles itself a Yogas'āstra but is not such a systematic work as the *Yogasūtras.* The word 'Yoga' is found there used in five different senses, namely (1) an exposition of the nature of anything; (2) a means for the attainment of liberation (3) Karma-yoga (4) the acquisition of a thing which one stands in need of but does not possess and (5) the divine power of creation, preservation and destruction of the universe. As for the first sense the title of each chapter of the work is made up of a compound word the second part whereof is the word 'Yoga' *e. g.* Vis'āda-yoga, Sāṁkhya-yoga, Karma-yoga, Sannyāsa-yoga, Aks'ara-brahma-yoga, &c. In the second sense it appears to have been used in the body of the work as the second member of a compound word such as Buddhi-yoga (II. 49-50, X. 10, XVIII. 57) Karma-yoga (III. 3, 7, V. 2), Jñāna-yoga (III. 3) Ātmasaṁyama-yoga (IV. 27) Brahma-yoga (IV. 27) Sāṁkhya-yoga (XIII. 28) Bhakti-yoga (XIV. 26) and Dhyāna-

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1. *S'. B. on Brahmasūtra I. 4. 28. (N. S. P. edition p. 430).*
2. *P. XXXIII supra.*
3. *Yogasūtra I. 1 and Vyāsa's Bhāshya thereon.*

yoga (XVIII. 52) or as the first member of a compound word such as Yoga-yajña (IV. 18) Yoga-samādhi (IV. 38, VI. 37) Yogārūḍha (VI. 4), Yoga-sevā (VI. 20) Yoga-yukta (VI. 29, IX. 28) Yoga-dhāraṇā (VIII. 12). The root 'Yuj' and its derivatives have also been used in VI. 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 23, IX. 34, XVIII. 51 to convey the same sense. In the third sense the term 'Yoga' is found used in II. 39, 48, IV. 1-3, 41, V. 4-7, VI. 1-3, 12, 16-19, 23, 33, 36-37, 44; VII. 1, X. 6-7, 18, XVIII. 33, 75. In the following derinatives also it is found used in the same sense, namely 'Yogin' (IV. 25, V. 24, VI. 8, 10, 18, 28, 31-32, 42, 45-47, VIII. 1-4, 23, 27-28, X. 17, XII. 14, XV. 11) and 'Yogavittama' and (XII. 1). In the fourth sense it is used as the first member of the compound word 'Yogaks'ema' in II. 45 and IX 22. In the last, it is found in the compounds Yoges'wara (XI. 4. XVII. 75, 78) Mahāyoges'wara (XI. 9), Yogamāyā (VII. 25), Madyoga (XII. 11) and Ais'wara-yoga (XI. 8). In VI. 18 again the term 'Yukta' (past participial noun from 'Yuj') has been defined as meaning one whose mind is completely subdued and concentrated only on the Self and in VI. 20-23 the term Yoga has been defined as that peaceful and self-sufficient state of mind which is the highest bliss and is as difficult to forsake as to attain. It is therefore clear that the said term had not acquired that technical meaning of a particular graded process of attaining to salvation based upon the later Saṁkhya doctrine, which it did since the promulgation of the *Yoga-dars'ana* of Patañjali but was being used to denote any of the different ways of attaining to peace of mind which different strenuous investigators of truth had found by personal experience successful and made known to others traditionally since the Upanishad age to that in which the Divine Song had been composed. Similarly we find scattered here and there in that work some of the eight Aṅgas of Yoga mentioned in Yogasūtra II. 29, recommended as conducive to the highest bliss. But we do not find the terms Yama, Niyama and Pratyāhāra, used anywhere. The term Asana occurs in VI. 11-12 but no particular variety thereof is recommended as in *Yogasūtra II. 46.* Prāṇāyāma is mentioned in VI. 29-30 as the sole pursuit of some ascetics not as a means to an end as in *Yogasūtra II. 49-52.* The term Dhāraṇā as such does not occur in the *Bhagawadgītā* but it forms the second member of a compound word, namely, Yoga-dhāraṇa occurring in Ch. VIII. 12. The term Dhyāna too appears in Ch. XVIII. 52 of that work as the second member of the compound word Dhyāna-yoga which means meditation as a species of Yoga having no connection with the Yoga-dhāraṇa above spoken of whereas the Dhyāna defined in *Yogasūtra III. 2* is a stage in Ashṭānga-Yoga next after Dhāraṇā. The term Samādhī too appears to have been used in Ch. II. 44 and 53 in the etymological sense of the steadiness of the intellect not in the technical one of trance. Its varieties Saṁprajñāta and Asaṁprajñāta and the sub-varieties of the former, namely Savitarka, Savichara, Sānanda and Asmitāmātra mentioned in *Yogasūtra I. 17* are nowhere referred to in the *Bhagawadgītā.* There

is thus no doubt that the *Bhagawadgītā* represents a stage in the development of the Upāsanā portion of the Upanishad teaching at which some leaders of society while accepting the foundamental doctrine of the Upanishads and also the original Sāṁkhya theory of the genesis of the world, set their face directly against the tendency to shake off social responsibilities with a view to create a congenial atmosphere for the attainment of the final beatitude by preaching that the evil lay not in the objects of the world which were as good manifestations of the Supreme Soul as the individual soul itself but in the mind of the individual, that therefore it was not absolutely necessary nor even desirable for the average man to abandon the rites which he is called upon by his position in life to perform that the right course of conduct was to do one's duty for the sake of duty without caring for its result and that the effect of doing so was to purify the mind of all the dross collected therein in innumerable previous births and thus prepare it for the reflection therein of the light of knowledge as in a clean mirror.

(12) *Rise of Buddhism, Jainism and Materialism.*

We have yet seen only one side of the upheaval of the social fabric which had set in as the result of the spread of the Upanishad teaching. It had its another side as well and that was that the contempt for the Vedic ceremonials which the said teaching had inculcated drove some people to disregard all the traditional lore and to strike out new paths for spiritual development. The two such powerful attempts which have left permanent marks on the religious and philosophical history of India were those made by Gautama Buddha and Vardhamān Mahavīra. Both of them agreed with the Vedic philosophers in believing that the soul of man was subject to transmigration from one birth to another endlessly, that some spiritual course must be gone through in order to free it from the cycle thereof and that the performance of Vedic sacrifices hampered rather than helped one in the pursuit of that ideal. They did not however agree as to one particular course to be adopted. Moreover while the followers of the Vedas did not admit to their spiritual order the members of the S'ūdra caste, the non-Vedic leaders freely admitted them to their orders. Lastly, the former preached their doctrines in Sanskrit while the latter preached theirs in the local languages of the people. These two became therefore the founders of two distinct religions known as Buddhism and Jainism besides two distinct systems of philosophy. Brief accounts of these two systems of philosophy will be found in the *Notes* at pp. 22-25 and 25-26 respectively.

The views of these two philosophers were not however very dangerous and therefore we do not meet with any direct attacks on them in the *Bhagawadgitā*, though there are indirect thrusts at them as the pursuers of non-S'āstric ways of salvation at the end of Chapter XVI and in Chapter XVII of that work. The class of philosophers whose views were very

dangerous was that of the Chārvākas, a brief account whereof will be found at pp. 20-22 of the *Notes*. Nothing has however been said there as to how their doctrine could have originated. As to that the doctrine that the body is the Self and that therefore the aim of life should be to eat, drink and enjoy to surfeit seems to be the "Upanishat" said in *Chhāndogya VIII. 8. 4-5* to have been disseminated by Virochana, very probably the father of King Bali who was driven to the nether regions by Upendra otherwise known as the Dwarf incarnation of Vishṇu and the son of Prahlad whose intense devotion to Vishṇu whom his father Hiranyakas'ipu hated, has served as an example to several devotees throughout the long period which has elapsed since the *Vishṇupurāṇa* was composed. There is a covert reference to this doctrine in the *S'wetās'watara*, and it is described in details in the *Mahābhārata*. In Chapter 108 of the Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa of the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmikī the sage Jābāli is represented to have tried to persuade Bharata to go back from the forest and enjoy the kingdom, on preaching a doctrine which very much resembles that of the Chārvākas. The *Bhagawadgītā* while setting forth in Chapter XVI the beliefs and conduct which go to make up what is called Āsurī Sampat describes exactly the same beliefs and conduct as were characteristic of the Āsura kings Hiraṇyāks'a, Hiraṇyakas'ipu, Sahasrārjuna, Bāṇāsura, Narakāsura and others who are referred to in the *Mahābhārata*, and *Vis'hṇupurāṇa*.[1] The sage Vyāsa has through the mouth of S'rī Krishṇa condemned these Epicureans of India in the most scathing terms. That he felt the necessity for doing so is a strong proof of the existence of a large number of powerful people holding such beliefs and acting up to them in his time. Tradition ascribes the origin of this doctrine to a man named Chārvāka but no more information is available about him except what is given in the *Notes*. Like all the other ancient original thinkers he himself does not seem to have composed any work embodying a systematic exposition of his doctrine but one of his two disciples, named Brihaspati is reputed to have composed a Sūtra work which too is not now available so far as I am aware and therefore information about it had to be gathered from the works of the other schools.

(13) Fundamental Doctrine of the Bhagawadgītā.

Although the term 'Vedāntas' signifies the Upanishads, and the adherents of the Vedānta school are otherwise known as the Aupanishadas, the *Bhagawadgītā* too has, from the time of S'ankarachārya onwards, been looked upon by them as containing the quintessence of their doctrine and is therefore respected by them as one of their three Prasthānas (works forming the starting-point or basis of a doctrine). Thus for instance, in one of the 9 verses containing a course of meditation (Dhyāna) to be gone through as a part of the ceremony to be performed

1. For a similar view of the contents of Ch. XVI. of the Bhagawadgītā, see *Belvalkar and Ranade's History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. Ch. X pp. 463-64.*

prior to the commencement of its recitation, it has been described as a cloud "showering the nectar of Advaitism" (Advaitāmritavarshiṇi) and in another, all the Upanishads have been compared to cows, S'rī Krishṇa to a milkman milching them, Arjuna to a calf and a man of good intellect to a person enjoying the milk in the form of the nectar of the teaching contained in the *Gītā*. S'ankarāchārya and the other Āchāryas such as Rāmānuja, Madhwa, Nimbārka and Vallabha have written Bhāshyas thereon in order to establish that the teaching contained therein is exactly in accordance with that contained in the Upanishads as interpreted by them. It must therefore be given its due importance in a historical survey of the Vedānta doctrine. It has already been drawn upon freely because of its being one of the few ancient works on the Yoga philosophy which have survived the devastating flood of time. Nothing has however been stated yet as to its fundamental doctrine.

As to that it is a work in eighteen chapters of uneven lengths containing in all 700 verses ever since the time of S'ankarāchārya at least. It is one of the several episodes which being almost independent works have been incorporated into the Great Epic of India in order to establish its importance as the fifth Veda or a mine of knowledge on all subjects of human interest, meant for the benefit of those who have no access to the original four Vedas. In the first chapter and the first 10 verses of the second the sage Vyāsa graphically describes the scene on the field of battle on the first day as it appeared to Arjuna the principal warrior on the side of the Pāṇḍavas and lays the foundation for the philosophical dissertation which is to follow, by saying that the said warrior expressed to his distinguished charioteer S'ri Krishṇa his disinclination to fight his own kith and kin who had arrayed themselves on the battlefield, as he was overpowered by remorse at the thought that many dire consequences would follow from such an internecine struggle. It is in order to remove this spirit of despondency which had ceased Arjuna that the S'rī Krishṇa commenced to disabuse his mind of the wrong notions which were its cause. That attempt continues from Ch. II. 11 to Ch. XVIII. 72. In verse 73 of the latter Arjuna is represented to have submitted completely to the will of his teacher which was the same as that of the Almighty and agreed to act up to his word. With the remaining five verses we are not concerned. The teaching above spoken of is quite in accord with the nature of the beginning middle and end of the work. Arjuna begins to fight as the result thereof. This means that it must have as its aim the inculcation of the doctrine that one must continue to do from a sense of duty the acts which one is required to do agreeably to one's position in life and that if one does so, one is not tainted by the fruits thereof but on the contrary, is freed from the cycle of births or deaths. That it is so has not been gainsaid even by that great champion of the renunciation-theory, S'ankarāchārya. He however controverts and refutes the theory that salvation can be attained

by the simultaneous pursuit of knowledge and active life and strongly maintains not only that it can be attained by knowledge alone but also that even the *Bhagawadgītā* holds that forth as the highest truth and reconciles that view with the repeated saying of S'rī Krishṇa that it is not desirable to abandon works necessitated by one's station in life and that what is desirable is only a change in the angle of vision, by saying that Arjuna was a Madhyamādhikāri for whom renunciation was dangerous rather than beneficial and that renunciation for an Uttamādhikāri is not precluded thereby. Similarly he maintains that even according to the *Bhagawadgītā*, Brahma is without form and without limbs and that the best course is to meditate on it and sink one's individuality in it but that since that kind of meditation is not possible for everybody S'ri Krishṇa has repeatedly recommended the easier course which is to meditate upon Saguṇa Brahma in his own form and sink his individuality in Him. This view appears to have been borne out by the contents of Ch. III. 1-3, IV. 32-41, Ch. V. 1, Ch. VII and especially verses 16–19 thereof, Ch. VIII. 18-22, X. 11, XII. 3-5, and XIII. 2, 7-11, 31. And just as Vyāsa has not forgotten the Uttamādhikāri though Arjuna was a Madhyamādhikāri it appears from Ch. IV. 33-41, IX. 30-32 and XII. 9-11 that he has not also forgotten the Kanishṭādhikāris and even the Anadhikāris of various grades. The author of the *Bhagawadgītā* has thus been so magnanimous as to recommend ways of salvation for all the diverse grades of human beings from the most abstract meditator to the most dull-headed materialist, from the most rigid self-disciplinarian to the variest libertine and from the believer in Nirguna Brahma only to the believer in ghosts and goblins and it is just because of that that no other work in the Indian religious literature can claim so much popularity as it.

When the work is viewed in this light, the doctrine found running through it may be summed up thus:—Parabrahma is the Highest Essence. It is above all limitations of time, space and causality and is therefore incapable of being defined in any other way except in the language of contradictions. It is thus Nirguṇa and Nirākāra when looked at from the standpoint of the absolute truth and Saguṇa and Sākāra when looked at from the standpoint of the relative truth. In the first there is no room for any other substance but in the other there is room for the multifarious phenomena. That phenomena is the result of the permutations and combinations of the three Guṇas of Prakriti, which is the divine Māyā of Brahma or Is'wara personified in the person of S'rī Krishṇa. Thus there is nothing either on the earth or in the heavens or in the mid-air which is free from the predominance of the one or the other of these Guṇas. The aim of an aspirant should be to rise above the power of these three Guṇas and realize the absolute nature of the Self between which and Brahma there is no essential difference. This can be realized by the increase of the Saṭṭwa element

in one's nature which helps one to concentrate one's attention on the soul. This is done by observing restrictions in diet, movements, thought, speech &c. and by meditation on the Absolute as instructed by a competent Guru approached meekly. Ultimately attachment towards the Sattwa element also should be shaken off, for Brahma is above all the Guṇas.

As this is possible only in the case of the highly meritorious and indifferent and that too after an effort continued for several births, an easier way for an average aspirant is to meditate on the visible symbols of Brahma in the universe such as the earth, fire, sea, wind &c. in the inanimate creation and human beings, beasts, birds, insects &c. in the animate world, to proceed upon the belief that all the objects are produced from it, reside in it and will ultimately be absorbed in it, that the individual soul has emanated from it, that so has the Prakriti, the primordial matter, that it is also inside everything as a thread is inside beads, that he alone is the right seer who sees unity in diversity, that Brahma is the only undivided one amongst the divided, self-illumined and the illuminator of all objects, that it makes itself manifest specifically in some objects and some human beings and that it also becomes incarnated at times in one form or another according to necessity. Such meditation accompanied by the observance of the same rules of conduct as are prescribed for the highest aspirant prepares one for the grace of the Almighty which being showered one's innate ignorance is dispelled and the knowledge of the Essence shines forth in all its glory. An alternative and still easier way of salvation is to believe in Vāsudeva-Krishna as the special incarnation of the Almighty and worship Him. This worship does not consist in performing elaborate ceremonies but in offering with devotion whatever is possible and above all in giving up selfish pursuits, doing all acts necessary for the pilgrimage of life to continue uninterrupted, only from a sense of duty and never expecting the enjoyment of their fruits. True renunciation consists in thus changing one's outlook on life rather than in forsaking one's domestic, social, national and religious duties because complete inaction is not possible for an embodied soul, the body with its five organs of action and five of knowledge and the mind and intellect being so constituted as to keep the soul active either physically or mentally except when temporarily necessary for resuscitating one's energy after over-work. Inaction is good in itself as conducive to the state of final beatitude by turning the mind to the pursuit of true knowledge but that term is not capable of an easy definition and has therefore baffled many an astute thinker. A real philosopher is one who sees action in inaction and inaction in action and goes on attending to his duties without caring for the fruits accruing from the discharge thereof. If we go deeper still we find that as a matter of fact the inner self of man is not the real doer of actions, the elements necessary for the performance thereof being (1) the body, (2) the ego (3) the means (4) the diverse movements and (5) a supernatural force of a good or evil nature. It is the last that many a time leads man to

act without thinking or against his best judgment. One remains subject to it in proportion as one allows himself to be swayed by passions and emotions which are the outcome of a latent desire for sense-objects, a veritable Moloch who consumes everything and is never satiated. The soul is covered over by it as fire by smoke, a mirror by dirt, a fœtus by a womb. Though the soul is essentially of the nature of knowledge, it becomes ignorant as it were owing to its being enveloped by this darkness brought on by desire. The latter is therefore the real enemy of man and must be destroyed by bringing under one's control the senses, the mind and the intellect which are its seats, holding firmly the belief that the soul transcends even the intellect. When the seed of desire is thus scorched, man ceases to feel himself miserable and is not tormented by the pairs of opposites and his mind keeps its balance firmly and the knowledge derived from the Scriptures is retained therein permanently. After that state is reached it is not necessary to perform the rites prescribed by the Vedas because knowledge itself is a sacrifice wherein Brahma is the fire, Brahma the oblation offered in it, Brahma the god to whom it is offered and Brahma the goal to be reached. This knowledge can be acquired by one who humbly approaches and serves a preceptor well-versed in it. After it is imparted to him, it kindles the fire within and that is never extinguished. If any actions are done thereafter, as they must be so long as the physical body is there, they do not affect the soul in the least.

There are men of weaker intellect who would not find the above process suitable or practicable. For them the easier way to salvation is to resign themselves completly to the Almighty in the form of Vasudeva-Krishṇa and submit to His will in all respects or at least to abandon all the fruits of actions is His favour. If they follow it, He in the exercise of His divine grace will keep them unaffected by the results of their actions and raise them up to the state of liberation through knowledge. They have neither to bother themselves about the philosophy of knowledge nor that of action. Complete self-resignation is by itself sufficient for the Almighty to confer His grace on them, purify their hearts and kindle the lamp of knowledge within them, whether they think of it or not.

Those who adore other gods, also adore the Almighty through them and get the fruits of their meritorious acts from Him through them. They cannot however be freed from the cycle of births and deaths because their visions and ideals are limited. Those on the other hand who adore ghosts and goblins or depend solely upon man-power are condemned to hell i. e. to say, unending cycles of births and deaths in various kinds of bodies.

Ignoring the ways of the last two classes of persons who are not on the path of salvation at all we can summarise the result of the teaching of the *Gita* in this manner that it recommends three ways of salvation, namely (1) that of knowledge to which the practice of Yoga is ancillary (2) that of devotion to Saguṇa Brahma in the impersonal or personal form to which

the attendance to one's worldly duties on knowing the real nature of action is ancillary and (3) the path of action to which the unqualified devotion to the Almighty is ancillary. It does not thus side with those who advocated exclusively either the path of knowledge or that of action and there is a reasonable basis for the belief that it advocated a Samuchchaya (mixture) of knowledge and action in one sense because even in the case of the first, action in the form of the practice of Yoga was held to be necessary, but when we reflect deeper we find that it does not advocate a Samuchchaya of Karma with the ultimate knowledge of the identity of the individual with the Supreme Soul which is the cause of liberation in the case of all the paths. That is not the same as the knowledge referred to in the first path. The latter presupposes duality *i. e.* to say, it is such knowledge only as would serve to enable one to distinguish between the Self and the non-selfs, a distinction which involves the separate existence of a knower, a thing to be known and a means of knowledge. This distinction must subsequently be merged in the unity of the whole and the identity of Self in the body with the Brahma in the world outside and roundabout it, wherein there can be no such distinction and therefore no scope for action. The knowledge thereof arises from the Mahāvākya as the fruit of the completion of any of the three courses above-mentioned.

Madhusūdana Saraswatī has, in his *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* which is a gloss on S'ankara's *Bhāshya on the Gītā*, faithfully interpreted the *Bhāshya.* He has repeatedly stated that his aim in composing that gloss was to explain the intention of the Bhāshyakāra which cannot be gathered by men of dull intellects.[1] This is borne out by the fact that though in the first of the introductory verses he declares that it is his intention to explain the *Gītā* word for word[2], he does not enter into a discussion as to false interpretations made by others on the ground that they had been refuted by the Bhāshyakāra[3]. I have however noticed that at two places[4] he differs from

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१. भाष्यकारमतसारदर्शिना ग्रन्थमात्रमिह योज्यते मया ।
आशयो भगवतः प्रकाश्यते केवलं स्ववचसो विशुद्धये ॥ गूढार्थ. (आ. सं. सि.) पृ. ९७ ॥
भगवत्पूज्यपादानामभिप्रायोऽयमीरितः ।
अनिष्णाततया भाष्ये दुरापो मन्दबुद्धिभिः ॥ सैव. पृ. ४५९ ॥
श्रीगोविन्दमुखारविन्दमधुना मिष्टं महाभारते
गीताख्यं परमं रहस्यमृषिणा व्यासेन विख्यापितम् ।
व्याख्यातं भगवत्पदैः प्रतिपदं श्रीशङ्कराख्यैः पुन-
र्विस्पष्टं मधुसूदनेन मुनिना स्वज्ञानशुद्ध्यै कृतम् ॥ सैव. पृ. ५१७ ॥

२. भगवत्पादभाष्यार्थमालोच्यातिप्रयत्नतः ।
प्रायः प्रतिपदं कुर्वे गीतागूढार्थदीपिकाम् ॥ सैव. पृ. १ ॥

३. भाष्यकारैर्निरस्तानि दुर्मतानीह विस्तरात् ।
ग्रन्थव्याख्यानमात्रार्थी न तदर्थमहं यते ॥ सैव. पृ. ५११ ॥

४. *Gūḍhārtha. under the Bhāshya on Bh. G. III. 20 and XVI. 29. (Ā. S. S. pp. 113 and 216).*

the latter but that is due to the influence on his mind of the views of the authors of the *Vārttika* and *Yogavās'ishṭha* which we will consider in their proper places.

(14) *Doctrines of the Upanishads and Bhagawadgītā Compared.*

When we compare the above doctrine with that deduced from the Upanishads we find that while there is a substantial agreement between them as to the nature of Brahma, the individual soul and phenomena and their mutual relations, and the path of knowledge described in both, there is a difference between them as to the method of devotion, for while in the former the object is either Brahma in the abstract or in any of its concrete manifestations in the world or in the human body, what is specially recommended in the latter as such an object is the personality of Vāsudeva-Krishṇa and there is in it nothing corresponding to the philosophy of Karma which we find in the latter. This was due to the altered conditions of Aryan Society above referred to. In his attempt to meet them and find a way out for dissuading people from either forsaking their homes for the pursuit of knowledge or from being complete materialists and thus destroying the social fabric Vyāsa went behind the express teaching contained in the Upanishads and on reflecting over the state of society in the age in which the Brāhmaṇa and Ks'atriya sages who are narrated to have carried on discussions in sacrificial and royal assemblies, actually lived, hit upon the truth that in the old days while there were some who went to the forests and thought over the problems of philosophy while living in hermitages there were also others who did so while continuing to attend to their family and social duties and on further reflecting as to how it could have been possible for the latter to do so, worked out the theory of Karma-yoga as above explained and thus opened out an easier way of salvation for those who had a desire to secure it but were not inclined to give up their daily pursuits. And for the general mass he found out a still easier method of self-resignation in favour of S'rī Krishṇa who had already been believed by a large number of his contemporaries to be an embodiment of the Almighty. As already stated, S'ankara made room in his Advaita doctrine for these innovations. That he was already a great devotee of Vishṇu and believed S'rī Krishṇa to be a complete incarnation thereof will be shown later on when we come to his time and work in life.

(15) *Formation of the Philosophical Systems other than the Vedānta.*

The spirit of revolt against the cult of sacrifices and the tendency to free-thinking which had been engendered by the Upanishad teaching had already given rise to two independent groups of men under the leaderships of Gautama Buddha and Vardhamāna Mahavīra and by their admission of the lay public to their ascetic orders they had already been recognized as the founders of two independent systems of philosophy and religions. They themselves never committed, their teachings to writing but their followers

subsequently met together discussed, arranged and wrote out their sayings with illustrations. These writings become known as the *Tripīṭhakas* in the case of the Bauddhas and *Āgamas* in the case of the Jainas and were used by them respectively as their sacred texts as the Purāṇas written under the influence of the Sāmkhya doctrine were used by the followers of the Vedas. In course of time and before the time of composition of the *Brahmasūtras*, the third Prasthāna of the Vedānta system, the Bauddha and Jain religions had attracted to themselves some of the best brains of the times and they having developed their argumentative faculty to a great extent had so mercilessly attacked the Vedic religion as to shake its very foundation. Its votaries were therefore compelled to justify it by a resort to logic in addition to the authoritative texts. As between themselves too there arose differences of opinion as to how much weight to be given to the former and how much to the latter. The Vais'eshikas and the Tārkikas or Naiyāyikas led by Kaṇāda and Aks'apāda respectively paid homage to the Vedas only in name and relied mainly on reason for establishing their views. By so doing they succeeded only in establishing the Ārambha-vāda (creation-theory) wherein the Almighty was a mere mechanic. The Sāṁkhayas and Pātañjalas headed by Pañchas'ikha and Patañjali respectively gave a greater weight to the Vedic texts as a means of knowledge and succeeded in establishing the Pariṇāma-vāda (evolution-theory) wherein the Almighty was a mere superintendent. Lastly, the Mīmāñsakas headed by Jaimini Bādarāyaṇa and others completely subordinated reason to the textual authority and succeeded in establishing the Vivarta-vāda (illusory appearance-theory) wherein the Almighty Himself appeared as the world-phenomena. Although these two philosophers are at present believed to have been the founders of two separate systems, there is no doubt as to their being in perfect agreement as to an intelligent entity named Brahma being the material and instrumental cause of the worlds, as to the individual soul being in essence the same as Brahma and as to the knowledge thereof derived from the Vedas being the means of salvation of the individual soul. They therefore fixed upon certain rules for the interpretation of the Vedas and Jaimini thereout applied them to the Karmakāṇḍa (works) portion thereof and Bādarāyaṇa to its Jñānakāṇḍa (knowledge) portion. They differed however on certain other points one of which was whether it was knowledge accompanied by works or independent of them that led to salvation. Jaimini held the former view and it is not unlikely that in forming it he was influenced by the doctrine of Karmayoga recommended so emphatically in the *Bhagawadgītā* for the general body of aspirants for freedom. According to that view, such works as are enjoined by the Vedas for performance daily by the twice-born must be performed without any motive to gain the fruits thereof, upto the end of one's physical existence and the primary end of the Vedas was to lay down injunctions and such texts as were devoted to an exposition of the nature of Brahma were ancillary to them because even its direct knowledge could not be acquired without

meditation which too was an act enjoined by some of the Upanishad texts. Bādarāyaṇa on the other hand did not see the necessity of doing works even in the state of an aspirant, much less in that of a liberated soul and believed that while Jaimini's view as to the purport of the Vedas was true so far as the Karmakāṇḍa portion was concerned it was not as regards the Jñānakāṇḍa portion *i. e.* to say, the Upanishads or the Vedāntas. Hence while Jaimini evolved a system of philosophy out of the former, Bādarayaṇa did so out of the latter. But they were looked upon as complements of each other and forming parts of one system because of the above points of similarity. This is sufficiently clear from the respect shown by the authors of the two Dars'anas for the views of the other. We thus come to the conclusion that when the *Brahmasūtras* were composed the Vais'eshikha, Nyāya, Sāṁkhya and Yoga existed as separate systems but the two branches of the Mīmāñsā system, Pūrva and Uttara, of the latter whereof it is a Dars'ana, had not yet been separated. Now we turn to that work itself.

(16) *Brahmasūtras.*

The author of this work is Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa. He must have flourished at a time posterior to Kapila[1], Kaṇāda[2], Aks'apāda[3] and Patanjali[4] from amongst the Brāhmaṇa philosophers and Nāgārjuna, Buddhaghosha and several other Buddhist philosophers[5] and been a contemporary of Jaimini,[6] Ātreya,[7] Ās'marathya,[8] Auḍulomi,[9] Kārs'ṇājini,[10] Kās'akritsna,[11] and Bādari[12]. He has been identified in some works, notably the *Bhāgawatpurāṇa* with Krishṇadwaipāyana Vyāsa but it seems from the *S'ārīrakabhāshya*[13] that S'ankara at least did not consider the two sages to be identical for he refers to Krishṇadwaipāyana by the names Vedavyāsa, Vyāsa and Dwaipāyana besides that name itself and at one place[14] says that he was born at

1. *Brahmasūtra I. 1. 5 to II. 1. 11.*
2. *Ibid. I. 4. 28; II. 1. 12.*
3. *Ibid. II. 1. 4–11.*
4. *Ibid. II. 1. 3.*
5. *Ibid. II. 2. 18–27.*
6. *Ibid. I. 2. 28; I. 2. 31; I. 3. 31; I. 4. 18; III. 2. 40; III. 4. 2-7; III. 4. 18; III. 4. 40; IV. 1. 17; IV. 3. 12; IV. 4. 5; IV. 4. 11.*
7. *Ibid. III. 4. 44.*
8. *Ibid. I. 2. 29; I. 4. 20.*
9. *Ibid. I. 4. 21; III. 4. 45; IV. 4. 6.*
10. *Ibid. III. 1. 9.*
11. *Ibid. I. 4. 22.*
12. *Ibid I. 2. 30; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 10.*
13. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 3-29; I. 3-33; II. 3-29; II. 3-47; III. 3-32 (N. S. P. edition) pp. 331, 346, 609, 624, 817.*
14. *Ibid. on Br. Sū. III. 3. 32 (The same edition p. 817).*

the junction of the Dwāpara and Kali Yugas and apparently treats him as a very ancient Smriti writer of great fame while he refers to Bādarāyaṇa by the terms Bhagwān Sūtrakāra, Āchārya and Bādarāyaṇāchārya and treats him as a comperatively modern writer.[1] Whatever the truth may be as to that question, this much is certain that the latter was the father of the great Yogī S'uka, whose name has been made immortal by the author of the present redaction of the *Bhāgawatpurāṇa*, because he is there frequently referred to as Bādarāyaṇi.

As to the contents of that work, it has been divided into four Adhyāyas (chapters) and each of them is again sub-divided into four Pādas (sections). Each of these Pādas has again been further sub-divided by the Bhās'yakāras into several Adhikaraṇas (sets of arguments) made up of Sūtras (aphoristic statements) whose number varies according to the nature of the topic dealt with therein. There is no uniformity also in the number of words in each Sūtra. They vary according to the exigencies of the context and there is no other mutual connection between the different Sūtras making up an Adhikaraṇa except the logical one. The Sūtra style is not thus a species of the poetic style but of the prose style. The Sūtras are in fact condensed prose sentences from which as many parts of speech are omitted as could, in the author's view, be done without detriment to the sense intended to be conveyed. They are therefore just like the short-hand notes of the lectures of a professor to his pupils. The *Brahmasūtras* are thus the short-hand notes of the lectures on the teaching contained in the Upanishads delivered by the sage Bādarāyaṇa to his disciples. If therefore they are written in long-hand they would make a digest of the Upanishads of the first two groups mentioned above, made by the said sage who was one of the numerous teachers who tought the Vedānta doctrine in their Ās'ramas. Dr. Belvalkar thinks it probable that there was originally one Brahmasūtra of each S'ākhā of each Veda before the time of the *Bhagawādgītā*, that thus there was originally a *Chhāndogya Brahmasūtra*, that it was expanded into a Sarvas'ākhīya Sūtra about 300 B. C. and that it recieved its present form about the beginning of the Christian era.[2] Now if this view is well-founded, as it appears to be from the evidence that has been marshalled in support of it, it means that just as each S'ākhā of each Veda had originally its own Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Upanishad, it had also its own Brahmasūtra. And if each had its Brahmasūtra it is equally probable that it had also its Karmamīmāṅsāsūtra embodying the principles regulating its own rituals. None of the Prātis'ākhiya Brahmasūtras or Karmamīmāṅsā-

1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 1. 2; (p. 83), II. 1. 14 (p. 462); II. 1. 37 (p. 485); II. 2. 42 (p. 573); III. 1. 1. (p. 658); III. 3. 28 (p. 783); III. 3. 57 (p. 860); III. 4. 1. (p. 869); III. 4. 19 (p. 879); III. 4. 34 (p. 905); IV. 1. 12 (p. 950); IV. 1. 17 (p. 961); IV. 2. 1. (p. 966); IV. 3. 2 (p. 988); IV. 3. 14 (p. 997); IV. 4. 7 (p. 1009).*

2. *Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy Vol. I. pp. 144-46.*

sūtras has however been yet brought to light so far as I am aware and therefore the solution of the question whether there were or were not such works in existence, cannot go beyond the range of probabilities. However when we consider together the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṇsā Sūtras it seems clear that it was not Bādarāyaṇa alone in his age who had been thinking over the problems of philosophy but there were several other heads of institution also who had been doing so and who while agreeing with him on certain fundamental dogmas differed from him and from one another on certain minor ones. Thus we find the authors of both these works referring to the views of Bādari[1], Kārs'ṇājini[2], Ātreya[3] and Ās'marathya[4], besides those of each other[5]. Although therefore the extant *Brahmasūtras* are, so to say, the notes of lectures delivered by Bādarāyaṇa they represent, with slight differences of opinion therein-noted, the views on philosophy of the Mīmānsā school as a whole as it existed prior to its sub-divison into two water-tight compartments. I propose to give a short synopsis thereof in order to give an idea of what those views are.

The first four Sūtras of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya which is named Samanvayādhyāya (Chapter on Sequence), form, as it were, an introduction to the remaining portion of the work. It is therein stated that it is proposed to minister to the need of those who wish to know Brahma—the cause from which the world was produced, in which it rests and in which it will be absorbed, that the means for knowing it is the Scriptures[6] and that the teaching contained therein must be gathered on settling the connected sequence of the various texts which lie scattered and which in some cases seem to point to views opposed to one another. The remaining portion of the first Adhyāya is devoted to establishing the view that Brahma is, according to all, the cause both material and instrumental, of the universe though the words used to designate it are various such as "Ātmā" "Ānandamaya", "Purusha in the solar disc", "Ākās'a" "Prāṇa", "Jyoti" &c., the specific objects denoted by them being but limited manifestations thereof, and to refute the Sāṁkhya view that the cause of the universe is the

1. *Pū. Mī. Sū. III. 1. 3., VI .1. 27, VIII. 3. 6; IX. 2. 33; Br. Sū. I. 2. 30; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 10.*

2. *Pū. Mī. Sū. IV. 3. 17; VI. 7. 36.; Br. Sū. III. 1. 9.*

3. *Pū. Mī. Sū. VI. 1. 26; Br. Sū. III. 4. 44.*

4. *Pū. Mī. Sū. VI. 5. 26; Br. Sū. I. 2. 29; I. 4. 20.*

5. *Pū. Mī. Sū. I. 1. 5; V. 2. 19; VI. 1. 8; X. 8. 44; XI. 1. 16; Br. Sū. I. 2. 28; I. 2. 31; I. 3. 31; I. 4. 18; III. 2. 40; III. 4. 2-7; III. 4. 18; III. 4. 40; IV. 1. 17; IV. 3. 12; IV. 4. 5; IV. 4. 11.*

6. By the terms "Scriptures" is here meant the *Upanishads* and such of the *Smritis* as may have been composed in accordance with the doctrine contained in the *Upanishads* e. g. those of Manu, Vyāsa and others and also the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhagawadgītā*, so far as the views expressed therein are not in conflict with that gathered from the *Upanishads*.

inert primeval substance called Pradhāna. It is also established there by a consideration of the various Upanishad texts on which the Sāmkhyas and Smritikāras such as Devala and others relied that their doctrine is not deducible from those texts, that the terms Mahat, Avyakta, Triguṇā &c. are not found to have been used in the Upanishads in the senses adopted in the Sāmkhyas'āstra and that Brahma is not simply the instrumental but also the material cause of the universe.

The second Adhyāya named Avirodhādhyāya (Chapter on Consistency) aims at establishing that the view propounded in the first is not inconsistent with the writings of certain ancient sages such as Manu, Vyāsa and others, that such portions of the Sāmkhya and Yoga Smritis as are not consistent with the doctrine as gathered from the Upanishads should not be given any weight because there is no knowing where unbridled human intellect would lead and one is at a loss to know which sage to follow when the opinions of different sages vary, that it is necessary to resort to logic within that limit in order to be convinced of the truth, that when that is done it appears that the view of the Upanishad sages that Brahma alone is both the instrumental and material cause of the universe is perfectly logical and that the reasonings of the propounders of the other doctrines such as the Vais'eshikas, Bauddhas, Jainas, Māheswaras, Naiyāyikas, Pāñcharātrikas or Bhāgawatas, are not sound. The author further distinguishes Brahma from the elements thus:—Space and air are products but Brahma is not. The other elements, light water and earth are also products. These are produced from Brahma in the order of space, air, light, water and earth. Their involution also takes place in the inverse order but Brahma or Ātmā which existed before evolution remains over after involution also. Similarly the intellect, mind, senses &c. are also produced in order but the Ātmā is neither produced nor destroyed because it is eternal. Speaking further of the nature of Brahma he says:—It is not atomic but all-pervading. There is only one such Chaitanya and that is Brahma but it acquires individuality owing to its coming in contact with the attributes of the intellect or the inner organ. The powers of knowing and action are due to this contact. The individual's source of these powers in the state of ignorance is Brahma to whom it stands in the same relation as a part to a whole or a spark to fire as stated in the Upanishads and the *Bhagawadgītā*. Injunctions and prohibitions bind the soul only because of its connection with the body. Therefore they cease to bind him when it is free from the body. The difference between one individual and another is like that between one reflection and another of the same sun in a basin of water. Just as the disc of the sun remains unaffected by the muddiness of water, its motion &c. so Brahma, who is the Self of all, remains unaffected by the Upādhis but the individual souls are like the reflections in water. Then referring to the organism of the body the Sūtrakāra says:—There

are in the body eleven Prāṇas doing their work within limited spheres through the powers of their presiding deities. One of them is the principle one on which the connection between the soul and the body depends, while the others which are the powers behind the five organs of action and the five of knowledge have their own individual characteristics and functions. The assignment of names and forms is due to the Almighty not the individual soul because it has been said in a Vaidic text that the Almighty said "Let me make them tripartite". The question of the transformation of the elements into the flesh, fat, blood &c. in the human body being a subject by itself is not discussed in a philosophical treatise like this.

The third chapter called Sādhanādhyāya (Chapter on the Means) is principally devoted to an exposition of the Vedānta doctrine as to the means for the realization of Brahma but the following incidental points are first established therein, namely:—What passes away at death is the Jīwa, the regulator of the principal Prāṇa together with senses and the mind and the bundles of Karmas. It goes to the region of the moon or the sun by a dark or a lighted path, according to its Karmas. Some Jīwas repair to any of the seven Narakas according to the same law of Karma. On the exhaustion of meritorious acts, they return to the earth through the space, air, clouds &c. and take fresh births in any of the four ways, again according to their Karmas, as insects, birds, beasts, human beings &c. The objects seen in a dream have no objective existence. The dream-phenomena is however sometimes suggestive of coming events of the waking state. In the state of deep sleep the soul enjoys rest in a vein called Purītat which covers over the inner organ. On its being dissociated from the mind, senses &c. it becomes joined to the Almighty. But owing to the force of Karma it again returns to the waking state and remembers previous experiences. In the state of stupification there is a quasi-union with the Almighty Brahma. Brahma is not both Saguṇa and Nirguṇa but Nirguṇa only, though there are texts in the Upanishads describing it on the one hand as the doer of all actions &c. and on the other as not possessed of any dimensions &c., because one and the same thing cannot be possessed of two opposite characteristics. The different forms thereof as the one having four feet, sixteen parts &c. are spoken of only for the purpose of Upāsanā and really speaking it is one whole and undivided. If Brahma were possessed of forms and limbs those texts which speak of it as being without form and without limbs would be meaningless while on the other hand if it is believed to be as a matter of fact of the latter sort but having been spoken of at times as of the former sort for the purpose of worship, that difficulty is avoided. It appears as having distinct forms because of intervening conditions just as the sun appears divided when the passage of its rays is obstructed. There are distinct S'ruti and Smriti texts expressly speaking of Brahma as not being a fit subject of speech, being different from all that can be known by the senses, being devoid of all

activity and being placidity incarnate. It is for that very reason that its manifestations in several objects are compared to the reflections of the sun in water, whose change of conditions leaves unaffected the solar disc itself. The thing of which there is a denial in the text "Hence it has been said, not this, not this" is the phenomena or duality. This denial makes room for something different from it and that is Brahma. Then coming to the subject proper the Sūtrakāra says:—This Brahma can be seen or realized by Bhakti or Dhyāna. The same Brahma is the giver of the fruits of action, though according to Jaimini the actions bear fruits from their very nature. The Vidyās such as Paryaṅkavidyā, Upakosala-vidyā, Daharavidyā, Madhuvidyā, S'āṇḍilyavidyā &c. tought in different Upanishads relate to the same Brahma, though they themselves are different. Brahma has all the qualities which are severally spoken of in those works so far as Upāsanā is concerned. Those who follow the Vidyās relating to Saguṇa Brahma go to different regions such as Ādityaloka, Agniloka, &c. by the path of light after casting off the fruits of all good and bad actions which are thereafter enjoyed by other people or destroyed. Those who follow the Nirguṇavidyā or Paramātmavidyā have not to go anywhere but are finally absolved on their attaining perfection in that Vidyā. There is a possibility of rebirth so long as complete perfection is not attained but not thereafter. Sometimes completely freed souls voluntarily take births or enter other bodies in order to achieve particular ends. There is no doubt about the existence of a soul distinct from the body and therefore there is scope for the science of final beatitude. In the case of the Vidyās which lead to the same end namely, the visualization of God in a state of trance, it is left to the option of the devotee which to resort to but in the case of those which are intended for some material gain such as the power to move about at will, one may either resort to all of them one by one for the acquisition of the various powers or be satisfied with one or more of them only. The knowledge of the Self is an independant end in itself. It is not ancillary to any Vaidic rites as was the view of Jaimini because the Vedas, besides teaching that the individual soul should perform certain rites, implying thereby that it is a limited agent possessing a physical body which is its instrument of action, say that there is a higher soul who is free from those duties and obligations to which the former is subject, who is devoid of all sin &c. and who should be known. Even the Brahmachāris and Sannyāsis are qualified to acquire this knowledge. They too should perform sacrifices, or make gifts or practice austerities. The Upāsanā of the Udgītha (Omkāra) has been ordained by the Upanishads in distinct terms and therefore it is not optional to do it. The Ākhyānas such as those of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyi in the *Brihadāranyaka*, Jānas'ruti Pautrāyaṇa in the *Chhāndogya* &c. are intended to help the teachings contained therein. The Karmas pertaining to the different Ās'ramas are necessary for the purpose of preparing the mind for the rise of

the desire for knowledge and once it has arisen one must practise restraint &c. As regards food and drink prohibited articles should be avoided except in case of a calamity likely to end in death. The performance of Vaidic Karmas is not an invariable condition precedent of a qualification for knowledge for there are instances of Vidhūra, Raikva, Vāchaknavī, Saṁvarta and others having acquired it though they had not been performing such Karmas. That fact can be explained on the assumption that they must have been repeating incantations, fasting, performing worship of God &c. which too prepare the mind for the rise of the desire for knowledge. There is no prohibition in the Upanishads against imparting the knowledge of Brahma to such persons. If those whose duty it is to observe strict celibacy and restraint in food, drink &c. are guilty of a deviation from the path of duty they ought to be discarded. One who has acquired that knowledge should behave like an infant i. e. to say, he should observe restraint in speech, eat what is given without being asked, behave in a candid manner, not entertain pride about his attainments &c. In the case of a qualified man following the pursuit of knowledge, it may arise in the birth in which it is commenced or in any subsequent birth if some impediments come in his way. While in the case of the Siddhis, there is a possibility of one soul getting a higher one than another, there is no such posibility in the case of final absolution because there are no grades in it.

The fourth chapter called Phalādhyāya (Chapter on the Fruits) is primarily concerned with a consideration of the fruit of knowledge but incidentally some other topics are also discussed therein. Thus for instance, it is said that it is necessary to make repetitions of S'ravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana because otherwise ignorance is likely to supervene so long as an Akhanḍākāravritti (uninterrupted consciousness of one's identity with Brahma) is not produced, that one should concentrate one's attention on the pure Self, it being identical with the Almighty, not on the Pratīkas (symbols) such as the mind, names, sun &c., because in the case of the latter looked upon as objects only one is apt to forget the true nature of Brahma, that the performance of Upāsanā should be made in a sitting posture, not in a walking, standing, running or lying one, that as to time, place and direction for it there is no particular rule, that therefore any Upāsanā that would conduce to the complete concentration of the mind on the one object of meditation may be chosen and that these Upāsanās are to be performed upto the time of death. Then as to the fruits the author says:—On the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahma, the past good and bad actions are destroyed and good and bad actions done in future do not bear any fruits and hence one who has known Brahma becomes necessarily freed from bondage on the fall of his body. Those actions which have already begun to yield fruits, one of which is the acquisition of knowledge itself, have necessarily to be enjoyed and it is only when they are exhausted that there occurs what is called death. The daily Karmas such

as Agnihotra &c. which a householder has necessarily to perform become helpful in that very cause. Just as such Karmas become helpful when joined with Upāsanā, they by themselves too are competent to purify the mind for the acquisition of the knowledge of the Essence. When those Karmas which have begun to yield fruits are exhausted by enjoyment till death, there occurs what is called Kaivalya (final absolution). Turning thereafter to the subject of the Devayāna by which the meritorious repair, the Sūtrakāra says:—Those who have advanced in knowledge and those who have not, both repair by that way but there is this difference that while the latter return to take another birth, the former attain final absolution. As to what goes out of the body he says that it is the substle body which is composed of the senses, vital breath, &c. and is the cause of heat in the gross body. Those who adore the Nirguṇa Brahma have not to repair anywhere but become merged in Para Brahma. The Jīwas of those who adore the Saguṇa Brahma rise up by the 101st. vein of the heart and having gone out of the physical bodies by the hole in the crown of the head reach Brahmaloka with the help of a light coming out of the front portion of the inner organ, whether the departure takes place in the Uttarāyana or Daks'iṇāyana. There is only one way for all the persons of that class, whatever the method of adoration adopted by them. The Varuṇa and other Lokas mentioned in the descriptions of the way are mere sign-posts, not places of halt for them because they are incapable of having any enjoyment owing to their senses having been bundled up together. This end is attained by those only who are not devoted to symbols. Those who are devoted to them get the specific fruits mentioned in the *Chhāndogyopanishat.* Coming to the question of what is meant when it is stated that one who has acquired the knowledge of Brahma attains the higher spiritual light, the Sūtrakāra has put forth the view that such a soul thenceforth becomes the absolute Self i. e. to say, it ceases to be affected by limitations and therefore to be distinct from Para Brahma. The author next refers to some of the Siddhis (supernatural powers) which those who devote themselves to some specific Vidyās mentioned in the Upanishads, are said to acquire. In doing so he says:—His departed ancestors appear before his mental eye merely by his will. He is his own master in that he is able to do anything at will. He can create numerous bodies which are not like wooden machines but full of life, ruled over by the same soul and have the same mind. Then referring to the probable objection that the Self having been stated to be pure, one and devoid of action, it is not possible to acquire such a power, the Sūtrakāra says that this absoluteness is spoken of only with reference to the state of deep sleep or of final absolution (S'ushupti or Kaivalya). As to whether the power above spoken of is restricted or unrestricted, he says that it is a restricted one in that it is subject to the order of the universe and is under the control of the Almighy who rules the universe and that though this is so, the souls who acquire them do not fall back but as stated above become merged in the Para Brahma at the end of the Kalpa.

The above is a short summary of the Vedānta doctrine of the age of Bādarāyaṇa. Most of the points mentioned therein seem to have been accepted by all the eight teachers above-mentioned. As regards the controversial ones which occur in the first, third and fourth chapters of the work they are:—(1) the significance of the term Vais'vānara in *Chhān. V. 11. 16-18*[1]; (2) the interpretation of the term Prādes'amātra in the same texts[2]; (3) whether the gods are competent to know Brahma[3]; (4) what is the object of knowledge referred to in *Kaushī. Brāh. IV. 19*[4]; (5) whether the Vedic texts as to the knowledge of Brahma or the Self are or are not ancillary to those relating to works[5]; (6) whether the text saying that sacrifice, charity and austerities are the three pillars of virtue (*Chhān. II. 23. 1*) contain a Vidhi (injunction) for entering the orders others than that of the householder[6]; (7) whether it is the inherent property of actions to bear fruits or it is God that gives them[7]; (8) whether a knower is absorbed at the end of the Kalpa in Kārya Brahma or Para Brahma[8]; (9) whether he becomes just like the one or the other i. e. to say, whether the qualities of the former do or do not become manifest in him on the perfection of knowledge while yet living[9]; (10) whether one who acquires the powers of moving about at will, producing things as he desires &c. has a physical body or not[10]; (11) whether the Self recommended to be known in *Brih. IV. 5. 6* is the Vijñānātmā or Paramātmā[11]; (12) whether the Upāsanās referred to in *Chhān. II. 3. 2* are to be performed by the priest or the householder and if by the former who gets the fruits thereof, he or the latter[12]; (13) what is the meaning of the term Charaṇa occurring at the end of the compounds Ramaṇīyacharaṇāh, Kapūyacharaṇāh &c. in *Chhān. V. 10. 5*[13]; (14) whether the individual soul is the same as Paramātmā or different from it[14]; (15) who are carried to Brahmaloka by the non-human Purusha referred to *Chhān. IV. 15. 5*, whether all Upāsakas including those of the symbols of Brahma or some only[15]; (16) whether Kāmya Karmas (actions done with the deliberate object of gaining some material

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1. *Br. Sū. I. 2. 28.*
2. *Ibid I. 2. 29-31.*
3. *Ibid I. 3. 26-31.*
4. *Ibid I. 4. 18.*
5. *Ibid III. 4. 2-8.*
6. *Ibid. III. 4. 18-19.*
7. *Ibid III. 2. 40-41.*
8. *Ibid IV. 3. 7-12.*
9. *Ibid IV. 4. 5-7.*
10. *Ibid IV. 4. 10-12.*
11. *Ibid I. 4. 20.*
12. *Ibid III. 4. 44-46.*
13. *Ibid III. 1. 8-11.*
14. *Ibid I. 4. 21.*
15. *Ibid IV. 3. 15.*

fruits) are or are not helpful in preparing the human mind for the knowledge and realization of Brahma[1] and (17) whether a Jīwanmukta (one liberated while yet in an embodied state) can become endowed with all the qualities of Brahma such as omniscience, omnipresence &c[2].

It is not that Bādarāyaṇa was at daggers drawn with Jaimini on all the points mentioned above. There are some of them on which he has expressed his unqualified agreement with the latter. Thus for instance, both agree in holding that Kāmya Karmas are not helpful in preparing the the mind for the knowledge and realization of the true nature of Brahma, that the Vais'vānara referred to in *Chhān. V. 11. 16-18* is identical with Paramātmā, that the gods are competent to learn the pure Brahmavidyā only and not any of the subsidiary Vidyās which involve Upāsanā, that what is spoken of in *Kaush. Brāh. IV. 19* as fit to be known is Brahma or Paramātmā and not Jiwātmā, that none can revert to the state of a householder after having once given it up and that one who has realized the nature of Brahma or the pure Self, can have a physical body and the powers of the Almighty can become manifest through it. Similarly there were some points on which there was an honest difference of opinion between them. Thus for instance, while Jaimini was of opinion that there was an inherent power in actions themselves to yield fruits Bādarāyaṇa held that such was not the case and that it was Paramātmā who conferred fruits on their doers. Similarly while the former held that one whose knowledge had become perfect by the worship of Saguṇa Brahma reached Para Brahma and not the Apara or Kārya Brahma the latter held that such a one reached the latter only. So too, while the former held that Nitya Karmas should be performed even by an aspirant for the knowledge of Brahma till the last stage, the latter was of the view that they were necessary only upto the stage of the rise of a strong desire for emancipation, that thereafter the peculiar Sādhanas, S'ama, Dama &c. ought to be pursued, that the knowledge of Brahma is an end in itself and that the state of Brahma can be reached only by its knowledge.

It seems also that by the time Bādarāyaṇa prepared these lectures Jaimini had already acquired a high reputation as the opponent of Bādari who held extreme views on the side of idealism and that Bādarāyaṇa found out a *via media* between them. Thus for instance, while Bādari held that a liberated soul who acquired the powers of moving about and producing things at will, did not stand in need of a physical body, Jaimini held that he did and Bādarāyaṇa expressed the view that such a soul needed a physical body whenever he wanted to do anything on the material plane and did not need it whenever he wanted to do anything on the metaphysical plane.

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1. *Br. Sū. IV. 1. 17.*
2. *Ibid IV. 4. 5.*

This Sūtrakāra does not seem to have any substantial difference of opinion even with the other teachers mentioned above. Thus one point on which he quotes three other teachers is why it should be believed that the Ātmā recommended to be known in *Brih. IV. 5. 6* is the same as Paramātmā.[1] This shows that they were all agreed that the Ātmā was identical with Paramātmā but differed as to the explanation of that fact. Bādarāyaṇa himself says that it must be believed so because the context in which the sentence occurs is such that no other conclusion is possible, Ās'marathya says that it must be so because the promise that on one knowing the Ātmā everything becomes known can be deemed to have been fulfilled only if such an interpretation is put upon the text in question, Auḍulomi says that though the knowing self cannot be identical with Paramātmā, it becomes identical with the latter when it attains its original state by knowledge, meditation &c. and that therefore the said conclusion is true in that sense and lastly Kās'akritsna says that it is true because in *Taitti. III. 12. 7* it has been said that Parabrahma itself having entered the body resides therein.

It can be seen from this work that Bādarāyaṇa has not in clear-cut terms drawn a distinction between Saguṇa Brahma and Nirguṇa Brahma but has indirectly done so (1) by discussing whether the Brahma to which the non-human Purusha carries an Upāsaka by the Brahmapatha or Devapatha as stated in *Chhān. IV. 15. 5* is Kārya Brahma or Kāraṇa Brahma[2] which are terms signifying the same objects as the terms Saguṇa Brahma and Nirguṇa Brahma, (2) by saying that in final absolution which means being absorbed in Para Brahma there are no degrees[3] and (3) by saying that those who follow the Saguṇavidyās not only do not acquire the power of control over the course of the universe but are also subject to the control of Saguṇa Brahma in the exercise of the other powers acquired by them and do not attain to the state which is free from all changes[4] which is that of Nirguṇa Brahma. Further as to whether the Jīwa is the same as Brahma or not he has not distinctly stated that it is but that must be deemed to be his view because he has said that Brahma cannot be both Saṁsārī and Asaṁsārī, that really speaking it is Asaṁsārī and is like the solar disc which is not affected by the changes taking place in the positions of its reflections in water.[5] So too he has not distinctly stated whether there are several Jīwas or only one Jīwa but by saying that the Saṁsārī is like a reflection of the sun in water[6] he has adopted either the Ābhāsa-vāda (semblance-theory) or Bimba-

1. *Br. Sū. I. 4. 19-22.*
2. *Ibid IV. 3. 7-14.*
3. *Ibid III. 4. 52.*
4. *Ibid IV. 4. 19.*
5. *Ibid III. 2. 11-21.*
6. *Ibid II. 3. 50, III. 2. 18.*

pratibimba-vāda (reflection-theory) both of which imply that there is one Self only animating all the bodies and that the apparent diversity of Jīwas is due to environments. This is supported by the Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa[1] and the Parādhikaraṇa also[2]. So too he has not distinctly stated whether the varied universe is real, unreal or indescribable but since he has denied in the Prakritaitāvattvādhikaraṇa[3] the existence of anything else except Brahma and established in the Ārambhādhikaraṇa[4] that Brahma the cause and the universe the effect are not different entities and having admitted the reality of the latter for all practical purposes has supported the view of Jaimini that the powers of the Almighty do make themselves manifest in the knower as against that of Auḍulomi that he remains after perfection as Chaitanya, pure and simple,[5] on the ground that those attributes of Brahma are real for the purpose of daily intercourse, it can be inferred that in his view the varied universe existed for all practical purposes as a positive entity and yet as a part and parcel of Brahma but did not exist when thought of philosophically because Brahma was the only reality and that therefore it could by nature be said to be Anirvachanīya (indescribable).

IX.

Foundation of the Independent Vedānta System.

It may be recalled that it has been established above that upto the time of the composition of the *Brahmasūtras* the study of the Vedāntas or the Upanishads was being pursued by the old Mīmāñsakas, of whom Bādarāyaṇa was one, as a part of the study of the Vedas as a whole and that though there were differences of opinion amongst them, the holders of one view did not look upon those of the other as outsiders but entertained fraternal feelings for them and showed toleration for their view. During the long period that elapsed between the time of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa on the one hand and Kumārila and S'ankarāchārya on the other, several persons had written commentaries on the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāñsā Dars'anas and expressed different views as to the doctrines propounded in them. Thus S'ankara refers in his Bhāshya[6] on the latter to the commentaries of Upavarsha who is identified by Ānandagiri with the Vrittikāra on both the Dars'anas[7]. Then we have the well-known Bhāshya of S'abara on the Pūrvamīmāñsā Dars'ana, and that Bhāshya and the Tantravārttika and S'lokavārttika of Kumārila seem to afford a reasonable

1. *Br. Sū. I. 4. 19–22.*
2. *Ibid III. 2. 31–37.*
3. *Ibid III. 2. 22–30.*
4. *Ibid II. 1. 14–20.*
5. *Ibid IV. 4. 5–7.*
6. *S'. B. read with Bhāmatī on Br. Sū. III. 3. 53. (p. 850).*
7. *A Brief Sketch of the Pūrva Mīmāñsā System by P. V. Kāṇe (1924) p. 12.*

ground for the inference that S'abara had been preceded by others in the same field and from the S'lokavārttika we also get the names of Bhavadāsa and Bhartrimitra. One more old commentator named Hari is quoted in the *S'āstradīpikā*, a commentary on the *Sūtras of Jaimini*[1]. Then as for the other Dars'ana, S'ankara refers to the view of "some from amongst us" besides some opponents who held the view that the form of the individual soul was a philosophic reality and says:—"It is for the edification of all those who are opposed to the view that there is really speaking one Self only that this *S'ārīraka* has been commenced"[2]. He also quotes with reverence a verse from the Kārikā of Gauḍapādāchārya introducing him as the repository of the Vedānta tradition[3]. Rāmānuja and other later commentators on the *Brahmasūtras* also refer to several commentators senior to S'ankara, namely, Bodhāyana, Dramiḍa, Tanka, Bhāruchī, Kapardi, Bhartriprapañcha, Brahmānanda and Guhadeva who had set forth views resembling those of Bādari, Auḍulomi, Kārshṇājini and others which are noted in the *Brahmasūtras* themselves[4]. It not would therefore be unreasonable to infer that the study of the two Mīmāñsās had continued uninterrupted during the long period of about eight centuries that had elapsed between the times above referred to. It must have been during this very period that the two branches of the Mīmāñsā school became completely separated and that the term 'Mīmāñsakas' began to be applied only to the adherents of the Pūrva Mīmāñsā while the term 'Vedāntins' was brought into vogue for the first time for designating those of the Uttara Mīmāñsā. The reason was that the former gradually ceased to have anything to do with the knowledge of Brahma and even with Brahma itself and began to advocate the view that salvation could be attained only by the performance of Vaidic acts enjoined to be performed daily, provided they were performed without any worldly object in view and in support of that doctrine laid special emphasis on the authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa or Saṁhitā portion of the Vedas and on the other hand, the latter began to be more and more averse to the performance of the Vaidic acts after the pursuit of knowledge was commenced, held that salvation could be attained by knowledge alone, though in the earlier stages Vaidic acts performed without having any material gain in view did render help in preparing the mind for the reception of knowledge, which required freedom from the pursuit of the objects of sense, and in support of that view laid special emphasis on the authoritativeness of the Jñānakāṇḍa or Upanishad portion of the Vedas. It is difficult to ascertain exactly who were the chief exponents of the above divergent doctrines and therefore

1. *A Brief Sketch of the Pūrva Mīmāñsā System by P. V. Kāṇe (1924) p. 13.*
2. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 3. 19 (p. 307).*
3. *Ibid on Br: Sū. II. 1. 9 (p. 447).*
4. *Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇa Vol. II p. 431 foot-note 2 and p. 663.*

responsible for the separation of the two branches of the Mīmāñsā joint family but it may be stated roughly that Bhartrimitra, Hari, Prabhākara and others on the side of the Mīmāñsā school and Bodhāyana, Dramiḍa, Bhartiprapañcha and others on that of the Vedānta school brought about the schism. From this time forward, we leave the Mīmāñsā school also behind and proceed to consider the development of the newly-founded Vedānta school.

X

Older Commentaries on the Brahmasūtras and the Upanishads, and the Samuchchayavāda.

The votaries of the newly-founded Vedānta school generally adopted the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa as their text-book and propounded their views in their commentaries thereon. They are not unfortunately available at present. Still from the references thereto occurring in the works of S'ankara, Sures'wara, Rāmānuja, Nīlakanṭha Madhwa, Nimbārka and others it appears that Upavarsha, or Bodhāyana, Dramiḍa, Ṭanka, Bhāruchi, Kapardi, Bhartriprapañcha, Brahmānanda and Guhadeva had written commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras*[1]. Other adherents of the same school such as Brahmadatta put forth their views through commentaries on some of the principal Upanishads. Lastly, there were some like Gauḍapāda who composed independent works for doing the same.

As to their views, we have already seen that the principal point of difference between the Mīmāñsakas and the Vedāntins was as to the right means of attaining salvation, the former holding that it could be attained through Vaidic rites and the latter that it could be secured through knowledge. As amongst the latter also there were two schools. One of them which insisted upon the Vaidic rites being performed even during the pursuit of knowledge was known as that of the Samuchchayavādins. We can infer from the works of S'ankara and Sures'wara that they must have been a very powerful band headed by Brahmadatta and that the arguments advanced by them in support of their view were so strong that both of them had to muster all their energy in meeting them. Sures'wara treats Bhartriprapañcha, a Bhedābhedavādin (advocate of the doctrine of unity in diversity) also as a Samuchchayavādin on the ground that he was of the view that though it was true that salvation lay through knowledge, the knowledge which brought it about was not that derived from S'ravaṇa but that derived from Nididhyāsana in a state of Samādhi, for words, be they even those contained in the Scriptures, had not the power to cause the realization of the truth and that therefore after the knowledge thereof is acquired from the Scriptures, one must practice Parisaṁkhyāna (meditation)

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1. *Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇa Vol. II pp. 431-32.*

which Sures'wara looked upon as an act[1]. His *Vārttika on the Brihadāraṇyakopanishat* and *Naishkarmyasiddhi* accordingly contain an elaborate refutation of that view also. And if the advocacy of the necessity of meditation for self-realization is the true test of one's being a Samuchchayavādin or otherwise, S'ankara's Paramaguru Gauḍapāda also must be placed in the same category as Bhartiprapañcha because he too has laid down that the phenomenal world does not in fact exist but appears on account of the unsteadiness of the human mind and that it would cease to appear if the mind were made steady by Abhyāsa by which he means Yogābhyāsa (meditation), and by Vairāgya (detachment). It will however be shown later on that S'ankara was not of the same view as Sures'wara.

Prof. Hiriyanna is of the view that one of the three aspects of the Samuchchayavāda refuted in the *Naishkarmyasiddhi* had been advocated by Manḍana Mis'ra, a Mīmāñsaka. It was to the effect that salvation could be attained by knowledge derived from meditation accompanied by the performance of Nishkāma Karma (rites performed without an aim as to enjoyment of their fruits). The name of Manḍana is nowhere found in that work nor is any work composed by him referred to therein but the professor says that the said view as mentioned in the *Vārttika* has been attributed to him by Ānandajñāna in his commentary thereon.

XI

S'ārīrakabhāshya of S'ankara.

We have already seen that none of the commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras* composed before the time of S'ankara is available to us for perusal. That being so, his known as the *S'ārīrakabhāshya* is the oldest commentary now available in its entirety. It is also the masterpiece of a master-mind for S'ankara whom one distinguished Orientalist has not hesitated to call "the greatest philosopher the world has ever seen" appears to have spent his best energies on it in order to establish by apposite arguments and authorities that his Advaita doctrine is the only one that could have been intended to be tought by the Upanishads of which the *Brahmasūtras* is, so to say, a digest. Even the learned Oriental scholars of the West who can hardly be suspected of partiality for him consider his view of the Upanishad philosophy the best and the most consistent that could be spelled out of those fragmentary monuments of the philosophical thought of a by-gone age[2]. It has attracted to itself the best brains the soil of India has produced during the eleven centuries that have elapsed since

1. *Introduction to the Naishkarmyasiddhi as re-edited by Hiriyanna—Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. XXXVIII.*

2. *History of Indian Literature by Winternitz as translated by Mrs. Kelkar Vol. I. p. 469 and foot-note 2 thereunder* in which are cited the opinions of Thebaüt, Gough and Jacob.

he sloughed off his mortal tenement and has found the greatest number of followers even after the advent of those philosophers who attempted to pick holes in his line of reasoning. Those who aspired to dislodge him from the high pinnacle to which he had been raised on account of extraordinary genius came and passed away one after another on creating some momentary interest in their theories. With some rare exceptions they found their adherents from the illiterate masses who were attracted by the element of a personal God in their dogmas. They therefore became the founders of religious sects rather than of philosophical schools strictly so-called and the high position of S'ankara in the philosophical firmament remained unaffected by their elevation. He writes with so much confidence born of knowledge derived from traditional experience and in such a simple, lucid and yet incisive style, has inserted such an abundant mass of illustrations drawn both from experience and from the Vaidic and post-Vaidic literatures, appeals so much to your reasoning faculty rather than your faith except when he is speaking to you of Brahma, pure and simple who cannot be reached by the human speech or mind, has anticipated and refuted such highly sceptical arguments and shows inspite of his uncompromising orthodoxy, so much independence of thought, that every unbiassed student of his works is bound to be convinced that his view of the purport of the Upanishads is the only correct one. That is the reason why Dr. Thebaüt who in the words of Prof. Rādhākrishṇa "cannot be charged with any partility for S'ankara,[1]" speaks of his philosophy in the following exalting terms:—"The doctrine advocated by S'ankara is from a purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedānta which diverge from the view represented by S'ankara nor any of the non-Vedāntic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedānta in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation". Dr. Winternitz also says—"Other interpreters of the Upanishads find it extremely difficult to account for all those passages which regard Brahman as indeterminate and Moks'a as oneness with Brahman. There are of course passages which S'ankara passes over as unimportant. Yet his interpretation of the Upanishads is more satisfactory than any other"[2]. He has written commentaries on the principal Upanishads individually and has also composed independent treatises like the *Upadês'asahasrī* but it is in his *S'ārīrakabhāshya* that he has taken occasions to consider the authoritative Upanishad literature as a whole and it is for that very reason that the said work has ever been looked upon by his followers as the principal work of their branch of the Vedānta system and that an abundant mass of philosophical literature consisting of commentaries and commentaries upon commentaries and also independent

1. *Indian Philosophy Vol. II p. 446.*
2. *History of Indian Literature as translated by Mrs. Kelkar Vol. I. p. 469.*

treatises expounding the Advaita doctrine and defending it against the attacks of the adherents of the rival schools has grown up around it.

XII
Biographical Sketch of S'ankarāchārya.

Before proceeding to explain the Advaita doctrine itself, it would be well if the reader is acquainted with the main incidents in the life of its great originator and the nature of the work done by him during his active life.

The original sources of information as to them are (1) the *S'ankarajaya* of Mādhava, (2) the *S'ankaravijaya* of Ānandagiri, (3) the *S'ankaravijaya* of Chidvilāsa, (4) the *Ninth Amśa of the Skandapurāṇa* and (5) the *Madhwavijaya* and *Maṇimañjarī* of Paṇḍit Nārāyaṇāchārya, a writer of the Madhwa school. There are differences between them as to certain details but the following facts can be deemed to have been fairly established by now. They are:—He was the only son of one S'ivaguru, a Nambudri Brāhman of an Agrahāra or settlement named Kālaṭi or Kāladi on the top of a hill named Vrishādri on the bank of the river Pūrṇā in the province of Kerala in Southern India[1]. The old writers are not careful to note the year of his birth and according to orthodox tradition he lived nearly 2500 years ago. But Dr. K. B. Pathak supported by Prof. Max Muller fixed A. D. 788 as the year of his birth, from reliable data[2]. Mr. K. T. Telang on the other hand fixed the end of the sixth century as the most probable time of his birth[3]. But his view has not found the same support from Oriental scholars as that of the former[4] and therefore 788 A. D. must be taken to be the date of S'ankara's birth. His father having died while he was yet a boy his mother Sati invested him with a sacred thread and placed him under the guidance of a teacher for acquiring such learning as a Brāhman boy should in those days have acquired. At the early age of 7 years he felt an inner call for getting himself initiated into the order of Sannyāsins and dedicate his life to the good of humanity. He got permission to do so from his reluctant mother on agreeing to the condition that he should come over to his native place, from wherever he may be, at the time of her last illness and perform her obsequies. Then he went to a place on the banks of the Narmadā and got himself initiated into the practice of Yoga by Gowindāchārya, a pupil of Gauḍapādāchārya, who is well-known as the author of the

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1. According to Ānandagiri S'ankara was concieved by his mother in a miraculous manner after her husband had renounced the world and left her alone and was born at Chidambaram.

2. *Indian Antiquary Vol. XI (1882) p. 174 and India, What It Can Teach Us p. 354.*

3. *Indian Antiquary Vol. XI (1882) p. 95.*

4. *S'rī S'ankarāchārya: His Life and Times by C. N. Krishnaswamy Aiyar pp. 19-21; Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy Vol. I by Belvalkar pp. 209-15.*

Kārikās on the *Māndukyopanishat.* At his Guru's behest he went and stayed at Benares for several years and composed several works there. It is said that when he composed his *S'ārirakbhāshya* he was only a youth 16 years old. After he did that he set out on a tour throughout India with a view to establish the superiority of his Advaita doctrine to all the others then prevalent in the different parts of the country. During his sojurn he silenced many an opponent and converted some of them. He is believed to have left his mortal frame at the young age of 32 years, while staying, according to Mādhava at Badarikās'ram in the Himālayas, according to Ānandagiri at Conjeevaram in Southern India and according to Chidvilāsa at Kedāres'wara in the Himālayas. During his trimphant tour he took many disciples, the most notable of whom were Sures'wara, Padmapāda, Troṭaka and Hastāmalaka and founded four Maths, one in each corner of India i. e. to say, at S'ringeri in Southern India, Puri in Eastern India, Dwārkā in Western India and Badarikās'ram in Northern India and at each of them installed one of his said four principal disciples. His object in doing so seems to have been to found colleges, where selfless teachers who would teach his exalted doctrine to those who were qualified for its reception and give instructions in religion based upon that doctrine to the ordinary folks, could be trained up, so that the good work which he had done might be perpetuated and the whole Aryan race may make substantial progress towards the realization of the highest truth which he had expounded in his philosophical works. For more than three centuries and a half his followers seem to have met with no obstacle in working out this ideal but thereafter there arose in Southern India itself a strong opposition to to the Advaita doctrine led by a saint named Rāmānuja, who was not a devotee of Rāma as his name seems to suggest but believed that Brahma was Saguṇa not Nirguṇa, that though it was one only, the world of diversity which was its body was as much real as Brahma itself and that the state of the highest beatitude for the individual soul consisted not in its merger in Brahma but in remaining separate from it and yet in its close proximity so that it may never be lost sight of. As S'ankara's followers were so conservative as not to admit members of the castes other than the Brāhmana into their fold and impart the knowledge of Brahma to them, Rāmānuja by keeping his door open to all and sundry, without distinction of caste could attract to himself a sufficient number of followers to enable him to found a school of his own which is known as the Vis'ishṭādvaita school. He believes in salvation by Bhakti (devotion) towards God or Saguṇa Brahma in the form of Nārāyaṇa, which is the way recommended for the men of the lowest qualifications in the *Bhagawadgītā,* with this difference only that the particular object of adoration therein recommended is Vāsudeva-Krishṇa, an incarnation of Saguṇa Brahma. About two centuries later a more powerful opponent of S'ankara's doctrine arose in the person of Madhwāchārya who fought hard to prove what every ordinary man believes on

account of the world-old ignorance, namely that Brahma and the universe were two distinct entities. He too was able to gather around himself a sufficient number of followers to enable him to found another Vedānta school known as the Dwaita school. There were no doubt numerous adherents of S'ankara's doctrine who were intelligent enough to meet the attacks of these opponents of the Advaita doctrine. Inspite of them however the rise of these rival schools did to a certain extent come in the way of their working out the ideal of their master. Another such cause was a bias in favour of S'aivism displayed by some of the occupants of the Gādis at the Maths founded by him. S'ankara himself seems to have been free from any such bias for though his name was S'ankara he appears to have believed that the most appropriate Paurāṇic equivalent of Saguṇa Brahma was Vishṇu and that it was devotion towards Him accompanied by the discharge of one's duties and the practice of austerities that prepared the inner organ of man for the reception of the knowledge of Brahma which was the means for the attainment of salvation[1]. In his *Bhāshya on the Brahmasūtras*, whenever he has an occasion to refer to the practice of worshipping idols, he either refers to the S'ālagrāma which is looked upon as an emblem of Vishnu or mentions Vishṇu specifically by name and refers to the other gods by adding the term 'Ādi' after the term Vishṇu[2]. In the introduction to his *Bhāshya on the Bhagawadgītā* also he very reverentially says:—"The duties tought by the Vedas are divisible into two sets, one whose characteristic is action and the other whose characteristic is inaction, that the first thereout is the means for the preservation of the universe and the direct means for the attainment of prosperity and final absolution, that in course of time it was supplanted by sinful practices born of the degeneration of the race made up of men belonging to the different Varṇas beginning with the Brāhmaṇas and to the different orders and that therefore the original Creator named Nārāyaṇa being desirous of continuing the preservation of the universe, became manifest as Krishṇa in a body which was concieved by Devaki through Vasudeva[3]". The fact that he had thought it proper to write *Harimīde Stotra, Ānandalaharī Stotra, Govindāshṭaka* and probably also a *Bhāshya on Vishṇusahasranāma* is also a proof of his belief that the Saguṇa Brahma was identical with Vishṇu. But just as he was not a sectarian S'aivite he was not also a sectarian Vaishṇavite. He nowhere exhibits a bias against any other sect. His followers however seem to have done so probably since the time that they had to encounter opposition from the Vishṇavite Achāryas, Rāmānuja and Madhwa. Thus, for instance Mādhava has in Sargas 2 and 3 of his *S'ankarajaya* described S'ankara as an incarnation of S'iva and his disciples as the incarnations of other deities. This reduced them to the position of sectarian adversaries of the Vaishṇavite teachers. The third

1. *Aparoks'ānubhūti. 3.*

2. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 2. 7 (p. 235), I. 2. 14 (p. 248), I. 3. 14 (p. 293), III. 3. 9 (p. 760), IV. 1. 3 (p. 937).*

3. *Jagad-hitechchhu Press edition pp. 2-3.*

cause of the weakening of their influence was the internal dissensions between the disciples of the same Achārya due to the love of the power and pelf which the occupation of the Gādis at the Maths carried with it and the consequent foundation of other rival Maths and the assumption of the honorific title of S'ankarāchārya by their founders and their successors[1]. Thus for instance there are newly-founded Maths at Kolhapur, Belgaum and Nasik in the Deccan, Hampi and Kanchi (Conjeevaram) in Southern India, Prabhaspatan, Dakor and Dholka in Gujarat, and Benares in the United Provinces. The fourth cause was the departure of the occupants of the Gādis from the life of strict self-discipline enjoined by the original founder in order that they may serve as exemplars to the men of their order and the lay public.

Although thus the great practical work which S'ankara had started for the good of the Hindu race has been undone and that race has been rent asunder by a diversity of creeds the literary work which he had left behind, in the form of his *Bhāshyas on the Brahmasūtras, the principal Upanishads, the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda* and the *Bhagawadgītā,* his independent treatises on the Advaita Vedānta such as the *Upades'asāhasrī, Aparoks'āuubhūti, Vivekachūḍāmaṇi, Mohamudgara, Ātmabodha, Swātmanirūpaṇam, Harimīḍe Stotra* &c., have been handed down to our generation in their unalloyed forms and that by itself is enough to keep his memory green in this land so long as there lives in it a single soul with sufficient subtlety of intellect to be able to grasp his Absolute Advaitism and sufficient purity of heart to cherish it as the highest truth concievable by the intellect and to strive to realize it by the method he has indicated in his said works. Dr. Belvalkar states at p. 217 of Vol. I of his *Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy,* that he had made out a list of some 400 works, big and small, consisting of Ṭikās, Prakaraṇagranthas (digests on certain topics) and Stotras, attributed to the great Achārya, from the three volumes of the *Catalogus Catalogorum* of Aufrecht, the *Catalogues of the Government Oriental Library, Madras* and *the collected editions of his works brought out in Mysore, Srirangam, Poona and elsewhere,* and at p. 230 thereof that on a critical examination thereof he had decided that there were 11 commentaries, 8 Stotras and 5 Prakaraṇagranthas, in all 24 works which were undoubtedly his compositions, that there were 26 others consisting of 15 commentaries, 3 Stotras and 8 Prakaraṇagranthas of doubtful authenticity and that the remaining 350 were certainly not his productions. The works above-mentioned fall in the first category thereout and therefore any conclusions based upon the contents thereof are therefore entirely sound. The one of the greatest importance to us thereout again, is the *S'ārīrakabhāshya* and to that therefore we now turn.

1. On the question of jealousy amongst the followers of S'ankara *inter se vide Belvalkar's Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy Vol. I, p. 231 foot-note.*

XIII

Advaita Doctrine of S'ankarāchārya.

As already stated the *S'ārīrakabhāshya*, the work in which the Advaita doctrine was first expounded, is a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. The ordinary term for a commentary in Sanskrit is Ṭīkā which means a composition from which the meaning underlying any particular treatise can be gathered[1]. The term Bhāshya is however used to designate a commentary on a Sūtra work which explains the meanings of the Sūtras contained therein by terms which are in consonance with the spirit underlying the whole work and which defines those terms[2]. Thus there is *Patañjali's Mahābhāshya on the Vyākaraṇasūtras* of Pāṇini, *S'abara's Bhāshya on the Pūrvamīmāṅsāsūtras* of Jaimini, *Vyāsa's Bhāshya on the Yogasūtras* of Patañjali &c. The *S'ārīrakabhāshya* of S'ankara also fully answers to that description because besides explaining the meanings of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa in words which are in consonance with the spirit underlying the work as a whole, it defines such of the terms occurring therein in the course of explanations of the Sūtras, as stood in need of definitions. Thus for instance, S'ankara has therein defined the terms "Jīwa", "Ātmā", "Jyoti", "Vais'vānara" &c[3]. It is called the *S'ārīrakabhāshya* because the *Brahmasūtras* are also otherwise known as the *S'ārīrakasūtras* which term means 'a set of aphorisms relating (to the nature) of the S'arīrin (embodied spirit).

Now, what is the Advaita doctrine that has been expounded therin? It is this:—From a strictly philosophieal or idealistic (Pāramārthic) view-point there is only one reality, i. e. to say, there is only one entity which is above all changes and limitations of time, space and causation. It follows from it that it must be indescribable in human language which is but an expression of human thought in physical speech which is finite as issuing out of an organ which has a limited existence and is changeable. It also follows from it that it cannot be visualized by the human eyes which constitute an organ of sense of the same nature. Nor can the mind understand it, for it too is an eleventh organ and therefore finite. It is true that it is comparatively free from the limitations of time and space than the ten organs, still after all it is a product and has therefore its own limitations. The reality cannot thus have a name or a form. That being so, anything and everything that has a name and a form, from Brahmā down to the tiniest insects whether onthe earth, in the air or under water and from the highest mountain to the smallest atom, in fact every-

1. टीक्यते गम्यते ग्रन्थार्थोऽनयेति टीका. (*Apte's Practical Sanskrit-Engish Dictionary, p. 522*).

2. सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र पदैः सूत्रानुसारिभिः । स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥ (*Ibid p. 816*).

3. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition pp. 80, 173, 210, 266, 267.*

thing concievable by the human intellect, has an objective existence in space which did not once exist and is likely to cease to exist at some time in future, and space and time themselves and the law of causation are also unreal like the objects seen in a dream. This is not the same thing as saying that the universe does not exist at all. What S'ankara means when he says that it is unreal is that just as the dream-phenomena is found to be unreal on one's returning to the waking state, so the waking-phenomena would be found to be so on the attainment of the Turīya (fourth) state by an aspirant for knowledge because the soul is then freed from all environments and that though the states of waking and dreaming are similar in nature they differ in the degrees of reality, in that the experience in the latter is found to be contradicted everyday while that in the former is contradicted only when the original ignorance which is the root of the mistaken belief in the reality of distinctions is destroyed by right knowledge[1]. Such is the highest truth according to S'ankara and the highest aim of man should be to know and realize this truth for that is the only means for the cessation of misery which human flesh is heir to and for the attainment of everlasting happiness which human beings are always in search of but never get because their efforts are always misdirected. They cannot know this with the help of reason alone because it has a limited range. It must therefore be subordinated to the Vedāntas which alone can impart the knowledge of that which is not knowable from any other source. And even they, revealed texts as they are, cannot describe it in ordinary language because the latter turns away from it. They have therefore to give it a name though as a matter of fact it is nameless. This name is Brahma. That term too does not give an adequate idea of that which is best spoken of in the language of silence. Still it makes the nearest approach to it because it is derived from *Brih to grow* and therefore means 'that which grows' i. e. to say, that which is the cause, material and instrumental, of the creation, preservation and destruction of the universe. As this necessarily implies a recognition of the existence of diversity, the absolute reality has to be distinguished at times from it by being called *Para Brahma*, i. e. to say, the higher Brahma or *Nirguṇa* or *Nirvis'esha Brahma*, i. e. to say, Brahma without attributes or Brahma from which all idea of specification or individuality is excluded, in order that while speaking of Brahma as the reality it may not be lost sight of, that it is a relative reality i. e. to say, as compared with the objects of the world, the cause of the world is infinite while the objects themselves are finite, that the highest truth is as above-stated and that when that truth is realized all the ideas pertaining to the world of ordinary experience in which are included even those as to the existence of God as ordinarily

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1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. II. 2.29-31 (pp. 555-57) and III. 2. 3-4 (pp. 689-93).*

understood, a teacher, the Scriptures &c., vanish[1] and the pure and perfect essence alone remains. As a matter of fact that essence is neither determinate i. e. Saguṇa nor indeterminate i. e. Nirguṇa, but when the existence of the universe is admitted for the purpose of teaching, such a distinction must be drawn in order to distinguish between the grades of purity. Thus so long as we continue to think of the reality in terms of the universe it must be believed to be the seat of all the powers which are essential for the creation, preservation and destruction of the latter but when we think of it in the abstract, it must be believed to have no such powers and it is the latter according to S'ankara that is the state of perfect knowledge, not the former, because it smacks of a belief in duality, however much concealed it may be as in the Vis'ishṭādvaita doctrine. As that pure state cannot be explained in words it has only been hinted at by negative assertions such as "Neti, neti" "Neha nānāsti kiñchana" &c. The state next below it can be easily explained in human language because it takes stock of the ordinary experience which is based upon a distinction between the knower, the knowledge and the thing to be known. It is therefore that the Upanishads generally use the term 'Brahma' in order to indicate the highest essence. This Brahma is an unknown thing because in our ordinary experience which is based on direct perception or inference, we do not meet with one general cause of all the varied objects of the universe[2]. The Upanishads which as said above are the records of the spiritual experiences of the sages of the pre-epic age, therefore come to our aid and say that there is one such cause and that if that is known everything becomes known and all misery comes to an end. But since it is not known to ordinary mortals, it is sometimes referred to in the Upanishads as 'that' (Tat), an unknown quantity and since it is not capable of being reached by the means of knowledge within the power of man, it is their special province to impart the knowledge thereof.

How do they do so? In some of them as in the *Taittirīya* it is described in terms of the universe i. e. to say, as being that from which everything has sprung, that in which everything rests and that in which everything will be absorbed, or in abstract terms, which too have connection with the universe, as being truth, knowledge and infiniteness, or as being everywhere in the whole universe or as being the inner ruler of everything &c. But all these texts give but an imperfect and distant idea of it. Those which go straight to the heart of man are the texts like "Tat twam asi" and "Aham Brahma asmi" which interpret it in terms of the inner soul of man, the substratum of the human conscious-

1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 1. 11. (p. 177), I. 1. 24 (p. 210), I. 2. 2 (pp. 232-34), I. 2. 6 (p. 235), II. 1. 14 (pp. 454-62), II. 1. 26-27 (pp. 475-77), III. 2. 11-21 (pp. 707-16), IV. 3. 14 (p. 1001), IV. 4. 5-7 (pp. 1008-09).*

2. This cause is according to S'ankara the same as the Mūlaprakriti. (*S'. B. on Br. Sū. II. 3. 9 (p. 689)*).

ness than which nothing else can be better known to human beings. When another man speaks of it in order to impart the knowledge of Brahma he speaks of it as 'Twam' and when the speaker himself speaks about it he speaks of it as 'Aham'. These texts are known in the latter works on the Vedānta Philosophy as the Mahāvākyas (principal sentences) because they contain the gist of the Upanishad teaching which is the identity of the World-Soul with the individual soul. At first sight this seems unbelievable because the world is so vast and the individual so small, and the powers of the soul of the first are so varied and infinite and those of the latter so few and restricted. In order therefore to understand the true gist of the Mahāvākyas, it is necessary to know what is the true significance of each of the terms 'Tat' and 'Twam'. As to that S'ankara says that both the World-Soul and the individual soul are limited by environments, that therefore though it is true that in their limited states they cannot be identical, what the Upanishads say is that they are the same in essence i. e. to say, it is the same ultimate reality that appears to function as the Supreme Soul and as the individual soul and that the difference between them and between one individual soul and another, which is due to limitations, is not real in the philosophical sense but imaginary[1], that they appear as real and formidable on account of ignorance (Avidyā)[2] on the part of the seer and that when that is removed by right knowledge they cease to appear, as when a rope which was believed to be a serpent on account of darkness appears in its true form when a lamp is brought near it, and the great truth shines forth in all its glory. This knowledge differs from empirical knowledge in this that while in the latter case, there is a possibility of ignorance again supervening, there is no such fear in the former. Nor is it a mere bookish knowledge. It is wisdom which comes in as the fruit of the realization of the truth contained in the Mahāvākyas[3]. In other words, in the Vedānta philosophy knowing means being. Of course from the standpoint of the Absolute, there is no ignorance and no knowledge to be acquired afresh. But those states are real to the same extent as the world of experience is real and therefore to the soul which believes in the existence of misery or bondage, the attainment of happiness or freedom from bondage is essential. This makes it necessary to state how the knowledge which puts an end to misery from his viewpoint can be acquired.

Since this knowledge is very subtle, it cannot be acquired, and if acquired, retained unless the heart is purified of the dross in the form of

1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 3. 19 (p. 307), I. 4. 10 (p. 389), II. 1. 9 (p. 447), II. 1. 14 (pp. 454-62), II. 3. 29 (pp. 609-10), II. 3. 50-51 (pp. 625-26), III. 4. 8 (pp. 873-74), IV. 3. 14 (p. 999).*

2. Though some of the later Vedāntins drew a distinction between Māyā and Avidyā, S'ankara did not. According to him the terms Māyā, Avidyā Aks'ara and Ayakta all mean the same thing, the primeval ignorance. See *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 3. 19 (p. 307), I. 4. 3 (p. 378), I. 4. 9 (p. 388) II. 1. 9 (p. 447).*

3. *Ibid on Br. Sū. III. 4. 15 (p. 875).*

latent desires which may have collected in it during countless previous births. For this purpose, one must either perform Nishkāma Karma i. e. to say, either the Nitya (daily) and Naimittika (occasional) ceremonies prescribed by the S'āstras for the twice-born or repeat specific Mantras (incantations), observe fasts and propitiate a deity, without keeping any material gain in view. Thus even those who do not perform Sandhyā, Havana &c. have other ways open to them for purifying their minds for the reception of Brahmavidyā. S'ankara has made this very clear in his commentary on *Br. Sū. III. 4. 36-39* and quoted the instances of Vidhura, brother of Pāṇḍu and Dhritarāshṭra but the son of their father by a S'ūdra wife, and those of Raikva and Gārgi Vāchaknavī in support of his view. That seems to be the view of the whole Vedānta school as opposed to that of the Mīmāñsā school[1]. But that is not enough. One must, whether he continues do Nishkāma Karma or not, observe restraint in the satisfaction of the natural desires, cultivate the virtues of truth-speaking, non-injury to other creatures by deeds, words or even thoughts, non-selfishness &c.[2] This would be possible only if one has learnt to discriminate between the philosophically true and the false, cultivated indifference towards the latter and has a desire to reach the state of perfect bliss which means freedom from from the liability to the changes of states such as births and deaths and those intermediate between them. Thus in addition to the purity of mind there must be S'amadamādisādhanasampat, Viveka, Vairāgya and Mumuks'utā, which are collectively known as the Sādhana. It is this Sādhana, not the Nishkāma Karma which, according to S'ankara, prepares one for knowledge[3]. But as the acquisition of this Sādhana itself would not be possible unless one has some inkling of what is Brahma and what non-Brahma or Atmā and non-Atmā, what is meant by knowledge in the philosophical sense, how it is to be acquired &c., one must resort simulateneously to S'ravaṇa (study) of the Vedānta works, Manana (thinking over what they have said) and Nididhyāsana (meditating over the truth). The pursuit of the Sādhana agein helps the mind in the processes of Manana and Nididhyāsana. When that is perfected by frequent repetitions[4] in one life or several lives[5], the gist of the Vedānta teaching, the identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul is realized in a state of trance[6] and then as one Upanishad sage has graphically put it "the bond of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut off and all the Karmas are destroyed". Although Brahma or Ātmā has no form and cannot therefore be visualized like an object of the external world, its reflection in the form of a Jyoti[7] is seen in the

1. *Nirnaya Sāgar Press edition pp. 907-08.*
2. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. III. 4. 19-20 (pp. 879-84).*
3. *Ibid on Br. Sū. III. 4. 26-27 (pp. 898-900).*
4. *Ibid on Br. Sū. IV. 1. 1-2 (pp. 928-36).*
5. *Ibid on Br. Sū. III. 4. 51 (p. 923-25).*
6. *Ibid on Br. Sū. II. 3. 39 (p. 615), III. 2. 24 (pp. 721-22).*
7. *Ibid on Br. Sū. III. 2. 24 (pp. 721-22).*

Antahkaraṇa or Buddhi in a state of trance. Jyoti here means the power which illuminates the objects inside the body and in the outside world[1]. So long as there remains the feeling of the seer and seen there is of course duality and the state in which it remains is not the highest state. One should not there fore be satisfied with that state but must practice meditation further and realize one's identity with the highest essence in which there is no duality.

The above is the method of what is known in the Vedānta terminology as Sadyomukti (prompt absolution). There is another method known therein as Kramamukti (absolution by degrees).[2] In that method, the Upāsanā i. e. Dhyāna[3] of Hiraṇyagarbha or any other deity, to be performed with a view to be freed from the cycle of births and deaths and therefore without any desire for any material gain, takes the place of S'ravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana. When it is perfected the devotee is favoured by the deity with a place in the highest region over which he has control. Thus for instance, a devotee of Hiraṇyagarbha is favoured with a place in the Satyaloka, the region in which there is the utmost purity of all sorts. Those who have reached the regions lower than that such as Maha, Jana and Tapas continue their Sādhana while there and ultimately reach that region. Those who have gone there from the commencement and those who go there gradually acquire there the knowledge of the true nature of the Self, which is that of a non-doer of actions and the non-enjoyer of the fruits thereof, which is eternal, pure, self-manifest, and ever free, and finally lose their individuality in it i. e. to say, in Para Brahma, along with Hiraṇyagarbha, at the end of the Kalpa[4], never to be reduced again at any time whatever to the state of limited souls[5]. Although thus the ultimate result is the same in the case of those who follow the path of prompt absolution and those who follow that of gradual absolution, there is this difference between their attainments that while the latter acquire several supernatural powers at intermediate stages in their course, the former do not, because in their case there are no such stages at all. As such powers are also after all a form of Māyā and the way to acquire them is full of many pitfalls, a majority of the aspirants for freedom prefer the path of prompt absolution. In any case it is the knowledge of the true nature of the Self that is the immediate cause of salvation, not action such as the performance of sacrifices, worship of a deity &c., however disinterested be the motive with which they are performed. S'ankara is very keen on establishing this point, so much so that he goes to the length of saying that at least the Vaidic Karma of all sorts must be shunned from the time the desire for final beatitude arises

1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 1. 24 (pp. 210).*
2. *Ibid on Br. Sū. I. 3. 13 (p. 289).*
3. *Ibid on Br. Sū. I. 2. 1 (p. 228).*
4. *Ibid on Br. Sū. IV. 3. 7-14 (pp. 994-02)*
5. *Ibid on Br. Sū. IV. 4. 22 (pp. 1019-20).*

because it acts as a hindrance to the attainment of the object[1]. Lest Manana and Nididhyāsana may be looked upon as actions, he says that they are not a species of action but of knowledge[2] and that knowledge itself is nothing else but knowledge i. e. to say, it cannot be enjoined by another, nay, not even by the Vedas, but depends entirely on the existence of a thing[3].

Here one might naturally ask what is the nature of the ignorance which is said to be the root of all misery and of which eradication is recommended for the cessation of misery and the consequent attainment of everlasting peace. The answer of S'ankara to that query is that it is not simply an antithesis of knowledge but a positive substance and that is the root-cause of all sense of duality. It has no beginning because it existed before the beginning of evolution but so far as individuals are concerned it has an end because it ceases to exist after the knowledge of the true nature of the Self arises. It has no existence whatever so far as Para Brahma, the highest essence, is concerned, for inside it there is no room for anything else and it being one only there is no possibility of ignorance living outside it. Nor is it an attribute of Para Brahma for the latter has no attributes. It is for that very reason that it ceases to exist in the state of perfect wisdom. But for those who have not yet reached that state it has existence, for the phenomena of the universe which is experienced by all alike cannot otherwise be explained and unless it is explained knowledge cannot arise. That general experience consists mainly of a consciousness of individuality, of the existence of the sense-objects apart from oneself, a desire for the enjoyment of those objects and a tendency to work for securing them. The root of that experience lies in Adhyāsa or Adhyāropa (superimposition) of the Self on the non-selfs and *vice versā.* All sentient beings are apt to superimpose them because they have not the right knowledge of the characteristics of both. Thus though the Self is eternal and unchanging they believe that it has a limited existence and is subject to changes of state which are really the characteristics of the body, the senses and the mind which are non-selfs. Similarly they believe that the sense-objects are eternal and the real source of happiness whereas as a matter of fact they are evanescent and are a source of misery. If they were to learn to discriminate between these categories they would realize that the Self is like the solar disc which remains unaffected by the vibrations of air which move the water in a stream or pond together with the reflections of the sun in it, for while in the embodied state it is securely placed in the crown of the head from which position it can complacently watch the changes which affect its reflection in the mind, the senses and body without being itself affected by them, that it is also above the points in the brain upto which the effects

1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. III. 4. 19-20 (pp. 879-84).*
2. *Ibid on Br. Su. I. 1. 4 (p. 153).*
3. *Ibid (pp. 128-30).*

of the changes of the waking, dreaming and sleeping states are felt, that the apparatus of work and enjoyment in the mind are also unconnected with its seat as above and that even in the disembodied state it is not the pure Self that goes to Chandraloka, or Agniloka or Varuṇaloka or any other region but that ethereal mass called the Lingas'arīra, a conglomerate of the ten senses, the five vital breaths, the mind and the intellect with the reflection of the Self therein which had entered the body after it was ready for being made use of as a vehicle of enjoyment of the fruits of the good and bad acts of previous births which were ready for enjoyment, that it is thus above all changes, does not do any work and does not enjoy the fruits of works, that in its state of absolute purity, there is perpetual happiness and undisturbed peace, that there is no room in it for the slightest misery and that the sense-objects on the other hand are evanescent and liable to frequent changes and the source of all the misery in the world. When this power of reflection is sufficiently developed, one's angle of vision also towards the sense-objects is changed and one commences to think less and less of the external forms and more and more of the essence of things and to solve the riddle of the universe. The Vedānta philosophy in trying to solve that riddle does not encroach upon the sciences of physics, biology, geology, astronomy &c. but it ends where they begin and that is at the point where the objects assume definite shapes and are given specific names. As to that the hoary Upanishad sages had by intuitive knowledge come to realize that earth, water and light were the three elements from the permutations and combinations of whose particles in various proportions with the admixture of those of air and space, the whole of the tangible world, organic and inorganic, was formed, that originally they were intangible but in order that the objects formed from them may take definite shapes and be capable of being given distinct names so as to be distinguishable from each other, each became divided into two equal parts and while one part of each remained intact, the other of each became sub-divided into four parts and one such sub-part of each became mixed with the entire halves of each of the others, with the result that each element became a mixture of five with the preponderance of one. This is called Pañchīkaraṇa[1]. The intangible elements again were originally in the Avyākrita (unmanifest) state as a tree is originally in the state of a seed. This Avyākrita state is, according to S'ankara, referred to in different Upanishads by different names such as Avyakta, Aks'ara, Ākās'a, Māyā and Avidyā[2]. It is none else than the original ignorance. That is the state to which the universe is reduced at the end of each Kalpa and from which the process of evolution begins at the beginning of the next Kalpa. The process of synthesis cannot go beyond it but that is not the real cause of the

1. For a more elaborate explanation of this process *vide the Notes at pp. 164-68 infra.*

2. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 4. 1-3. (pp. 377-81).*

universe according to the Vedānta philosophy for it is Jaḍa (inert) and cannot therefore act without being animated by Brahma who is its inner ruler or regulator. And it is not also an independent entity but exists in Brahma. Thus there is Brahma inside the Avyākrita and also outside it and roundabout it when looked at from a dualistic point of view. Even after the Avyākrita becomes the Vyākrita and the elements are evolved thereout and they having become quinquepartite become materialized, Brahma enters each of them and permeats every particle thereof for otherwise they would not have the powers to discharge their respective functions. Thus Brahma which is greater than the greatest and smaller than the smallest object, is above, below, in the middle of and roundabout everything, great and small, and is therefore the breath of their breath and the life of their life. In fact everything is Brahma itself appearing in (Vivarta), not transformed (Pariṇata) into, their forms. But it is not simply the sum-total of everything, called the concrete universal, because the universe exists in only a part of it. And though it cannot be gainsaid that just as on the one hand there are the different mundane objects, so on the other there are different individual subjects or souls in different degrees of development on the earth, in the air and in the sky, one with a sense of discrimination begins to realize that the apparently different souls are but the one Brahma appearing as manifold on account of several Buddhis and Antahkaraṇas in the same way as the spaces delimited by the numerous objects contained therein such a pot, a cupboard, a house &c., though appearing to be distinct, are in fact one substance appearing as manifold. These Buddhis or Antahkaraṇas, which are the causes from which different subtle and gross bodies are produced, being different, it is but natural that there should be a distinct experience of each individual in the waking and dreaming states in which the Buddhi or Antahkraṇa is present but in the states of deep sleep and complete trance, in which it is not present, the experience of all individuals is the same, namely, that of unalloyed happiness. The state of complete trance thereout is not attainable by all and sundry. Nor is it a state which is ever reached as a constitutional neecssity by any sentient beings. It is attainable by an extremely limited number of human beings because it comes in as the fruit of a long course of spiritual discipline, study, reflection and meditation as already stated. It is not therefore possible for everybody to realize the truth of the above proposition, so far as the experience in that state is concerned. But the state of deep sleep is experienced by everybody everyday and therefore everybody can bear witness to the fact that he always rises from that state with a feeling that he was till then in a happy state. This happiness is however of a different kind. The senses having been then drowned and there being consequently no contact between them and any external material objects and the mind also having been set at complete rest and there being therefore no imaginary objects also as in the state of dreaming, the happiness experienced in that state

is that of being restored to one's original state. Here one would ask why is it then that men do not rise from that state with the consciousness that they have known the truth as do those who rise from the state of trance? The answer to that query is that there is a very thin ethereal layer of the original ignorance separating the Self from the Antahkaraṇa in that state and so the individual on returning to the waking state is reminded that in the previous state he did not know anything. Of course there was nothing either material or imaginary which one could have known then in the same way as one knows things in the states of waking and dreaming. There was only the one who in the other state becomes the knower and one could have known it but for the veil of ignorance. This experience is common to all sentient beings and is therefore a positive and the most powerful proof of the one Brahma, the seat of the highest happiness, appearing in many forms as individual souls on account of contact with diverse reflecting substances in the form of Antahkaraṇas. Even in the two states in which the distinction exists, the Antahkaraṇas, the sense-organs and bodies are powerless to function so long as they are not favoured with attention by the Self as in the states of deep sleep and stupor. This it does by permeating each of them by its rays of light and identifying itself with them. Thus just as on the one hand there is the Supreme Soul permeating each particle of the inanimate objects, so on the other there is the individual soul permeating every particle of the mind, senses and body and the distinction between individual souls being unreal, it comes to this that there is only one Supreme Soul pervading both the subjects and objects as these terms are used in ordinary parlance, that all the organic and inorganic bodies are really His bodies and that therefore there is really speaking one subject and all else that appears or is felt to exist must be deemed to fall in the category of objects. The latter have no independent existence because they stand in need of an illuminator or a substratum and that is none other than the subject itself. In fact it is the subject itself that appears as the object and so when knowledge arises the knower really speaking knows himself though in his ignorance he believes that he knows things existing outside himself but when true knowledge arises, that ignorance is dispelled, the knowledge of his true nature shines forth in him and he then realizes the truth that there is only one reality and that therefore the distinction between the knower, thing to be known and the means of knowledge which he used to draw, was due to nothing else but ignorance or was a mere display of the infinite powers of the Self called the Divine Māyā.

One very palpable and therefore easily accepted objection to this interpretation of life and phenomena is that the Advaita philosophy which lays a claim to be the science of sciences counts too much upon one's credulity when it asks one to believe that the general experience

of mankind that the subject and object are distinct entities, in other words that the world of experience exists apart from the experiencing subject, is the result of ignorance and that knowledge consists in realizing their identity. It will appear however, on a little reflection that this claim is not in any way greater than what it can legitimately make as a science dealing not with any particular portion of the universe such as the celestial world which is dealt with by astronomy, the natural objects which fall within the purview of physics, the properties of the so-called elementary substances which come within the domain of chemistry, the structure &c., of the human body which form the subject-matter of the medical science, the nature of the human mind and the laws governing its operations which are treated of by psychology &c., but with all the so-called subjects and objects of knowledge, wherever existing and in whatever forms. Every science, however humble its province, must have in store some such knowledge to communicate to its student as he cannot acquire from the man in the street and as at the outset presupposes a certain degree of subtelety of intellect, a certain degree of faith that what it teaches was discovered as the truth by the previous experts in that line after they followed a particular procedure, a fair measure of keenness of desire to be convinced of that truth and a certain amount of patience and perseverance on his part to meticulously follow the same course of conduct in order to realize that truth. The scientist-teacher who imparts that knowledge does not mind whether what he has got to teach is or is not in accord with the generally accepted notion about the subject-matter of his discourse. His only anxiety is to make some substantial addition to the world's stock of knowledge on that subject and if in doing so he has to disabuse the minds of his students of any mistaken notions about the subject, he does that without fear, for he has the force of truth at his back. Thus for instance, although everybody percieves that the sun rises and sets daily, revolving round the earth, and therefore believes that the earth is stationary and that the sun revolves round it, astronomy says that the appearance is not true and that what really happens is that the earth revolves round the sun. Similarly though the moon is in appearance bigger than the biggest planet or star seen from this earth, that science says that she is only a satellite of the earth and that there are some amongst the planets which are considerably bigger than the earth and some amongst the stars which are considerably bigger than our sun. And why go to any science at all for being convinced of the truth that appearances are not always the correct mainfestation of truth, for, are not even laymen aware that our sense of vision decieves us at times, as while we are sitting in a railway train or a ship, the mountains, buildings, trees &c., in front of ourselves appear to be moving rapidly and we feel ourselves sitting unmoved at one place though the fact is quite the reverse of that? Hence an objection based on mere sense-perception or a general belief does not deserve to be given any countenance as against a scientific truth.

XIV

S'ankara's Debt to Gauḍapāda.

It will be seen on a comparison of this statement of the Advaita doctrine with that of the doctrine of the principal Upanishads, the *Bhagawadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtras* given above, that it was not altogether a new doctrine that S'ankara had propounded. Nor does he himself anywhere lay a claim to his having done so. On the contrary he cites Upanishad texts to support each link in his chain of reasoning and even maintains strongly that the knowledge of Brahma or the Self cannot be acquired from any other source but the *Upanishads*. Though occasionally he cites the *Bhagavadgītā*, which he looks upon as a Smriti, and other Smritis in support of his views, he does so only on points on which they do not differ from those texts and has even disregarded the view of the author of the *Bhagavadgītā* on the question of the ways by which the soul departs after separation from the physical body.[1] Reference has also already been made to the previous commentators of the *Brahmasūtras*. In some of the literary works of the famous poets, Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti and Bhāravi such as *Raghuvams'a* and *Kumārasambhava* of the first, *Uttararāmacharita* of the second, and *Kirātārjunīya* of the third, there are references to that doctrine and therefore they bear testimony to its spread and to the existence of works thereon in the three to four centuries preceding the advent of S'ankara in the field. The *Lankāvatārasūtra*, a Buddhist work translated into Chinese in 443 A. D. also refers to "a doctrine of the heretics" by the term "Ātmavada"[2]. There are therefore good grounds for believing that there were adherents of the Advaita school prior to the time of S'ankara and that there were also in existence certain works wherein its doctrine had been expounded. But unfortunately no such work is now available to us except one of S'ankara's Paramaguru Gauḍapādāchārya, known as his *Kārikās*. S'ankara refers to him in his *S'ārīrakabhāshya* as the repository of the Vedānta tradition[3] and has written a *Bhāshya on the Kārikās*. There is a close similarity between the doctrine expounded therein and that expounded in the *S'ārīrakabhāshya*. It therefore deserves to be noticed here for the purpose of ascertaining the debt of S'ankara to its author.

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1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. IV. 2. 20–21.* (*p. 984*).

2. *Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy Vol. I p. 186.*

3. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. II. 1. 9.* (*p. 447*). One Oriental scholar, Prof. Walleser, seems to have doubted the existence of this Achārya but his view has not been accepted by Jacobi and Barnett and has been refuted by Belvalkar (*Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy Vol. I pp. 182-85*). The above distinct reference to him by S'ankara also negatives the reasonableness of the doubt, no matter whether we do or do not believe the tradition contained in such works as the *Samks'epas'ankarajaya* of Mādhava.

That work has been divided into four chapters, entitled 'Āgama,' 'Vaitathya,' 'Advaita' and 'Alātas'ānti' respectively. The first thereout is, so to say, a commentary on the *Māṇḍukyopanishat* which he calls an Āgama or Veda[1] and the rest contain an exposition of the doctrine underlying that Upanishad as understood by the author. In the first the presiding deities of the three states of the individual soul have been equated with the three Mātrās of the syllable Om ! which are expressive of the presiding deities of the creation, preservation and destruction of the universe, the imaginary nature thereof has been postulated and the ultimate truth is established that there is only one real entity, whether it is called the Ātmā from the stand-point of the individual or Brahma from that of the cosmos. In the subsequent chapters of the work it has been established that the Self of man is not a mere momentary consciousness or a void but a positive entity which illuminates itself and everything that comes in contact with it and is an eternal substance transcending all limitations of time, space and causality. The existence of the phenomenal world is denied there and its appearance is attributed to delusion as in the case of a serpent imagined to exist in place of a rope in darkness and it is stated that it will cease to be felt on a conviction of the absolute truth as a serpent ceases to appear in a rope after a conviction as to its being a rope, arises[2]. The phenomena which we see in the waking state only is according to him of the same nature as the one we see and act upon in a dream in asmuch as both cease to exist in the states of deep sleep and knowledge[3]. It was never created just as a son of a barren woman was never born and appears on account of the activity of the mind and would cease to be felt when the mind is brought under control, turned away from the sense-objects and made steady in the contemplation of the pure Self.[4] This is not of course an easy task; nay, it requires as much patience and perseverance as the emptying of the ocean with a blade of Kus'a grass. Still it is not quite impossible and when it is accomplished the pure Brahma is realized as the only reality.[5]

From some of the illustrations given by this Achārya as to the

1. Pandit Vidhus'ekhara Bhaṭṭāchārya seems to have propounded the view that the *Kārikās* constituted the original work and the Upanishad the subsequent one. He has supported it by some reasons but that view is not held by Belvalkar to be convincing (*Vide Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy Vol. I pp. 189-93*). The title of the first chapter of the *Kārikās* also negatives such a view.

2. *Gau. Kā. II.* 12–19.

3. *Ibid I. 13–17, II. 31.*

4. *Ibid III. 28.31.*

5. *Ibid. III. 41–46, IV. 78–100.*

nature of the phenomena and as to why it appears it might be thought that he denied the existence thereof absolutely but such is not in fact the case. He must have, like S'ankara, admitted its existence for the purpose of daily intercourse, *i. e.* to say, upto the last stage of ignorance, for if this had not been his view he would not have prescribed the remedy above-mentioned for realizing the truth of his theory. Moreover, by saying that what did not exist before birth and will cease to exist after death is as good as not existing even now[1], the fact that the phenomenal world is found to exist is not denied but what is denied is its existence as a real entity apart from the Self. This means that even according to his view there are two kinds of truth, Pāramārthic (absolute) and Vyāvhāric (relative), the first implying unity and the other diversity. These two can be reconciled in the basis of the Māyā-vāda or Vivarta-vāda (Illusion-Theory). This again implies the Adhyāsa (superimposition) of the Self on the non-selfs and *vice versā* which has been resorted to by S'ankara in order to explain how the whole of Vyavahāra, Vaidic and Laukic, has come into being.[2] There is thus as a matter of fact no fundamental doctrinal difference between the teachings of the first two groups of the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagawadgītā* and the *Bràhmasūtras* as interpreted by S'ankara on the one hand and the *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda on the other and therefore it is but right that Gauḍapāda is considered by the modern scholars like Professors Dās Gupta and Rādhākrishṇa and by such Paṇḍits of the old school trained up in the modern historical method of criticism as Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudev S'āstri Abhyankara, as the father of Advaitism. Even S'ankara has in his *Bhāshya on the Kārikās* admitted so far that it was its author who first re-claimed that ancient doctrine from the Upanishads and placed it in such a logical form as would be acceptable to the men of the age in which he lived. That age was the one subsequent to that in which great Buddhist logicians and philosophers like As'vaghosha, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu had succeeded in wining for the Buddhist negativist philosophy such an exalted position that no believer in the Upanishad doctrine with an ordinary knowledge of logic could hope to succeed in dislodging it from that position[3]. Gauḍapāda being a thorough student of that philosophy and therefore an adept in the science of dialectics and at the same time having an unbounded faith in the positivist teaching of the Upanishads, had succeeded in doing so. But that was not enough. There was a necessity of a work containing an elaborate exposition of the doctrine in all its implications and taking note of the experiences of an average aspirant for knowledge, which could serve as the standard work of a new school that would absorb all that was good and unobjectionable in the tenets of the other schools and particularly the Buddhist and would at

1. *Gau. Kā. IV. 31.*
2. *S'. B. on Br. Sū.—Introduction pp. 6-46.*
3. *Dās Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy p. 422.*

the same time revive the faith of the Hindus in their Vaidic Scriptures and place them at the head of all the means of proof. It is to the immortal glory of his grandpupil S'ankara that he supplied such a work by writing his famous *S'ārīrakabhāshya.* The result thereof was that the *Kārikā* work, which did the spade work, has been eclipsed, that for more than eleven centuries the *S'ārīrakabhāshya* is being respected by the Advaita philosophers as the work of the highest authority on the doctrine of their school and that its author is universally acknowledged as the founder of that school.

XV.

Advaita Philosophy and the Yogavāsishṭha.

We have upto this time traced the history of the Vedānta system through the works which are positively known to be directly connected with the *S'ārīrakabhāshya* of S'ankara which the followers of the Advaita school believe to be the most authoritative and earliest source of its doctrine. Those works are the *Upanishads* which are acknowledged by S'ankara as the basis of that doctrine, the *Bhagawadgītā* which is acknowledged by him as a Smriti and therefore as having an equal authority on all such points on which the S'ruti *i. e.* the Upanishad portion of the Vedas is silent and the *Brahmasūtrās* which evolve a well-reasoned out system out of those ancient and authoritative works. We have also seen to what extent S'ankara was indebted to Gauḍapāda for the Advaita doctrine and how he modified it in order to make it acceptable by the general public. It will now be our task to trace its development after S'ankara in order that we may rightly appraise the contribution of our author to the development of that doctrine. Before proceeding to do that however it is necessary to state in what relation the *Yogavāsishṭha,* a philosophical poem of importance from more than one view-point, stood to the said doctrine. Dr., B. L. Atreya, who seems to have made a special historical study of that work, complains[1] that the said work has not recieved the kind of recognition it deserves at the hands of historians of Indian Philosophy like Professors Dās Gupta and Rādhākrishṇa although other students of Indian Philosophy like Swāmi Rāma Tīrtha, S'iva Prasād Bhaṭṭāchārya, Lālā Baij Nāth, K. Nārāyaṇ-swāmi Aiyer, Bhagwāndās, Bihāri Lāl Mitra, Thākur Prasād, Munshi Suraj Nārāyaṇa Mehra, S'ivavrat Lāl, the writer himself and an anonymous author and some enterprising managers of printing presses in Bombay, namely, the Nirṇaya Sāgar, Vyankaṭes'wara, and Ganpat Krishṇāji Presses have done their best to bring its merits to the notice of those interested in the subject-matter thereof and though it is very popular in India. He also complains that it has been misunderstood by dis-

1. *Yogavāsishṭha And Its Philosophy,* an article published in "The Theosophy" for April 1932 at pp. 49-62.

tinguished Orienatalists like Drs. Winternitz and Farquhar and Professor Rādhākrishṇa. At the same time he himself admits that (1) the work is too lengthy (2) That it is written in such a style and suffers so much from the faults of want of coherence of thought, prolixity and repetitions that attempts have been made from time to time to abridge it, that he himself made one to evolve a system out of it by compiling a work called *Vasishtha-dars'ana* in which repetitions are avoided and thoughts are arranged logically and (3) that there is no direct connection between it and the well-known standard works of S'ankara such as *S'ārīrakabhāshya, Upanīshadbhāshyas, Gītābhāshya* and *Upades'asāhasrī,* though there is some similarity of thoughts between it and *Vivekachūḍāmani.* These reasons by themselves explain why the work has not been recognized as a scientific work and has been misunderstood. None of them is however a good excuse for the omission thereof from a bibliography such as has been appended to Prof. Abhyankar's edition of the *Sarvadars'anasaṁgraha.* It also deserves notice in this Introduction because Madhusūdana seems to have been influenced by some of the ideas expressed therein, he having cited its authority once in the *Siddhāntabindu*[1], and once in the *Advaitasiddhi*[2] and taken several extracts from it in order to support his interpretation of several verses of the *Bhagavadgītā*[3]. I do so at this place because though in the present state of my knowledge I am not prepared to say whether Dr. Atreya's view that this is a work composed in the sixth century A. D. is acceptable or not, I can say that it must have been composed before 900 A. D. because there is a pointed reference to it in Verse 182 of Chapter II of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* of Sarvajñātmā who lived about that time[4]. True, there is no direct mention therein of its name in that verse but there being no other earlier work in which Rāma had been stated to have been initiated into Brahmavidyā, not even the *Vālamiki-Rāmāyaṇa,* the *Yogavāsishtha* must be taken to have been alluded therein.

Now, it is a big work in 27687 stanzas as at present available. The author himself says however that it was in 32000 stanzas as originally written. His chief object in composing it seems to have been to make Brahmavidyā popular. Such being his object he has deliberately preferred the narrative to the argumentative style and made the subject interesting by inserting long stories and appropriate figures of speech drawn from experience in order to bring home to the reader the principles expressed therein. He has avoided citing authorities and always appealed to

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1. *Sanskrit Section p.* ७६ *infra.*

2. *Adwaitasiddhi, Parichchheda I p. 411.*

3. *Gūḍhārthadīpikā under Bhagawadjītā III.18, V. 23, VI. 29, 32, 35, 36.*

4. सङ्कल्पपूर्वकमभूद्रघुनन्दनस्य नाहं विजान इति कञ्चन कालमेतत्। ब्रह्मोपदेशमुपलभ्य निमित्तमात्रं तच्चोत्ससर्ज स कृते सति देवकार्ये ॥

experience but has nevertheless adopted the views expressed in the previous works such as the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagawadgītā* and even borrowed their language at times in order to express his own views. He has divided the work into six chapters called Prakaraṇas whose titles are 'Vairāgya' (Indifference towards sense-objects), 'Mumuksu-vyavahāra' (Conduct of the aspirant), 'Utpatti' (Evolution) 'Sthiti (Preservation) 'Upas'ama' (Involution) and 'Nirvāṇa' (Cessation of the finite existence). The central doctrine therein is that man finds the world full of misery because he does not know his own Self which is identical with Brahma, that there are two distinct ways of knowing it, namely Jñāna which means right perception and Yoga which means control of the action of the mind, that people select the one or the other as it suits their temperament and circumstances, that from the state of desiring to know the Self to that of final absolution there are seven stages of spiritual development, that upto the fifth a man remains capable of attending to his ordinary duties as an embodied soul and can therefore impart knowledge to another but when in the sixth called Padārthābhāvinī he ceases to know the objects of sense-perception and in the seventh called Turyagā the connection between his soul and the body is severed, all his previous Karmas are destroyed and he loses his individuality and becomes merged in Brahma for ever. This view has been accepted by Vidyāraṇya in his *Pañchadas'ī* and *Jīwanmuktiviveka* and by Madhusūdana in the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*. As for the nature of the phenomena, Vasishṭha's view is the same as that of Gauḍapāda, namely that it has no existence when philosophically viewed and that it appears to exist through Avidyā (ignorance). This view is accepted by Madhusūdana in the *Advaitasiddhi* while discussing the Drishṭisrishṭi-vāda. The same author's view that a recollection of pain while in the state of deep sleep can arise because each of the three states has three sub-states such as Jāgrat-jāgrat, Jāgrat-swapna, Jāgrat-sushupti &c., has been availed of in the *Siddhāntabindu* while discussing the nature of the state of deep sleep. According to Drs. Winternitz, Konow and Keith[1] This work first attracted the notice of the Vedāntins about the middle of the ninth century when Gauḍa Abhinanda of Kashmir brought out an abridgment thereof into about 6000 stanzas to which he gave the name *Laghu Yogavāsishṭha* and according to Dr. Atreya many minor Upanishads such as the *Mahopanishat, Annapūrṇopanishat, Aks'yupanishat* and others and some treatises such as *Vedāntamuktāvalī, Hathayogapradīpikā* and *Rāmagītā* contain evidence of the *Yogavāsishṭha* having influenced the thoughts of several predecessors of Vidyāraṇya, including Prakās'ātmā, a very prominent Vedantin who lived about two centuries before him.

1. 'Theosophy' for April 1932 pp. 58, 59.

XVI

Subsequent Development of the Advaita Doctrine upto the time of Madhusūdana Saraswatī.

(1) *Padmapādāchārya.*

Having disposed of the *Yogavāsishṭha* which had been composed before, in or shortly after the time of S'ankara, we now proceed to trace the history of the Advaita doctrine subsequent to his death. As to that we have already had occasion to refer to some of the prominent amongst his disciples. Two of them who have contributed substantially to the development of that doctrine are Padmapādācharya and Sures'warāchārya. The first of them has not been able to leave behind him as high a reputation as the latter though he had the benefit of a longer contact with the Āchārya. The only work which he is reputed to have composed is a *Commentary on the Bhāshya of S'ankara* so far as it relates to the first five Pādas of the *Brahma-sūtras* and unfortunately that too is not available in a complete form but only so far as it relates to the first four Sūtras only. There is a legend explaining the loss and it is that after he composed the *Pañchapādikā,* which was the name given to his commentary, he was actuated by a desire to go about on a tour of pilgrimages and therefore sought permission for it from his Guru. The latter tried to dissuade him but he was inexorable and was therefore allowed to go. He carried the commentary with himself. On his way to Rāmes'wara he halted at the house of his maternal uncle, who was a follower of Prabhākara and showed him his commentary, wherein he had refuted the Prābhākara view and established that of S'ankara. Thereafter he left his belongings including the manuscript of his commentary at his uncle's house saying that he would take them away on his return from Rāmes'wara. During his absence, his uncle thought that if the *Pañchapādikā* gained publicity his master's doctrine would not stand. And he had so much attachment towards it that he would rather sacrifice his all than allow it to be supplanted. He therefore hit upon the trick of setting fire to his own house in order that the manuscript of that work may be destroyed. Padmapāda spoke of this to his master on his return and repented for having gone against his advice. The latter thereupon dictated to him the Chatuhsūtrī portion of the work which he remembered. That is the reason why that portion of it only is now available. The special service which it has rendered in continuing the work of the master is that the theory of Adhyāsa which forms the foundation of the Vivarta-vāda has been fully and ably discussed therein. It was Prakās'ātmā, a twelfth century writer who brought this work into prominence by writing a commentary thereon called *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa.* Amalānanda thereafter

wrote another named *Pañchapādikādarpaṇa* and Vidyāsāgara, a third called *Pañchapādikāṭīkā.* On the *Vivaraṇa* again there is the commentary of Nrisimhās'rama called *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakās'ikā* and Vidyāraṇya has composed a digest on it called *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha.* Padmapāda's views have been thrice referred to in the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana[1] and once in the *Siddhāntales'a* of Appaya Diks'it.[2]

(*2*) *Sures'warāchārya.*

The disciple of the Āchārya whose name will always remain inseparably associated with the development of the Advaita doctrine is Sures'warāchārya. Madhusūdana Saraswatī has deemed his contribution to it so valuable as to have placed him on a par with the master in one of the concluding verses of the *Siddhāntabindu.*[3] He was a very pet pupil of the Āchārya and was therefore installed by him on the principal Gādi of the Math at S'ringeri in the Mysore State. There is a general belief that he was identical with Manḍana Mis'ra, a disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the great Mīmāñsaka who had the boldness to cross swords with his own preceptor Prabhākara, and to found a new school in opposition to his, and that S'ankara had given the name Sures'wara to him after he, agreeably to his pledge, gave up the order of the Grihasthas and accepted that of the Sannyāsīs on being defeated in debate with him. His wife Bhāratī too is believed to have been a very learned woman and S'ankara is said to have been compelled by her to conquer her in debate before calling upon him to fulfil his pledge.[4] This identity has recently been seriously questioned by Prof. Hiriyanna of Mysore in an able article published in two parts in J. R. A. S. for April 1923 and January 1924. In his Introduction to the *Naishkarmyasiddhi* published in the Bombay Sanskrit Series also he says that one of the views refuted in that work was that of Manḍana Mis'ra which was not possible if he were identical with Sures'wara. Dr. Belvalkar however seems to believe them to be identical persons for the reasons mentioned at p. 289 of his *Mullick Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy, Part I* which to me appear convincing. I therefore take the belief in that identity to be well-founded. Even if it is considered otherwise it matters little so far as our purpose is concerned because it is with the work of Sures'wara only that we are concerned, Manḍana Mis'ra as such not being known to have composed any of the works which are considered authoritative by and which seem to have influenced the thoughts of Madhusūdana Saraswatī.

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1. *Gujratī Press edition pp. 15, 273, 623.*
2. *Advaita Mañjarī Series p. 205.*
3. *Sanskrit Section p. ८२ infra.*
4. *Saṁks'epa S'ankarajaya XIV.*

Those works are *Vārttikas on the Bhāshyas of S'ankara on the Brihadāranyakopanishat and Taittirīyopanishat* and at least three independent works, namely *Brahmasiddhi, Naishkarmyasiddhi* and *Mānasollāsa.* Thereout the first is referred to in our work as the *Vārttika* or *Vārttikāmrita.*[1] It is again due to his authorship of that work that he is spoken of in the works of Madhusūdana Saraswatī as the Vārttikakāra or Vārttikakrit or Vārttikakārapādāh[2] and that his views came to be considered as worth-quoting frequently in such works of authority as the *Advaitasiddhi* of our author[3] and *Siddhāntales'a* of Appaya Diks'it.[4] It was he who put forward the Ābhāsa-vāda (Semblance-theory) which is the first Vāda mentioned by our author in order to explain how one and the same Brahma could be both the individual soul and Īs'wara (the ruler of the universe).[5] S'ankara had no doubt stated frequently and most emphatically that the distinction between Jīwa and Īs'wara was felt because of ignorance and that if that is removed, that distinction would cease to be felt,[6] that the Jīwas appeared to be many on account of different limitations such as the Buddhi &c.,[7] and that it was Paramātmā or Brahma itself which believed itself to be liable to the changes of states which are really those of its environements[8] but that was not enough to solve the above problem. Sures'vara therefore propounded the above theory which has been fully explained in the *Notes,* for the appropriate references to which the *Index* commencing at p. 281 may be looked into. His *Naishkarmyasiddhi* again is a very remarkable treatise. As its name itself implies it had been specially composed in order to establish that the knowledge of the true nature of the Self which is the only means of salvation can be acquired from the Mahāvākyas (principal sentences of the Upanishads) themselves without the help of Vaidic acts. S'ankarāchārya himself had no doubt stated most unequivocally at several places that knowledge alone was the means of salvation and that the performance of S'rauta and Smārta Karmas was necessary only till the heart was so purified as to enable one to understand and realize the purport of the Upanishad teaching which is contained in the Mahāvākyas

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1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* २५ *and* ८० *infra.*

2. *Ibid pp.* २७, ३०, ५३.

3. *Gujrāti Press edition pp. 86, 206, 314, 332, 350, 378, 399, 411, 462, 463, 672, 684, 711, 743 and 746.*

4. *Advaita Mañjarī Series p. 28.*

5. *Sanskrit Section pp.* २६-२८ *infra.*

6. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 3. 19 (pp. 300-07), I. 4. 10 (pp. 388-89), I. 4. 19-22 (pp. 411-21).*

7. *Ibid II. 3. 17 (pp. 601-03).*

8. *Ibid II 1. 9. (pp. 446-47), III. 2. 9. (pp. 704-05), III. 2. 25 (p. 722), III. 4. 8. (p. 874).*

and refuted at length the view of the Samuchchayavādins[1] but he had not included amongst them those who maintained that the acquisition of knowledge once from the Mahāvākyas was not sufficient to make one realize at once the identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul, that for that purpose, meditation on the truth was absolutely necessary and that the knowledge which was really the means of salvation was therefore not that derived from the Mahāvākyas but that which came from the Self itself after the actual realization thereof in a state of trance. He seems to have refrained from doing so because in his view Prasaṁkhyāna was not an act but a part of the process of knowledge itself[2] and because it would rarely happen that an aspirant would at once realize the true nature of the Self on reading or hearing a Mahāvākya or even all the Mahāvākyas once only. He has on the other hand spent much energy in establishing the necessity of repetitions of the teaching[3] and either approved of or emphasized at several places in his works[4] the necessity of practising Prasaṁkhyāna which connotes the same idea as the words Parisaṁkhyāna, Dhyāna, Upāsanā, Bhāvanā, Saṁrādhana and Bhakti. He has also prescribed a particular course of 'Parisaṁkhyāna' in Ch. III. of his *Upades'asāhasrī* (in prose) and another of Rājayoga, of which Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna and Samādhi form parts, in Verses 100-143 of his *Aparoks'ānubhūti.* Sures'wara being his direct and devoted pupil,[5] having written this work at his bidding and having admitted that his master had acquired Brahmavidyā by the practice of Yoga,[6] having frequently drawn upon the *Upades'asāhasrī* for the support of his views,[7] and having made no other claim than that of propounding a doctrine that had been propounded by the Saints of the Gauḍa and Drāviḍa provinces (i. e. Gauḍapāda and S'aṅkara)[8] it cannot be that he intended to modify S'aṅkara's doctrine. Still he has used so much dialectical skill in Chapter III of the *Naishkarmyasiddhi* to refute the view that knowledge can arise from Prasaṁkhyāna in any form whatever that one who reads that chapter only is likely to be led into the belief that he intended to establish by his arguments a position which would not have been acceptable to S'ankara. But if one reads that chapter along with the others one will find that he too has not only not excluded the necessity

1. *S'. B. on Bh. Gītā. II. 11, III. 1-2. &c., S'. B. on Br. Sū I. 3. 19 (p. 303), II. 1. 3. (p. 438-39), II. 3. 30. (p. 611), III. 4. 26-27 (p. 898-00), IV. 3. 14. (pp. 997-02).*

2. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 1. 4. (pp. 128-30, 153).*

3. *Ibid IV. 1. 1-2. (pp. 928-36), Upa. Sā. I. 1.*

4. *Ibid II. 1. 1. (p. 228). II. 3. 39 (p. 615), III. 2. 21 (pp. 711-16), III. 2. 24-26 (pp. 721-22), III. 4. 15. (p. 875), Aparo. 100-01.*

5. *Nai. I. 3.*

6. *Ibid IV. 74, 76.*

7. *Ibid IV. 19, 62, 65 &c.*

8. *Ibid. IV. 44.*

of Prasaṁkhyāna but on the contrary affirmed that it forms one of the intermediate stages through which one has to pass before reaching the highest state and that his object in composing this work was to establish logically that the knowledge which is conducive to the liberation of the human soul from bondage can arise from the Mahāvākyas only[1]. By this he could not have meant that any one who once reads any of the Mahāvākyas would at once realize the true nature of the Self because Brahmavidyā being in his days a secret science in which initiation was impossible unless one approached and stayed with and propitiated by devotional service a preceptor who was well-versed in it, he could not have dreamt of the possibility of an Upanishad going into the hands of any one else except those who had been thoroughly tested and found fit to learn the esoteric doctrine. What he must therefore have meant was that the knowledge of Brahma whenever it arises, must arise from the Upanishad texts not from Vaidic Karmas or even from Prasaṁkhyāna. He cannot however deny that S'ankara has emphatically established the necessity of frequent repetitions of S'ravaṇa which is one form of Prasaṁkhyāna and therefore in order to make room for it he says that it is a part of S'ravaṇa itself and that thereby the fundamental point above-mentioned remains unaffected[2]. Lest however any one should be led to believe that in his view it was not necessary for any one whatever to have recourse to Prasaṁkhyāna he has made his position clear by dividing the students of Brahmavidyā into four classes, namely (1) those who have already realized that the purport of the Mahāvākyas lies in the identity of Brahma and Jīwa; (2) those who are likely to realize it on hearing a Mahāvākya once only; (3) those who are able to do so on doing Anvaya and Vyatireka *i. e.* to say, on eliminating the non-selfs one by one by reflecting over their nature and over that of the Self as understood from the Scriptures and (4) those who are not competent enough to do so unless frequently initiated into the truth contained in the Mahāvākyas and the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka is frequently explained to them. They stand in need of a Brahmanishṭa Guru who would point out that the one whom they are seeking for is none else but their own Self just as when one of a company of ten, which has crossed a river, believes on counting over the remaining nine that one of them is missing, he has to be told that he himself is the tenth.[3] The process of Anvaya and Vyatireka here referred to and described in details in Chapter II of the work differs little from that of Parisaṁkhyāna described in Chapter III of the *Upades'asāhasrī* (in prose) of S'ankarāchārya. Hence this author's view comes to this that besides the Āptakāmas there are men of

1. *Nai. Sambandhokti (p. 32), Ch. II. 6-9 (pp. 61-62), IV. 71-73 (p. 203).*
2. *Ibid III. 125 (175-76).*
3. *Ibid III. 64. (p. 146).*

the highest qualifications who do not stand in need of any Prasaṁkhyāna, that there are those of the middling qualification who do their own Prasaṁkhyāna, that there are others of the lowest qualification who stand in need of being put on the way by others in the matter of Prasaṁkhyāna and that even in the last two cases what gives rise to the knowledge of the true nature of the Self is not Prasaṁkhyāna but a Mahāvākya, though the former is not without a place amongst the stages through which an aspirant passes in his quest for truth, in that it creates an inclination in his mind to think of the Self pure and simple, after all the Karmas, even Nis'kāma not being excepted, are given up[1]. Besides accomplishing this main purpose, the author expounds the whole of the Advaita doctrine in this work. One distinguishing feature of his exposition is that it relates only to the means of attaining Sadyomukti (immediate absolution) which is knowledge, pure and simple, of the identity of the individual soul with Brahma, the cause of the universe, derived from the Mahāvākya "Tat twam asi". For the preparation of the mind for grasping this knowledge it is, according to him, first of all necessary to perform all the Vaidic acts appropriate to one's caste and station in life enjoined by the Vedas, what is then necessary is the observance of the rules of discipline, namely S'ama, Dama &c, and lastly what is necessary is the acquisition of the knowledge of the true Self by the process of Anvaya and Vyatireka. This discrimination also smacks of ignorance because in the pure Self there is no distinction whatever, it being one only without a second. It is however necessary to resort to this process in order to turn the mind away from the mere names and forms to which it is naturally attracted and apply it towards the realization of the true nature of the Self. In asmuch however as it gives only a negative idea of the Self the disciple is put to thinking as to what it is. It is then that the preceptor initiates him into the secret of the Mahāvākyas which speak of the identity thereof with the Supreme Soul. At first the pupil is unable is to grasp or if he grasps he is unable to believe in that identity because the distinction between 'this' and 'that', 'You' and 'He' is not yet out of his mind. His mind is therefore disabused of it by the preceptor by making him understand that since the Vāchyārtha (primary senses) of the words are incompatible he should understand them in their Laks'yārtha (secondary senses) which means that both the individual soul and the Supreme Soul are to be understood there as devoid of their limitations. The primary senses are not to be given up absolutely because the objects indicated thereby are to be retained but their limitations only are to be excluded. Thus there takes place the species of Laks'aṇā known as Bhāgatyāga (abandonment of a part) or Jahadajahad (abandonment and now-abandonment). It is after that is done, that the disciple realizes

1. *Nai. Sambandhokti p. 32.* Cf. with this *S'. B. on Br. Sū I. 1. 2. (p. 130).*

the truth of the saying 'Thou art That' and becomes conscious of it as 'I am Brahma'.[1] Once this realization has taken place there is no reversion to the state of ignorance.

Comparing this statement of the Advaita doctrine with that of S'ankara, the difference that we find is that the process of S'ravaṇa is retained but those of Manana and Nididhyāsana are substituted by those of Anvaya and Vyatireka. There is of course not much substantial difference between the two kinds of processes but there is a remarkable difference in nomenclature and that is primarily due to a desire to push to a logical conclusion the theory of S'ankara that knowledge can arise from the S'ravaṇa of the Mahāvākyas only and as this meant a paramount importance given to words we find the later Vedāntins entering into elaborate discussions as to their power to give rise not only to an intellectual understanding of the gist of the sentences but also to what is called Avākyārtha, *i. e.* to say the realization of the truth contained in the Upanishad sayings. It is this very change that has been responsible for the rise of the class of S'ushka (dry) Vedāntins which believes that what is necessary for salvation is to pick up the Mahāvākya "I am Brahma" from the *Brihadāraṇyakopanishat*, go on repeating it, believe that one is Brahma in fact and go on with one's daily duties as one formerly did and in course of time one would become Brahma just as a worm is transformed into a bee. It is also responsible for the misunderstanding amongst scholars that there is no room in this doctrine for ethics. Sures'wara however did not mean that, for he says that although it is true that a Brahmavit as such knows no distinctions and is not therefore bound by any ethical code, one who is attracted to sense-objects and is tempted to lead the life of a libertine is not a Brahmavit at all but an impostor for the former's mind is too balanced to get ruffled by the perception of any sense-object, however attractive.[2] The fault is not thus in the teaching but in its going into the hands of those who are not ripe for it and that is the very reason why S'ures'wara has in the concluding verses of the work under notice laid down that it should not be given into the hands of those who are not completely indifferent towards sense-objects, who are not of a balanced mind &c.[3]

It is this doctrine that is set forth in the introductory part of Madhusūdana's commentary and in the portions thereof on Verses 1 and 8 of the *Das'as'lokī*. As nearly 8 centuries had elapsed between the times of Sures'wara and Madhusūdana, it is quite likely that the questions which were in the forefront in the time of the former should have ceased to be discussed amongst the Vedāntins of the time of the latter and new ones should have called for solutions just as

1. *Nai. III.*
2. *Ibid IV. 56-69.* (*pp. 199-03*).
3. *Ibid IV. 71-73* (*p. 203*).

the question whether the cause of the world was Brahma, an intelligent substance or Pradhān, an inert substance, which was much agitated in the time of Bādarāyaṇa, had ceased to be of interest and the one whether the means of final absolution was knowledge of Brahma alone or that knowledge accompanied by the performance of Nis'kāma Karma had began to engage the attention of the philosophers of the time of S'ankara and Sures'wara. We do not accordingly find any discussion in the *Siddhāntabindu* as to the latter question as we find in the works of the said two philosophers but do find discussions on several other topics arising out of the doctrine as established by them owing to the different views which had been propounded by different philosophers during the intervening period. To these I will turn later on. For the present it is enough to state that while S'ures'wara has in the *Naishkarmyasiddhi* considered three kinds of Anvaya and Vyatireka, namely those of the Dṛik (Seer) and the Dris'ya (Seen), the S'āks'ī (Witness) and Sāks'ya (Things witnessed), and the Āgamāpayī (Transient) and Tad-avadhi (That in which they end)[1], we find in the *Siddhāntabindu* one more, namely those of the Duhkhi (One affected by miseries) and the Paramapremāspada (Seat of the highest joy) added thereto and still one more, namely those of the Anuvritta (That which is followed) and the Vyāvṛitta (That which is excluded) spoken of as having been implied in all the previous four[2].

(3) *Vāchaspati Mis'ra.*

The next philosopher who has won for himself a prominent place in the history of the Advaita doctrine is Vāchaspati Mis'ra. He is believed to have lived about 841 A. D. Very few years must therefore have elapsed between the death of Sures'wara and the rise of Vāchaspati to eminence. He is a highly respected writer though from his name it appears that he was not a Sannyāsī. He had composed works on several other systems of philosophy such as the Mīmāñsā, Nyāya, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, namely *Nyāyakaṇikā*, a commentary on *Vidhiviveka*, *Tattwabindu*, an independent work on the Bhāṭṭamata of the Mīmāñsā school, *Nyāyavārttika-tātparya-ṭikā*, *Tattwa-Kaumudi*, a digest of the Sāṁkhya system and *Tattwavais'āradī*, a commentary on *Vyāsa's Bhashya* on the *Yogasūtras*. His two works on the Vedānta system are a commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* known as *Tattwasamīks'ā* and a commentary on the *Bhāshya of S'ankara on the S'ārīraka Sūtras* known as *Vāchaspatya* after his own name and as *Bhāmatī* after that of his devoted wife. This last commentary itself has earned for him an honoured place amongst the authoritative writers on the Advaita

1. *Prof. Hiriyanna's Notes on the Nai. p. 253.*
2. *Sanskrit Section p.* ৬০ *infra.*

doctrine. It is either referred to by any of its two names or any of the views expressed therein are taken note of in such standard works as the *Advaitasiddhi*[1] and *Siddhāntales'a*.[2] There are also references in the latter work to a school going by the name of Vāchaspatipaks'ānusāriṇah (followers of the view of Vāchaspati)[3]. He has accepted the doctrine that it is knowledge alone that leads to final absolution and that this is the knowledge derived from the Mahāvākya "Tat tvam asi" but has made it very clear that it is only after the perfection of S'ravaṇa, Manana and Dhyānābhyāsa, by which he means Nididhyāsana or Prasaṁkhyāna, that the individual soul having experienced the Self as the pure intelligent Essence, becomes free from the net of miseries together with the latent desires, absolute and self-contained.[4] In the *Advaitaratnarakṣ'aṇa* of our author he has accordingly been referred to as the holder of the view that the Mahāvākya produces indirect (Paroks'a) knowledge only and that direct knowledge arises as the result of deep impressions formed in the mind by the repetitions of study, reflection and meditation.[5] This is therefore another interpretation of the term Nididhyāsana or Prasaṁkhyāna, as to the necessity of going through which, before the truth contained in the Mahāvākya can be realized, all the Advaitins are agreed. It shows a clear influence on his mind of the *Yogasūtras of Patañjali* on *Vyāsa's Bhāshya* whereon he has written a commentary as above stated.[6] In the *Siddhāntabindu* again he is referred to as the originator of the theory called Avachcheda-vāda which is said to have become current amongst the followers of S'ankara as to the explanation of the riddle how one and the same Brahma could be both the individual soul and the Supreme Soul[7]. An alternative explanation given by our author of the function of a Vritti (operation of the mind) in producing knowledge is also based upon this theory[8]. It follows from this very theory that there are as many ignorances as there are individual souls and that therefore though Brahma is common to all that soul alone has the consciousness of being freed whose individual ignorance is dispelled and it is stated in the *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa* that this was in fact the view of the author of the *Bhāmatī*[9].

His views are not accepted by our author but still they are mentioned in his works on account of his high reputation.

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1. *Gujrati Press edition pp. 168, 187, 252, 274, 371, 528, 720, 919, 995.*
2. *Advaita Mañjarī Series No. VI pp. 65, 123, 149-50, 242, 396.*
3. *Ibid pp. 39, 350, 465.*
4. *Bhāmatī on S'. B. on Br. Sū. II. 2. 10., IV. 1. 1. (pp. 502, 928-30).*
5. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 45.*
6. *Ānandās'ram Sanskrit Series No. XLVII.*
7. *Sanskrit Section p.* २९ *infra.*
8. *Ibid pp.* ३४-३५.
9. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 46.*

(4) *Vimuktāchārya.*

Another great writer of the same age was Vimuktāchārya, the author of the *Ishṭasiddhi.* The earliest work in which his authority is found by me to have been cited is the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* of Sarvajnātmā[1]. The point for elucidation before him in Chapter IV thereof is whether the removal of ignorance is the same as or different from the Self *i. e.* as I understand it, from the realization of the Self. He discusses some possible alternatives and says in Verse 14 that the "Muktikovidāh" have opined that the removal of ignorance takes place on brushing aside both the forms of falsity, namely difference from the Self and identity with the Self. Madhusūdana has in his commentary *Sārasaṁgraha* explained the term "Muktikovidāh" as meaning "Ishṭasiddhikārāh". If his explanation is correct it means that the author of the *Ishṭasiddhi* lived prior to that of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka.* Further Chitsukhāchārya has in the Chapter IV of the *Tattwapradīpikā* referred to this author's way of explaining why if there is only one Self the experiences of individuals differ.[2] Madhusūdana has in Parichcheda I of the *Advaitasiddhi* justified the view of the author of the *Ishṭasiddhi* that what determines the quality of being a means of proving something is a popular view.[3] In the *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa* again he has availed himself of the view of that author that there are as many ignorances as there are knowledges, in the discussion as to how far the means of proof such as direct perception are authoritative and what is the nature of their authoritativeness. He has there referred to that author by his work.[4] In the *Siddhāntabindu* too he has made use of the same dictum in order to explain why if Brahma is knowledge one's ignorance as to the true nature of the Self is not destroyed on the knowledge of an object such as a pot.

Ishṭasiddhi is being edited in the G. O. Series by a distinguished scholar. When therefore it is published more light may be thrown on the date and views of its author.

(5) *Sarvajñātma Muni.*

One more Vedāntin of the Advaita school who rose to fame within about half a century more after Vāchaspsti Mis'ra *i. e.* to say, about the end of the ninth century was Sarvajñātma Muni. As his surname implies, he was a Sannyāsī and was a direct pupil of Deves'wara whom our author has in his commentary on the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka,* a work of that Muni, identified with Sures'warācharya[5]. According to his own statement he was a

1. *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series No. XVIII Part II p. 368.*
2. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, first edition p. 376, second edition p. 384.*
3. *Gujrātī Press edition p. 267.*
4. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 32.*
5. *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series No. XVIII Part I. p. 15.*

contemporary of a ruling prince named Manukulāditya and was probably his protègé also.[1] This prince is believed to have been living about 900 A. D. The name *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* is significant in that the work contains the gist of the *S'ārīrakabhāshya* of S'ankarāchārya but only so far as the portion of it containing an exposition of Nirguṇa Brahma is concerned.[2] This means that its author has eliminated the whole of the Upāsanā portion of that work which presupposes the existence of Saguṇa Brahma, which even S'ankara has repeatedly stated is assumed for the temporary purpose of Upāsanā only.[3] Though the titles of the four chapters of his work accordingly correspond to those of the *S'ārīraka Sūtras,* and the subject-matter treated of in each is the same as in the *Bhāshya of S'ankara* on the corresponding chapter of the latter work, all reference to the nature of Saguṇa Brahma, the methods of Upāsanā thereof, the fruits accruing therefrom &c. is studiously avoided. On the other hand we find several new side-topics, not discussed in the *S'ārīrakabhāshya,* raised and discussed therein at great lengths. It is that portion of it which has won for it a prominent place in the history of the Advaita doctrine because several new objections raised by the adherents of the view that the Mahāvākyas can lead to Paroks'a (indirect) knowledge only and that Self-realization can take place only as result of the perfection of a course of study, reflection and meditation, are considered and refuted therein. Those discussed in the first chapter are:—(1) What is the place of the Vidhivākyas such as "This Self, O dear! is to be seen, studied, reflected upon and meditated upon" &c., in the science of Brahma? (2) How many kinds of Nivritti (cessation of activity) does that science recognize and what are they? (3) How can the Vākyārtha (sense of the sentence) be made consistent with the apparent contradictions between the primary meanings of the words 'Tat' and 'Twam' occurring therein? (4) Have the Vedānta sentences sufficient authoritativeness to produce the required knowledge of Brahma? (5) Is the S'aktivāda of the Naiyāyikas fully acceptable to the Vedāntins? (6) What is a Laks'anā (secondary sense)? (6) How many kinds of Laks'aṇā are resorted to by the people in getting at the correct meanings of words and sentences relating to daily intercourse? (7) Whether the same can be resorted to in getting at the true meanings of Vaidic words and sentences? (8) What is the difference between a Gauṇi Vritti (sense depending upon the attributes of an object indicated by a word) and Laks'aṇā? (9) What are the senses conveyed by the words, Nitya, S'uddha, Buddha, Mukta, Satya, Jñāna, Ānanda &c. when used in ordinary parlance and when found used in the Upanishads

1. *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series No. XVIII. part I pp. 16-17.*
2. *Saṁ. S'ār. IV. 62.*
3. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. I. 1. 11 (p. 177) I. 1. 24 (pp. 210-11), I. 2. 7 (pp. 235-36), III. 2. 11-21 (pp. 707-16), IV. 3. 14 (pp. 997-02, 1001).*

to convey an idea of the nature of Brahma? (10) What is the psychological process which has to be resorted to in order to get the intended meaning from the sentence "Tat twam asi" as a whole? (11) What is Sāmānādhikaraṇya (case in apposition) and what are its varieties? (12) Which of them is useful in arriving at the entire meaning of the sentence? (13) What is Vaiyadhikaraṇya (the state of being in different case-relations? (14) What is a Paryāya (synonym)? (15) Whether there is scope for the two latter in the sentence in hand? (16) How is it that the secondary senses of the terms 'Tat' and 'Twam' lead to the knowledge of pure Brahma? (17) How far is it necessary to have S'raddhā (faith) in the words of the S'āstra and a teacher? (18) Can the word 'Brahma' convey the idea of Parabrahma? (19) What is the meaning of Samanvaya (mutual connection)? (20) Is the view of the Prābhākaras on this point acceptable? (21) What purpose does Samanvaya serve in producing knowledge? (22) What is meant by the words "Brahmaiva san" in the text "Brahmaiva san Brahmāpyeti"? (23) What purpose do the verbs occurring in the Vedānta sentences serve? (24) What were the views of Jaimini and S'abara on the place of Karma in Brahmavidyā? (25) What is a Bhāvanā and what are its varieties? (29) What is the significance of the negative particles in such Vedānta texts as "Neti, neti" (Not this, not this) "Neha nānāsti kiñchana" (There is here no diversity whatever) &c. as compared with that of those in the Karmakānda portion of the Vedas such as "Kalañjam nādyāt" (One should not eat onions)? (27) How can the material and instrumental cause of the universe be the same? (28) Do the terms 'Satya', 'Jñāna' and 'Ananta' used in the text *Satyam jñānamanantam Brahma* (Brahma is truth, knowledge and infiniteness) indicate one object or several? (29) Does that sentence contain a definition of Brahma and (30) What is the purpose of the texts such as *Yato vā imāni bhūtani jāyante* &c. (That from which these beings are produced &c.). The conclusion laid down at the end of the chapter is that a Vedānta sentence is competent to lead to the realization of that which is self-proved and undivided, and to yield the fruit of final absolution. The topics discussed in the second chapter are:—(1) Whether ignorance does in fact exist or is merely assumed; (2) What function does a Vṛitti produced by a Mahāvākya perform? (3) To what do the objects of the world owe their existence? (4) How can the contradiction between the Upanishad teaching as gathered from its purport be reconciled with experience? (5) Did Bādarāyaṇa accept any one of the three Vādas, namely the Pariṇāma-vāda, Ārambha-vāda and Vivārta-vāda or all of them, keeping men with different qualifications in view? (6) Is Ajñāna (individual ignorance) the same as Māyā (the divine power which is the cause of the world) or different from it? (7) Does the

liberation of one soul mean the liberation of all souls? (8) Is any other view than that of S'ankara as to the plurality of souls acceptable? (9) What is the limit upto which the reality of differences continues to be felt? (10) What is the Ās'raya (support) of ignorance? (12) Is the view of Maṇḍana Mis'ra on that point, namely that the individual soul is the Ās'raya of ignorance acceptable? (13) What is the difference between Brahma functioning as Is'wara (Supreme Soul) and the same functioning as a Jīwa (individual soul)? (14) How can the Pratibimba-vāda be reconciled with the view of S'ankara that Īs'wara is not affected by Māyā? (15) Is the Īs'wara pure? (16) What is it that gives rise to the notion of diversity? (17) What is the varied universe like and (18) Can a Guru though not existing in reality make one realize the real Brahma? Having discussed those and other topics the author winds up the subject-matter of that chapter by saying that the soul having attained the state of knowledge through the Vedānta sentences and cast off all the ignorance which is the cause of the notion of duality becomes his own master in the state of the pure Self wherein he enjoys the highest bliss and that done there is no room whatever for any other means of proof, much less a contradiction thereof with those sentences. The new points discussed in the third chapter are:—(1) What is meant by the term 'Jīwa'? (2) Which are the Purīs (cities) in which it is said to lie? (3) What are the constituent parts of the Linga-s'arīra (subtle body)? (4) What is meant hy the term 'Vidyā' and what by the term 'Pūrvaprajñā' when used in connection with the 'Jīwa'? (5) Does the pure Self pass to another world? (6) Is there a connection between the Purīs and the Self? (7) If the answers to the last two questions are in the negative, why do men believe that they pass to another world? (8) What is the source of power in the body? (9) Whose power directs the motions of the Jīwa after its separation from the physical body? (6) If that of Īs'wara, has the Jīwa no inherent powers? (11) Do those who repair to the regions other than Brahmaloka return to the earth or not? (12) What happens to those who neither go by the Devayāna nor by the Pitriyāna? (13) Is Vairāgya (indifference towards the sense-objects) sufficient by itself to put an end to all misery? (14) If not, what is the way to reach that goal? (15) What is the test for determining whether it is attained or not? (16) What is the state of a disciple in whose case a repetition of the teaching of the Mahāvākya becomes necessary? (17) Why does the Self appear as the doer of actions and the enjoyer of their fruits? (18) Is the experience in the waking state of the same nature as or of a nature different from that in the state of dreaming? (19) If both are of the same nature, namely illusory, is there any difference between their illusoriness and that created by a juggler? (20) Is there any difference between what is called Māyā and what is called Avidyā or Ajñāna? (21) Is this Ajñāna of a negative or positive charac-

to convey an idea of the nature of Brahma? (10) What is the psychological process which has to be resorted to in order to get the intended meaning from the sentence "Tat twam asi" as a whole? (11) What is Sāmānādhikaraṇya (case in apposition) and what are its varieties? (12) Which of them is useful in arriving at the entire meaning of the sentence? (13) What is Vaiyadhikaraṇya (the state of being in different case-relations? (14) What is a Paryāya (synonym)? (15) Whether there is scope for the two latter in the sentence in hand? (16) How is it that the secondary senses of the terms 'Tat' and 'Twam' lead to the knowledge of pure Brahma? (17) How far is it necessary to have S'raddhā (faith) in the words of the S'āstra and a teacher? (18) Can the word 'Brahma' convey the idea of Parabrahma? (19) What is the meaning of Samanvaya (mutual connection)? (20) Is the view of the Prābhākaras on this point acceptable? (21) What purpose does Samanvaya serve in producing knowledge? (22) What is meant by the words "Brahmaiva san" in the text "Brahmaiva san Brahmāpyeti"? (23) What purpose do the verbs occurring in the Vedānta sentences serve? (24) What were the views of Jaimini and S'abara on the place of Karma in Brahmavidyā? (25) What is a Bhāvanā and what are its varieties? (29) What is the significance of the negative particles in such Vedānta texts as "Neti, neti" (Not this, not this) "Neha nānāsti kiñchana" (There is here no diversity whatever) &c. as compared with that of those in the Karmakānda portion of the Vedas such as "Kalañjam nādyāt" (One should not eat onions)? (27) How can the material and instrumental cause of the universe be the same? (28) Do the terms 'Satya', 'Jñāna' and 'Ananta' used in the text *Satyam jñānamanantam Brahma* (Brahma is truth, knowledge and infiniteness) indicate one object or several? (29) Does that sentence contain a definition of Brahma and (30) What is the purpose of the texts such as *Yato vā imāni bhūtani jāyante* &c. (That from which these beings are produced &c.). The conclusion laid down at the end of the chapter is that a Vedānta sentence is competent to lead to the realization of that which is self-proved and undivided, and to yield the fruit of final absolution. The topics discussed in the second chapter are:—(1) Whether ignorance does in fact exist or is merely assumed; (2) What function does a Vṛitti produced by a Mahāvākya perform? (3) To what do the objects of the world owe their existence? (4) How can the contradiction between the Upanishad teaching as gathered from its purport be reconciled with experience? (5) Did Bādarāyaṇa accept any one of the three Vādas, namely the Pariṇāma-vāda, Ārambha-vāda and Vivārta-vāda or all of them, keeping men with different qualifications in view? (6) Is Ajñāna (individual ignorance) the same as Māyā (the divine power which is the cause of the world) or different from it? (7) Does the

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ter? (22) If the whole of the experience in the waking state is unreal, how is it that it is believed to afford means for the knowlege of the true nature of the Self? (23) In what different forms does this Ajñāna become manifest? (24) Is there ignorance in the state of deep sleep? (25) How are two different statements of S'ankarāchārya on this point to be reconciled? (26) Can ignorance be known? (27) Are there any Upnishad texts for believing that there is Ajñāna? (28) Whether Brahma has the dual phenomena inside it or is it non-dual or is it of both the characters? (29) If it is non-dual how are the different texts as to creation, powers and attributes of Brahma to be reconciled? (30) Is it possible to prove the existence of the phenomena as an independent entity? (31) What is the real nature thereof and how does it happen to appear? (32) What are the Antaraṅga (inward) and the Bahiraṅga (outward) means for the realization of the truth contained in the Mahāvākya "Tat twam asi"? (33) What is achieved by each of those groups? (34) What is S'ravaṇa? (35) What is Manana? (36) What is Nididhyāsana? (36) What part does each process play in the achievment of the ultimate goal which is Self-realization? and (37) Can any one other than a Sannyāsī have Self-realization? Having discussed these and other points the author closes the third chapter with the following remark:—The sources of wealth are cunning and forbearance, those of the fulfilment of sexual desire, beauty, age and body, those of religious merit, sacrifices &c, compassion and self-restraint and that of final absolution, cessation of all actions. The fourth is a very short chapter. The side-issues discussed therein are:—(1) Does the Vritti (operation of the mind) in the form of a Pramā (right knowledge) generated by the Mahāvākya dispel Nescience by itself as the knowlege of a mother-of-pearl dispels the false notion as to there being silver or does it stand in need of another means such as Adṛshṭa (spiritual merit acquired by actions)? (2) Is the removal of Nescience a positive or a negative fact or partakes of the nature of both or is it indescribable or something different from all these? (3) Is it identical with or different from the Self? (4) Is the Vritti itself required to be subsequently dispelled and if so, does it stand in need of something else to do so or does it disappear automatically? (5) Is Mukti (liberation) an existing fact merely made manifest or is it a new thing coming into existence after the Vritti arises? (6) What is the difference between the Mukti known as Kaivalya (absolute libaration) and Sāyujya (union with the Almighty), Sārūpya (being of the same nature as the Almighty) &c., spoken of in the Smṛiti works and (7) Does one who attains this state become a Videhamukta (one whose connection with the physical body has ceased) or a Jīwanmukta (one who is as good as liberated though living)? This point has been discussed by S'ankara also and he is of the latter view.[1] Sarvajñātmā has not adopted that view but has said that it too is authoritative and

1. *S'. B. on Br. Sū. IV. 1. 15. (pp. 956-59).*

explained that in such a case connection with the body remains and the man continues to act as an ordinary prudent man though convinced that the world-phenomena does not in fact exist and that he becomes a Videhamukta on the vestige of the Prārabdha Karma (actions which had already begun to bear fruits) being exhausted by enjoyment, without his being affected by it[1], *i. e.* to say that though the Āvaraṇa S'akti (power of enveloping) of Māyā or Avidyā is destroyed by knowledge, its Viks'epa S'akti (power of giving rise to a variety of objects) is not and that it persists till what is termed death in ordinary parlance occurs. This author having however stated at the end of the work, that the disciple to whom the knowledge of Brahma had been imparted began to look upon the varied world as a burnt rope and to wonder that it should formerly have appeared real to him though the S'rutis from which he acquired that knowledge were all there and expressed his obligation to the preceptor, who had explained their meanings to him, for having dispelled his ignorance and declared that he would continue to serve him as hithertofore until the fall of his body, it is clear that even in his view there was the possibility of Jīwanmukti and that real Videhamukti could be attained only on death, for otherwise the disciple could have no recollection of his former state of ignorance and could not have been conscious of the separate existence of the body of the preceptor and that of his own and without such consciousness there could be no expression of an obligation and no declaration of a resolve to continue to serve the preceptor till the fall of one's body.

The fact that he could anticipate and discuss so many new points is enough to show that its author had an individuality of his own. And it is remarkable that though he was a devout follower of S'ankara and has paid homage to him in the beginning of the work[2], he has not shrunk from expressing his own view explicitly wherever he differed from his grand-master. He has in that work not only strictly adhered to his own preceptor Sures'wara's theory that knowledge whenever it arises must arise from the Mahāvākya "Tat twam asi" but also considered that theory in all its possible aspects and refuted all possible objections to it. It is therefore but natural that he should have been looked upon by later Advaitins as an independent thinker of a high order and that his view on any point should have been given its due weight. In the *Siddhāntabindu* itself, it is his line of reasoning that has been mainly adopted so far as the portion of it under Verse I of the *Das'aslokī* is concerned[3], two statements have been taken from his work and quoted therein as if they were axiomatic truths[4] and he has been spoken of as the advocate of one aspect of the Pratibimba-

1. *Saṁ. S'ār. IV. 54-59.*
2. *Saṁ. S'ār. I. 7.*
3. *Index to the Notes p. 292 infra.*
4. *Sanskrit Section p. २८ infra.*

vāda (Reflection-theory) in the matter of the explanation as to how one and the same Brahma could become both the Jīwa and the Īs'wara.[1] He is referred to as an authoritative writer in some other works of this author as well[2] and in the *Siddhāntales'a* of Appaya Diks'it.[3] From the latter work it also appears that a view of Sarvajñātmā had in later times been the centre round which a distinct faction had grown up.[4]

(6) *Srī Harsha.*

The next great writer who claims our attention is the author of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* who lived about the end of the twelfth century when Jayachandra Rāthoḍ ruled over Benares.[5] Prof. Rādhākrishṇa says about his work:—"(It is) the greatest work of Advaita dialectics. It is one long dissertation on the vanity of philosophy setting forth the inability of the human mind to compass those exalted objects which its speculative ingenuity suggests as worthy of pursuit. In the spirit of Nāgārjuna he (*i. e.* S'rī Harsha) analyses the common categories with minuteness and accuracy and takes the reader through a long and arduous process of dissection to establish the simple truth that nothing can be conclusively proved to be true or false. Everything is doubtful except universal consciousness. His belief in the ultimate reality of spirit marks him off from Buddhist Nihilism. He discusses at length the Pramāṇas of Nyāya, its theory of causation and argues that the Nyāya is busy with apparent existence and not reality. The diversity of things is not ultimate while the Absolute is, though never known".[6] According to Mm. Laxman S'āstri, the learned editor of that work in the Chaukhambā Sanskrit Series, *the Nyāyasūtras* had been composed by Aks'apāda in order that they may be helpful to a seeker after truth in removing by logical reasoning the doubts that might arise in his mind on studying the Upanishads owing to different views having been expressed by different learned men as to their purport and that even according to their author the *Brahmasūtras* alone were intended to acquaint him with the true path of liberation. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and

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1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* २५, २७ *infra.*

2. *Advaitaratna pp. 43, 45; Advaitasiddhi (Gujrāti Press edition) pp. 220, 261, 342, 663, 678, 686.*

3. *Advaita Mañjarī Series No. VI pp. 64, 69, 186, 233, 295, 359, 467.*

4. *Ibid pp. 26, 48.*

5. Drs. Thebaut and Gangānāth Jhā, the learned translators of that work in 'The Indian Thought Series', Vol. I. believed this work to have been composed about the 8th century A. D. but that does not seem probable in view of the contents of the work and Prof. Rādhākrishṇa's view which is here followed seems to be more acceptable. Cf. also Mm. Laxman S'āstri's Introduction to the Chaukhambā Sanskrit Series No. CXXXV pp. 1–10.

6. *Indian philoshphy Vol. II pp. 451-52 foot-note 1 and p. 472 foot-note 1.*

Vāchaspati had recognized that fact but some other commentators tried to establish that the Nyāya was an independent system of philosophy and lays down a different method of salvation from that contained in *Brahmasūtras.* It was in order to refute their view that S'rī Harsha had specially composed this work[1]. He has accomplished that task by first refuting with the help of the arguments advanced by the Sūnyavādins, the view that the sixteen Padārthas are independent categories, then established that knowledge is self-manifest by taking advantage of the arguments advanced by the Vijñānavādins and lastly that the whole universe is an indescribable substance and that Brahma is the only reality[2]. Though thus the work was mainly composed as an attack against the Naiyāyikas, it virtually contains a refutation of the doctrines of all the Āstika and Nāstika schools as Mm. Anant S'āstrī, the learned editor of the *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa* says[3]. It was after this work was composed that Ganges'a Upādhyāya founded his Navya-Nyāya system which concerns itself with the science of reasoning only. Chitsukhāchārya has written a commentary on the *Khaṇḍana* and also composed an independent work named *Tattwapradīpikā* or *Chitsukhī* in which the same line of reasoning has been adopted as in that work and its authority too has been drawn upon at times. Vidyāraṇya too has referred in his *Panchadas'ī* to the ways of refutation adopted in the *Khaṇḍana* while expounding the nature of the Kūṭastha[4]. The *Siddhāntabindu* also contains one quotation from that work and that relates to the nature of the Pramāṇa known as Anyathānupapatti[5]. There are several references to it in the *Advaitasiddhi*[6] also.

(7) *Prakāsātmā.*

It has been stated while speaking of Padmapādācharya that his *Pañchapādikā* was brought into very great prominence at a late age by one of his commentators. This was Prakās'ātmā who is otherwise known by his work named *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa* as the Vivaraṇakāra. The fact that he was deemed by the later Vedāntins to be an independent thinker like Sarvajñātmā on the points left untouched or doubtful by S'ankara is quite clear from the number of references to his views contained in the *Advaitāsiddhi*[7] and *Siddhāntales'a*[8]. It also seems from the latter that there was in the time of Appaya

1. *Chaukhambā Sanskrit Series No. CXXXV Vol. II-Bhūmikā p. 24.*
2. *Ibid p. 32.*
3. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition-Bhūmikā.*
4. *Pañchadas'ī VIII. 55.*
5. *Sanskrit section p.* ३६ *infra.*
6. *Gujrāti Press edition pp. 206, 279, 281, 306, 321, 322, 383, and 384.*
7. *Ibid pp. 28, 45, 74, 196, 256, 347, 401, 403, 436, 438, 464, 470, 494, 511, 515, 611, 678, 993.*
8. *Siddhāntales'a pp. 76, 116, 124, 151, 169, 289, 374.*

Diks'it a group of Vedāntins who were distinguished from the others by the appellation 'Vivarṇānusāriṇah' (followers of the *Vivaraṇa*).[1] In the former and in the *Advaitaratna* of Madhusūdana he is also referred to by the respectful term "Āchārya".[2] In the *Siddhāntabindu* he is credited with having propounded one aspect of the Pratibimba-vāda (Reflection-theory)[3] and from certain statements made in the *Advaitaratna* and *Siddhāntabindu* read with one in the *Siddhāntāles'a* it appears that it was Prakās'ātmā who established that the Pramā (right knowledge of the Self) did not arise from any attribute but from the materials necessary for knowledge[4] and that a formless limbless substance could be reflected.[5] The explanation also of the term 'Anirvachanīya' given in the first seems to have been based upon a view expressed in the *Vivaraṇa*[6]. Besides the *Vivaraṇa*, he was the author of another work entitled *Nyāyanirṇaya* which too is considered a work of authority[7].

(8) *Amalānanda.*

After Prakās'ātmā comes Amalānanda who lived about the middle of the thirteenth century[8], The works which have made him famous are the *Kalpataru* which is a gloss on the *Bhāmatī* of Vāchaspatī Mis'ra and *S'āstradarpaṇa*, an independent work. He was also the author of a commentary on the *Pañchapādikā* of Padmapāda called *Pañchapādikā-darpaṇa*. No peculiar view of his seems to have been distinctly referred to in the *Siddhāntabindu* but there are several references to such views of his in the *Advaitsiddhi*[9] and *Siddhāntales'a*[10]. He cannot however be placed on a par with the authors of the *Bhāmatī*, *Vārttika* or *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* because he is not spoken of anywhere in the latter work as having followers like them.

(9) *Chitsukhāchārya.*

The writer subsequent to Prakās'ātmā who attracted much attention was Chitsukhāchārya, a pupil of Gauḍes'warāchārya Jñānottama and the Guru of Sukhaprakās'a Muni. The work which brought him into prominence was *Tattwapradīpikā* or shortly *Tattwadīpikā*, also known otherwise as *Chitsukhī* after his own name. That was not however his

1. *Siddhāntales'a pp. 21, 49, 86, 268.*
2. *Advaitasiddhi p. 45; Advaitaratna p. 24.*
3. *Sanskrit Section p.* २८ *infra.*
4. *Advaitaratna p. 34.*
5. *Sanskrit Section p.* १४ *read with Siddhāntales'a pp. 93–103.*
6. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 280.*
7. *Siddhāntales'a. pp. 248, 301.*
8. *Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇa Vol. II p. 451 foot-note 1.*
9. *Gujrāti Press edition pp. 62, 627, 664, 694, 703.*
10. *Advaita Mañjarī Series No. VI pp. 88, 302, 356, 395, 467.*

only work. He has also written a commentary on the *Khandanakhanda-khādya* of S'rī Harsha and also on the *Nyāyamakaranda* of Ānanda-bodhāchārya. *Tattwadīpikā* is a work in four chapters none of which as printed by the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, except the second, bears a title. The learned editor thereof has however given in the Tables of Contents titles which are the same as those of the four chapters of the *Brahmasūtras*. An examination of the work itself shows that he is substantially correct. Thus in the first he has considered all the possible logical objections to Brahma being Swaprakās'a (self-manifest); in the second is considered the question whether any of the Pramāṇas is opposed to the view that Brahma is the only reality and that the phenomena is the result of Avidyā; in the third, it is discussed whether Brahma is capable of being known by any other means except unadulterated knowledge and in the last are considered the questions as to what is the nature of Moks'a (final absolution) and whether it is possible for one to attain it while in an embodied state. His method of treatment is a striking one. Thus in the last of the introductory verses he makes "obeisance to Nrisimha, the self-resplendent intelligent Self, who by his claws in the form of the means of proof destroyed the enemy of the gods in the form of the great delusion". The expression 'Swaprakās'a-chidātmane' which is here translated as "the self-resplendent intelligent Self" occurs in that verse as the last distich. The author takes up that expression and asks what is meant by it, suggests several alternative meanings and then refuting them one by one establishes his own view. Similarly at the end of the last sentence of the first Parichchheda there occurs the word "Vigalitanikhilabhedavisuddhabrahmapramiti" and the second is commenced by asking how that is possible. So too the second ends with the statement that the Vedāntavākya conveys a direct knowledge of Brahma which is without a second and the third commences with a query how words can produce direct knowledge. Lastly, the third ends with the remark that it is thus proved that knowledge alone is the means of attaining Moks'a and the fourth commences with the query what is Moks'a. Inside the Parichchhedas also new topics are introduced in the same way. Those topics are too many to be mentioned here. Suffice it to say that all the possible logical objections, whether likely to be raised by the orthodox or by the heterodox thinkers, are considered in this work. Particularly it may be mentioned that the Samuchchaya-vāda appears to be a live topic at the time of composition of this work for it is discussed at length in Chapter IV thereof.

This work seems to have been specially aimed at refuting the objections to the Advaita doctrine by the adherents of the Dwaita doctrine such as the Tārkikas[1]. The arguments advanced therein

1. *Tattwapradīpikā with Nayanaprasādinī (Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition)—Preface in Sanskrit.*

are so appropriate and telling that Vyāsāryar thought it necessary to attempt to refute them and did so in his *Nyāyāmrita.* Madhusūdana's special connection with him was that the arguments put forward in the *Nyāyāmrita* were criticized by him in his *Advaita-siddhi*[1]. The latter having been specially composed in defence of the Advaita doctrine it is but natural that Chitsukha's views should have been frequently referred to in that work[2]. Even in the *Siddhāntāles'a* of Appaya Diks'it it has been referred to several times[3].

(10) *Vidyāraṇya.*

Another great writer who has left an indelible mark on the history of the Advaita doctrine is Vidyāraṇya Muni. He is usually identified with Mādhava, a minister of king Bukka I of Vijayanagar in Southern India who ruled from A. D. 1399 onwards. He has left numerous works behind him, the most notable of which are *Jīwan-muktiviveka* and *Pañchadas'ī.* The latter thereout is a treatise from which we can gather his views on the whole of the Vedānta doctrine. It seems to have been composed under the influence of *the principal Upanishads, Bhagawadgītā, Brahmasūtras, S'ārīraka-bhāshya, Upades'asāharī, Naishkarmyasiddhi, Brihadāraṇya-bhāshya-vārttika, Vivaraṇa, Yogavāsishṭha* and even *S'ivapurāṇa.* The main doctrine set forth in the first chapter thereof entitled *Tattwaviveka-prakaraṇam* and amplified in the subsequent chapters is the same as that propounded in the *Vārttika, Naishkarmyasiddhi, Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* &c, namely that it is knowledge of one's true nature alone which is the means for attaining salvation and that its knowledge arises directly from the Mahāvākya "Tat twam asi". However Vidyāraṇya has stamped his individuality on the history of that doctrine by putting forth strong views on many side-topics which are only hinted at by his distinguished predecessors and by entering into minute analyses of the several psychological notions which have to be formed in order to understand the gist of the Advaita doctrine. Thus for instance, in the second chapter intituled *Pañchabhūtaviveka-prakaraṇam,* he has taken each element one by one, mentioned the characterstics of each and distinguished the Self from each of them and from all taken together. Similarly he has distinguished the Self from each of the five Kos'as (sheaths) of the soul and from their collection, in Chapter III which is headed *Pañchakos'aviveka-prakaraṇam.* In Chapter IV which bears the heading *Dwaitaviveka-prakaraṇam* the Self is distinguished

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1. *Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇa Vol. II pp. 451-52 foot note I; Siddhāntales'a (Advaita Mañjarī Series)—Introduction in English p. 2.*

2. *Gujrāti Press edition pp. 33, 89, 237, 473, 623, 686, 694, 786, 984.*

3. *Advaita Mañjarī Series pp. 158, 181-82, 301, 311, 442.*

from all duality whatever. Moreover the author has there distinguished between two kinds of dualities, one brought into existence by Īs'wara and the other by the Jiwa and sub-divided the latter into that which is S'āstrīya (approved by the Scriptures) and that which is otherwise[1] and then gone on explaining when and how each kind of duality could and should be discarded. Similarly in the beginning of Chapter VI which he has named *Chitradīpa-prakaraṇam* he has distinguished between four kinds of Chit (Intelligence), namely Kūṭastha, Brahma, Jīwa and Īs'a and shown their inter-relation by comparing them with Ghaṭākās'a (space in the pot), Mahākās'a (the big sky), Jalākās'a (the portion of the sky reflected in a basin of water) and Abhrakha, (the portions of the sky overcast with clouds)[2]. Further up in the same chapter he has distinguished the Kūṭastha from Brahma by saying that the former is like a Ghaṭākās'a and the latter like the Mahākās'a[3]. Thus according to him the Self of man is by nature the same as Brahma but is related to it as a spark is to fire. Of course this according to him is a Vyāvahārik distinction because all phenomena is Anirvāchya (indescribable) and nothing but the Māyā of Īs'wara[4]. It is clear however that he does not believe that all this is found to exist simply because of individual ignorance as the advocates of Drishṭi-srishṭi-vāda (Illusion-theory) like Sures'wara and Sarvajñātmā believed because in his view the creation upto the stage of entering the body was the work of Paramātmā and since then there are the individual creations of the Jīwas, each according to his own powers, from Vis'hṇu down to the lowest mortal[5]. Even his definition of Jīwa is very peculiar for according to him what is called the Jīwa is a conglomerate of (1) the substratum which is the Chaitanya or Kūṭastha, (2) the Lingadeha (subtle body) and (3) the Chitchhāyā (shadow of the Chit *i. e.* Chaitanya) in that body[6]. In Chapter VII again he distinguishes between three kinds of Ahaṁkāra (egotism), one Mukhya (principal) and the other two Amukhya (subsidiary), all of which are the result of mutual identification between the Kūṭastha and the Ābhāsa thereof in the Buddhi (intellect). The consciousness "I am the Kūṭastha or Sāks'ī," is also a false notion and must be shunned in the end[7]. The belief in Bhoktritwa (one's being the enjoyer) according to him therefore arises not only in the Chidābhāsa but also in the Kūṭastha[8]. It is not possible,

1. *Pañchadas'ī III. 43.*
2. *Ibid VI. 18.*
3. *Ibid VI. 237.*
4. *Ibid. VI. 123–30.*
5. *Ibid VII. 4; VIII. 69; X. 1. 2.*
6. *Ibid. IV. 11.*
7. *Ibid. VII. 9–16.*
8. *Ibid. VII. 194–00.*

according to him, for any one to remain without doing any work so long as the body has life in it since men's activities are controlled by Īs'wara. Prārabdha Karmas (works which have begun to bear fruits) are of three sorts, namely (1) those whose fruits are enjoyed willingly, (2) those whose fruits are enjoyed without any desire for their enjoyment arising in the mind and (3) those whose fruits are enjoyed according to the wishes of others. These Karmas do not leave anybody not even a Jñānī. The only difference between the nature of his enjoyment and that of the ignorant people is that he enjoys the fruits unwillingly and with agony while the latter do so willingly[1]. Thus according to him, there is such a state as that of a Jiwanmukta and men in such a state can be found engaged in worldly pursuits to such as extent as even to rule. In support of this view he has cited several instances, the most well-known whereout are those of Janaka and Yājñavalkya[2]. As for the Chidābhāsa, he is of the view that it passes through seven states, namely, those of Ajñāna (ignorance), Āvriti (false notion), Viks'epa (reflection in the gross and subtle bodies), Paroks'adhī (indirect knowledge), Aparoks'amati (direct knowledge), S'oka (dispondency) and Moks'a (final absolution or liberation). The last is the state of a Jīwanmukta. It is the state in which perfect satisfaction must arise. Until that arises one must continue to do Abhyāsa (study, reflection and meditation) or Upāsanā (devotion to any particular form of the Almighty) and observe S'ama, Dama &c.[3] Upāsanā should preferably be that of Nirguṇa Brahma for it leads to knowledge. That of Saguṇa Brahma leads to Brahmaloka and thence to knowledge which arises from the Mahāvākya "Tat twam asi" only[4]. Chapter VIII of this work is comparatively small. However it is therein that the theory, that not only the Chidābhāsa but Brahma also plays a part in the process of the perception of an object in this manner that the consciousness "This is a pot" is due to the former while the one "I have known the pot" is due to Brahma has been put forth[5]. It is also therein established that the states of Sushupti (deep sleep), Mūrchhā (fainting) and Samādhi (trance) are similar so far as the absence of Vrittis is concerned and that the Chidābhāsa and the Kūṭastha are separate entities and that each plays its own part in man's life in the states of ignorance and knowledge.[6] The author further dilates therein upon the true nature of the Kūṭastha and winds up the topic by saying that the differences in its states are not real but due to Māyā only and

1. *Pañchadas'ī VII. 132-44.*

2. *Ibid IV. 51-69; VI. 53, 287-88; VII. 129-31, 143-45, 182-84, 245-46, 287-88; IX. 101-15; XIII. 83.*

3. *Ibid VII. 101-22; IX. 44.*

4. *Ibid IX. 56-66, 126-58.*

5. *Ibid VIII. 4-5, 15-16.*

6. *Ibid VIII. 20.*

that the very existence of the Jīwa and of the Īs'wara as well is the result of Māyā.[1] The subject-matter of Chapter IX intituled *Dhyānadīpa-prakaraṇam* is too much allied to that of Chapter VII and therefore the substantial portions thereof have already been drawn upon while speaking of the subject-matter of the latter chapter. Chapter X is shorter even than Chapter VIII. Therein the Kūṭastha has been said to be the same in essence as Paramātmā and been compared to a lamp in a theatre which continues to shine whether the stage-manager, dancing-girl and audience are present there or not[2]. Shining in its case means being of the nature of knowledge. The Buddhi (intellect) like a dancing-girl dances in various modes on deriving its power from the Kūṭastha. Ahaṁkāra (egotism) is the stage-manager, the objects of sense constitute the audience and the senses the musicians. The Sāks'ī *i. e.* Kūṭastha staying in the crown of the head illumines both the inner side and the outer side of the stage, the body. The Buddhi along with the senses though staying behind the curtain comes out often and often and all its movements are fathered upon the Sāks'ī though really it does nothing.[3] Although itself unapproachable by the speech or intellect, it illumines all the forms which the Buddhi concieves and becomes their witness. It is difficult to know such a Self in the manner in which things are ordinarily known but it becomes conscious of itself on the cessation of the process of perception as the only residue. No authority is needed to prove its existence because self-consciousness, which is common to everybody, needs no proof and for knowing it one must study the Upanishads through a teacher. If it is not possible to avoid all perception whatever, the way to get at the Self is to approach the Buddhi first and then to realize the Self as the witness of whatever inward and outward objects are conceived by the Buddhi[4].

The last five chapters of this work are devoted to an exposition of the various forms in which the nature of the Self as Ānanda becomes manifest at different stages in the devolopment of the individual soul. Sādhu Nis'chaladās has in his *Vrittiprabhākara* expressed the view that these chapters were added by Bhāratītīrtha[5]. This view receives support from the facts that in Ch. XII. 90, XIV. 65 and XV. 22 and 34 these five chapters have been distinguished by the title "Brahmānanda" and treated as if they formed a separate work by themselves and that the commentator Rāmakrishṇa who calls himself a servant of Bhārtītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya Munivarya" in the colophon at the end

1. *Pañchadas'ī VIII. 22-72.*
2. *Ibid X. 1-2, 11.*
3. *Ibid X. 13-17.*
4. *Ibid X. 23-26.*
5. *Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇa Vol. II. p. 451 foot-note 1.*

of each chapter, makes obeisance to two saints, Bhārtītīrtha and Vidyāraṇya, in the first of the introductory verses at the beginning of his commentary on each of Chapters I to XI. As against that view there are however other facts, namely that the same Rāmakrishṇa states in the commencement of his commentary on Ch. VII which according to the above view would be a part of the composition of Vidyāraṇya:—"The preceptor Bhāratītīrtha who is about to commence the chapter named "Triptidīpa" which is of the nature of a commentary on a Vedic text quotes the text which is to be commented upon therein"[1] and Appaya Diks'it refers in his *Siddhānta-les'a* to a verse in the "Dhyānadīpa" which is the title of Ch. IX of the work and which would consequently form part of the composition of Vidyāraṇya and says that the view expressed therein is that of Bhāratitīrtha[2]. Moreover the name *Pañchadas'ī* itself would not be proper unless the last five chapters had been composed at the same time as the first ten or unless no name had been given to the work until the first ten chapters were composed which does not seem possible. It therefore appears to me that the said view is not sound and that the better view is that Bhāratitīrtha was most probably a contemporary and friend of Vidyāraṇya and that both of them jointly composed this work. The numbering of the last five chapters as I to V contained in Ch. XII. 90 &c. can be easily explained in this manner that the subject-matter thereof namely, Brahmānanda and its varieties, is common to all the five.

Now, the dullest form in which that Ānanda becomes manifest to all alike is that which is experienced in the state of deep sleep. Some people who faint at times also experience it involuntarily. The Yogis experience it voluntarily in the state of Samādhi. Lastly, Brahma has the same experience before the process of creation begins. So there arises the experience of Yogānanda in Brahmānand in these four states.[3] It is said to be Yogānanda in that it arises on going through the process of Yoga, which is gone through in the last two cases consciously and in the first two unconsciously. Another way to realize the same nature of Brahma or the Self is to follow the process of Jñāna (knowledge). This is discussed at length in Chapter XII which bears the heading "Atmānanda in Brahmānanda". There are some who take easily to the way of Yoga and others to that of Jñāna. The result according to Vidyāraṇya is the same in both the cases but there is this difference that while the senses of a Yogi are drawn inwards those of a Jñāni are not.[4] The latter still gets the same kind of experience because his angle of vision is quite the

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1. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 209.*
2. *Advaita Mañjarī Series No. VI p. 387.*
3. *Pañchadas'i XI. 16.*
4. *Ibid XII. 83-87.*

opposite of that of an ordinary mortal, in that he looks upon all duality as the result of the Māyās'akti of the one immutable Brahma and consequently finds Brahma wherever any of his senses is directed. This is proved at considerable length with the help of Upanishad texts and quotations from the *Yogavāsishṭha* and *Bhagawadgītā* and on giving several apposite illustrations based upon the common human experience in Chapter XIII which bears the title "Advaitānanda in Brahmānanda". The subject-matter of Chapter XIV is very unique. It is what is called "Vidyānanda in Brahmānanda." The author says as to that that it is of the nature of a Vritti of the Buddhi and has therefore four varieties, namely (1) absence of misery, (2) fulfilment of desire, (3) Self-satisfaction and (4) Contentment born of the attainment of whatever was possible to attain. The distinctions between these mental states are so very subtle that they would be manifest only to those who have made any progress in Yoga practice. Suffice it to say here that the final stage is that in which one is in raptures and knows no other authority for regulating one's conduct except one's own conscience because the Self is above all distinctions which are presupposed by all external authorities. But the conscience itself advises him to act as prescribed by the S'āstras and therefore he is not bound by his acts, whatever they are. We find here a parallel between this conclusion and that laid down in the *Naishkarmyasiddhi*, namely that one is not a knower at all if one is prompted to act as a libertine, for such conduct presupposes a mistaken identification of the Self with the body and the senses, which repels true knowledge[1]. The description of the mental condition of a true knower contained in verses 40 to 64 of this chapter is only an enlarged edition, so to say, of the *Das'aslokī* of S'ankarāchārya. One more peculiarity that we find in this chapter is that it is stated therein that the Ātmā is of two sorts, namely Jīwātmā and Paramātmā, that the latter being identified with Nāma and Rūpa (names and forms) becomes reduced to the state of the objects of enjoyment and the former becomes an enjoyer through its identification with the three bodies which are the seats of misery in the form of diseases, desire, anger &c. and the seeds of the first two and that when true discrimination arises in the mind, the distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed ceases to be felt, the desire for enjoyment is extinguished and consequently there is no misery[2]. The last chapter treats of the "Vis'ayānanda in Brahmānanda' which means seeing the existence of Brahma in every object and deriving joy from it. As to how one can do that the author says that the Vrittis of the mind are of three classes, namely quiescent

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1. *Nai. IV. 56-69. (pp. 199-02).*
2. *Pañchadas'ī XIV. 6-11.*

violent and stupefying, that those of the first class are indifference towards the sense-objects, forgiveness and magnanimity, those of the second, desire, affection, attachment and avarice, and those of the third, infatuation, fear &c., that the nature of Brahma is reflected in all of them and particularly its aspect of joy or happiness in those of the first class, that in those of the second and third the said aspect being covered over by impurity, is not reflected just as the moon is not reflected in dirty water, that even in those of the first class it is not always that the said aspect is found in such a sufficient measure as to be experienced by an untrained observer, that when one desires for an object of sense one feels pain on an apprehension being felt as to whether it will be obtained or not, that if it is not obtained the pain increases, that if an obstacle arises, one is filled with anger or if there are some unfavourable circumstances malice arises, that if the impediments are not removed, despondency arises and that being a result of dulness there is no experience of happiness from it, that in the angry and other moods there is the experience of extreme pain and not even a shadow of happiness, that on the other hand if a thing that is craved for is obtained, there arises a quiescent feeling of joy and so in that case a good deal of happiness is felt and much more is felt at the time of its enjoyment, that some happiness is felt even when there seems a possibility of acquisition, that the greatest amount of happiness is felt when any of the three quiescent Vrittis above-mentioned arises because that is the joy of knowledge, and anger and avarice are absent and that whatever happiness is experienced anywhere is due to a reflection of Brahma there and that is uninterrupted when the Vrittis are drawn inwards. The author also explains here that Brahma whose nature is Sat (existence) Chit (knowledge) and Sukha (bliss) becomes manifest in such material objects, as the earth, stones &c., only as existence, that where the violent and stupefying moods predominate it becomes manifest as existence and knowledge, that where any of the quiescent moods predominates it becomes manifest completely as existence, knowledge and bliss, that all this is mixed Brahma and that unmixed Brahma can be experienced only by Jñāna or Yoga as explained in the first three chapters relating to the Ānanda aspect of Brahma. The author further makes it clear that while to know Brahma as existence, knowledge and bliss is also ignorance, non-existence which is found in such conceptions as men's horns &c. and dulness which is found in such inert substances as wood, stones &c. are positive miseries, that since there is pain in the violent and stupefying moods they are looked upon as forms of ignorance, that the quiescent ones are looked upon as forms of mixed Brahma because Brahma is there found to have become one with the moods themselves, that leaving aside the non-existent objects such as horns of men one should meditate on Brahma through all the other objects separating the Brahma portion therein, which consists of Sat, Chit and Ānanda from the non-Brahma one, which consists

of names and forms, that when that is perfected the difference between existence, knowledge and bliss disappears and the one without a second is alone experienced and that is what is known as Bhūmānanda.

Madhusūdana Saraswatī has not accepted all the views expressed by Vidyāraṇya in this work and even particularly contradicted one dictum of his, namely that the Sāks'i in the case of each individual whether in the waking or sleeping state is different[1]. But that does not mean that he differed from that writer in all matters. That he did consider him a thinker of some eminence is sufficiently clear from his having taken one quotation from the *Pañchadas'ī* in order to support the view that an inference which is indirect knowledge removes only the notion of non-existence of a thing and that for the removal of that of non-perception, direct sensual perception is absolutely necessaary[2]. It also appears that both agreed in the view that there were two distinct ways of reaching the goal, namely Jñāna and Yoga.[3] Vidyāraṇya seems to have been held in very great esteem particularly by Appaya Diks'it for in the *Siddhāntales'a* of that author he is called Vidyāraṇyaguru[4] and numerous quotations made therein appear to have been taken from the *Pañchadas'ī*[5]. He seems to have been held in high esteem by Sadānanda Vyāsa also, for quotations from his *Pañchadas'ī* are found at four places in such a small manual of the Vedānta philosophy as the *Vedāntasāra*[6] of that author, to which I presently turn.

(11) *Sadānanda Vyāsa.*

That writer flourished about the fifteenth century[7]. The only work which he is known to have left behind himself is the *Vedāntasāra* which as already stated is a small manual. It contains in a nutshell the Advaita doctrine stated without specific references to any previous authors. Small though the work is, it has been honoured with commentaries by such distinguished later Vedāntins as Nrisimhās'rama and Rāmatīrtha and is generally recommended to beginners for enabling them to pick up the rudiments of the Advaita Vedānta. As for its contents, while they are in the main in accord with those of the previous works of this school such as the *Upades'asāhsrī*, *Naishkarmyasiddhi* and

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1. *Sanskrit section pp.* ५३ *and* ७४ *infra.*

2. *Ibid p.* ३८ *infra.*

3. *Cf. Panchadas'ī XII. 83 and Gūḍhārthadīpikā under Bhagawadgītā VI. 29.*

4. *Advaita Mañjarī Series No. VI p. 272.*

5. *Ibid pp. 70, 79, 84, 153, 157, 181.*

6. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press (Fourth) edition pp. 22, 35, 41, 42.*

7. *Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇa Vol. II pp. 451-52 foot-note 1.* Col. Jacob who has edited the *Vedāntasāra* is totally silent as to the date of its author.

Samks'epa Sārīraka they do strike a different note in that (1) there is in them an attempt by the author to reconcile the different views of the followers of S'ankara as to whether there is one Ajñāna only or many Ajñānas by opining that looked at from the point of view of the individuals like the trees in a forest, there are many Ajñānas but looked at collectively like the forest itself there is one Ajnāna only[1]; (2) it is explained therein that the question as to the reason for a distinction between Īs'wara attended by Māyā and the Prājña (presiding deity of the state of deep sleep in the individual) attended by ignorance can also be answered in the same way[2], that the Chaitanya or Brahma attended by Ajñāna, which has the powers of Āvaraṇa and Viks'epa, becomes the instrumental cause of the universe by its predominance and its material cause by that of the conditions limiting it[3], that the Vyāvahārika Jīwa (what is called Jīwa in common parlance) is the Vijnānamayakosha (intellegence sheath) *i. e.* the Buddhi together with the organs of knowledge[4], that the Sūks'ma S'arīra (subtle body) is made up of the three sheaths, namely that above-mentioned, the Manomayakosha (emotion sheath) and Prāṇamayakosha (energy sheath)[5], that the Sūks'ma S'arīra of the Samashṭi (macrocosm) stands in the same relation to that of the Vyashṭi (microcosm) as a forest to the trees inside it[6], that the fourteen worlds, Bhūh, Bhuwah, Savah &c. and the four kinds of bodies Jarāyuja (produced from wombs) &c. are produced from the elements after they have become quinquepartite, that the relation of the Virāt which is made up of these to any of the individual bodies is also the same as that of a forest to a tree inside it[7]; (3) Samādhi (trance) is stated therein to be an act as much necessary for self-realization as S'ravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana[8] and subsequently the whole process of the Ashṭānga Yoga of Patañjali has been described therein as if the said Yoga had been forming part of the Advaitaprakriyā[9] and (4) instead of the Anvaya-Vyatireka method the Adhyāropa-Apavāda method has been resorted to for the ascertainment of the meanings of the terms 'Twam' and 'Tat' occurring in the sentence "Tat twam asi". Of course practically speaking there is no distinction between the two methods but the difference in nomenclature arrests our attention.

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1. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition pp. 8-10.*
2. *Ibid pp. 11-12.*
3. *Ibid pp. 14-15.*
4. *Ibid pp. 17-18.*
5. *Ibid p. 19.*
6. *Ibid pp. 19-20.*
7. *Ibid pp. 23-24.*
8. *Ibid p. 42.*
9. *Ibid pp. 47-50.*

Madhusūdana Saraswatī has nowhere taken any quotation from this work or made any reference to any view of this author. Nor does he seem to agree with any of the peculiar views or to adopt the terminology above-mentioned. The only similarity which we find between this work and the *Siddhāntabindu* is that there are in both attempts to bring about a harmony between the Vedānta and Paurāṇic methods of explaining the process of evolution from the Avyākrita down to the physical bodies and to establish that the microcosm and macrocosm do not differ in any other respect except size[1]. And since Sadānanda was an earlier writer it is probable that if Madhusūdana had perused the *Vedāntasāra*, the said idea may have been suggested itself to him from that work. Even if that was so, he has gone far beyond his predecessor because his attempts in the said directions are far more thorough-going than those of the latter.

(12) *Nrisiṁhās'rama.*

There is one more distinguished writer of the age prior to that of Madhusūdana Saraswatī and that is Nrisiṁhās'rama Saraswatī. He was the Gurū of Rangoji Bhaṭṭa, a brother of Bhaṭṭoji Diks'it, the grammarian and was one of those who were conquered in debate by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, whose father Rāmes'wara Bhaṭṭa was the Guru of Madhusūdana's Vidyāgurū Mādhava Saraswatī[2]. He is reputed to have left behind himself three works on the Advaita philosophy, namely *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakās'ikā*, a gloss on Prakās'ātmā's *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa* *Bhedadhikkāra*, an original work and *Subodhini*, a commentary on Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra*. In the last work he has stated at the end that he was a pupil of Krishṇānanda and had composed that commentary at Vimuktaks'etra in S'ake 1510 corresponding with A. D. 1588. I have not found any distinct or covert reference to any of these works in any of the works of our author.

(13) *Dharmarājādhwarīndra.*

This is one notable writer whose name does not deserve to be omitted from this history of the Advaita doctrine though he was not a predecessor of our author. He is generally considered to have flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century and therefore to have been a contemporary of Madhusūdana Saraswatī during the earlier part of his life[3]. But Mm. Ananta Krishṇa S'āstri of the Calcutta University who had edited his *Vedāntaparibhāshā* with a commentary of his own in

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1. *Vedāntasāra pp. 7–30; Sanskrit Section pp.* ५३-७० *infra.*

2. *Indian Antiquary for 1912, p. 9.*

3. *History of Indian Philosophy by Dās Gupta Vol. I p. 420; Annals of the B. O. R. I. Vol. VIII pp. 154-55; Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇa Vol. II pp. 451-52 foot-note 1.*

1927 has in his Introduction propounded the view that he was a contemporary of Appaya Diks'it and must therefore be placed in the beginning of the seventeenth century[1] and Prof. Rādhākrishṇa has in his 'Foreword' to that work accepted that view[2]. Whichever view is correct there is such a close similarity between the contents of his *Vedāntaparibhāshā* and those of some of the works of Madhusūdana Saraswatī on the Vedānta philosophy[3] that it is almost certain that either the latter was indebted to the former or *vice versā*. It appears from the Introductory verses in the said work that Nrisiṁhās'rama, who was probably the same as the writer last-mentioned, was his Paramaguru, that Venkaṭanātha of Veṭāngudi was his father as well as Guru and that he was the author of another work namely *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* which was a commentary on *Tattwachintāmaṇi*, the famous work of Ganges'a Upādhyāya on Navya-Nyāya.

As for his *Vedāntaparibhāshā* with which we are concerned, it is a manual of the Advaita philosophy expounding its doctrine in eight Parichchhedas, the fiirst six whereof derive their titles from each of the six Prāmaṇas, Pratyaks'a, Anumāna &c., the seventh whereof is entitled 'Vis'aya-parichchhedah' and the last, 'Prayojana-parichchhedah'. If therefore the first six Parichchedas are included under one general heading of Pramāṇaparichchheda, there would be only three Parichchhedas in the work, namely those relating to the Pramānas, Prameya and Prayojana. In the first six, the author has given definitions, classifications &c. of the six means of proof acknowledged by the Mīmāñsakas of both the schools and included in each chapter the particular portion of the doctrine connected with that means. Thus for instance, in the first he has discussed the point whether the knowledge derived from words is Pratyaks'a or Paroks'a; in the second whether the phenomena is philosophically real or unreal and so on. In the seventh, he has discussed what is to be proved including therein the significance of the terms 'Tat' and 'Twam', the first involving an explanation as to how Brahma becomes Īs'wara and how the worlds are created and destroyed and the second how Brahma becomes Jīwa and how the knowledge of an object

1. *Vedāntaparibhāshā with Paribhāshāprakās'ikā-Bhūmikā p. 64.*

2. *Ibid-Foreword p. IX.*

3. *Cf. Vedāntaparibhāshā p. 57 with Sanskrit Section pp.* ३२-३३ *infra, Advaitaratna p. 86; Bhaktirasāyana p. 26 ;*
„ *Vedāntaparibhāshā p. 362 with Sanskrit Section pp.* ५८-५९ *infra;*
„ „ *p. 93 with Sanskrit Section pp.* ४-५ *infra;*
„ „ *pp. 365-75 with Sanskrit Section pp.* ६१ *infra;*
„ „ *pp. 379-89 with Sanskrit Section pp.* २७-३६ *infra ;*
„ „ *p. 223 with Advaitaratna pp. 19-20.*
„ „ *pp. 265-78 with Vedāntakalpalatikā pp. 33-57.*

N. B. The pages of the *Vedāntaparibhāshā* referred to in this note are those of the Vyankaṭes'war Press edition thereof.

arises. In the last are discussed the aim of philosophy, the qualifications required of an aspirant, the means for the attainment of that aim and the ultimate states of Jīwanmukti and Videhamukti. Thus though the way of treatment is different the topics considered are the same as those in the older works such as *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* and *Chitsukhī* and the later works such as the *Siddhāntales'a* except that the topic of Adhyāsa is not discussed therein and that there is no detailed reference to the views of any sages. The aim of the author seems to be to acquaint his readers with the Advaita doctrine from a logical view-point. We therefore find him entering into such an elaborate discussion as to the nature of each Pramāṇa, its varieties, &c. as we do not find in many other works of the Vedānta system. On the other hand we find in it very little discussion as to the interpretation of particular Vedic texts except under the head of 'Āgama'. One more special feature of this work is that the traditional view, that since the primary senses of the terms 'Twam' and 'Tat' are incompatible with that of the sentence "Tat twam asi" as a whole we must resort to their secondary senses, has not been accepted therein and a novel one has been put forward, which is that the incompatibility can be removed by resorting to the primary senses themselves, their power not being deemed to have been exhausted on the failure of the qualified objects pointed at by them to convey the intended meaning but deemed to extend further so as to point to unqualified objects as well[1]. Like the author of the *Pañchadas'ī* and unlike that of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* which Madhusūdana seems to have followed, Dharamrāja believes Māyā and Avidyā, and Īs'wara-sāks'ī and Jīwa-sāks'ī to be distinct[2].

There is no direct reference to the *Vedāntaparibhāshā* in any of the works of Madhusūdana Saraswatī nor is there any in that work to any of them.

(14) *Value of Appaya Diks'it's Siddhāntales'a as a Digest.*

Appaya Diks'it, son of Rangarāja Diks'it and grandson of Āchārya Diks'it or Vaks'asthalāchārya Diks'it, has already been shown to have been a contemporary of Madhusūdana Saraswatī only in the latter part of his life. Great therefore as his reputation is, he does not deserve a place in the list of the authors who had contributed to the development of the Advaita doctrine upto the time of Madhusūdana Saraswatī. I have however made use of his valuable digest, known as the *S'āstrasiddhāntales'a* or shortly *Siddhāntales'a* at certain places because it must have been compiled within a few years of our author's *Advaitasiddhi* with the avowed intention of focussing together the different views on several

1. *Vyankaṭes'war Press edition pp. 275-78; Calcutta University edition pp. 204-07.*

2. *Vyankaṭes'war Press edition pp. 104-05; Calcutta University edition pp. 93-100.*

subsidiary points connected with their doctrine, prevailing in the first half of the seventeenth century amongst the Advaita philosophers.

(15) *Other Writers and Works of the Advaita School.*

The writers who have been individually noticed above are those only from amongst the predecessors of our author whose dates could be ascertained with some degree of certainty. Besides them there are some others whose dates could not be ascertained and whose position could not therefore be fixed. As however they too must to some extent have influenced the thoughts of our author I mention their names. Moreover there is a large number of works from which quotations are found to have been made in the works of our author but whose authorship I could not ascertain for want of time. I mention their names also as collected from the *Advaitasiddhi,* which from amongst the works of our author, contains the largest number of quotations as seen at a cursory glance, because they are works on which he relied for his views. Those names are:—

Writers.

1. Ānandabodhāchārya.
2. Vidyāsāgara.

Works.

1. Saṁkarshaṇasūtra.
2. Brahma Purāṇa.
3. Kaumudī or Tattwakaumudī.
4. Tattwas'uddhi.
5. Drishṭāntāsiddhi.
6. Mahābharata-S'antiparva.
7. S'āstradīpikā.
8. Nayaviveka.

In addition to these there are several quotations from unnamed works which I could not trace to their sources for the same reason. Moreover I infer from the references in the *Siddhāntales'a* that the following writers must have flourished and the following works must have existed from a time prior to or in the age of our author as the difference between his birth-date and that of Appaya Diks'it was that of a few years only.

Writers.

1. Prakaṭārthakāra.
2. Padārthatattwanirṇayakāra.
3. Siddhāntamuktāvalīkāra.
4. Advaitavidyāchārya.
5. Nrisiṁhabhaṭṭa Upādhyāya.
6. Nyāyasudhākāra.
7. Rāmādwayāchārya.

Works.

1. Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa.
2. Gauḍapādīya-vivaraṇa.
3. Ānandavallī.
4. Adhyāsabhāshya-tīkā-vivaraṇa.
5. Vivaraṇa-vārttika.
6. Nyāyaratnamālā.
7. Advaitadīpikā.

Again in that work too various views are introduced by remarks such as "Iti kechit" "Ityapare", "Ityanye" &c. The above does not therefore claim to be an exaustive notice of the writers and works on the Advaita doctrine of the period between the times of S'ankara and Madhusūdana. Still as it includes all the most important writers and works of the period it can serve as the basis for a few general remarks as to the development of the said doctrine during that period. I therefore proceed to make them.

(16) *General Remarks on the Development of the Doctrine with special reference to the Controversial Points in the Siddhāntabindu.*

It can be seen from the preceding portion of this section that the points of difference which engaged the attention of the writers upto S'ankara and his direct pupils had ceased to engage that of their successors in the field from Vāchaspati downwards, that new points had begun to arise for discussion, that each author attempted to justify his view on the ground of its being more in consonance with the main doctrine which was accepted by all alike, that those distinguished followers of the same school who came after them such as the authors of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka, Khanḍana, Kalpataru* &c., upto that of the *Pañchadas'ī* had taken full advantage of the convinient principle enunciated by Sures'wara that any method by which one becomes convinced of the true nature of the Self is to be considered good and consistent with the main doctrine and solved the numerous new problems of the day which called for solution on account of the attacks of the adherents of the rival schools. When room is thus made for the exercise of individual talent it is but natural that there should be divergent views expressed by the followers of the Advaita School itself for explaining away one and the same doubtful point arising out of the main doctrine.

The points that had thus arisen for consideration upto the seventeenth century were, as can be seen from the *Siddhāntales'a*, which is quite an upto date digest taking stock of the whole of the literature on the subject, many and varied but the different views expressed with reference to all of them could not have equal importance. There are two of them which had acquired a special importance and the views expressed with reference to them have been designated as Vādas (theories). The first point thereout is how does one and the same Brahma appear as both the Īs'wara and Jīwa and the second is how does it appear as the knower, the thing to be known, the act of knowledge and the means of knowledge. Allied to the second there is a subsidiary point also, namely what function a Vritti performs when knowledge arises. The theories propounded for explaining those facts are known as Ekajīwa-vāda (One-soul-theory) or Drishṭi-srishṭi-vāda (Illusion-theory), Ābhāsa-vāda, (Semblance-theory), Pratibimba-vāda (Reflection-theory) and Avachchheda-vāda (Limitation-theory). All these four are found discussed in the *Siddhāntabindu*[1]. The first is also discussed at greater length in the *Advaitasiddhi*[2]. In the *Siddhāntales'a* there is a mention of a fifth Vāda also, known as Srishṭi-drishṭi-vāda (Reality-theory). The reality admitted by the advocates of this theory is not of the same nature as that admitted by the other

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* २७-३५ *infra.*
2. *Sections XXXVI–XXXVII of Parichchheda I.*

Vedānta schools but such only as is capable of being proved by the ordinary means of proof such as perception, inference &c., and liable to be contradicted by the knowlege of the ultimate truth.[1] This theory is inconsistent with the Ekajīwa-vāda or Drishti-srishti-vāda but quite consistent with any of the three other Vādas. Madhusūdana has not referred to this Vāda, but has, like an eclectic philosopher, discussed the *pros* and *cons* of all the other Vādas, put forward the view that any of them which one finds satisfactory can be accepted without objection and laid down that the test to be employed for making a selection is whether the one that we accept has anything in it which militates against the main doctrine that the aim of the Scripures is to teach that the soul of the individual and that of the universe are identical. Another point on which Madhusūdana has referred to a difference of opinion amongst his predecessors, though without naming them, is what is the substratum of the dream-phenomena, whether the the Jīwa as limited by the mind or Brahma as limited by the original ignorance. He has referred to a third view also, namely that the substratum of that phenomena may be Brahma as limited by the mind but as Brahma in that condition is in no better position than the Jīwa he has understood that view to be only another phase of the first. Even on this point Madhusūdana has tried to establish that there is no harm if any of those views is accepted, for both can be shown to be reasonable and consistent with the main doctrine[2]. The third point on which he has referred to a difference of views is whether the Pratibimba (reflection) of the Self, which according to the Ābhāsa-vāda (Semblance-theory) and Pratibimba-vāda (Reflection-theory) was called the Īs'wara or Jīwa according as it appeared in the original ignorance or in a product thereof, such as the Buddhi or Antahkaraṇa, is real or unreal, the advocates of the first believing it to be unreal, those of the second, real. As in the case of the Vādas themselves he is of opinion that either view is acceptable[3]. The fourth point of difference noted by him is whether Ajñāna (ignorance) is overpowered only for the time being when the knowledge of an object such as a pot arises or whether it is destroyed completely. Madhusūdana is of the first view because according to him Ajñāna is one only and if it were believed to be destroyed with a single act of objective knowledge, there would be immediate liberation and no possibility of anything else remaining unknown thereafter. He has not however rejected the other view but has given an alternative explanation based upon the theory that there are as many Ajñānas as there are Jñānas in which case one specific Ajñāna being destroyed, other specific ones remain to obstruct the Jñāna concerning the other objects and the original Ajñāna would remain till Jñāna as to one's real nature arises[4].

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1. *Siddhāntales'a pp. 309-11.*
2. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ६४-६७ *and Notes p.184 infra.*
3. *Ibid p.* १६
4. *Ibid pp.* ३५-३६.

The fifth point noted by our outhor is whether there occurs the experience of pain in the state of deep sleep. He holds the firm belief that it should not. But there is another view that each of the three states has three sub-states such as Jāgrat-Jāgrat, Jāgrat-Swapna, Jāgrat-Sushupti &c., and that the experience of pain which one feels is possible in the state of Sushupti-Swapna[1]. It may be mentioned here in passing that in the *Īswarapratipattiprakās'a* this author mentions the Turiyā (fourth) state also along with the three and says that each has four sub-states[2]. The omission of the fourth from the *Siddhāntabindu* was most probably due to the fact that therein he was speaking only of the states of ignorance.

Although these are the only points on which our author has in the *Siddhāntabindu* specifically referred to a difference of opinion still when we compare the contents thereof with those of the *Siddhāntales'a*, we find that there were differences amongst S'ankara's followers as to several other points also. His silence as to them can be explained in this way that on those points he must have felt the necessity of accepting one particular view and did so and established it and put forth the others as objections and refuted them. I refer to a few such which I consider to be of some importance. One of them is whether Self-realization, which is the end of philosophy, arises as the result of S'ravaṇa only or of that supplemented by Manana and Nididhyāsana. The author of the *Vārttika, Naishkarmyasiddhi* &c., had expressed the former view and further opined that if the latter processes were essential, as they were in the case of men of inferior qualifications, they should be deemed to be parts of the process of S'ravaṇa. The author of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* while not admitting that the two latter processes were not essential, accepted and elaborately established the alternative view expressed by the author of the *Vārttika*. The author of the *Bhāmatī* on the other hand, held that Self-realization could take place only as the result of the perfection of S'ravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana, which according to him meant meditation and that all the three were important processes. He did not differ from the view that the realization can take place of that only which may have been learnt from a teacher and the S'āstra but held that before it could take place meditation should be practised. The authors of the *Khandana, Vivaraṇa, Chitsukhī* and other notable works accepted the alternative view of Sures'wara and cleared up in their works the doubts that had been raised against it while the author of the *Kalpataru* followed Vāchaspati. That of the *Pañchadas'ī* agreed with the majority but following the *Yogavās'ishtha* put forward the view that there were two ways of reaching the same goal, namely Jñānamārga and Yogamārga. In doing so he seems to have tried to

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ७५-७६.
2. *Trivendrum Sanskrit Series No. LXXIII p. 8.*

reconcile the two views above-mentioned because Jñānamarga means the process of Anvaya and Vyatireka advocated by Sures'wara and Yogamārga means the process of meditation. And he was on firm ground in doing so because even the Upanishads recommend two ways of reaching the goal, namely those of Jñāna and Upāsanā and Upāsanā there does not mean idol-worship with concrete substances but meditation on Saguṇa Brahma as a whole or on any of its manifestations in the outside world or inside our bodies. Some of the Upanishads recommend Yoga practice also but that is only another name of the Upāsanā above referred to and is different from the Ashṭāñga Yoga, which ends where the former begins. The latter is not therefore considered a necessary part of the practical side of the Advaita doctrine by any of the writers on that doctrine who are mentioned above. Sadānanda Vyāsa has however put forth the dictum that its practice is a necessary preliminary to the state of Nirvikalpa Samādhi in which the true nature of the Self is realized. A reference to Chapters I and II of the *Yogasūtras* shows that this view is wrong and that its practice is recommended only for those whose minds are too much attracted towards the objects of sense and cannot therefore be easily turned to that sort of abstract thinking which not only excludes concrete objects but also mental images thereof. Madhusūdana has in his works on this subject and also in the *Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā*[1] expressed the view that knowledge capable of eradicating ignorance arises from the S'ravaṇa of the Mahāvākya of which Manana and Nididhyāsana are adjuncts, on disposing of, at some places as in the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, *Siddhāntabindu* and *Advaitasiddhi*, the objection that direct knowledge cannot arise from finite words, be they even of the Upanishad texts, and in his *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* and *Advaitaratnarakṣ'aṇa* he has made it clear that he accepts the view of the author of the *Yogavāsishṭha* that the paths of Jñāna and Yoga are distinct, that therefore one is free to follow any that suits one and that the ultimate goal reached by both of them is the same, namely, the realization of the Self, whose immediate cause is a recollection of the teaching of the Mahāvākya. In Nos. 12 to 24 of the introductory verses given in beginning of the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā,* he has however stated that though the realization of the true nature of the Self and the eradication of ignorance do take place by either of the two processes, the extinction of the Vāsanā (latent desire) for the enjoyment of the objects of sense does not take place except by Saṁyama by which he, following Patañjali, means Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna and Samādhi, the last three Añgas of the Ashṭāñga Yoga and that in practising Saṁyama, the first five Añgas become helpful, that the same result can be secured by Īs'wara-praṇidhāna (profound meditation on the Lord) and that it is only when

1. *Sanskrit Section p.* ७ *infra; Advaitasiddhi III. 1; Advaitaratna p. 9; Vedāntakalpalatikā pp. 90-91; Sārasaṁgraha (K. S. Series No. XVIII Part II) pp. 145-46, 339-45, 357; Mahimnastotra-ṭīkā pp. 7 and 50-57,*

the latent desire is extinguished that Jīwanmukti becomes steady. He must also therefore be deemed not to agree with Sadānand Vyāsa in the view that the practice of Ashṭaṅga Yoga is an indispensable part of the practical side of the Advaita doctrine and to be of the opinion that the extinction of the latent desire which cannot be effected through the the realization of the true nature of the Self but which is necessary in order that Jīwanmukti may be ever-lasting, can be secured either by the practice of Saṁyama aided by the first five Aṅgas of that Yoga or by propound meditation on the Supreme Soul. The second such point is whether the Sāks'ī (witness of the phenomena) is different in the case of each embodied soul or the same in that of all of them. Our author has refuted the former view in the *Siddhāntabindu*, relying on the view of the author of the *Vārttika* and established the latter[1]. The third point is whether the organ of speech is produced from the element of space or from that of light and the organ of motion from that of light or that of space. Madhusūdana has decided in view of the attributes exhibited by these organs that speech must be a product of space and the organ of motion of light.[2] The fourth such point is whether there takes place a Trivritkaraṇa or a Pañchīkaraṇa of the elements in order that concrete substances may be produced. Our author has discussed this point at great length and established that the latter is the only correct and acceptable view[3].

XVII.

Active Rival Schools of the Time of Madhusūdana Saraswatī.

The above few select points are, I believe, sufficient to give the reader an idea of the nature and number of the problems that engaged the attention of the philosophers of the Advaita school when Madhusūdana composed the *Siddhāntabindu* and of the ways in which he has tackled them in that work. Those problems were however of minor importance because those who had raised them were all men who acknowledged their allegiance to S'ankara and were therefore friendly critics of one another. All of them had however to meet the attacks of the critics of the other rival schools of their own times. Such critics in the time of our author appear from his works to be the followers of Madhwa and the Tārkikas or Naiyāyikas. The *Siddhāntabindu* contains a covert and somewhat contemptuous reference to the former in the portion of the commentary on Verse IX where an objection is raised whether one has or has not the consciousness of happiness in the state of final absolution. That objection has been raised because the view of that school was

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ५३ *and* ७४ *infra.*
2. *Ibid p.* ७६ *infra.*
3. *Ibid pp.* ५८-५९ *infra.*

that unless the distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed is present in that state, it cannot be worth striving for and that it not being present in the ideal state concieved by the Advaitins the better ideal was a state in which the individual soul remained the enjoyer and the Supreme Soul, the source of happiness[1]. It is answered by saying that the Self being capable of making itself manifest does not, after the removal of Nescience, stand in need of any other substance for becoming manifest as the highest joy. Moreover the doctrine of that school had been propounded in the *Nyāyāmrita* of Vyāsārya on refuting the doctrine of the Advaita school as set forth in the *Tattwapradīpikā* of Chitsukhāchārya and therefore Madhusūdana re-established the latter in his *Advaitasiddhi* on showing the hollowness of all the arguments of Vyāsārya. This war of dialectics was carried on further by Rāmatīrtha of the Madhwa school in his *Tarañgiṇī* and the arguments advanced therein by him were refuted by Gauḍa Brahmānanda Saraswatī in his commentary on the *Advaitasiddhi* known as *Laghuchandrikā* or *Gauḍabrahmānandīya.* The latter again was criticised in the *Vanamālāmis'rīya* and that again in the *Advaitasiddhāntavaijayantī.* We thus have *Chitsukhī, Advaitasiddhī, Laghuchandrikā* and *Advaitasiddhāntavaijayantī* of the Advaita school on the one hand and *Nyāyāmrita, Tarañgiṇī,* and *Vanamālāmis'rīya* of the Dvaita school on the other[2]. The *Advaitasiddhi* thus forms a link in a chain of dialectical works and the method of refutation adopted therein, namely the use of Vāda, (arguments based on logic and advanced with a view to convince an opponent) Jalpa (arguments advanced simply with a view to win over an opponent) and Vitaṇḍā (arguments advanced with a view to avoid coming to a decision), was so effective that it has won for its author an honoured place amongst the great Advaita philosophers of the medieval period[3].

The S'akti-vāda of the Naiyāyikas has been approved in the *Siddhāntabindu* when the necessity of resorting to Laks'aṇā (derivative power of words) in order to arrive at the true significance of the terms 'Tat' and 'Twam', is established[4]. The principal writer of that school who is indirectly referred to in that work and directly in the other works of this author is Ganges'a Upādhyāya, the author of the *Tattwachintāmaṇi,* shortly referred to at times as the *Maṇi.* The whole of the doctrine of that school is however found to have been ruthlessly criticised in the *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa* of this author which had been composed specially "for guarding the jem of the Advaita doctrine against the inroads of the Naiyāyika thieves". This is done by showing how certain Upanishad texts should be construed and why they should be

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* १८-१९ *infra.*

2. *Introduction in English to the Siddhantales'a in the Advaita Mañjarī Series p. 2.*

3. *Introduction to the Advaitasiddhi in the same series.*

4. *Sanskrit Section p.* ४ *infra.*

so construed. When we compare the language used in that work with that used in the *Siddhāntabindu* and *Advaitasiddhi*, we cannot but feel that Madhusūdana had some respect for the opponents of the Madhwa school for it is once only that the opponents of that school have been called "Vaishṇavaṁ-manyāh" in the former and "Devānāṁpriyāh" in the latter while in this small work derisive and contemptuous forms of address are found to have been used too often towards a Tārkika.[1] The portion of the text upto p. 40 is of a polemical nature but there the discussion is wound up, the opponent is converted into a pupil and gradually initiated into the Prakriyā of the Advaita School. There is a tradition that Madhusūdana himself had studied Navya-Nyāya at Naḍia and had become such an adept in the art of debate in which that school gave a special training, that when he subsequently met his fellow-pupil Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya and had a discussion with him over a new work of his, he astounded the audience by establishing his superior skill.

Rāmānuja who is believed to have lived about the end of the twelfth century and Vallabha who is believed to have flourished in the second half of the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth century must have composed their Bhāshyas on the *Brahmasūṭras* sufficiently long before the literary activity of Madhusūdana commenced. Still either because their followers were mostly non-Brāhmans not possessed of sufficient Sanskrit learning to enable them to carry on wordy warfares with the Advaitins on equal terms or because they were looked upon as Ekades'ins in asmuch as they believed in Advaitism in other forms, or as Dvaitins in disguise in that they looked upon the world-phenomena as having real existence and therefore not deserving of any special attention apart from the Mādhwas who were uncompromising Dvaitins or for any other reason, we do not find any pointed reference to their tenets in the digests of Madhusūdana or in that of Appaya Diks'it. I too do not therefore think it necessary to say anything about them here.

XVIII.

Other Systems of Philosophy Criticised in the Siddhāntabindu.

Ever since we came to the separation of the Vedāntins from the Pūrvamīmāṅsakas we have had no occasion to refer to any other system of philosophical thought in India except the Naiyāyikas. The full development of the latter from the time of Bādarāyaṇa to that of Madhusūdana Saraswatī, which was our primary task owing to the *Siddhāntabindu* being a digest of that system, having been traced, it will now be our endeavour to get an insight into the doctrines of the other systems so far as it is necessary to do so for the right understanding of our own.

1. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Preess edition pp. 1, 11-17, 41 &c.,*

The reason given in the *Siddhāntabindu* for mentioning and criticising them is that doubts are likely to arise in the minds of men of poor intellects owing to divergent views having been propounded by learned men and that so long as they are not removed, ignorance would not be dispelled[1]. According to the introductory remarks in the beginning of this author's commentary on Chapter III of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka*[2], and in the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*[3] and the Krama (order) given in the concluding portion of the *Advaitaratna*[4] such a discussion forms part of the process of Manana which establishes Avirodha (Consistency) in order to remove Prameyagatāsaṁbhāvanā (non-belief with regard to the thing to be known) which is one of the five obstacles to the rise of knowledge, the others being (1) Vis'hayabhogavāsanā (craving for the enjoyment of the objects of sense), which is removed by the acquisition of S'amadamādi Sampat, an adjunct of S'ravaṇa; (2) Pramāṇagatāsaṁbhāvanā (non-belief as to the means of knowledge) which is removed by the Chapter on Samanvaya (Sequence); (3) and (4) Viparītabhāvanā or Pramitigatāsaṁbhāvanā consisting of doubts of two sorts, as to the fruit of Brahmavidyā, which are capable of being removed by Nididhyāsana the subject-matters of the Chapters on Sādhana (Means) and Phala (Fruit). This reason seems to be proper because an ordinary aspirant would feel bewildered on seeing diametrically opposite views based upon the same authorities advocated with the same sincerity by the adherents of the rival schools. He would also naturally feel unconvinced of the truth of the Vedānta doctrine which at first sight seems opposed to our daily experience and relegates reason to a position subordinate to that of the Scriptures. The practice of establishing one's own doctrine on refuting those of the other Schools which are likely to influence the minds of students is also a very ancient one, dating back from the time of Gauḍapāda because whether one referred to the names of the schools or not, it was indispensable to discriminate the pure intelligent Self from the body, senses, mind, vital breath &c., the one or the other of which the writers of the other schools believed to be the Self.

In the *Siddhāntabindu* the views of the following Schools as to the true significance of the term 'Twam' have been referred to and refuted, namely:—(1) Chārvākas; (2) to (5) Four other cognate schools not specifically named but referred to vaguely by the terms "Apare", "Anye", "Eke" and 'Anye', (6) and (7) Saugatas *i. e.* Ks'aṇikavijñānavādins and Mādhyamikas *i. e.* S'ūnyavādins, both sub-schools of the Buddhists; (8) Digambaras *i. e.* Jainas; (9), (10) and (11) Vais'eshikas, Tārkikas *i. e.* Naiyāyikas of

1. *Sanskrit Section p.* ϵ *infra.*

2. *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series No. XVIII Part II. pp. 146, 357.*

3. *Prince of Wales Saraswatī Bhawan Text Series No. III pp. 90-91.*

4. *Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition p. 45.*

the old school and Prābhākaras, a sub-school of the Mīmāñsakas, (12) Bhāṭṭas, another sub-school of the Mīmāñsakas, (13) and (14) Sāṁkhyas and Pātañjalas. The views of these schools as to the nature of the individual soul are such that the soul becomes, according to them, identical either with the physical body, a product of the elements or with any of the senses or with their group or the mind or vital breath or a Vritti (function) of the mind or a something attended by certain attributes of the mind[1]. The general principles of these schools and the works in which they are established will be found mentioned in the *Notes* at pp. 20–38 *infra*. It is on denying the possibility of any of these being the Self that the view of the Aupanishadas, that the Self though endowed with the attributes of the doer, &c., on account of Nescience, is as a matter of fact without any attributes and is of the nature of the highest bliss and knowledge, is set forth as the only logical and acceptable one. The denial is supported by one reason applicable to all of them, namely that all the objects *i. e.* the physical body &c. are by nature variable whereas the Self is by nature immutable.[2]

Those schools whose views are referred to and refuted in the same works while determining the significance of the term 'Tat' are:—

(1) Sāṁkhyas; (2) Pās'upatas; (3) Pāñcharātrikas; (4) and (5) Jainas and Tridaṇḍins (6) Mīmāṁsakas; (7) Tārkikas *i. e.* Naiyāyikas of the old school, (8) Saugatas *i. e.* Ks'aṇikavijñānavādins, and (9) Pātañjalas. The views of these schools of which Nos. (1), (4), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are the same as Nos. (13), (8), (11) and (12), (10), (6) and (14) respectively of the list occurring in the previous paragraph will be found explained and the principal works thereof mentioned in the *Notes* at pp. 20-38, and 135 and 146. It is remarkable that the order in which the views are mentioned under the second point is not the same as that under the first. The deviation seems deliberate because the principle kept in view in the first case is a gradual rise from the gross body to the intelligent Self and in the second, one from the non-intelligent primordial matter to the omniscient God unaffected by sorrows, actions &c., which are the sources of misery to an individual soul. Some of these schools such as the Sāṁkhyas, Jainas and Saugatas do not believe in the existence of Īs'wara, *i. e. to say*, an intelligent cause of the universe and some of them such as the Saugatas and Jainas do not believe the Vedas to be the source of the knowledge of the first cause but since they too have their own views as to that cause those views also are taken note of here in order that the right significance of the term 'Tat' may be ascertained. That cause, according to the views of those schools, is either the unintellegent primordial matter or a product

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1 *Sanskrit Section p.* ६ *infra.*

2. *Ibid pp.* १०–११ *infra.*

thereof such as an Aṇu or a Paramāṇu or an intelligent universal principle limited by that matter or a product thereof. The views of those thereout who believe in the authority of the Vedas and depend upon them for support are refuted by citing Vedic texts incompatible with them and by advancing cogent arguments while the views of those who do not believe in the Vedas are shown to be untenable by advancing arguments and then the view of the Aupanishadas (Vedāntins) is established on the authority of the special experience gained in the state of Samādhi as the result of an Akhaṇḍākāra Vritti (uninterrupted consciousness) produced by the text "Tat twam asi"[1].

XIX.

Advaita Doctrine as Expounded in the Siddhāntabindu.

The doctrine of the Aupanishadas as expounded in the *Siddhāntabindu* is briefly this:—It is the highest object of man's endeavour to get himself freed from the bondage of transmigration and attain eternal happiness. He is in fact always striving to avoid misery and attain peace but not being well-guided he seeks such happiness from the things of this world, which being by nature transient cannot help him to achieve his goal, and as a consequence he becomes more and more entangled in the cobweb of Māyā. If on the contrary he were to turn his attention away from those objects and direct it towards knowing the true nature of the Self within him with the help of a Guru and the Scriptures, which alone can give him proper guidance, his object would surely be achieved. There are two kinds of Muktī (liberation), namely (1) Sadyomukti (instantaneous liberation) and (2) Kramamukti (gradual liberation). The first is attained by the S'ravaṇa (study) of the Mahāvākya "Tat twam asi", from the Upanishad in which it occurs, with the help of a competent teacher followed by Manana (reflection) of what has been studied and Nididhyāsana (meditation), which by giving rise to an uninterrupted Vritti of one being Brahma in the form "Aham Brahmāsmi" leads to the realization of that truth. The second can be attained by the Upāsanā of the one Brahma whose symbol is Om and who has become manifest equally in the individual body, the objective world and the spiritual world in their three aspects as the Jāgrat, Swapna and Sushupti (waking, dreaming and sleeping) states of the individual soul, which while in those states receives the appellations of the Vis'wa, Taijasa and Prājña respectively, the Sattwaguṇa, Rajoguṇa and Tamoguṇa of the objective world, which looked upon collectively are given the names Virāt, Hiraṇyagarbha and Avyākrita and the states of the Supreme Soul known as the preservation, creation and destruction of the worlds in which states He is known as Vis'ṇu, Brahmā and Rudra respectively. These correspond with the parts A, U and M of the syllable Om and between which *inter se* there is

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ४४-४६ *infra.*

practically no difference. The latter is called gradual liberation because the individual soul which follows its course is not liberated completely even after its connection with its physical body is severed but repairs to the region of Hiraṇyagarbha known as Brahmaloka or Satyaloka, stays there till the end of the Kalpa and then its Kāraṇas'arīra portion becomes absorbed in the Avyākrita, the primordial matter, along with the Hiraṇyagarbha, and its spirit portion becomes permanantly united with Parabrahma[1]. As for the first thereout, the Mahāvākya can give rise to the Akhaṇḍākāra Vritti when the sense of the sentence as a whole is gathered and that is possible only when those of the principal words 'Tat' and 'Twam' occurring therein are ascertained with the help of the other Upanishad texts, whose object is the subsidiary one of imparting the knowledge of the true nature of the individual soul and Brahma. The primary sense of the word 'Twam' is the Jīwātmā which is possessed of limited powers and is capable of getting limited knowledge only, inasmuch as it is confined within the physical body and has a limited number of organs peculiarly constituted and a mind depending for knowledge upon those organs. That of the word 'Tat' is Brahma, Īs'wara or Paramātmā, who is the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the universe and is as such possessed of unlimited powers and omniscient. The first again though capable of being known subjectively is apparently different in the case of each living creature while the second though one and the same everywhere is not capable of being known subjectively because it is objectified as the numerous objects of perception. The primary senses of the said words are therefore incompatible with the sense of the sentence as a whole, which is that the Jīwātmā is identical with the Paramātmā. Therefore the said words must be understood to have been used in their secondary senses. This sense has three varieties, namely (1) that which is resorted to on completely abandoning the primary sense, (2) that which is resorted to without at all abandoning it and (3) that which is resorted to on abandoning it partly. In this case the third species has to be availed of because the senses of the words would be compatible with that of the sentence if the Upādhis, which make of the pure Brahma or Self a Jīwa and those which make of it the Īs'wara or Paramātmā, are given up but the pure Brahma or Self to which the Upādhis are attached in the case of both is retained. When the words are understood in that kind of secondary sense the sense intended to be conveyed by the sentence becomes intelligible. That understood, it should be constantly reflected over and meditated upon in order that all doubts being removed an Akhaṇḍākāra Vritti may arise, the truth contained in the Mahāvākya may be realized and the Self may forsake its Jīwatwa (quality of being the individual soul) and be actually of the nature of the highest joy and

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1. *Sanskrit Section p.* ७६ *infra.*

knowledge[1]. Of course from the standpoint of the Absolute, all this is meaningless because it is immutable but so long as there is even a vestige of the original ignorance a notion of duality persists and so long as it does, all this is real.

XX.

That Doctrine Considered in the light of Previous History.

Out of the ways for the attainment of the two kinds of Muktī, that for the Kramamukti (gradual liberation) is found dealt with in some works such as the *Upanishads, Bhagawadgītā, Brahmasūtras, S'ārīrakabhāshya, Bhāmatī* and *Pañchadas'ī,* but not in others such as the *Naishkarmyasiddhi, Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka, Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, Tattwadīpikā, Vedāntasāra, Advaitasiddhi* and *Advaitaratnaraks'aṇa.* The reason is that the latter group of works are Prakaraṇagranthas[2], *i. e. to say,* works written with the avowed object of treating of a particular portion of the subject-matter of the Scriptures, namely an exposition of the nature of pure Brahma or Brahma in the abstract and the way to attain to its state directly. Strictly speaking, Brahma is neither pure nor impure because it is one only without a second and that being so there is nothing like one's being really bound or freed because these states presuppose duality, which in fact does not exist, but like all other experience, the experience that one had been bound and has become freed does take place owing to the ignorance which is the root-cause of the sense of duality. The state of absolute purity being attained, the previous existence of the state of ignorance, and the consequent existence of the dual phenomena consisting of the existence of one's own body, that of the preceptor who imparted the knowledge, that of the Scriptures with whose help he did that &c., appear as imaginary events. There is some apparent difference of opinion between Gauḍapāda on the one hand and the subsequent philosophers beginning with S'ankara on the other as to whether the phenomenal world should or should not be deemed to exist for the purpose of daily intercourse. The former is of the view that it should not because Brahma has no second. In that view the world is unreal, a mere figment of imagination appearing so long only as the mind is active just as a circle of light appears so long as a burning fire-brand is whirled round and ceases to appear when that action is stopped and is not therefore worth any serions consideration like the objects which are created and destroyed in the state of dreaming or the illusory phenomena produced by a juggler. However, as already stated[3] that philosopher too indirectly admitted

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1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ४-५ *and* ८१.
2. शास्त्रैकदेशसम्बद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम् ।
आहुः प्रकरणं नाम ग्रन्थभेदं विपश्चितः ॥ सारसङ्ग्रह-काशी संस्कृत ग्रन्थमाला पु. १८ (१) पृ. १६.
3. *PP. LXXXVI-LXXXVIII supra.*

the existence of the phenomenal world for the purpose of daily intercourse but by theoratically denying its existence he avoided the responsibility of explaining how one and the same Brahma could become both the subject and object, a distinction between which is the very foundation of all objective experience, and so function as both the Jīwa and Īs'wara, and as the knower, thing to be known, the act of knowledge and the means of knowledge, without which objective knowledge is impossible, and the other incidental facts of human experience. S'ankara and his followers including Madhusūdana Saraswatī on the other hand held the view that theoratically it is alright to say that the world is Mithyā (unreal) but it will not do to ignore its existence for the purpose of daily intercourse, which includes even the acquisition of the very knowledge which enables one to come to the conclusion that it is unreal and to realize that truth, and that therefore the more accurate epithet to apply to the phenomena is Anirvachaniya, *i. e. to say,* incapable of being described categorically as unreal or real because it is found by an average man to exist apart from himself and by a philosopher to be unreal. Madhusūdana has in order to reconcile this difference distinguished between two kinds of truth, namely Pāramārthic (philosophically real) and Vyāvahāric (phenomenally real) and has for the purpose of comparison or illustration added a third, namely Prātibhāsic or Prātītic[1] (illusory). The first is eternal and capable of being known by only one means of proof, namely the Scriptures and is never liable to be contradicted. The second is a relative truth, is capable of being known by the six means of proof and liable to be contradicted by the knowledge of the first. The third is a temporary truth, exists only in the imagination and is liable to be contradicted by the knowledge of the second. The first consists of nothing else than pure Brahma who is one only without a second. The second comprises all the objects of the phenomenal world which an average human being would believe to exist. In the third category fall such imaginary objects as silver in a mother-of-pearl, a serpent in a rope, a mirage &c., which do not in fact exist at the places at which they are believed to exist though they have existence at other places but nevertheless a belief in their existence at places where they are not arises temporarily and persists so long as it is not removed by right knowledge of the second variety. The difference between such objects and purely fanciful objects such as the horn of a hare, the city of Gāndarvas, a flower of the sky &c., is that the former are real objects in the ordinary sense of the word but do not exist at a particular time and place whereas the latter never formed parts of God's creation and were concieved only by some poets. The proper province of the Scriptures is to impart the knowledge of the first kind of truth but they proceed to impart that of some of the objects of the relative world also because they are helpful in explaining the nature of the former.

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ४०, ५२-५४, ६१. *Cf. also Advaitaratna pp. 17-21 and Advaitasiddhi I. LVIII-LIX (Gujrāti Press edition pp. 612-18).*

The latter kind of knowledge consists on the one hand of explanations as to the different forms in which the Spirit which is the subject is met with in the world of experience including in that of the state of Samādhi, and the processes of evolution and involution of the universe including the different kinds of bodies which the Spirit enters and resides in and the experience which it gets while passing through different states. These explanations lie scattered here and there in the original works namely, the *Upanishads, Bhagawadgītā* and *Brahmasūtras.* In his *S'ārīrakabhāshya* S'ankara considered them as a whole, forged links between them, expounded the absolute nature of Brahma and threw out hints here and there as to how any such new problems that may arise could be worked out. Most of his followers upto the time of Madhusūdana like the authors of *Pañchapādikā, Vārttika, Samks'epa S'ārīraka, Vivaraṇa,* and *Chitsukhī* had worked out most of them in details according to the needs of their times. As their explanations did not agree they were subjected to attacks by the rival schools. The authors of the *Pañchadas'ī, Vedāntasāra* and *Vedāntaparibhāshā* had attempted to reconcile them in their own ways.

Madhusūdhna Saraswatī having taken stock of all these attacks and explanations attempted to reconcile them and worked out a systematic arrangement which is set forth in the portion of the *Siddhānta bindu* under Verse VIII of the *Das'aslokī*[1]. It appears that he must have made some necessary additions and alterations therein in order to give the collection a definite shape and bring them in a line with the current beliefs of his time, which were based upon the Smritis and Purāṇas. Sadānanda had in his *Vedāntasāra* already made such as attempt but it was imperfect. Madhusūdana's attempt was all-comprehensive and likely to satisfy public opinion to which it is a concession. It is not necessary to give here a synopsis of what Madhusūdana has stated on this point because short summaries of the statements on particular topics have been given in the *Notes*[2]. What deserves to be noted here particularly is that though the initial statement namely:—"In our view, substance is twofold, Drik (the seer) and Dris'ya (the seen)" may seem irreconcileable with the Advaita doctrine according to which there is only one entity, it is not really so because the synthesis of all substances into those two is only from the point of view of Vyavahāra. From the Pāramārthic view-point there is only the pure Brahma which is above the distinction between the seer and the seen or the knower and the known or Atmā and Anātmā and which in the state of ignorance becomes subject and also the substratum of the objective world. Our author too has made it clear by working out the theory of Adhyāsa (superimposition) in all its bearings and explaining how one and the same Brahma becomes the Jīwa, Īs'wara and Sāks'ī and the knower, thing

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* ५३–५४ *infra.*
2. *English Section pp. 160, 170-71, 172-73, 185-86, and 193-94 infra.*

to be known, act of knowledge and the means of knowledge and established, on dispelling all possible doubts arising out of the difference of opinions amongst the followers of S'ankara, in the portion of the *Siddhāntabindu* under Verse I of the *Das'as'loki*[1] that it is possible to explain all subjective phenomena in terms of the one and absolute Self on admitting differences in the Antahkaraṇas (inner organs) and all objective phenomena also in the same terms on admitting differences in names and forms and believing in a common substratum. The said differences are the products of Avidyā (ignorance) or Māyā (divine power) which though beginningless is capable of being eradicated by right knowledge derived from the Mahāvākyas. It has no existence apart from the Absolute and is assumed to exist in it only for the purpose of setting doubts at rest.

XXI.

Siddhāntabindu Considered as a Digest.

We have already seen that the *Siddhāntabindu* is an up-to-date digest of the views of the followers of the Advaita school on several important points connected with their doctrine. When however we compare it with another digest thereof most probably composed within a few years of it by another distinguished writer, namely *S'āstrasiddhāntales'a-saṁgraha* we cannot help feeling that it is not as all-comprehensive as the other, for it is quite silent as to the following points, namely:— What qualifications are required of one desirous of knowing the Self? What is the nature of the Vidhi (injunction) contained in the text "The Self, O dear ! should be seen, studied, reflected over and meditated upon"? In what sense is Brahma the creator, preserver and destroyer of universe? Whether the Sāks'ī is enveloped or unenveloped? Why should not direct perception be deemed a more authoritative means of proof than revelation in the matter of Brahmavidyā? If the world is unreal when looked at from the philosophical point of view where is the room for Arthakriyākāritwa (the capability of objects to cause human beings to act)? What Upādhi comes in the way of one man partaking of the pleasures and pains of another? Why should the state of pure of Brahma be capable of being acquired by knowledge only? Upto what stage is (Vaidic) Karma helpful in the attainment of that object? Is Sannyāsa (renunciation) necessary for the members all the Varṇas or of the Brāhma Varṇa only? Are Sūdras competent to study Brahmavidyā? Is it possible to perform the Upasānā (adoration) of Nirguṇa Brahma? How can Brahmajñāna in the nature of a Vrittī arising from the Mahāvākya be itself destroyed? What is Jiwanmukti? Does one in that state remain conscious of the existence of his body, senses

1. *Sanskrit Section pp.* १६–२६ *infra.*

&c., If he does, what is that due to? Why is an effort required to be made for getting uninterrupted joy if it is always present? Does one attain to the state of Īs'wara or to that of pure Chaitanya on the removal of the notion of Jīwatwa? Owing to such an imperfection, it cannot be deemed to be a perfect digest.

This imperfection may be due either to the work being in the form of a commentary or to a deliberate intention on the part of the author to confine his attention to a limited sphere so far as this work was concerned. Very probably the latter was the case because on the one hand, so many questions not directly arising out of the subject-matters of Verses I, IV and VIII have been discussed in the portions of the commentary thereunder that it would be improper to assume that the above questions could not have been easily raised and discussed in the appropriate portions of the commentary and on the other, the name *Siddhāntabindu* (A Drop of the Doctrine) implies that the author did not intend to enter into a discussion of a larger number of questions than was absolutely necessary for making the student acquainted with the main doctrine of the Advaita school. Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that Madhusūdana Saraswatī had settled views on all the above questions because most of them are found set forth in clear-cut terms in his other works on the Advaita philosophy, namely *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, *Advaitasiddhi*, *Advaitaratnarakṣ'aṇa*, *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* and *Sārasaṁgraha*.

XXII.

Madhusūdana's Style and Diction with special reference to the Siddhāntabindu.

The *Siddhāntabindu* being a work intended for the use of a student desirous of getting himself acquainted with the ways of refuting the views of hostile critics and reconciling the differences of views between the followers of the Advaita school, it is but natural that it should presuppose on the part of the student a knowledge of the technical terms used in and of the fundamental principles of the Vedānta and other systems of Indian philosophy. Anyone who not being so equipped would take up this work for study is therefore likely to meet with numerous difficulties. I have tried to make his task easy by giving copious notes on all such topics as seemed to me to require explanation. Moreover the author having recieved a training at Naḍiā, the home of Navya-Nyāya in the middle ages and having become an expert in the ways of argumentation of that school which consisted of subtle reasoning, at times drifting into an hair-splitting, it is also natural that there should be abstruse passages in his works. The first two Parichchhedas of the *Advaitāsiddhi* and the first 40 pages of the *Advaitaratnarakṣ'aṇa* contain many such passages. This characteristic may, to us of the twentieth century, seem to be a fault inasmuch as

the object of the writer is rather to confound the adversary by putting in too many alternatives and showing them all to be unacceptable rather than to convince him. Nevertheless it was a recognized form of debate and Madhusūdana has made a name by showing himself to be an adept in that way of reasoning. The *Siddhāntabindu* does not contain such hair-splitting logic. It does however contain subtle and at times elliptical reasoning. I have therefore explained the arguments contained therein in simple language and also given summaries thereof at the places where one topic is finished and another is commenced and hope that this edition which is unlike any that has yet appeared will serve to light up the path of the student and enable him to reach his goal without difficulty. Except for the technical terms and the terse way of expressing ideas the language is not likely to present any difficulties because it is not characterized by any pedantry such as a deliberate use of uncommon words, long compounds or too many complex sentences.

XXIII.

Commentaries on the Siddhāntabindu.

This work appears to have been commented upon several times upto about the end of the nineteenth century. Aufrecht mentions as many as nine commentators under the term *Siddhāntatattwabindu* but of one thereout he has not given the name, after the name of another he has put in a sign of interrogation obviously because 'Saraswatī' is not a name of an individual but that of an order of Sannyāsins, and out of the remaining seven he has not given the names of the works of two of them. So there remain five commentaries, namely *Laghuṭīkā or Nārāyaṇī* of Nārāyaṇa Yati or Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, *Bindusaṁdīpana* of Purushottama Saraswatī, *Tattwaviveka* of Pūrṇānanda Saraswatī, *Nyāyaratnāvalī* of Brahmānanda Saraswatī and *Nyāyaratnaprakāśikā* of Krishṇakānta. Thereout again *Tattwaviveka* is not as a matter of fact a commentary on the *Siddhāntabindu* as I will subsequently show and *Nyāyaratnaprakāśikā* has not yet been brought to light so far as I am aware. In *Laghuṭīkā* or *Nārāyaṇī* there is a reference to another commentary, namely *Guruṭīkā* of the same author[1] but no MS. thereof has not been found[2]. So there remain only three old commentaries to be considered. Thereout *Nyāyaratnāvalī* alone had been formerly published along with the text in the *Advaita Mañjarī Series* and was again published recently along with the text in the *Kāśī Sanskrit Series. Laghuṭīkā* too was published in the latter series along with the text and the Gujrāti Printing Press of Bombay recently brought out an edition thereof along with the text and *Bindusaṁdīpana*. The last appears again in this volume. Besides these

1. *Kāśī Sanskrit Series No. LXV p. 233.*

2. *Ibid-Introduction p. 11.*

old ones there is a fourth named *Binduprapāta* recently composed by Mm. Abhyankar S'āstri and published at Poona along with the text in the *Government Oriental Series, Class A.* All these commentaries were consulted for preparing the *Notes* given in the English section of this Volume.

Of these four commentaries *Bindusaṁdīpana* though a short one is entitled to much weight on account of its merits. One of them is that its author is Purushottama Saraswatī who is reputed to be a direct pupil of Madhusūdana Saraswatī. Secondly, it seems to have been composed in simple language and with the special aim of elucidating certain obscure points in the text, which as the author himself says "though a small digest, conveys a great meaning[1]" and whose "language though so framed as to be intelligible to beginners, is so pregnant with meaning that even some advanced students comprehend its purport after a long time"[2]. A third remarkable point about it is that its author, like a modern scholar, mentions, except in a few instances, the sources from which Madhusūdana must have taken his quotations. The other preceptors of Purushottoma besides our author were S'rīpāda and S'rīdhara Saraswatī[3]. This Purushottama Saraswatī was a different individual from Purushottamānanda Saraswatī, the author of *Smritisārasaṁgraha* and the preceptor of Pūrṇānanda Saraswatī, to whom I shall refer later on. Nor does he seem to be identical with any of the other 18 persons having 'Purushottama' as part of their names, who are mentioned at page 341 of Part I and p. 76 of Part II of Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum.* This commentator seems to have also composed a commentary on the *Advaitasiddhi* named *Siddhisādhaka*[4].

Nyāyaratnāvalī is a work of Brahmānanda Saraswatī who is better known as Gauḍa Brahmānanda Saraswatī on account of his commentary on the *Advaitasiddhi* called *Gauḍabrahmānandīya,* also otherwise known as *Laghuchandrikā.* This commentator is more widely known than Purushottama because in the *Advaitasiddhi* Madhusūdana had rent into pieces the Dvaitavāda established in the *Nyāyāmrita,* a work of Vyāsayati or Vyāsāryar, on refuting the arguments adavanced in the *Tattwapradīpikā* or *Chitsukhī* of Chitsukhāchārya, which had been written in defence of an attack on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of S'rī Harsha, a work of the Advaita school of outstanding merit from a dialectical view-point, the *Advaitasiddhi* had been attacked by Rāmatīrtha in his *Taraṅgiṇī* and Brahmānanda effectively refuted all the arguments advanced against the Advaita doctrine in the latter work and re-established its faultlessness

1. *Sanskrit Section p.* ८२ *infra.*
2. *Ibid p.* ८३ *infra.*
3. *Catalogus Catalogorum Part I. p. 341.*
4. *Sanskrit Section pp.* २० *and* ७० *infra.*

from a logical point of view[1]. His commentary on this work, though a good and informing one, is, so to say, an enlarged editon of the *Laghu-vyākhyā* of Nārāyaṇa because it seems to follow that work almost word for word with some additions thereto at some places. The reason thereof appears to be that he was a pupil of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. He has also acknowledged one Paramānanda Saraswatī as his Guru. Pūrṇānanda Saraswatī has written *Tattwampadārthaviveka* or concisely *Tattwaviveka* wherein are discussed the meanings of the terms 'Tat' and 'Twam' with special reference to certain passages occurring in the *Siddhāntabindu* under Verse VIII of the *Das'as'lokī* as explained by Brahmānanda in the *Nyāyaratnāvalī*. This Purṇānanda was a disciple of Purushottamānanda Saraswatī who in turn was a disciple of Advaitānanda Saraswatī and was therefore a different individual from the author of the *Bindusaṁdīpana*[2]. Brahmānanda is also the reputed author of an independent work on Advaita philosophy named *Advaitasiddhāntavidyotana*[3].

The third old commentary is a very valuable one. Though not prolix it is not so concise as that of Purushottama and is therefore very helpful in interpreting some of the abstruse passages in the *Siddhānta-bindu*. It is also easily intelligible on account of the simplicity of the language employed therein and is, unlike the *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, free from jarring digressions. I have made a very extensive use thereof in my *Notes*. Its author Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is known to be a disciple of Vāsudeva Tīrtha and Rāmagowinda Tīrtha and one of the Gurus of Brahmānanda Saraswatī and the author of the following other works namely:—*Tattwachandra*, a commentary on *Sāṁkhyatattwakaumudī*, *Bhaktichandrikā*, a commentary on the *Bhaktisūtras of S'āṇḍilya*, *Bhaktyadhikaraṇamālā*, an original work, *Gūḍhārthadyotanikā*, a commentary on the *Yogasūtras* and *Sāṁ-khyachandra*, a commentary on the *Sāmkhyakārikā*. He is also credited with the authorship of a commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali-kārikā*, one on the *Vedastuti*, and one on the *Vedāntavibhāvanā*.

The fourth and the recent commentary called *Binduprapāta* is the work of Mm. Vāsudev S'āstri Abhyankar, the Pandit at the Fergusson College, Poona, who had already distinguished himself by composing a new commentary on the *Sarvadars'anasaṁgraha* of Mādhava and editing the *S'rī Bhāshya* of Rāmānuja in two volumes and the *Mīmāñsānyāyapra-*

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1. *Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishna Vol. II pp. 451-52 foot-note 1*; *Introduction to Nyāyaratnākara*, written on the lines of the *Saurabha* wherein the views expressed in *Gauḍabrahmānandīya* have been criticized; *Introduction in English to Advaitasiddhi* in the Advaita Mañjarī Series.

2. *A Trienerial Catalogue of Mss at the Government Manuscript Library, Madras for 1913-14 to 1915-16 Vol. II Part I. p. 1776.*

3. *Catalogus Catalogorum Vol. I p. 388.*

kās'ikā singly and an English translation of the *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāshya* in collaboration with Prof. K. V. Abhyankar, M. A. His *Binduprapāta* too has the same merits as the *Laghuvyākhyā* and has been helpful to me in elucidating many abstruse passages in the text which had either not been explained by any previous commentator or on which his view differed from theirs.

Having thus introduced the reader to the author, the work and the commentaries thereon I leave him to read the mind of the author personally from the accompanying record of his thoughts with the help of the *Notes* and *Translation* which will act as an interpreter whenever referred to.

Sanskrit Section.

॥ श्रीः ॥

अथ सिद्धान्तबिन्दुः ।

उपोद्घातः ।

श्रीशङ्कराचार्यनवावतारं
विश्वेश्वरं विश्वगुरुं प्रणम्य ।
वेदान्तशास्त्रश्रवणालसानां
बोधाय कुर्वे कमपि प्रयत्नम्[1] ॥

इह खलु साक्षात्परम्परया वा सर्वानेव जीवान्समुद्दिधीर्षुर्भगवान् श्रीमच्छङ्करो[2]ऽनात्मभ्यो विवेकेनात्मानं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं संक्षेपेण बोधयितुं दशश्लोकीं प्रणिनाय ।

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीकृष्णाय नमः ॥

यद्बोधादिदं भाति शुक्तिकारजतं यथा ।
यद्बोधादस्तमायाति न चोदेति तदस्म्यहम् ॥ १ ॥
श्रीरामं मुहुरानम्य वक्ति श्रीपुरुषोत्तमः ।
सिद्धान्तबिन्दौ तत्त्वार्थसाधकं किमपि स्फुटम् ॥ २ ॥
परमेष्ठिगुरुं रामं श्रीपादं परमादरात् ।
नत्वा हरिहरानन्दं नमामि परमं गुरुम् ॥ ३ ॥
श्रीधरं श्रीगुरुं नत्वा नौमि श्रीपादमादरात् ।
विद्यागुरुं गुरुमिव सुराणां मधुसूदनम् ॥ ४ ॥

विघ्नविघातार्थं मङ्गलं कुर्वन्नारभ्यमाणग्रन्थस्य प्रयोजनमाह—**श्रीशङ्कराचार्येति** । विश्वेश्वरनामानं गुरुं प्रणम्येत्यन्वयः । तं किंभूतम् । विश्वगुरुं विश्वेषां हितोपदेष्टारम् । श्रीशब्दः उत्कर्षवाचकः । श्रीशङ्कराचार्याणां भाष्यकृतामभिनवावतारम् । यद्वा विश्वेश्वरं सगुणं ब्रह्म प्रणम्य । श्रीरित्युपलक्षणं वाणीभवान्योः । शं कल्याणं करोतीति व्युत्पत्त्या ब्रह्मा विष्णुः शम्भुश्च । आचार्या उपदेष्टारो व्यासवैयासिककपिलशङ्कराचार्यप्रभृतयः । अत एव नवीना उत्कृष्टा एते आधुनिकावतारा यस्य तम् । शेषं पूर्ववत् । प्रयोजनमाह—**वेदान्तेति** । **कमपि**, अनिर्वचनीयम् । ननु, कमपि प्रयत्नं कुर्वे इति प्रतिज्ञातं तस्य च विषयः स्वतन्त्रो ग्रन्थो वा कस्यचिद्व्याख्यानं तत्र द्वितीयमभि-

१. खपुस्तके प्रबन्धमिति पाठः । २. तस्मिन्नेव श्रीशङ्करः इति ।

प्रेत्याह—**इहेति** । **इह,** अद्वैतविचारे शारीरकविचारे वा । **खलु,** वाक्यालङ्कारे । असम्भावनाविपरीतभावनारहितामुत्तमाधिकारिणोऽभिप्रेत्याह—**साक्षादिति** । श्लोकोपदेशमात्रेण इत्यर्थः । असम्भावनाविपरीतभावनावतो मध्यमानधिकारिणो[1]ऽभिप्रेत्याह—**परम्परयेति** । शास्त्रजन्यज्ञानानन्तरं श्रवणद्वारेत्यर्थः । यद्वा स्वसन्निकृष्टा ये तान्साक्षात् अन्यांस्तु शिष्यादिद्वारा परम्परयेति । **अनात्मभ्य इति** । अनात्मभ्यो देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिप्राणाहङ्कारचित्तादिभ्यो विवेकेनात्मानं बोधयितुमित्यन्वयः । एतेनात्मनो ब्रह्माभेदो ध्वनितः । नहि ब्रह्मातिरिक्तः कश्चिन्मुक्तस्वभावोऽस्ति । **नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावेत्यनन्तरं** सत्यसूक्ष्मसद्विभु—अद्वितीय—परमानन्देति पूरणीयम् । तथाचोक्तं संक्षेपशारीरके (१—१७३):—

नित्यः शुद्धो बुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः सत्यः सूक्ष्मः सद्विभुश्चाद्वितीयः ।
आनन्दाब्धिर्यः परः सोऽहमस्मि प्रत्यग्धातुर्नात्र संशीतिरस्ति ॥

द्वन्द्वात्परो यः श्रूयते स प्रत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते इत्यनेन न्यायेन[2] नित्यस्वभावत्वशुद्धस्वभावत्वादिरित्यर्थः । अत्र च प्रमाणमुत्तरनृसिंहतापनीयनवमखण्डस्थवाक्यानि । तद्यथा—'एवमेवैषा माया सा व्यतिरिक्तानि क्षेत्राणि दर्शयित्वा जीवेशावाभासेन करोति, माया चाविद्या च स्वयमेव भवति, सैषा चित्रा सुदृढा बह्वङ्कुरा' इत्यादिकमुक्त्वा, 'तस्मादद्वय एवात्मा सन्मात्रो नित्यः शुद्धो बुद्धस्सत्यो मुक्तो निरञ्जनो विभुरद्वयानन्दः परः प्रत्यगेकरसः' इति । तथा तत्रैव 'सहोवाच तद्वा एतद्ब्रह्माद्वयं बृहत्त्वान्नित्यं शुद्धं मुक्तं सूक्ष्मं परिपूर्णमद्वयं सन्मात्रं चिन्मात्रमात्मैव व्यवहार्यम्' इति । **नित्यत्वं,** कालपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वम् । तच्च 'अज आत्मा महान्ध्रुवः,' 'अविनाशी अरेऽयमात्मा,' इत्यादिश्रुत्यर्थापत्तिप्रमितम् । **शुद्धत्वं,** अविद्यामलरहितत्वम् । तच्च, 'असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः' 'असङ्गमगुणमविक्रियम्' इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रमितम् । **बुद्धत्वं,** स्वप्रकाशानुभवस्वरूपत्वं, भावे क्तप्रत्ययात् । अत्र च प्रमाणं 'चेतनश्चेतनानाम्,' 'सत्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म,' 'अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः' इत्यादिश्रुतिः । **मुक्तत्वं,** प्रमातृत्वादिबन्धरहितत्वं परमानन्दस्वरूपत्वं वा । अत्र प्रमाणं, 'तद्ब्रह्माहमिति ज्ञात्वा सर्वबन्धैः प्रमुच्यते' । एवं च बन्धस्य काल्पनिकत्वेन मुक्तस्वभावत्वं[3] बोध्यम् । अन्यथा बन्धस्य सत्यत्वे ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं न स्यात् । नहि सत्यस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं दृष्टम्[4] । 'विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते' इति श्रुतेश्च । 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इत्यनेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वं च मुक्तत्वं च । **ब्रह्म च,** परमानन्दस्वरूपम् । तत्र प्रमाणं, 'एष एव परमानन्दः,' 'कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म,' 'आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति । आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति' इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः । **सत्यत्वं,** पारमार्थिकत्वम् । तच्चाबाध्यत्वं सूक्ष्म-

१. गपुस्तके अधमानधिकारिण इति । २. क१ पुस्तके सम्बध्यतेति न्यायेनेति । ३. तस्मिन्नेव मुक्तिस्वभावत्वमिति । ४. खपुस्तके ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं क्वचित् दृष्टमिति ।

त्वमिन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वं दुर्विज्ञेयत्वं वा । अत्र च प्रमाणान्तरं, 'नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मम्' इत्यादिश्रुतिः । **सद्भावरूपं,** 'सदेव सौम्य' इत्यादिश्रुतेः । **विभुत्वं,** सर्वगतत्वम् । तच्च देशपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यं वा । तत्र प्रमाणान्तरं, 'महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति' इति श्रुतिः । **अद्वितीयत्वं,** स्वसमानसत्ताकद्वितीयरहितत्वम् । तच्च स्वसमानसत्ताकभिन्नद्वितीयकत्वम् । स्वसमानसत्ताकप्रतियोगिसामान्यभेदरहितत्वमिति सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदशून्यत्वमिति वा । **आनन्दत्वं,** अपरिच्छिन्नसुखस्वरूपत्वमिति । नन्वत्रार्थे सन्ति बहवो निबन्धाः किमनेन इत्यत आह—**संक्षेपेणेति** ।

नन्विदङ्कारास्पदेभ्योऽनात्मभ्योविवेकेनाहङ्कारास्पदमात्मानं सर्वो लोकोऽहमस्मीति प्रत्येति दुःखं चानुभवति । तेन ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वान्निष्प्रयोजनकत्वाच्च आत्मतत्त्वप्रतिपादनं व्यर्थमिति चेत्, न, चिद्भास्यत्वेन लक्षणेन इदङ्कारास्पदानामपि देहेन्द्रियमनसां[1] प्रतिभासतोऽहङ्कारास्पदत्वेन तदविवेकात्, तेन विशुद्धेऽप्यात्मनि[2] दुःखित्वाद्यभिमानात् शास्त्रीयेणैवं[3] ब्रह्मैक्यज्ञानेन समूलस्य तस्य निवृत्तेः । तस्मादज्ञातज्ञापकत्वात्सप्रयोजनकत्वाच्चात्मतत्त्वप्रतिपादनं न व्यर्थम् ।

नन्वनात्मभ्यो घटपटादिभ्यो भिन्नत्वेनात्मनि ज्ञातेऽपि दुःखानुभवदर्शनान्नात्मज्ञानं दुःखनिवर्तकं ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वाच्च शास्त्रं न प्रमाणमित्याशङ्कते—**नन्विति** । **अथ इदङ्कारास्पदत्वं नाम,** इदमिति प्रतीतिविषयत्वम् । तच्चात्मन्यपि सत्त्वात् 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म,' 'अनेन जीवेन' इत्यादिना इदंत्वेनात्मनो बोधनात्तथा चानुपपन्नतरोऽयमनुभवः, नहि कश्चिदनात्मभ्यो भेदेनात्मानमनुभवति इत्यत आह—**अनात्मभ्य इति** । घटपटादिभ्य इत्यर्थः । एवं घटपटाद्यन्यतमत्वं जडत्वं वा इदंत्वं न पूर्वोक्तमत एवोपपन्नतमोक्तानुभव इति भावः । कियद्भ्यो भेदेन, आत्मनि गृहीतेऽपि अनात्मभ्यो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यः । भेदेनाग्रहणात् अनात्मसामान्येभ्यो भेदाग्रहात् । तादृशं ज्ञानं जातमपि न प्रयोजनक्षममिति परिहरति—**नेति** । वस्तुतः इदङ्कारास्पदानां देहेन्द्रियमनसां चिद्भास्यत्वलक्षणरूपेणासाधारणधर्मेणानात्मनामपि अहङ्कारास्पदत्वेनाहमितिप्रत्ययावलम्बनत्वेनात्मत्वेन प्रतिभासतो ज्ञातत्वादिति भावः । **तदविवेकादिति** । देहेन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्कारादिभ्यो भेदेनाग्रहादित्यर्थः । एवं च तद-

१. खपुस्तके देहेन्द्रियप्राणमनसामिति । २. खगयोस्ते च शुद्धेऽप्यात्मनीति । ३. कपुस्तके शास्त्राचार्येण च ब्रह्मात्मैकाज्ञानेन इत्यशुद्धः पाठो विद्यते । ४. क१ पुस्तके नकारोऽयं नास्ति तथापि स आवश्यक इति खगपुस्तकयोरुद्धृतः ।

विवेकादित्यन्तेनाशङ्कितानामात्मभेदग्रहः परास्तः । चिद्भास्यत्वमनात्मत्वसाधने हेतुः । अनात्मत्वेनाज्ञातत्वम्, आत्मत्वेन ज्ञातत्वं विवेकाग्रहे हेतुरिति मन्तव्यम् । एवं च देहेन्द्रियादय अनात्मानश्चिद्भास्यत्वात् । देहादय आत्मनो न गृहीतभेदकाः, अनात्मत्वेनाज्ञातत्वादात्मत्वेन ज्ञातत्वाद्वेति प्रयोगः । **चिद्भास्यत्वं** च, चैतन्यप्रकाश्यत्वम् । तत्र च प्रमाणं, 'तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' इत्याद्या श्रुतिः । आशङ्कितदुःखानुभवमपनुदति[1]—**तेनेति** । तेन, अविवेकेन, अगृहीतभेदेनेति यावत् । **अभिमानादिति** । आत्मनि दुःखभ्रममात्रं न तु दुःखमिति भावः । यदीदं ज्ञानं न प्रयोजनक्षमं तर्हि कीदृशमात्मतत्त्वज्ञानं प्रयोजनक्षमं तत्राह—**शास्त्रीयेणेति** । शास्त्रं च ।

'जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यादिप्रपञ्चं यत्प्रकाशते ।
तद्ब्रह्माहमस्मीति ज्ञात्वा सर्वबन्धैः प्रमुच्यते ॥' इत्यादि ।

एवं च शुद्धजीवब्रह्मणोरभेदावगाहिज्ञानं शास्त्रजन्यं तच्च बन्धनिवर्तकमिति फलितमुपसंहरति—**तस्मादिति** ।

तस्य चात्मतत्त्वस्य 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७), 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' (बृ. आ. १।४।१०), इत्यादिवेदान्तमहावाक्यमेव प्रमापकम् । वाक्यं च पदार्थज्ञानद्वारेणैव ज्ञापकमिति तत्त्वम्पदार्थयोः प्रकृतवाक्यानुकूलयोरन्यतोऽसिद्धत्वात् तावपि शास्त्रेणैव प्रमातव्यौ यूपाहवनीयपदार्थवत् । ततश्च 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन वा जातानि जीवन्ति' (तै. ३।१।१) इत्याद्याः सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतयस्तत्पदवाच्यार्थस्य समर्पिकाः, 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम्' (सैव. २।१) इत्याद्यास्तु लक्ष्यार्थस्य । एवं जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यादिश्रुतयः 'तद्यथा महामत्स्य उभे कूले अनुसञ्चरति'[2](बृ.आ.४।३।१८)इत्याद्यास्त्वम्पदवाच्यार्थस्य समर्पिकाः, 'योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः,' (बृ. आ.४।३।७) 'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः' (सैव. ३।४।२) इत्याद्यास्तु लक्ष्यार्थस्य । तेन प्रथममवान्तरवाक्येभ्योऽनुभूतयोः शुद्धजीवब्रह्मणोस्तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये मुख्यार्थान्वयानुपपत्तेर्लक्षणया स्मरणोपपत्तिः । सुषुप्तौ निर्विकल्पकसाक्षिचैतन्यानुभवाङ्गीकाराच्च अद्वितीयब्रह्मजिज्ञापयिषया प्रवृत्तानां सत्यज्ञानादिपदानामुपाधिविशिष्टचैतन्ये शक्तत्वेऽपि चैतन्यमात्रे तात्पर्येण तत्रैव तदंशे एव[3] संस्कारोद्बोधाच्च । इच्छन्ति हि आकाशादिपदादपि निर्विकल्पकं स्मरणं[4] तात्पर्याधीनत्वाच्छब्दवृत्तेः । एतेन प्रमितिप्रमात्रोर्महावाक्यार्थबोधे भानमपास्तम् । असम्प्रज्ञात-

१. क१ पुस्तके अनुवदतीति पाठः स न युक्त इति मन्ये । २. कपुस्तके तद्यथा महामत्स्य इत्याद्या इति पाठः । ३. तदंशे एव इत्येतत्पदद्वयं कपुस्तके नास्ति । ४. तस्मिन्नेव स्मरणमितिपदं नास्ति ।

समाधेः श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धत्वाच्च[1] । पारोक्ष्यसद्वितीयत्वाभ्यां च न तत्त्वम्पदार्थमात्रानुभवादेव कृतकृत्यता । वाच्यार्थस्य च भेदावभासान्न पौनरुक्त्यम् । लक्ष्यार्थस्य चैकत्वादखण्डार्थता । पदजन्यस्य च स्मरणस्य निर्विकल्पकवाक्यार्थानुकूलस्य निर्विकल्पकत्वमनुभववदेवाविरुद्धम्[2] । सविकल्पकवाक्यार्थबोधे च सविकल्पकपदार्थोपस्थितिरङ्गम् । प्रकृते च निर्विकल्पको वाक्यार्थबोधस्तस्यैव प्रमात्वेनाज्ञाननिवर्तनसामर्थ्यात्[3] । अतो न लक्ष्यतावच्छेकमन्तरेण लक्षणानुपपत्तिः । प्रकृतवाक्यार्थानुकूलपदार्थोपस्थितिरेव शक्तिलक्षणासाध्यत्वात् ।

शास्त्रमेवाह—**तस्य चेति । आत्मतत्त्वस्य,** जीवब्रह्मणोरभेदस्य । **एवकारेण** लौकिकप्रमाणव्यावृत्तिः कृता । नन्वेवमपि पदार्थबोधकाभावान्न वाक्यार्थबोध इत्याशङ्क्याह—**वाक्यं चेत्यादिना । असिद्धत्वात्,** अज्ञातत्वात् । नन्विदमदृष्टचरमेव कल्प्यते, न इत्याह—**यूपेति** । 'यूपे पशून्बध्नाति' इति श्रूयते, तत्रैव 'यूपं तक्षति,' 'यूपमष्टास्रिं करोति' इति च तेनाष्टास्रितक्षणविशिष्टखदिरादिकाष्ठविशेषो यूपपदवाच्य इति यथा वेदाच्छक्तिग्रहस्तथा तत्त्वम्पदार्थयोरपि वेदाच्छक्तिग्रह इत्यर्थः । **आहवनीयेति** । यद्यपि 'वसन्ते ब्राह्मणोऽग्नीनादधीत' इत्याद्युत्पत्तिविधिषु आहवनीयत्वादिरूपेणाग्नेराधानकर्मत्वं न श्रूयते तथापि तस्य स्वरूपेणाग्नित्वेन वा उत्पाद्यप्राप्यविकार्यकर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः आहवनीयादिशब्दार्थाज्ञानाच्चाधानकर्मविधिप्रवृत्तितः प्रागपूर्वसाधनत्वस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्तेन रूपेण व्रीह्यादिवत्संस्कार्यत्वानुपपत्तेः केन रूपेण कीदृशं कर्मेत्याद्यपेक्षायां 'नक्तं गार्हपत्यमादधाति दिवा आहवनीयं भूरिति गार्हपत्यमादधाति भुव इत्याहवनीयम्' इत्यादिगुणवाक्येषु[4] गार्हपत्याहवनीयरूपेणाग्न्याधानकर्मत्वावगमात्तद्रूपस्य चाधानात्प्रागसिद्धत्वात्तेन रूपेणोत्पाद्यकर्मत्वं प्रतीयते । आधानेनाग्नी गार्हपत्याहवनीयौ कुर्यादिति, खदिरादिकाष्ठं तक्षणादिभिः यूपं कुर्यादितिवत् । ततश्चाधानजन्योऽग्निगतोऽतिशय एवाहवनीयादिपदवाच्यो भवतीति । आदिपदग्राह्यं तु स्वर्गाद्यपि वेदबोधितशक्तिकम् । तथाहि वेदः—

'यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।
अभिलाषोपनीतं यत्तत्सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम् ॥' इत्यादि ॥

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१. खपुस्तके सिद्धत्वाच्चेति इति पाठः । २. गपुस्तके अनुभववदेव विरुद्धमिति । ३. कपुस्तके प्रमातृत्वेनाज्ञाननिवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादिति । ४. क१ पुस्तके कीदृशं कर्मेत्याद्यपेक्षायां गार्हपत्यमादधाति भुव इत्याहवनीयमित्यादिगुणवाक्येषु इति ।

तैत्तरीयकस्य तृतीयप्रपाठकवाक्यमुदाहरति—**यत इत्यादि** । **जीवन्तीत्यनन्तरं** 'यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म'इति श्रुतिशेषभागो बोध्यः । एवं च प्रयन्तीत्यंशेन ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वमपि ध्वनितम्, अन्यथा तत्र लयासम्भवात् । नहि कपालातिरिक्तोऽसमवायिकारणनाशजन्यो घटनाश इति कश्चिच्चेतनो ब्रवीतीत्यवधेयम् । पुनरपि तैत्तरीयश्रुतिमुदाहरति—**सत्यमित्यादि** । 'ब्रह्मैवेदं निहितं गुहायाम्' इति श्रुतिशेषः । **लक्ष्यस्य,** तत्पदलक्ष्यस्य । **एवमित्यस्य** समर्पिका इत्यनेनान्वयः । त्वंपदार्थवाच्यार्थसमर्पिकां बृहदारण्यकषष्ठाध्यायस्थज्योतिर्ब्राह्मणमध्यपातिश्रुतिमुदाहरति—**तद्यथा महामत्स्य इति** । अस्य शेषभागः 'उभे कूलेऽनुसञ्चरति पूर्वं चापरं चैवमेवायं पुरुष एतावुभावन्तावनुसञ्चरति स्वप्नान्तं बुद्धान्तं च' इति । ज्योतिर्ब्राह्मणस्थलक्ष्यार्थसमर्पकं वाक्यमुदाहरति—**योऽयमित्यादि हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुष इत्यनन्तरम्,** 'स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसञ्चरति ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव' इत्यन्तो द्रष्टव्यः । उषस्तब्राह्मणस्थवाक्यं लक्ष्यस्य समर्पकं पुनरुदाहरति—**न दृष्टेरिति** । 'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येर्न श्रुतेः श्रोतारं शृणुयान्न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीथा, एष त आत्मा, अतोऽन्यदार्तं' इत्यन्तं बोध्यम् । **लक्ष्यस्य,** त्वंपदलक्ष्यस्य । **मुख्यार्थेति** । एतेनान्वयानुपपत्त्या लक्षणा आद्रियते इति ध्वनितम् । यदि गौरनित्य इत्यत्रैवान्वयबोधः सम्भवति तदा तात्पर्यानुपपत्त्यैव लक्षणेत्यवधेयम् । विनापि लक्षणामनुभवप्रकारमाह—**सुषुप्ताविति** । एवं च लक्षणानादरणीयेति भावः । विशिष्टवाच्यार्थबोधादेव निर्विकल्पकं स्मरणमित्याशयेनाह—**अद्वितीयेति** । प्रमेयवद्रामजनकवृत्तिधर्मवदित्यादिना बोधितस्य दशरथस्य दशरथत्वान्यप्रमेयांशस्य दशरथत्वान्यरामजनकवृत्तित्वांशस्य च मोहात् दशरथत्वांशेऽन्यप्रकारकं दशरथज्ञानं यथा परे वदन्ति तथाऽत्रापीत्यर्थः । परसम्मतिमाह—**इच्छन्तीति** । उभयत्रापि साधकमाह—**तात्पर्येति** । त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्षवादिप्राभाकरमतमपनुदति—**एतेनेति** । तात्पर्यं आत्ममात्रे, अन्यथा 'तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय' इति श्रुतिविरोधः । नच तत्रापि तं विदित्वैव इत्येवकारभङ्गः कर्तव्यः, अन्यथा ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्यापि कर्मणो मोक्षजनकत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यं, 'नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय' इत्यनेनैव तद्व्यावृत्तेः । ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वेन नान्य इत्यंशवैयर्थ्यात्, 'न कर्मणा न प्रजया' इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधाच्च । न च शाब्दबोधे प्रमितिप्रमात्रोर्भानाभावेऽपि सर्वत्र भानाभावो न सिद्ध इति वाच्यं, नियमभङ्गेऽन्यत्र भानसाधकाभावादन्यत्र भानेऽपि क्षत्यभावाच्च । ननु शुद्धात्ममात्रविषयकपदार्थज्ञानादेव मोक्षोऽस्तु तत्राह—**पारोक्ष्येति** । ननु, तत्त्वंपदार्थयोः पौनरुक्त्यं यत् तद्वाच्यार्थयोर्लक्ष्यार्थयोर्वा । नाद्य इत्याह—**वाच्यार्थस्येति** । द्वितीयेऽप्येवं

क्रमेण वक्तव्यम् । तथाहि—घटं घटं[1] इत्यादौ उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोरुद्देश्यविधेययोर्वा ऐक्येन शाब्दबोधानुदयात् पदयोर्विरुद्धप्रकारकोपस्थितेः कारणत्वं वाच्यम् । तथाच निष्प्रकारकचैतन्यमात्रोपस्थापकयोस्तत्त्वंपदयोर्[2]गतं पौनरुक्त्यमिति । सोऽपि न निर्विकल्पकः, साधारणसमानप्रकारकोपस्थित्यभावस्यैव कारणत्वकल्पनेन सर्वसामञ्जस्यात् । एतेन तत्त्वंपदलक्ष्यार्थयोर्न पौनरुक्त्यं वाच्यार्थस्य भेदेनावभासमानत्वादित्युपालम्भः परास्तः । यदपि च वाक्यार्थे संसर्गाभावात्पदार्थबोधवाक्यार्थबोधयोरैक्यरूप्यमिति, तदपि न रमणीयम् । भूतले घटो न, घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र सप्तम्यर्थमतुबर्थसम्बन्धभूतलघटाभावरूपविषयैक्येऽपि विषयताभेदवत्पदार्थबोधापेक्षया वाक्यार्थबोधे जीवब्रह्मणोरभेदरूपस्य वैलक्षण्यभानात् । स चाभेदः स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः प्रतीतिविशेषसाक्षिकः । परे त्वयं घट इति शाब्दबोधे घटस्यैव विशेष्यत्वप्रकारत्वसांसर्गिकविषयत्ववदेकस्यैव चैतन्यस्य विशेष्यत्वप्रकारत्वाङ्गीकारेण सर्वसामञ्जस्यात् । विशेष्यत्वं प्रकारत्वं च स्वरूपमेव नातिरिक्तम् । नच विशेष्यत्वप्रकारत्वोक्तौ निर्विकल्पकत्वहानिरिति वाच्यम् । पारिभाषिकनिर्विकल्पकत्वहानावपि अखण्डार्थविषयकत्वाक्षतिरिति वदन्ति । वस्तुतस्तु पदार्थवाक्यार्थयोरैक्यरूप्येऽपि न क्षतिः, अपि ममानुकूल एव । उक्तं च सिद्धान्तभास्करादौ वाक्यार्थबोधस्येव पदार्थबोधस्याज्ञाननाशकत्वमित्युपरम्यते । तर्हि वाक्यार्थबोधस्य कथमखण्डार्थविषयकत्वमत आह—**लक्ष्यार्थस्य चेति** । ननु स्मरणस्य निर्विकल्पकत्वमदृष्टचरमत आह—**पदजन्येति । प्रमात्वेनेति** । निर्विकल्पकत्वस्य प्रमात्वं विशेष्यावृत्ति प्रकारकत्वं अबाधितार्थविषयकत्वं वेत्यन्यदेतत् । नन्वेवमपि निर्विकल्पकवाक्यार्थबोधो न संगच्छते लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यभाननियमादत आह—**अत इति** । यतो वाक्यार्थबोधो निर्विकल्पकः 'तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति' इति श्रुत्यादिसिद्धः, यतश्च निर्विकल्पकवाक्यार्थबोधे निर्विकल्पकपदार्थोपस्थितिरङ्गम्, अतोऽत्र न लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यभानमित्यर्थः । ये तु लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यभानमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति तेऽप्यतिप्रसङ्गभङ्गाय नानाधर्मवत् धर्मिस्थल एव न तु निर्धर्मकस्थले, तत्रातिप्रसङ्गाभावात् । लक्ष्यभेदेन लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकस्य नानात्वेनानुगतत्वात् । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकभिन्नप्रकारेणोप[3]स्थित्यभावस्य उभयसाधारणतयानुगतत्वाच्चेति दिक् ।

ननु तर्हि वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव पदार्थोपस्थितौ वाक्यार्थबोधे च सति तस्य स्वत एव प्रामाण्यात्तेनाज्ञानतत्कार्यनिवृत्त्युपपत्तौ किं विचारेणेति चेत्, सत्यम्, वेदान्ता यद्यपि स्वतःप्रामाण्यान्निर्विक-

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१. क१ पुस्तके घटं पटः इति पाठः । २. तस्मिन्नेव तत्त्वम्पदार्थयोरिति । ३. खपुस्तके लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारेण इति पाठः ।

रूपकमात्मसाक्षात्कारं जनयन्ति तथापि मन्दमतीनां वादिविप्रतिपत्तिजसंशयप्रतिबन्धेन तस्याज्ञाननाशकत्वासामर्थ्यात्, विचारेण तु संशयनिवृत्तौ निरपवादमज्ञाननिवृत्तिरिति संशयबीजभूतवादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणार्थं विचार आरभ्यते ।

इदानीं विचारमाक्षिपति—**नन्विति** । तथाच शास्त्रं नारम्भणीयमिति भावः । अहं ब्रह्म भवामि नवेत्यादिविषयसंशयाहितप्रामाण्यसंदेहेनाप्रामाण्याशङ्काऽनास्कन्दितनिश्चयाभावाद्वाक्यार्थबोधस्यना ज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वमित्याह—**सत्यमिति** । तत्र त्वंपदार्थ इति आचार्यैर्यद्यप्याहत्य भूम्यादीनामात्मत्वनिषेध एव कृतो न विप्रतिपत्तिः प्रदर्शिता तथापि विनाविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकरणेऽनुक्तोपालम्भः स्यात्तदर्थं निर्णयाक्षिप्ता विप्रतिपत्तिर्वक्तव्या, सैव प्रदर्शितेत्यवधेयम् ॥

प्रथमो विभागः ।

त्वंपदार्थनिर्णयः ।

तत्र त्वम्पदार्थे विप्रतिपत्तयः प्रथमं प्रदर्श्यन्ते । तत्पदार्थस्य शास्त्रतात्पर्यविषयतयाऽभ्यर्हितत्वेऽपि त्वम्पदार्थस्य शास्त्रफलमोक्षभागितया ततोऽप्यभ्यर्हितत्वात् ।

तत्र देहाकारपरिणतानि चत्वारि भूतान्येव त्वम्पदार्थ इति चार्वाकाः। चक्षुरादीनि प्रत्येकमित्यपरे। मिलितानीत्यन्ये। मन इत्येके। प्राण इत्यन्ये। क्षणिकं विज्ञानमिति सौगताः। शून्यमिति माध्यमिकाः। देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्तो देहपरिमाण इति दिगम्बराः। कर्ता भोक्ता जडो विभुरिति वैशेषिकतार्किकप्राभाकराः। जडो बोधात्मक इति भाट्टाः। भोक्तैव केवलबोधात्मक इति साङ्ख्याः पातञ्जलाश्च। अविद्यया कर्तृत्वादिभाक् परमार्थतो निर्धर्मकः परमानन्दबोधरूप एवेत्यौपनिषदाः। एवं सामान्यतोऽहम्प्रत्ययसिद्धचिदात्मनि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिभिः सन्दिग्धेऽहम्प्रत्ययस्यालम्बनविशेषनिर्णयायाह भगवानाचार्यः—

नन्वभ्यर्हिततत्पदार्थस्यैव प्रथमतो विप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनमुचितं न त्वंपदार्थस्य तत्राह—**तत्पदार्थस्येति** । **अपर इति** । त्वंपदार्थ इत्यनेनान्वयः । एवमुत्तरत्र । **जड इति** । स्वप्रकाशकभिन्न इत्यर्थः । **जडबोधात्मक इति** । मामहं न

जानामीति प्रतीतेः कर्तृकर्मविरोधात् । जडबोधात्मकमात्मानमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति भाट्टा इत्यर्थः ॥ इदानीं व्याख्येयग्रन्थस्यावतारिकामाह—**एवमिति** । कारिकास्थाहंप्रत्ययस्य व्याख्यानमाह—

न भूमिर्न तोयं न तेजो न वायु-
र्न खं नेन्द्रियं वा न तेषां समूहः ।
अनैकान्तिकत्वात्सुषुप्त्येकसिद्ध-
स्तदेकोऽवशिष्टश्शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥ १ ॥

अहम् अहम्प्रत्ययालम्बनम् । एकः अद्वितीयः । अवशिष्टः सर्वद्वैतबाधेऽप्यबाधितः । शिवः परमानन्दबोधरूपस्तस्यैव मङ्गलरूपत्वात्[1] । केवलो निर्धर्मकः । तेनाद्वितीयस्सर्वप्रमाणाबाध्यः परमानन्दबोध एवाहम्प्रत्ययावलम्बनमित्यौपनिषदपक्ष एव श्रेयानित्यर्थः । एतदुपपादनायेतरवादिमतानि निराकरिष्यन् प्रथमं देहात्मवादं निराकरोति न भूमिर्न तोयं न तेजो न वायुर्न खमिति । तत्राहमिति सर्वत्र प्रत्येकं नञा सम्बध्यते[2] । या भूमिः साऽहं न भवामि योऽहं स भूमिर्न भवतीति[3] च परस्परतादात्म्याभावो द्रष्टव्यः ।

अहम्प्रत्ययावलम्बनमिति । अहम्प्रत्ययविषय इत्यर्थः । पदार्थं व्याख्याय वाक्यार्थमाह—**तेनेति** । देहात्मवादस्यातितुच्छत्वादादौ तं निराकरोति—**प्रथममिति । परस्परेति** । उभयत्रैव एकस्तादात्म्याभावः शाब्दः, अपरस्तादात्म्याभाव आर्थ इत्यवधेयम् ।

यद्यपि वादिना प्रत्येकं भूम्यादेरात्मत्वं नाभ्युपेयते संघातस्यैव तदभ्युपगमात् तथापि तन्मते अवयव्यनङ्गीकारात्पञ्चमतत्त्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गेन च संयोगादिसम्बन्धानभ्युपगमात् संहन्तुरभावाच्च संघातो नोपपद्यत इत्यभिप्रेत्य प्रत्येकं भूतनिराकरणेन भौतिकदेहात्मवादो निराकृतः ।

भवतु संघात एवात्मा तत्राह—**तथापीति । संघातो**ऽवयवी संयुक्तद्रव्यं वा । तत्र नाद्य इत्याह—**अवयवीति** । नान्त्य इत्याह—**संयोगादिति** । तत्रैव हेतुमाह—**पंचमेति । संहन्तृ** संघातकर्तृ ।

१. गपुस्तके परमानन्दबोधस्सन्निति ।
२. कपुस्तके सर्वत्र प्रत्येकतया सम्बध्यत इति पाठस्तन्न युक्तः ।
३. खगपुस्तकयोर्या भूमिः सोऽहं न भवामि योऽहं सा भूमिर्न भवतीति ।

यद्यपि च भूतचतुष्टयतत्त्ववादिनो मते आवरणाभावत्वेनाभिमतस्य स्थिरस्यासत[1] आकाशस्य देहानुपादानत्वं, तथापि सिद्धान्ते तस्य भावत्वं देहोपादानत्वाद्यङ्गीकारात्[2], तत्राप्यात्मत्वप्रसक्त्या तन्निराकृतम्। अथवा न वायुरित्यन्तमेव देहात्मवादस्य निराकरणं न खमिति तु शून्यवादस्य, खशब्दस्य शून्यवाचकत्वात्।

देहानुपादानत्वे हेतुमाह—**असत इति**। असत्वे हेतुमाह—**स्थिरस्येति**। स्वसिद्धान्तसिद्धेऽपि तन्मते सिद्ध्यभावात्तन्निराकरणमनुचितमित्यत आह—**अथवेति**। **शून्यवादस्येति**। निराकरणमित्यनेनान्वयः। मिलितानामित्यादिपरिणतानामित्यस्य पूर्वेणान्वयः।

नेन्द्रियमिति प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वनिरासः। न तेषां समूह इति मिलितानां भूतानां देहावयव्याकारेण परिणतानामिन्द्रियाणां च मिलितानां निरासः। पूर्वं संघातमनभ्युपगम्य प्रत्येकं भूतानि निराकृतानि। अधुना तु संघातमभ्युपगम्यापि निराकृतानीति भेदः। भूतनिराकरणेन भौतिकयोः प्राणमनसोर्निरासः। मनोनिराकरणेन मनोवृत्तेः क्षणिकविज्ञानस्य देहातिरिक्तस्य कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिविशिष्टस्य च निरासः। सिद्धान्ते ज्ञानेच्छासुखादीनामन्तःकरणाश्रयत्वाभ्युपगमात्, कामसङ्कल्पादीन्प्रकृत्य[3] मन एवेति श्रुतेः। (बृ. आ. १।५।३)। तेन देहमारभ्य केवलभोक्तृपर्यन्तानां तत्तद्वाद्यभिमतानामनात्मत्वं प्रतिज्ञातं भवति। तत्र हेतुमाह—अनैकान्तिकत्वादिति। व्यभिचारित्वात् विनाशित्वादिति यावत्। आत्मनो देशकालापरिच्छिन्नत्वात्तत्परिच्छिन्नानां घटादिवदनात्मत्वात्, तद्ध्वंसप्रागभावयोश्च गृहीतुमशक्यत्वात्, अनात्मनां जडत्वात्, स्वभिन्नस्य चात्मत्वाभावात्, आत्मन एकत्वेऽपि सुखदुःखाद्याश्रयाणामन्तःकरणानां भेदाभ्युपगमाद्व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः, स्वेनैव स्वाभावग्रहणे विरोधात्, ग्राह्यकाले ग्राहकासत्त्वात् ग्राहकसत्त्वे ग्राह्याभावात्[4] कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसंगाच्च न तस्य ध्वंसप्रागभावौ। सद्रूपस्यात्मनः सर्वत्रानुगमाच्च

१. कपुस्तके आवरणाभावत्वेनाभिमतस्यास्थिरस्य सत इति।
२. खगपुस्तकयोर्भावत्वेन देहोपादानत्वाद्यङ्गीकारादिति।
३. कगयोर्कामादीन्प्रकृत्येति।
४. कपुस्तके ग्राह्यकाले ग्राहकासत्त्वात् ग्राह्यसत्वे ग्राहकाभावादिति पाठस्स स्पष्टमेव दोषवान्।

नात्यन्ताभावसंभवः। द्वैतस्य मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानसत्तादात्म्यापन्नतयैव सिद्धत्वात्[1], शुक्तिरजतादिवद्ध्यस्तत्वेन तत्तादात्म्यभावानुपपत्तिः। तेनात्माना भावप्रतियोगी। अभावप्रतियोगिनश्च देहेन्द्रियादयः। तेनामी नात्मानः। किं तु स्वप्रकाशबोधरूपे आत्मनि अद्वैतेऽप्यनाद्यनिर्वचनीयाऽविद्याकल्पिता अनिर्वचनीया एवेति सिद्धान्तरहस्यम्।

पौनरुक्त्यमाशङ्क्याह—**पूर्वमिति**। ननु पूर्वपक्षे आशङ्कितं प्राणमनसोरात्मत्वं किमिति न निराकृतं तत्राह—**भूतनिराकरणेनेति**। एवमप्याशङ्कितं सौगतमतं किमिति न निराकृतमत आह—**मनोनिराकरणेनेति**। क्षणिकविज्ञानस्येति वक्ष्यमाणनिरास इत्यनेनान्वयः। वैशेषिकमतं निराकरोति—**देहातिरिक्तस्येति**। कर्तृत्वादिविशिष्टं तु मन एवेत्याशयः। तर्हि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धानामहंकरोमीति प्रत्ययानां का गतिरत आह—**सिद्धान्त इति**। कर्तृत्वादीनां मनोधर्मत्वे प्रमाणमाह—**कामेति**। 'कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत् सर्वं मन एव' इति बृहदारण्यकश्रुतेरेतेषां मनोधर्मत्वम्। एवकारेण आत्मधर्मत्वं निराकृतम्। मन एवेत्यनेन कार्यकारणयोरभेदोऽपि ध्वनित इत्यवधेयम्। एनमर्थं भागवतस्मृतिरप्यनुवदति—

हर्षशोकभयक्रोधलोभमोहस्पृहादयः।
अहङ्कारस्य एवैते जन्म मृत्युश्च नात्मनः॥ इति॥

एवं मोक्षकाण्डकल्पतरुधृतब्रह्मपुराणवचनमप्यचेतनस्यैव कर्तृत्वादिकं बोधयति। **न चेतनस्येति**। तथाहि—

कुर्वन्त्यचेतनाः कर्म देहेन्द्रियगणाः सदा।
चेतनस्तदधिष्ठाता शान्तात्मा न करोत्यसौ॥ इति॥

तथाचाहङ्करोमीति प्रत्ययस्याहङ्कार एव विषयो नात्मा। एवं श्रुतिस्मृतिविरोधमङ्गीकृत्यापि अहङ्करोमीतिप्रत्ययबलात् आत्मनः कर्तृत्वादिकमङ्गीकुरुषे चेत्तर्हि अहं गौरः अहं स्थूलः अहं गच्छामीत्यादिप्रतीतिबलात् देहात्मवादोपि आस्थेय इत्यलं मृतमारणेनेति दिक्। ज्ञानादेर्मनोवृत्तित्वमुपपादयति **सिद्धान्त इत्यादिना श्रुतेरित्यन्तेनेति** परमार्थः॥ कर्तुर्भोक्तुरात्मत्वनिराकरणेन भट्टसाङ्ख्यपतञ्जलिमतमपि निराकृतम्। शून्यवादस्य न खमित्यनेन निराकरणमिति[2]। मध्यमपरिमाणस्य विनाशित्वेन

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१. कपुस्तके सिद्धत्वादिति पदं न वर्तते।
२. क१पुस्तके शून्यवादस्य......निराकरणमिति इत्येतद्वाक्यं नास्ति।

घटादिवदात्मभिन्नत्वमिति दिगम्बरमतमुपेक्षितम् ॥ आत्मनि हेत्वभावमाह—**आत्मन इति** ॥ तर्कमाह—**तत्परिच्छिन्नानामिति** । देशकालपरिच्छिन्नानामित्यर्थः । ग्राहकभावादपि न तस्य ध्वंसप्रागभावावङ्गीकरणीयावित्याह—**तद्ध्वंसेति** । आत्मध्वंसेत्यर्थः । नन्वनात्मा ग्राहकोऽस्तु तत्राह—**अनात्मनामिति । जडत्वात्**, ज्ञानभिन्नत्वात् ॥ एकात्मवादिमते कथमहं सुखी अहं दुःखीत्यादिप्रत्यय इत्यत आह—**आत्मन इति** । नन्वात्मैव स्वाभावं गृह्णातु तत्र आह—**स्वेनैवेति** ॥ विरोधं विवृणोति—**ग्राह्यकाल इति** ॥ आत्मनो विनाशित्वे प्रतिकूलतर्कं प्रदर्शयन्नुपसंहरति—**कृतहानीति** । आत्मनो नाशाङ्गीकारे अदत्तफलस्य सर्वस्य कर्मणो नाशः पुनरकस्मात् उत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारे तदुत्पत्तिमव्यवहिताभिमतोत्तरक्षणेऽनुभूयमानयोः सुखदुःखयोरनुपपत्त्याऽनेनात्मनाऽकृतस्य कर्मसम्बन्धोऽस्य वक्तव्यः ॥ तथा चेदं द्वयमनिष्टमित्यर्थः ॥ नास्ति कस्यापि तप्तशिलारोहणादिकर्मणां कृतानामावश्यकफलदातृत्वमिति नियम इति तन्मतेऽपि दोष इति बोध्यम् ॥ ननु माऽस्तु कालपरिच्छेदः देशपरिच्छेदस्तु केन वारणीय इत्यत आह—**सद्रूपस्येति** । सद्रूपस्यात्मनः सर्वत्र सम्बन्धत्वेन घटो नास्तीति प्रत्ययवत् सन्नास्तीति प्रत्ययाभावादिति भावः ॥ नन्वेवमन्योन्यभावनिरासात् तत्प्रतियोगित्वेनैव परिच्छिन्नत्वादविनाशित्वमित्यत आह—**द्वैतस्येति** । फलितमाह—**तेनात्मा नाभावप्रतियोगीति** ॥ अनात्मनामभावप्रतियोगित्वेन किं साधनीयं तत्राह—**अभावप्रतियोगिनश्चामीत्यादि सिद्धांतरहस्यमित्यंतेन** ॥

ननु, बोधरूप आत्मेति तवाभ्युपगमात्सुषुप्तौ च बोधाभावात् गाढं मूढोऽहमासं न किञ्चिद्वेदिषमिति सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शात्कथमव्यभिचारिता तस्येत्याशङ्क्याह–सुषुप्त्येकसिद्ध इति। अयमर्थः। आत्मनः सुषुप्तिसाक्षित्वान्न तत्र तदभावः, अन्यथा मूढोऽहमासमिति परामर्शानुपपत्तेः, मातृमानमितिमेयानां व्यभिचारित्वेऽपि तद्भावाभावसाक्षिणः कालत्रयेऽप्यव्यभिचारात् ।

अथ न प्रमातुः सर्वग्राहकस्य साक्षिग्राह्यत्वमित्याशङ्कते—**नन्विति** । तर्कं आह—**अन्यथेति** ।

ननु, प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता स एव कर्ता भोक्ता प्रदीपवत्स्वपरसाधारणसर्वभासकश्चेति न घटादिवत्साक्षिसापेक्ष इति चेत्, न, विकारित्वेन स्वविकारसाक्षित्वानुपपत्तेः दृश्यस्य द्रष्टृत्वानुपपत्तेः, प्रमातुश्च परिणामित्वेन दृश्यत्वात्, एकस्य कूटस्थस्यैव सर्वसाक्षित्वात् ।

विकारित्वेनेति । प्रमातुरिति शेषः ॥ हेतुमाह—**दृश्यस्येति** । आस्तामियं व्याप्तिः प्रमातुर्भासकत्वाभावे को भासकस्तत्राह—**एकस्येति** । न च साक्षिणः कथमव्यभिचारित्वं अविद्यावच्छिन्नत्वेन विनाशित्वादिति वाच्यम् । अविद्योपलक्षितस्य साक्षित्वात् । **कूटस्थः** अविकारि । एकरूपतया तु यः कालव्यापि स कूटस्थ इत्यमरः ॥

ननु, एकः कूटस्थो निर्धर्मकः साक्षी नाद्रियतेऽप्रामाणिकत्वादिति चेत्, न, 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' (श्वे. ६।१४, मुं. २।२।१०, क. २।५।१५), 'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः' (बृ. आ. ३।४।२) 'अदृष्टो द्रष्टा, नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' (सैव ३।७।२३) इत्यादि वदता वेदान्तप्रमाणराजेन तस्यैव सर्वसाक्षित्वेनाभिषिक्तत्वात् ।

वाचो भङ्ग्याह[1]—**एक इति** ॥ ग्रामे पञ्च त्रयोऽरण्ये नगरे सप्त साक्षिण इत्यादिस्मृत्या बहूनां साक्षीत्वप्रतिपादनात् ॥ कूटस्थ इत्यनेन कूटसाक्षिणो नादरणीयत्वमुक्तम् । अधार्मिकोऽपि न साक्षि स्मृतिनिषिद्धत्वादित्युक्तं निर्धर्मक इत्यनेन ॥ हेतुमाह—**अप्रामाणिकत्वादिति** ॥ श्वेताश्वतरषष्ठाध्यायस्य वाक्यमुदाहरति—**तमेवेति** ॥ एतस्य पूर्ववाक्यम्—'न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः' इत्यन्तम् । एतदानुपूर्वीवाक्यं[2] कठवल्ली द्वितीयाध्यायद्वितीयवल्ल्यामपि इति बोध्यं ॥ बृहदारण्यकस्थवाक्यमुदाहरति—'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येत्' इत्यादिना । राज्ञा यः साक्षी अङ्गीक्रियते स एवार्थसाधकः प्रामाणिकश्चेत्युक्तं **वेदान्तप्रमाणराजेनेत्यनेन** ॥

ननु, महदेतदिन्द्रजालं, प्रमाश्रयानकूटस्थान्विहाय कूटस्थमप्रमाश्रयमेव प्रमाणराजः सर्वसाक्षिणं करोतीति । बाढं, इन्द्रजालमेवैतत्स्वप्नवदविद्याविलसितत्वात्, तथापि दृश्यस्य घटादिवज्जडत्वेन कथं प्रमाश्रयत्वमिति चेत्, न, दर्पणादिवदतिस्वच्छत्वेन चिद्बिम्बग्राहकत्वा[3]च्चित्तादात्म्याध्यासाद्वा[4] ।

इन्द्रजालत्वे हेतुमाह—**अविद्याविलसितत्वादिति** । अविद्याविरचितत्वादित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तमाह—**स्वप्नवदिति** । दृश्यस्यान्तःकरणस्य चैतन्याश्रयत्वरूपं प्रमाश्रयत्वं कुत इत्याक्षिपति—**तथापीति** । **चिद्बिम्बग्राहकत्वादिति** । एवं च प्रतिबिम्बग्राहकत्वमेव चैतन्याश्रयत्वमिति भावः ॥

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१. क१पुस्तके वाचो भ्रान्तिमाहेति पाठः ।

२. एतदानुपूर्वकमिति खपुस्तके, एतदानुपूर्वीकमिति च गपुस्तके ।

३. कपुस्तके बिम्बग्राहकत्वादिति ।

४. तस्मिन्नेव चैतन्यतादात्म्याध्यासादिति ।

ननु, नीरूपस्य निरवयवस्यात्मनः कथं प्रतिबिम्ब इति चेत्, कात्रानुपपत्तिः, विभ्रमहेतूनां विचित्रत्वात्, जपाकुसुमरूपस्य नीरूपस्य निरवयवस्यापि स्फटिकादौ प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनाच्छब्दस्यापि प्रतिशब्दाख्यप्रतिबिम्बोपलम्भात्तयोः सम्प्रतिपन्नप्रतिबिम्बवैलक्षण्यानिरूपणात् ।

प्रतिबिम्बत्वमाक्षिपति—**नन्विति । नीरूपस्यापीति** ॥ अपिशब्दान्निरवयवस्यानुकर्षः ॥ ननु उभयत्रापि प्रतिबिम्बत्वमेव नास्ति तत्राह—**तयोः सम्प्रतिपन्नेति** ॥

तथापीन्द्रियग्राह्यस्यैव प्रतिबिम्ब इति चेत्, न, व्यभिचारात्, अनिन्द्रियग्राह्यसाक्षिप्रत्यक्षस्याप्याकाशस्यापि जलादौ प्रतिबिम्बोपलम्भात् । अन्यथा जानुमात्रेऽप्युदके अतिगम्भीर(ता)प्रतीतिर्न स्यात् । तर्हि अन्धस्य जले प्रतिबिम्बप्रतीतिः कुतो न जायते,[1] सालोकस्य साभ्रस्य प्रतिबिम्बतत्त्वात्तद्ग्रहणार्थं चक्षुषोऽपेक्षणात् । एतेन नीलं नभ इत्यादिविभ्रमेऽपि चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकौ व्याख्यातौ, तत्र सालोकस्याकाशस्याधिष्ठानत्वात् । तस्माचाक्षुषप्रतिबिम्बमेव रूपसापेक्षमित्यवधेयम् ।

प्रकारान्तरेण पुनराक्षिपति—**तथापीति ।** भाष्यकारमतमालम्ब्याह—**साक्षिप्रत्यक्षस्यापीति । अतिगम्भीरेति ।** अतिविशालस्याप्युपलक्षणमिति बोध्यं । ननु प्रतिबिम्बस्य साक्षिभाष्यत्वे अन्धस्य किमिति न प्रत्ययस्तत्राह—**प्रतिबिम्बस्येति** ॥ ननु तर्हि नीलं नभ इतिप्रत्यये तव मते कथं चक्षुरन्वयः इन्द्रियाग्राह्यस्याकाशस्याधिष्ठानत्वात् तत्राह[2]—**एतेनेति** ॥ ननु तत्रैवात्र नाधिष्ठानग्रहणार्थं चक्षुरपेक्षा इत्याशङ्क्य न केवलमाकाशमधिष्ठानं येन नापेक्षा स्याच्चक्षुषः किन्त्वालोकोऽपि, तथा चालोकांशे चक्षुषः अपेक्षणात् न त्वदुक्तदोष इत्याह—**सालोकेति** ॥ उपसंहरति—**तस्मादिति** ॥

तथाप्यात्मनः प्रतिबिम्बे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, शृणु—'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय' (बृ. आ. २।५।१९) 'मायाभासेन जीवेशौ करोति' (नृ. उ. ९), 'एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्' (ब्र. बिं. १२) इत्यादि श्रुतिः, 'स एष इह प्रविष्टः' (बृ. आ.

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१. क पुस्तके 'तर्हि......न जायते' इत्येतद्वाक्यं न दृश्यते तथापि तदस्मिन्प्रकरणे आवश्यकमिति खगपुस्तकयोर्गृहीतम् ।

२. खगपुस्तकयोः कथं चक्षुरन्वयस्तत्राह इति पाठः ।

१।४।७), 'स एतमेव सीमानं विदार्यैतयाद्वारा प्रापद्यत' (ऐ.१।३।१२), 'तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्' (तै. २।६।१) इत्यादि प्रवेशश्रुत्यन्यथानुपपत्तिः, 'आभास एव च' (ब्र. सू. २।३।५०), 'अतएव चोपमासूर्यकादिवत्' (तदेव. ३।२।१८) इत्यादि पारमर्षसूत्राणि च तत्र मानानि ।

बृहदारण्यकीयमधुब्राह्मणस्थं वाक्यमुदाहरति—**रूपं रूपं प्रतीति** ॥ 'तदेतत्' ऋषिः पश्यन्नवोचत्' इत्याद्यं मानमित्यनेन अन्वयः। 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयत' इत्यन्तं बोध्यम् । काठके द्वितीयवल्ल्यां

'अग्निर्यथैको भवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।
एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च' ॥ इति ॥

इत्याद्यपि बोध्यम् ॥ उत्तरनृसिंहतापनीयस्थं वाक्यमुदाहरति—**मायेति** ॥ मायाभासेन जीवेशावभिव्यनक्तीत्यर्थः ॥ तैत्तरीयक श्रुतिमुदाहरति—**स एतमेवेति** ॥ बृहदारण्यकश्रुतिमुदाहरति—**स एष इति । तत्सृष्ट्वेति** । आदिपदग्राह्या 'यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपोभिन्ना बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन् उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपो देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा' इत्यादिश्रुतिः । 'पुरश्चक्रे द्विपदः पुरश्चक्रे चतुष्पदः पुरः स पक्षी भूत्वा पुरः पुरुष आविशत्' इत्याद्यूह्यम् ॥ बादरायणीयद्वितीयाध्यायस्य तृतीयपादसूत्रसंमतिमाह—**आभास एवेति** । जलसूर्यकादिवदाभास एव जीवो न वस्त्वन्तरं परमात्मन इत्यर्थः । बादरायणीयतृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयपादसूत्रमुदाहरति—**अतएव चोपमासूर्यकादिवदिति** ॥ 'यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः रसघन एवं वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव' इत्यादिना यत ऐक्यरूप्यं प्रतिपादितं यतश्च 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' इत्यादिना रूपान्तरं प्रतिषिद्धम्, अतएवास्योपाधिनिमित्ताऽपारमार्थिकी विशेषवत्ता इत्यभिप्रेत्य जलसूर्यकादिवदित्युपमा उपादीयते मोक्षशास्त्रेषु । एवं च यथासूर्यादिप्रतिबिम्बं जलचलनेन चलति जलभेदेन भिद्यते तथा आत्माऽपि उपाधिधर्मेण धर्मवानिव भवति ॥ उपाधिभेदेन भिन्न इव भवति । वस्तुतो निर्धर्मको निर्भेदोऽद्वितीयः । उक्तं च भागवते—

यथा जले चन्द्रमसः कम्पादिस्तत्कृतो गुणः ।
दृश्यतेऽसन्नपि द्रष्टुरात्मनोऽनात्मनो गुणः ॥ इति ॥

यथा जलसूर्यकः सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बः । आदिशब्देन चन्द्रप्रतिबिम्बादिग्रहणम् ॥ तथाचामृतबिन्दूपनिषत्—

'एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्' ॥ इत्यादि ॥

तथाच याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृतिरपि—

आकाशमेकं हि यथा घटादिषु पृथग्भवेत् ।
तथात्मैको ह्यनेकश्च जलधारास्विवांशुमान् ॥ इति ॥

तस्य च प्रतिबिम्बस्य सत्यमेवेति प्रतिबिम्बवादिनः, मिथ्यात्वमेवेत्याभासवादिनः । स्वरूपे तु न विवाद एवेत्यन्यदेतत् । अचेतनविलक्षणत्वन्तु तस्य श्रुतिसिद्धमनुभवसिद्धं च । तस्मात्सिद्धमन्तःकरणस्य प्रतिबिम्बाध्यासद्वारा प्रमातृत्वम् ।

नन्वयं दृष्टान्तिभूतः प्रतिबिम्बः सत्योऽसत्यो वा तत्राह—**तस्य चेति** ॥ तर्हि प्रतिबिम्बस्य चेतनत्वमापतितं तत्राह—**अचेतनविलक्षणत्वमिति** । दर्पणादिवदित्यादिना यच्चित्प्रतिबिम्बग्राहकत्वेन प्रमाश्रयत्वमुक्तमन्तःकरणस्य तदुपसंहरति—**तस्मादिति** ।

ननु, अध्यासोऽपि नोपपद्यते । तथाहि—आत्मनि वा अनात्माध्यस्यते अनात्मन्यात्मा वा । नाद्यः, तस्य निःसामान्यविशेषवत्वेन सर्वदाभासमानत्वेन सादृश्यादिरहितत्वेन चाधिष्ठानत्वासम्भवात् । नापि द्वितीयः, तस्य मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात् । मिथ्यावस्तुनोऽधिष्ठानत्वे शून्यवादप्रसङ्गात् । तस्य च सत्यत्वे तदनिवृत्तेरनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गाच्च । न हि सत्यं क्वचिन्निवर्तते, निवर्तमानं वा भ्रमज्ञानेन । श्रुतयश्च 'भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः । क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे' (मुं. २।२।८), 'तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यते अयनाय' (श्वे. ३।८), 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' (छां. ७।१।३) इत्याद्याः ज्ञानात्सर्वसंसारनिवृत्तिं दर्शयन्त्यः तस्य मिथ्यात्वं सूचयन्ति । 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छां. ६।२।१), 'अतोऽन्यदार्तम्' (बृ. आ. ३।४।२), 'नेह नानास्ति किंचन' (सैव. ४।४।१९), 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' (सैव. २।३।६) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः साक्षादेव मिथ्यात्वं प्रतिपादयन्ति । दृश्यत्वेन शुक्तिरजतवन्मिथ्यात्वानुमानाच्च । आत्मन्यध्यस्ततयैव चानात्मनि सिद्धे तत्रात्माध्यासः । अनात्माध्यासेन चात्मनो दोषसादृश्यादिसम्भवात् तत्र चानात्माध्यास इत्यात्माश्रयादिदोषप्रसङ्गाच्च । एतेनात्मानात्मा-

१. कपुस्तके आभासभासवादिन इति ।
२. खपुस्तके निवर्तमानं वा न ज्ञानेन इति, गपुस्तके च निवर्तमानं वा ज्ञानेन इति ।

ध्यासस्याविद्याकल्पितत्वान्न विकल्पावसर इत्यपास्तम्, स्वप्रकाशात्मनि अविद्याया अप्यनुपपत्तेः। तथाहि साऽपि अध्यस्ताऽनध्यस्ता वा। तत्र आद्ये कथं नात्माश्रयादिदोषप्रसङ्गः। अन्त्ये तस्या अनुच्छेदादनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः। सर्वस्याध्यासमूलत्वे च भ्रमप्रमादिव्यवस्था न स्यात्। एकस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमितिप्रमातृरूपता च विरुद्धा, अविरोधाभ्युपगमे वा सौगतमतोपपत्तिरिति।

नतु दृष्टं हि लोके सामान्यरूपेण ज्ञातं विशेषरूपेणाज्ञातमधिष्ठानम्, ब्रह्म च तद्विपरीतं, तथा च कारणाभावान्नाध्यास इत्याक्षिपति—**नन्विति। तस्येति।** द्वयेति शेषः[1]। **निःसामान्यविशेषत्वेनेति।** निर्गतौ सामान्यविशेषरूपौ धर्मौ यस्मात्तेन इदन्त्वशुक्तित्वादिवत् सामान्यविशेषधर्मरहितत्वाद्ब्रह्म नाधिष्ठानमित्यर्थः। भवतु मिथ्यात्वं किं तेन तत्राह—**मिथ्यावस्तुन इति।** एतदनुपपत्त्या चेत् सत्यत्वमास्थीयते तर्हि अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्ग इत्याह—**तस्य च सत्यत्व इति।** आत्मवदिति शेषः। को वा ब्रवीति ज्ञानेन निवर्तते तत्राह—**श्रुतिश्चेति। तस्येति।** स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वादिकं यदा मिथ्यात्वं तदा[2] सूचनं, यदा तु ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं मिथ्यात्वं तदा साक्षान्मिथ्यात्वबोधनमित्यवधेयम्। एवमपि प्रपञ्चमात्रस्य मिथ्यात्वं नागतम्[3] किन्तु हृदयग्रन्थ्यादाविति[4] हृदये निधाय सत्यभिन्नत्वं मिथ्यात्वम्। सत्यत्वं च श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयीभूतत्वमित्याशयेनाह—**एकेति।** एवं चागतं प्रपञ्चमात्रस्य मिथ्यात्वमित्यवधेयम्। इदं तु वाक्यं छान्दोग्यस्थम्। आर्तिर्विनाशः। इदं च पूर्वमीमांसायां सुप्रसिद्धम्। विवेचितं चास्माभिः सिद्धान्तभास्करे। विनाशप्रतियोगित्वं मिथ्यात्वमित्याशयेनाह—**अतोऽन्यदिति।** इदं तु वाक्यं बृहदारण्यकस्थम्। प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ निषेधप्रतियोगित्वं बाध्यत्वं वा मिथ्यात्वमभिप्रेत्याह—**नेहेति।** मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यमित्यादि। इह नाना ब्रह्मभिन्नं किमपि नास्तीत्यर्थः। बाध्यत्वं मिथ्यात्वं स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं वा इत्याशयेनाह—**अथात इति।** बाध्यत्वं च न इदमिह नास्तीति प्रमाविषयत्वं, कस्यचित् कचिन्निषेधस्य प्रमितत्वेन सिद्धसाधनात् श्रुतेरनुवादकत्वापत्तेश्च, किन्तु कालिकविशेषणताविशेषेण इदमिदानीं नास्तीति प्रमाविषयत्वम्। तस्य चाज्ञातत्वेन न श्रुतेरनुवादकत्वम्। न च कालिकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोगित्वमतेनैव सम्बन्धेन कथं तदभाव इति वाच्यम्।

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१. क१ पुस्तके अत्रद्वयेति शेष इति।
२. तस्मिन्नेव यदा मिथ्यात्वसूचनमिति।
३. खगपुस्तकयोर्मिथ्यात्वमित्यवधेयमिति।
४. खपुस्तके हृदयग्रन्थ्यादेरेवेति।

अभावस्य दैशिकविशेषणता[1]विशेषेण वृत्तेरङ्गीकारेण एकसम्बन्धावस्थितत्वाभावात्[2] । ईश्वरस्यैव कालत्वात् समानसत्ताकत्वाभावेन विरोधाभावाच्च समानसत्ताकयोरेव विरोधात् । ईश्वररूपकालवृत्तिरभावस्तु पारमार्थिकः, प्रतियोगी च व्यावहारिकः । यद्यपि सूर्यक्रियारूपकालोपाधिवृत्तित्वे[3]नाभावस्यापि न पारमार्थिकत्वं तथापि उपाध्यवच्छिन्नेश्वरस्यैव कालोपाधित्वेनाभावस्य पारमार्थिकत्वात्, वस्तुतस्तु प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ नास्तीति प्रतीतिविषयत्वं प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ[4] प्रतियोगिकालातिरिक्तकाले नास्तीतिप्रतीतिविषयत्वं बाध्यत्वमिति दिक् । नापि द्वितीय इत्यत्र हेत्वन्तरमाह—**आत्माध्यस्ततयैवेति** । यदि चात्माध्यस्ततयैवानात्मसिद्धौ(?द्धिः) तत्रात्माध्यासः, अनात्माध्यासेन चात्मनो दोषादिसंभवात्तत्र चानात्माध्यास इति व्याकुरुषे तदात्माश्रयान्योन्याश्रयादिदोष इत्यर्थः । **प्रसङ्गाच्च** इत्यत्र चकारस्तु मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमादित्याद्यपेक्षया बोध्यः । **स्वप्रकाशात्मनीति** । आच्छादिकाया इति शेषः । नहि सूर्येऽन्धकारोऽस्तीति कश्चिद्वदतीति भावः । पूर्वोक्तमात्माश्रयादिदोषमप्यापादयति—**कथं नात्माश्रयादीति । अन्त्य इति ।** अनध्यस्तस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाभावश्चेत्यपि बोध्यम् । **सर्वस्येति** । बाधितविषयकत्वं भ्रमत्वं, अबाधितविषयकत्वं च प्रमात्वमिति व्यवस्था न स्यादित्यर्थः । **सौगतेति** । यथा विज्ञानवादिनां सर्वं विज्ञानात्मकं न तदतिरिक्तोऽर्थोऽस्ति तथा त्वन्मतेऽपीत्यर्थः ।

अत्रोच्यते—अहं मनुष्यः कर्ता भोक्तेत्यादिप्रतीतिस्तावत्सर्वजनसिद्धा । सा च न स्मृतिरपरोक्षावभासत्वाद्भेदाग्रहपूर्वकत्वाच्च । नापि प्रमा श्रुतियुक्तिबाधितत्वात् । तथा च श्रुतयः—'योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः' (बृ. आ. ४।३।७), 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (सैव. २।५।१९), 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१), 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ. आ. ३।९।२८), 'य आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा' (छां. ८।७।१), 'यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः' (बृ. आ. ३।४।१), 'योऽशनायापिपासे शोकं मोहं जरां मृत्युमत्येति' (सैव. ३।५।१), 'स यत्तत्र किञ्चित्पश्यति अनन्वागतस्तेन भवति असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः' (सैव. ४।३।१५) इत्याद्या अकर्तृभोक्तृपरमानन्दरूपतामात्मनो दर्शयन्ति । युक्तयश्च—विकारिणः परिच्छिन्नत्वेन अनात्मत्वापत्तेः, स्वेनैव स्वस्य ग्रहणे कर्तृकर्मविरोधात् दृग्दृश्ययोश्च

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१. खपुस्तके विशेषता इति ।
२. खगयोरवच्छिन्नत्वाभावादिति ।
३. क१ पुस्तके कालोपाधिवृत्तत्वेनेति ।
४. क१खपुस्तकयोः प्रतिपन्नोपाधीति ।

सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः, भेदेनाभेदेन वा धर्मधर्मिभावानुपपत्तेश्च। ज्ञानानित्यत्वपक्षे तत्तद्व्यक्तिभेदध्वंसप्रागभावसमवायज्ञानत्वजात्याद्यभ्युपगमे गौरवात्, एकत्वाभ्युपगमे चातिलाघवात्, घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमित्युपाधिभेदपुरस्कारेणैव ज्ञानभेदप्रतीतेः। स्वतस्तु ज्ञानं ज्ञानमिति एकस्वरूपावगमात्, तदुत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतीत्योश्चावश्यकल्प्यविषयसम्बन्धविषयतयाप्युपपत्तेः, उपाधिपरामर्शमन्तरेण स्वत एव घटाद्धटान्तरस्य भेदप्रतीतेः तत्प्रतिबन्दीग्रहासम्भवात् आकाशकालदिशामपि नानात्वापत्तेश्च। कर्तृत्वादेर्वास्तवत्वेऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात्। स्वप्रकाशानभ्युपगमे च जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात्, परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन च तस्यानन्दरूपत्वात्, निर्धर्मकनित्यस्वप्रकाशसुखात्मक एवात्मा इत्यादयः।

नन्वध्यासोपीत्यादिना पूर्वपक्षिणाऽऽक्षिप्तेऽध्यासे सिद्धान्ती समाधत्ते—**अत्रोच्यत इति। भेदाग्रहपूर्वकत्वाच्चेति।** नहि स्मृतौ भेदाग्रहः किन्तु विशिष्टानुभवे, तथाच अपरोक्षानुभव एवेति। अहं मनुष्य इत्यादिप्रत्ययस्य मनुष्यत्वादिबाधिकां बृहदारण्यकादिश्रुतिमाह—**योऽयं विज्ञानमय इत्यादि।** एतत्सर्वस्य पूर्वं कतम आत्मेति बोध्यम्। इयं श्रुतिस्तु ज्योतिर्ब्राह्मणस्था। **अयमात्मा ब्रह्म,** इति श्रुतिस्तु मधुब्राह्मणस्था अपूर्वमनपरमबाह्यमित्याद्या। **विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म,** इति श्रुतिस्तु शाकल्यब्राह्मणस्था। **रातेर्दातुः परायणम्** (?) इत्यन्तां तैत्तिरीयकश्रुतिमाह—**सत्यमिति।** छान्दोग्यश्रुतिमाह—**य आत्मेति।** विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपास इत्यन्तां उषस्तब्राह्मणस्थामाह—**यत्साक्षादिति।** कर्तृत्वादिबाधिकां कहोलब्राह्मणस्थां श्रुतिमाह—**योऽशनायापिपासे,** इत्यादि। ज्योतिर्ब्राह्मणस्थं वाक्यमाह—**स यत्तत्रेति। अनन्वागतो**ऽननुषक्तः। अहं मनुष्यः कर्तेत्यादिप्रत्ययस्य बाधिकां श्रुतिमुपन्यस्य युक्तिमाह—**युक्तयश्चेति।** सुखात्मक एवात्मेत्यादय इत्यनेनान्वयः। आत्मनः कर्तृत्वादिरूपविकारसत्त्वेन परिच्छिन्नत्वं प्रसाध्यते। नानात्वं साधयति—**विकारिण इति।** इदं तु पूर्वमप्युक्तमभावप्रतियोगिनश्चामीत्यादिना। आत्मनो ज्ञानरूपविकाराङ्गीकारे दूषणमाह—**स्वेनैवेति।** मामहं न जानामीति प्रत्यये एकस्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वं कर्मत्वं च वक्तव्यं तच्च विरुद्धम्। विरोधमेव प्रदर्शयति-(**कर्तृकर्मविरोधादिति।**) तत्र च केचन स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता स्वातन्त्र्यं च तदितरकारकाप्रयोज्यत्वे सति सकलकारकप्रयोक्तृत्वम्, एवं च एकस्यैव कर्तृत्वेन इतरकारकाप्रयोज्यत्वं कर्मत्वेन इतरकारकप्रयोज्यत्वरूपं विरोधमिति वदन्ति। अन्ये तु कर्तुरीप्सिततमत्वेन प्रधानत्वं, क्रियानिष्पादकत्वेन गुण-

त्वम् । तथा च एकस्यैव गुणत्वप्रधानत्वरूपं विरोधं वर्णयन्ति । अपरे तु पाणिनीय-प्रथमाध्यायचतुर्थपादे 'आ कडारादेका संज्ञा' इति प्रथमसूत्रे 'कडाराः कर्मधारय' इत्यतः पूर्वं एका संज्ञा विहिता, एवं च एकसंज्ञाधिकारे एकस्य[1] कथं कर्तृसंज्ञा कर्मसंज्ञा इत्युभयसंज्ञाविधानमिति विरोधमुद्भावयन्ति—**दृग्दृश्यसम्बन्धानुपपत्तेरिति ।** नन्वज्ञानं विषयासम्बन्धमेव प्रकाशकं सर्वेषां जीवानां सार्वज्ञप्रसङ्गात् । नापि सम्बद्धमात्मस्वरूपस्य तद्गुणस्य ज्ञानस्य वा विषयेण सह संयोगसमवायरूपसम्बन्धान्यतराभावात्, ज्ञानेऽध्यस्तो विषय इत्याध्यासिकसम्बन्धानङ्गीकारेऽन्यस्य साक्षाद्विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनकस्य सम्बन्धस्याभावात् । न च विषयविषयिभावरूपोऽस्तु स इति वाच्यम्; तस्य विषयत्वविषयित्वरूपत्वादेकमात्रनिष्ठत्वेन सम्बन्धस्य उभयमात्रनिष्ठतया विशिष्टप्रत्ययजनकत्वक्षतेश्च तस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात् । तथाहि तस्यातिरिक्तत्वेऽपसिद्धान्तात् । अनतिरिक्तत्वे[3] किं ज्ञानजन्यफलाधारकत्वं[4] किंवा ज्ञानजन्यहानादिबुद्धिगोचरत्वम् । तत्र न आद्यः, ज्ञाततारूपतत्फलस्यानङ्गीकारात् अतीतादावभावाच्च । नापि द्वितीयः, गगनादौ तदभावात् महारजतमलादेरपि तज्ज्ञानविषयत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । एवमन्यदपि बहुविधमाशङ्क्य निराकृतमद्वैतसिद्धौ गुरुचरणैः । तदपि च विवेचितं मया मत्कृतसिद्धिसाधके । नापि ज्ञानविषययोर्विषयिविषयत्वं स्वरूपसम्बन्धस्यासिद्धेः[5] । तथाहि स्वरूपसम्बन्ध इत्यस्य स्वरूपं सम्बन्ध इत्यर्थे संयोगसमवाययोरतिव्याप्तिस्तयोरपि स्वरूपत्वात् । न च संयोगसमवायान्यस्वरूपत्वं, हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरपि स्वरूपसम्बन्धापत्तेः । अथ सम्बन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं स्वरूपसम्बन्ध इति चेत्, न, आत्मानं जानामीत्यत्राव्याप्तेः, तत्र सम्बन्धान्तरस्य समवायस्यैव सत्त्वात्, अतीन्द्रिये आकाशादावव्याप्तेश्च । न हि तस्य विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वे मानमस्ति । अन्यथा तेन[6] विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननापत्तेः । किंच विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं धर्मो वा सम्बन्धस्तादृशस्वरूपद्वयमेव वा । आद्ये स्वरूपस्य सम्बन्धत्वव्याघातः प्रतीतिघटितस्य चाक्षुषादिज्ञानगोचरत्वप्रसङ्गश्च । न द्वितीयः अननुगमात् । किंच स्वरूपस्य सम्बन्धत्वे घटाभावप्रमाद्यनुपपत्तिः[7] । अभावभ्रमस्थले[8] घटतदभावयोरन्यतरस्य स्वरूप-

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१. गपुस्तके एवं च एकस्य कथमिति ।
२. खगपुस्तकयोर्विषयत्व इति ।
३. तयोरेवानतिरिक्तत्वेऽपीति ।
४. क१ पुस्तके फलाधायकत्वमिति पाठः स न युक्तः ।
५. तस्मिन्नेव स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषासिद्धेरिति ।
६. खगयोरन्यथा तेनेति पाठस्सोऽनुपपन्नः ।
७. खपुस्तके घटाभावभ्रमाद्यनुपपत्तिरिति ।
८. खगयोरभावभ्रमस्थलेऽपीति पाठः ।

सम्बन्धस्य सत्त्वेन विशिष्टप्रमासम्भवात् । न च सम्बन्धान्तरमन्तरेण[1] विशिष्टप्रमाजननयोग्यत्वं वक्तव्यम् । वास्तवसम्बन्धसत्त्वेन विशिष्टप्रमात्वस्याप्यापाद्यत्वात्[2] । अन्यथा तत्र तस्याप्रमात्वे सम्बन्धाभावः, सम्बन्धाभावे च तस्याप्रमात्वं इत्यन्योन्याश्रयात् । किंच ज्ञानस्याभावः ज्ञातोऽभावः इति प्रतीत्योर्वैलक्षण्यं[3] न स्यात् । ज्ञानाभावयोरेवोभयत्र स्वरूपसम्बन्धत्वे विषयकृतविशेषाभावात् । तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तं अध्यासं विना दृग्दृश्यसम्बन्धानुपपत्तेरिति दिक् । **भेदेनेति** । अत्यन्तभेदे गौरश्व इत्यादौ धर्मधर्मिभावानुपपत्तिः । एवमत्यन्ताभेदेऽपि घटस्य धर्मधर्मिभाव इत्यर्थः । अहं मनुष्यः कर्तेत्यादिप्रतीतिबाधिकां युक्तिमुपन्यस्य ज्ञाननित्यत्वसाधनोपयोगितया ज्ञानानित्यत्वं दूषयति—**ज्ञानानित्यत्वपक्ष इति** । ननु ज्ञानानित्यत्वपक्षे एकपुरुषीयज्ञानेऽपि निर्वाहो नास्तीति एकस्मिन्नष्टेऽन्येषामनुत्पादात्[4] किमुत बहुपुरुषीयज्ञाने इत्याशयेनाह—**तत्तद्व्यक्तिभेदेति** । ज्ञाननित्यत्वपक्षे उक्तदोषाभाव इत्याह—**एकत्वाभ्युपगमे इति** । ज्ञानैक्यपक्षे अस्माज्ज्ञानादिदं ज्ञानं भिन्नमित्यत्र का गतिरित्यत आह—**घटज्ञानमिति** । अत्र चैतद्भेदत्वं[5] घटविषयत्वादिकमेवेति न उक्तदोष इति भावः । नन्वेवमपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तिविनाशयोः का गतिरित्यत आह—**तदुत्पत्तीति** । ककारो नष्ट इति प्रत्ययस्य यथा वायुसंयोगनाशविषयकत्वं, यथा वा स्वर्गी नष्ट[6] इति प्रत्ययस्य स्वर्गसम्बन्धनाशविषयकत्वं,[7] यथा वा दण्डपुरुषोभयसत्त्वे दण्डी नष्ट इति प्रत्ययस्य एतदुभयसंयोगध्वंसविषयकत्वं, यथा वा अहं विद्वान् जातः, घटाकाश उत्पन्नः, कूपाकाश उत्पन्नः, घटाकाशो नष्टः, कूपाकाशो नष्ट इति प्रत्ययस्य न आत्माकाशादिविषयकत्वं अपि तु विद्याघटादिविषयकत्वं, तथा ज्ञानं नष्टमिति प्रत्ययस्य न ज्ञानविषयत्वं किन्तु तदुभययोः सम्बन्धविषयकत्वमित्यर्थः । अन्यविषयकप्रत्ययस्यान्यविषयकत्वं सर्ववादिसिद्धं, तच्चाधस्तात् प्रदर्शितम् । न च घटाकारावृत्तिरेव ज्ञानं तस्य विनाशित्वेन[8] कथं तदपलाप इति वाच्यं, विषयात्मरूपज्ञानयोः सम्बन्धरूपा वृत्तिर्न तु ज्ञानं, ज्ञानस्य नित्यस्वरूपत्वसुखस्वरूपत्वादिकं तु

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१. सम्बन्धान्तरेण इति गपुस्तके ।

२. क१ पुस्तके विशिष्टप्रमासंभवादिति ।

३. खपुस्तके कुतोऽभाव इत्यभाव इति पाठः स न युक्तः । गपुस्तके ज्ञानस्याभावः प्रतीत्योर्वैलक्ष्ण्यमिति स नार्थबोधकः ।

४. खगयोरन्येषामुत्पादादिति पाठस्सोऽनुपपन्नः ।

५. क१ खयोरत्र चैतन्यत्वमिति ।

६. गपुस्तके स्वर्गो नष्ट इति ।

७. क१ पुस्तके स्वर्गविषयकत्वमिति ।

८. गपुस्तके विनाशित्वे चेति ।

तद्विरुद्धं नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेत्यादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धं गुरुचरणप्रदर्शितयुक्तिविरुद्धं च। न च तवापि शास्त्रे वृत्तौ ज्ञानपदप्रयोगो दृश्यत इति वाच्यं, वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्ये ज्ञानपदप्रयोगात् न तु केवलवृत्तौ, असम्बद्धस्य भासकत्वे तवातिप्रसङ्गवत् ममाप्यतिप्रसङ्गात्। एवं ज्ञानविषययोः सम्बन्धो वक्तव्यः। स चास्मन्मते वृत्तिः, परेषां तु पदार्थान्तरम्। उक्तं च नव्यैरपि विषयत्वाद्योऽप्यतिरिक्ता एव पदार्था इति दिक्। तर्हि घटादेरपि भेदो न स्यात् तत्राह—**उपाधीति**। यद्यौपाधिकभेदेन वस्तुभेदः साध्यते तर्ह्यतिप्रसङ्ग इत्याह—**आकाशेति**। अहं मनुष्यः कर्तेत्यत्र यदि कर्तृत्वं वास्तवं तत्र दूषणमाह—**कर्तृत्वादेरिति**। तदुक्तं वार्तिककारपादैः—

'आत्मा कर्त्रादिरूपश्चेन्माकाङ्क्षीस्तर्हि मुक्तताम्।
नहि स्वभावो भावानां व्यावर्तेतौष्ण्यवद्रवेः' ॥ इति ॥

'हर्षशोकभयक्रोध'इत्यादिना 'कुर्वन्त्यचेतनाः कर्म' इत्यादिना चात्मनः कर्तृत्वादिकं वास्तवं नास्तीत्यावेदितमधस्तादिति। 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' इति श्रुत्या सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञाततयाऽज्ञाततया वा साक्षिभास्यमिति विवरणेन च सर्वं चैतन्यभास्यमित्युक्तम्। तच्च तस्य जडत्वे न संभवति इत्याह—**स्वप्रकाशेति। आन्ध्यप्रसङ्गादिति**। अप्रकाशप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः। आनन्दरूपत्वं साधयति—**परमेति**। अत्रार्थे भागवतस्मृतिरपि प्रमाणम्—

'स वै प्रियतमश्चात्मा यतो न भयमण्वपि।
इति वेद स वै विद्वान् यो विद्वान् स गुरुर्हरिः' ॥ इति ॥

तस्मात्परिशेषाद्भ्रान्तिरियमिति स्थिते तत्कारणमपि योग्यं किञ्चित्कल्पनीयम्। कल्प्यमानं च तदात्मन्यध्यस्ततयैव धर्मिग्राहकमानेन सिध्यतीति न जानामीति साक्षिप्रतीतिसिद्धमनिर्वाच्यमज्ञानमेव तत्। न चेदमभावरूपम्, ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन तदभावानुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात्[1]। धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां च व्याघातापत्तेः। नापि भ्रमसंशयतत्संस्कारपरम्परारूपम्, अपरोक्षत्वात्, अतीतानागतभ्रमसंशयतत्संस्काराणां चापरोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्, आवरणात्मकत्वात्, भ्रमाद्युत्पादनत्वाच्च। आत्मनो निर्विकारत्वात्, अन्तःकरणादेश्च तज्जन्यत्वात्, 'देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्' (श्वे. १।३) इति गुणवत्त्वश्रुतेश्च, 'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्' (सैव. ४।१०), 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते' (बृ. आ.

१. खगपुस्तकयोस्तदभावानुपपत्तिरित्युक्तत्वादिति।

२।८।१९), 'अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः' (छां. ८।३।२), 'नीहारेण प्रावृताः' (तै. स. ४।६।२।२), 'भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः' (श्वे. १।१०) इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च मायाऽविद्यानिर्वाच्यमनृतं[1] तत्त्वज्ञाननिवर्त्यश्चाज्ञानमेव स्वपराध्यासे कारणम्। न चात्माश्रयादिदोषप्रसङ्गः, अनादित्वेन तन्निरासात्, अनादित्वेनोत्पत्त्यभावात्, स्वप्रकाशात्मन एव तज्ज्ञप्तिरूपत्वात्।

तस्माद्भ्रान्तिरिति। अहं मनुष्यः कर्ता भोक्तेत्यादिप्रतीतिर्भ्रान्तिरित्यर्थः। साधकमाह—न जानामीति। ज्ञानस्येति। ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन त्रिविधपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वं तथा च कथं तदभाव इत्यर्थः। तुष्यतु दुर्जनं[2] इति न्यायेन परमतमवलम्ब्य घस्स्वभावस्तथापि न त्वदिष्टसिद्धिरित्याह—धर्मीत्यादि। मयि घटज्ञानं नास्ति ज्ञानं नास्तीति वा वक्तव्यम्। उभयथाप्ययं सामान्याभावः। स च यत्किञ्चित्प्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोधी। यदि च प्रतियोगिनो घटज्ञानस्य ज्ञानमस्ति तर्हि ज्ञानस्य विषयविषयकत्वनियमे[3] नास्ति घटज्ञानरूपं प्रतियोगि, कुतस्तदभावः। सामान्याभावरूपविषयाभावाच्च न तस्य ज्ञानम्। यदि च न प्रतियोगिज्ञानं तदा सुतरामेव न अभावज्ञानं प्रतियोगिज्ञानरूपकारणाभावात्। एवं ज्ञानं नास्तीत्यत्रापि यदि धर्मिप्रतियोगि ज्ञानं तदाज्ञानमस्ति। न तत्सामान्याभावस्तथा च कुतस्तस्य ज्ञानम्। न हि विषयाभावे ज्ञानं जायते, जायमानं वा प्रमा अप्रमा च न स्वविषयसाधकम्। यदि च न ज्ञानरूपस्य प्रतियोगिनो ज्ञानं, तदा न सुतरां तदभावज्ञानं प्रतियोगिज्ञानरूपकारणाभावादित्यर्थः। संस्कारस्यातीन्द्रियत्वमित्यभिप्रेत्याह—अपरोक्षत्वादिति। भ्रमादीनामप्यपरोक्षत्वे बाधकमाह—अतीतेति। आवरणात्मकत्वादिति। 'अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तव' इत्याद्याः स्मृतयो भावरूपाज्ञानस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपात्मन आवरणकत्वे प्रमाणम्। वृत्तिज्ञानस्याज्ञानावृतत्वं नोक्तिसम्भवं, अभावस्य चावरकत्वं न दृष्टं न श्रुतमित्याशयः। भ्रमसंशयादीनामपि भावकार्यत्वेन उपादानं वक्तव्यं, तदपि च विवक्षितविवेकेनाज्ञानमेवेत्याह—भ्रमेति। तथा चागतं भ्रमाद्यतिरिक्ताज्ञानेन, स्वस्य स्वानुपादानत्वादित्याशयः। आत्मान्तःकरणं वा उपादानमस्तु तत्राद्यमभिप्रेत्याह—आत्मन इति। अन्त्यमभिप्रेत्याह—अन्तःकरणादेरिति। तस्याप्यनिर्वचनीयस्य जन्यत्वेनोपादानगवेषणायामज्ञानमेव पर्यवसितमिति[4] भावः। श्वेता-

१. कपुस्तके मायाऽविद्याऽनिर्वाच्यमिति।
२. खगयोस्तुष्यतु सुजन इति पाठः स न युक्तः।
३. गपुस्तके विषयिविषयकत्वनियमे इति।
४. अज्ञानमेव तदुपादानं पर्यवसितमिति खपुस्तके।

श्वतरप्रथमाध्यायस्थं वाक्यमुदाहरति—**देवेति**। इतः पूर्ववाक्यं, 'ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन्' इति। 'स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्' इत्यनेन गुणवत्त्वश्रुतेर्नाभाव इति भावः। तत्रैव चतुर्थाध्याये **मायां त्विति**। **विद्यादित्यनन्तरं** 'मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्' इति बोध्यम्। इतः पूर्ववाक्यं,

छन्दांसि यज्ञाः क्रतवो व्रतानि भूतं भव्यं यच्च वेदा वदन्ति।
अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत् तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः॥ इत्यन्तम्॥

बृहदारण्यकवाक्यमुदाहरति—**इन्द्र इति**। छान्दोग्यदशमाध्यायीयां श्रुतिमुदाहरति—**अनृतेति**। एतस्य पूर्ववाक्यं, 'तद्यथा हिरण्यं निधिनिहितं क्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि संचरन्तो न विन्देयुरेवमेवेमाः सर्वाः प्रजा अहरहर्गच्छन्त्य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति'। तत्र हेतुमाह—**अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढा इति**। असत्येनाच्छादिता इत्यर्थः। वाजसनेयिसंहितायाः स्वप्राध्यायस्थकण्डिकावृत्तिवाक्यमाह[1]—**नीहारेणेति**। तद्यथा कण्डिकाः—

न तं विदाथ य इमा जजानान्यद्युष्माकमन्तरं बभूव।
नीहारेण प्रावृता जल्प्या चासुतृप उक्थशासश्चरन्ति॥ इति॥

श्वेताश्वतरस्थप्रथमाध्यायवाक्यमुदाहरति—**भूय इति**। एतस्य पूर्ववाक्यम्–'तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्त्वभावात्' इत्यन्तम्। नन्वविद्याध्यासे सैवाविद्या चेत् कारणं तर्हि आत्माश्रयः। अन्याविद्या चेदेतदविद्याध्यासे कारणं तर्हि अन्योन्याश्रयः, तदध्याससिद्धौ एतदध्यासः, तदध्याससिद्धौ च तदध्यास इत्याशङ्क्याह—**न चेति**। ननु उत्पत्तौ आत्माश्रयः ज्ञप्तौ वा। नाद्य इत्याह—**अनादित्वेनेति**। नान्त्य इत्याह—**स्वप्रकाशेति**।

तेनाज्ञानाध्यासः, तद्विशिष्टे चैतन्येऽहङ्काराध्यासः, तद्विशिष्टे च कामसङ्कल्पादीनामहङ्कारधर्माणामिन्द्रियधर्माणां च काणत्वबधिरत्वादीनामध्यासः[2]। इन्द्रियाणां तु परोक्षत्वान्नापरोक्षधर्म्यध्यास इति सिद्धान्तः। तद्विशिष्टे च स्थूलदेहाध्यासः, धर्मिपुरस्कारेणैव[3]ाहं मनुष्य इत्याकारः, न तु स्वरूपतोऽहं देह इत्यध्यासः, तथा

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१. एतद्वाक्यं तैत्तिरीयसंहितायामपि वर्तते। तत्र 'न तं विदाथ य इदं जजानान्यद्युष्माकमन्तरं भवाति' इति पाठान्तरं, अन्ते च 'परो दिवा पर एना' इति विशेषः।

२. खगपुस्तकयोस्तद्विशिष्टे च कामसङ्कल्पादीनामहङ्कारधर्माणामध्यासः। तद्विशिष्टे चेन्द्रियधर्माणां काणत्वबधिरत्वादीनामध्यास इति।

३. तस्मिन्नेव धर्मपुरस्कारेणैवेति।

प्रतीत्यभावात्। तद्विशिष्टे च स्थौल्यादीनां देहधर्माणामध्यासः। तद्विशिष्टे बाह्यानां पुत्रभार्यादीनां साकल्यवैकल्यादिधर्माध्यासः। एवं चैतन्यस्यापि अहङ्कारादिषु देहपर्यन्तेष्वध्यासः संसर्गतः। अध्यासव्यवधानतारतम्याच्च[1] प्रेमतारतम्यम्। तदुक्तं वार्तिकामृते (बृ. आ. भा. वा. १।४।१०३१)—

वित्तात्पुत्रः प्रियः पुत्रात्पिण्डः पिण्डात्तथेन्द्रियम्।
इन्द्रियेभ्यः प्रियः प्राणः प्राणादात्मा परः प्रियः॥ इति॥

पिण्डः स्थूलशरीरम्, प्राणोऽन्तःकरणम्। देहापेक्षया चेन्द्रियाणां प्रियत्वं शस्त्रवृष्ट्यादिधारापाते चक्षुषो निमीलनदर्शनादनुभवसिद्धम्। तेनान्योन्याध्यासाच्चिदचिद्ग्रन्थिरूपोऽध्यासः। एकतरस्याध्यासाङ्गीकारेऽन्यतरस्याभानप्रसङ्गात्, अध्यस्तस्यैव भ्रमे भाननियमात् (सं. शा. १. ३६) 'इमे रङ्गरजते' इति समूहालम्बनभ्रमवद्वद्वयमितरेतराध्यासः। सर्वबाधावधिभूतचैतन्यपरिशेषेण च न शून्यवादापत्तिः, सत्यानृतसंभेदावभासत्वादध्यासस्य। तस्मात्पूर्वपूर्वाध्यासमूल एवायमुत्तरोत्तरोऽहङ्काराद्यध्यासो बीजाङ्कुरवदनादिः। अविद्याध्यासश्च एक एवानादिः।

एवमज्ञानाध्याससिद्धौ कुत्र कुत्र कस्याध्यास इति शिष्याकाङ्क्षायां तं तमध्यासं संकलय्य[2] दर्शयति—**तेनेति**। अज्ञानाध्यासस्यानादित्वात् प्राथम्येनेत्यर्थः। अहङ्काराध्यासवदिन्द्रियाध्यासः किमिति नोक्तस्तत्राह—**इन्द्रियाणां त्विति**। नेत्यत्र हेतुमाह—**तथेति**[3]। **साकल्यवैकल्ये** संपत्तिविपत्ती। चैतन्येऽहङ्काराद्यध्यासमुक्त्वा अहङ्कारादौ चैतन्याध्यासमाह—**एवमिति**। **संसर्गत इति**। यथाहङ्कारादीनां स्वरूपतोऽध्यासस्तथा न किन्तु चैतन्यस्य संसर्गतः। अनात्मवच्चैतन्यस्यापि स्वरूपत अध्यासे अनात्मवच्चैतन्यस्यापि मिथ्यात्वप्रसङ्गाच्छून्यवादप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः। संसर्गत इति षष्ठ्यर्थे तसिः, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिलिति[4] सूत्रेण। एवं संसर्गस्येत्यर्थः। अन्यथा संसर्गित्वेनाप्यध्यासे शून्यवादतादवस्थ्यमिति भावः। सर्वस्य प्रेयात्मा[5]ध्यासत्वे

१. तस्मिन्नेव देहपर्यन्तेष्वध्यास इत्यनन्तरं संसर्गतोऽध्यासस्तद्व्यवधानतारतम्यादिति पाठस्स न समञ्जसः।
२. सकलमपि इति गपुस्तके पाठस्सोऽनुपपन्नः।
३. खपुस्तके नन्विलत्र हेतुमाह-अहं देह इति।
४. गपुस्तके सर्वविभक्तिभ्यस्तसिल् इति।
५. सर्वस्य प्रियात्मा इति तस्मिन्नेव।

प्रेमतारतम्यं कुत इत्याह—**अध्यास इति**। पुत्रादिपिण्ड इत्यादि। प्रिय इत्यनेनान्वयः। **इन्द्रियमिति**। प्रियमिति शेषः। उपसंहरति—**तेनेति**। हेतुमाह—**एकतरस्येति**। अभानप्रसङ्गे हेतुमाह—**अध्यस्तस्यैवेति**। 'अध्यस्तमेव हि परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु, नान्यत्कथंचन परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु' इत्यादिना संक्षेपशारीरकाचार्यैरुक्तत्वात्। एवं च देहपर्यन्तेष्वेव चैतन्याध्यासो नान्यत्रेति भावः। ननु जडचैतन्ययोरुभयोरध्यस्तत्वे शून्यवादापत्तिरत आह—**सर्वबाधेति**। चैतन्यसंसर्गाध्यासेऽपि न स्वरूपतोऽध्यासो यतः शून्यवादापत्तिरित्यर्थः। ननु, ज्ञातस्यैवाध्यासः, तथा च अहङ्काराध्यासात्पूर्वं तस्य ज्ञातत्वाभावात्कथमध्यास इत्याशङ्कामुपसंहारव्याजेन परिहरति—**तस्मादिति**। अनादौ संसारे पूर्वं पूर्वं ज्ञातानामहङ्काराणामुत्तरोत्तरत्राध्यासस्तस्य च प्रवाहानादितयैवानादित्वमित्यर्थः।

नन्वध्यासस्यानादित्वे 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासोऽध्यास' (शा. भा. १७-१८) इति वदता भाष्यकारेण स्मृतिरूपत्वेन संस्कारजन्यत्वमुक्तं विरुध्येत इति चेत्, न, कार्याध्यासाभिप्रायत्वात्तस्य, परत्र परावभास इत्येतावन्मात्रस्यैव उभयानुगतस्य लक्षणत्वात्। यद्वा 'सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य' (तदेव. १६) इति भाष्यकारवचनात्सत्यमिथ्यावस्तुसंभेदावभासोऽध्यास इत्येव सिद्धान्तलक्षणम्। तेन कारणाध्यासेऽपि न लक्षणाव्याप्तिः। कार्याध्यासस्य च प्रवाहरूपेण बीजाङ्कुरवदनादित्वाभिधानान्न कोऽपि दोषः।

नन्वेवमपि अध्यासलक्षणे[1] भाष्यविरोधमाशङ्कते—**नन्विति**। स्मृतिरूपपदं व्याचष्टे—**स्मृतिरूपत्वेनेति**। इत्थंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया। एवं च स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्येति व्युत्पत्त्या स्मृतिसदृशत्वं प्राप्तं तच्च संस्कारजन्यत्वमित्यर्थः। नेदमविद्याध्याससाधारणं लक्षणं, अपि तु पञ्चभूतादिरूपकार्याध्यासस्येत्याह—**कार्याध्यासाभिप्रायत्वात्तस्येति**। इदं तु लक्षणमध्यस्यत इत्यध्यास इति व्युत्पत्त्या अर्थाध्यासस्य, अध्यसनमध्यास इति व्युत्पत्त्या ज्ञानाध्यासस्य, इति विवेकः। नन्विदमयुक्तं सामान्यलक्षणाभावात् विशेषलक्षणस्य तत्पूर्वकत्वात् तत्राह—**परत्रेति**।

एवमध्यासे सिद्धे एकस्याप्यात्मनो जीवेश्वरादिव्यवस्था मानमेयादिप्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था चोपपद्यते। तथाहि—अज्ञानोपहित आत्मा अज्ञानतादात्म्यापन्नः स्वचिदाभासाविवेकादन्तर्यामी साक्षी जगत्का-

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१. अर्थाध्यासलक्षणेन भाष्येण विरोध इत्याशङ्कत इति गपुस्तके पाठः।

रणमिति च कथ्यते[1], बुद्ध्युपहितश्च तत्तादात्म्यापन्नः स्वचिदाभासाविवेकाज्जीवः कर्ता भोक्ता प्रमातेति च कथ्यत इति वार्तिककारपादाः। प्रतिदेहं बुद्धीनां च भिन्नत्वात् तद्गतचिदाभासभेदेन तदविविक्तं चैतन्यमपि भिन्नमिव प्रतीयते। अज्ञानस्य तु सर्वत्राभिन्नत्वात्तद्गतचिदाभासभेदाभावात् तदविविक्तसाक्षिचैतन्यस्य न कदाचिदपि भेदभानमिति।

अध्याससाधनफलमाह—**एवमिति**। मानमन्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यम्। मेयं घटाद्यवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यम्। चिदुपहितस्येश्वरोपजीव्यत्वेन प्रथमतोऽज्ञानोपहितस्येश्वरस्य स्वरूपलक्षणमाह—**अज्ञानोपहित इति**। अज्ञानोपहितो य आत्मा स एवात्माज्ञानतादात्म्यापन्नो यः स्वचिदाभासः स्वस्य अज्ञानोपहितो यश्चिदाभासस्तदविवेकात्तदगृहीतभेदकः सन्नन्तर्यामीत्यादिरुच्यत इत्यर्थः[2]। **अन्तर्यामीति**। 'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति' इत्यादिना अन्तर्नियमनशील उक्त इत्यर्थः। **साक्षी** सर्वद्रष्टा। ईश्वरं निरूप्य जीवं निरूपयति—**बुद्ध्युपहितश्चेति**। पूर्वोक्तेनात्मनानुषङ्गः। **तत्तादात्म्यापन्नो** बुद्धितादात्म्यापन्नः। जीवस्य प्रमातृत्वमधिककञ्चुकप्रवेशादित्यवधेयम्। तर्हि जीवभेदः कथं तत्राह—**प्रतिदेहं चेति**। तर्हि जीवभेदवत् साक्षिभेदोऽपि स्यात् तत्राह—**अज्ञानस्य त्विति**।

अस्मिंश्च पक्षे तत्त्वमादिपदे[3] जहल्लक्षणैव, साभासस्योपाधेर्वाच्यार्थांशस्य हानादाभासस्यापि जडाजडविलक्षणत्वेनानिर्वचनीयत्वात्। तदुक्तं सङ्क्षेपशारीरके (१-३६)—

साभासाज्ञानवाची यदि भवति पुनर्ब्रह्मशब्दस्तथाहं
शब्दोऽहङ्कारवाची भवति तु जहती लक्षणा तत्र पक्षे[4]। इति।

न चाभासस्यैव बद्धत्वात्केवलचैतन्यस्य च मुक्तत्वाद्बन्धमोक्षयोर्वैयधिकरण्यं स्वनाशार्थं प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिश्चेति वाच्यम्, केवलचैतन्यस्यैवाभासद्वारा बद्धत्वाभ्युपगमात्, तदुक्तं वार्तिककारपादैः—

अयमेव हि नोऽनर्थो यत्संसार्यात्मदर्शनम्। (बृ. आ. भा. वा. २।४।१३८) इति[5]।

१. कपुस्तके जगत्कारणमिति च कथ्यते इति वार्तिककृतः इति।
२. खगपुस्तकयोः स्वस्य अज्ञानोपहितस्यात्मनो यश्चिदाभास इति।
३. खगपुस्तकयोस्तत्त्वस्यादिपद इति पाठस्सोऽनुपपन्नस्तत्त्वमसीत्येतस्य वाक्यत्वात्।
४. अस्य श्लोकस्य उत्तरार्धः—नौरेषा रौति लोहं दहति विषधरो रज्जुरमे तवास्तित्यत्रैवात्मवस्तुन्यपि भवतु जहल्लक्षणा को विरोध इति।
५. अस्य पूर्वार्धः—संसर्गात्मनि दृष्टेऽपि न च किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमिति।

तेन शुद्धचैतन्यस्याभास एव बन्धः, तन्निवृत्तिश्च मोक्ष इति न किञ्चिदसमञ्जसम्। अथवाऽऽभासाविविक्तं चैतन्यमपि तत्त्वमादिपद्वाच्यम्। तेन वाच्यैकदेशस्यात्यागादस्मिन्पक्षे जहदजहल्लक्षणैवेति न कोऽपि दोषः। अयमेव पक्ष आभासवाद इति गीयते।

विनाशिनः साभासस्योपाधेस्त्वंपदवाच्यार्थत्वे समागता[1] जहल्लक्षणेत्याशङ्क्य इष्टापत्त्या परिहरति—**अस्मिंश्चेति**। भवत्वाभास एव वाच्यार्थस्तत्राह—**आभासस्यापीति**। आभासस्यैवेति बुद्धितादात्म्यापन्नचिदाभासस्यैव जीवत्वेन बद्धत्वादित्यर्थः। ननु, प्रपञ्चवदाभासस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वेन ज्ञाननाश्यत्वमेवं च स्वनाशस्याप्युद्देश्यत्वं वाच्यं तच्चानुपपन्नम्। तथाहि[2]—आत्माऽपि दुःखहेतुत्वात्[3] निर्वर्तयितव्य इति विज्ञानवादिवदास्तिकोऽपि न स्वनाशार्थं प्रवर्तेत इत्याह—**स्वनाशार्थमिति**। **संसार्यात्मदर्शनमिति**। संसारित्वेन आत्मदर्शनमित्यर्थः। आभास एव तत्त्वंपदवाच्य इति मतं समर्थ्य आभासानतिरिक्तं चैतन्यं तत्त्वंपदवाच्यमिति मतं समर्थयति—**अथवेति**।

अज्ञानोपहितं बिम्बचैतन्यमीश्वरः, अन्तःकरणतत्संस्कारावच्छिन्नाज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीवः[4], इति विवरणकाराः। अज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमीश्वरः, बुद्धिप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीवः, अज्ञानोपहितं तु बिम्बचैतन्यं शुद्धमिति सङ्क्षेपशारीरककाराः। अनयोश्च पक्षयोः बुद्धिभेदाज्जीवनानात्वम्। प्रतिबिम्बस्य च पारमार्थिकत्वाज्जहल्लक्षणैव तत्त्वमादिपदेषु। इममेव प्रतिबिम्बवादमाचक्षते।

एकाविद्यापक्षेऽपि जीवेश्वरभेदो जीवनानात्वं चेत्यभिप्रेत्याह—**अज्ञानोपहितमित्यादि**। बिम्बचैतन्यमित्यत्र बिम्बपदं स्वरूपकथनार्थम्। अन्तःकरणसंस्कारावच्छिन्न इत्यज्ञानविशेषणम्। जीवनानात्वस्य सुषुप्तौ जीवनाशाभावस्य च सम्पादनायां अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नस्य जीवत्वे 'कार्योपाधिरयं जीवः कारणोपाधिरीश्वर' इति श्रुतिः प्रमाणम्। भगवद्भाष्यकारवचनम्—'अन्तःकरणसम्भिन्नबोधः स त्वंपदाभिध' इत्यादि। उक्तोभयपक्षे जीवनानात्वमुपपादयति—**अनयोरिति**[5]।

१. गपुस्तके तदागता इति पाठस्सोऽनुपपन्नः।
२. खगयोर्नहीति।
३. तयोरेव दुःखहेतुरिति।
४. खगपुस्तकयोरन्तःकरण......जीवः इत्यनन्तरं अज्ञानानुपहितं बिम्बचैतन्यं तु शुद्धमिति विवरणकाराः इति वाक्यं दृश्यते।
५. गपुस्तके अज्ञानभेदाज्जीवनानात्वं कुतस्तत्राह-अनयोरित्येतादृशः पाठः।

अज्ञानविषयीभूतं[1] चैतन्यमीश्वरः, अज्ञानाश्रयीभूतं च जीव इति वाचस्पतिमिश्राः। अस्मिंश्च पक्षे अज्ञाननानात्वाज्जीवनानात्वम्। प्रतिजीवं च प्रपञ्चभेदः, जीवस्यैव स्वाज्ञानोपहिततया जगदुपादानत्वात्। प्रत्यभिज्ञा च अतिसादृश्यात्[2]। ईश्वरस्य च सप्रपञ्चजीवाविद्याधिष्ठानत्वेन[3] कारणत्वोपचारादिति। अयमेव चावच्छेदवादः।

परज्ञानेच्छादिवत् पराविद्यायाः परप्रत्यक्षत्वाभावेन परप्रत्यक्षत्वाभावादाह—**प्रतिजीवं चेति**। अत्र केचन पराविद्याकल्पितत्वं स्वाप्रत्यक्षे तन्त्रं न किन्तु स्वाविद्याकल्पितत्वं स्वप्रत्यक्षे तन्त्रम्। तथा च यावतां पुरुषाणां यद्वस्तु प्रत्यक्षं तावतामविद्याभिरेव तदारब्धम्। न चैकस्य मोक्षे तदविद्यानाशात्तत्प्रपञ्चनाशेन पुनः प्रपञ्चप्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। खण्डघटवत्[4]पुनरुत्पत्तेश्च चरमस्मरणस्य संस्कारनाशकत्ववद्वा चरमाविद्यानाशस्यैव तन्नाशकत्वकल्पनेन त्वदुक्तदोषाभावात्। एवं सर्वसामञ्जस्येऽनन्तकोटिप्रपञ्चकल्पनं स्वभिन्नत्वे सति स्वगतभूयोधर्मवत्त्वरूपेण सादृश्येन प्रत्यभिज्ञासमर्थनं नातिरमणीयमिति वदन्ति। 'पुरत्रये क्रीडति यश्च जीवस्ततस्तु जातं सकलं विचित्रम्' इत्यादि श्रुत्यनुसारेणाह—**जीवस्यैवेति**। **प्रत्यभिज्ञेति**। यज्ञदत्तेन यो घटो दृष्टः स एवायं मया विष्णुमित्रेण दृश्यत इत्यादिरूपा इत्यर्थः। तर्हि ईश्वरस्य कारणव्यपदेशः कथं तत्राह—**ईश्वरस्येति**।

अज्ञानोपहितं बिम्बचैतन्यमीश्वरः, अज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीव इति वा, अज्ञानानुपहितं शुद्धचैतन्यमीश्वरः, अज्ञानोपहितं जीव इति वा, मुख्यो वेदान्तसिद्धान्त एकजीववादाख्यः। इममेव च दृष्टिसृष्टिवादमाचक्षते। अस्मिंश्च पक्षे जीव एव स्वाज्ञानवशाज्जगदुपादानं निमित्तं च, दृश्यं च सर्वं प्रातीतिकम्। देहभेदाच्च जीवभेदभ्रान्तिः। एकस्यैव च स्वकल्पितगुरुशास्त्राद्युपबृंहितश्रवणमननादिदार्ढ्यादात्मसाक्षात्कारे सति मोक्षः। शुकादीनां मोक्षश्रवणं चार्थवाद एव। महावाक्ये च तत्पदमनन्तसत्यादिपदवदज्ञानानुपहितचैतन्यस्य लक्षणयोपस्थापकमित्याद्या अवान्तरभेदाः स्वयमूहनीयाः।

एकजीववादे द्वितीयं मतमाह—**अज्ञानोपहितमिति**। ननु जीवस्यैकत्वे

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१. कपुस्तके अज्ञानविषयीकृतमिति।

२. तस्मिन्नेव प्रत्यभिज्ञा च सादृश्यादिति।

३. तत्रैव ईश्वरस्य च प्रपञ्चजीवाविद्याधिष्ठानत्वेनेति।

४. क१पुस्तके खण्डपटवदिति पाठः।

गुरुशिष्यभावः कथं एकस्यैव श्रवणादिना मोक्षः स्यादित्याशया[1] बहूनां श्रवणादौ प्रवृत्तिश्च न स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह—**एकस्यैवेति**। स्वप्ने यथा गुरुशिष्यभावकल्पनया व्यवहारस्तथा जागरणेऽपि। यथा वा स्वप्ने एकस्य नानात्वकल्पनया क्रीडा तथा श्रवणादौ प्रवृत्तिः। नित्यमुक्तानन्तकोटिब्रह्माण्डेश्वरश्रीकृष्णसौभरिप्रभृतीनां यथा कायव्यूहेन धर्मादौ प्रवृत्तिः तथा श्रवणादौ प्रवृत्तिः शीघ्रमोक्षार्थम्। न च जीवस्यैक्ये कथं बहूनां प्रवृत्तिरिति शङ्का। अस्मन्मते 'कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्से'त्यादि 'कुर्वन्त्यचेतनाः कर्म' इत्यादि 'हर्षशोकभयक्रोधे'त्यादि श्रुतिस्मृत्यादिपर्यालोचनया अचैतन्यस्यैव प्रवृत्तेः। तान्यचेतनान्यन्तःकरणानि बहूनि इति नोक्तदोष इति दिक्। ननु तर्हि कथं शुको मुक्तः प्रह्लादो वेति प्रथा सङ्गच्छते तत्राह—**शुकादीनामिति**। नन्वस्मिन्पक्षे लक्षणाऽस्ति न वा, सत्यामपि तस्यां कस्योपस्थापकत्वं तत्राह—**महावाक्ये इति**।

ननु, वस्तुनि विकल्पासम्भवात्कथं परस्परविरुद्धमतप्रामाण्यम्, तस्मात्किमत्र हेयं किमुपादेयमिति चेत्, क एवमाह वस्तुनि विकल्पो न सम्भवतीति। स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा राक्षसो वा इत्यादिविकल्पस्य वस्तुन्यपि दर्शनात्। अतात्त्विकी सा कल्पना पुरुषबुद्धिमात्रप्रभवा, इयं तु शास्त्रीया जीवेश्वरविभागादिव्यवस्था इति चेत्, नूनमतिमेधावी भवान्। अद्वितीयात्मतत्त्वं हि प्रधानं फलवत्त्वादज्ञातत्वाच्च प्रमेयं शास्त्रस्य। जीवेश्वरविभागादिकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्धिमात्रप्रभवा अपि शास्त्रेणानूद्यन्ते, तत्त्वज्ञानोपयोगित्वात्। फलवत्सन्निधावफलं तदङ्गमिति न्यायात् भ्रमसिद्धस्यापि श्रुत्यानुवादसम्भवात्। एतेन द्वैतज्ञानेनाद्वैतज्ञानस्य बाधो निरस्तः[2]। घटादिद्वैतज्ञानस्यापि अद्वैतसन्मात्रांशेऽज्ञाते[3] प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमाच्च। ज्ञानाज्ञानयोस्समानाश्रयविषयत्वनियमात्, जडे च प्रमाणप्रयोजनयोरभावेनाज्ञानानङ्गीकारात्, तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्याज्ञानादेव तत्राप्यज्ञानव्यवहारोपपत्तेः, प्रामाण्यस्य चाज्ञातज्ञापकरूपकत्वात्[4]। अन्यथा स्मृतेरपि तदापत्तेरिति। वेदान्तेषु सर्वत्र एवंविधविरोधेऽयमेव परिहारः। तदाहुर्वार्तिककारपादाः (बृ. आ. भा. वा. १।४।४०२)—

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१. कपुस्तके श्रवणादिना मम मोक्षः स्यादिति।

२. कपुस्तके अद्वैतज्ञानस्य बोधो निरस्त इति पाठस्सोऽनुपपन्नः।

३. तस्मिन्नेव अद्वैतसन्मात्रांशेऽद्वैत इति।

४. खगपुस्तकयोः। प्रमाणस्य चाज्ञातज्ञापकत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यादिति।

यया यया भवेत्पुंसां[1] व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सा सैव प्रक्रिया ज्ञेया साध्वी सा च व्यवस्थिता[2] ॥ इति ।

श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थविरुद्धत्वं च हेयमेवेति शतश उद्घोषितमस्माभिः । तस्मान्न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

अथैकमेव चैतन्यं तदप्युपाधिभेदेन भिन्नं तत्र च कथं एकं नित्यं मुक्तमपरं च बद्धमित्यादिव्यवस्था इत्याशङ्कते—**नन्विति** । यदुक्तं—**इयं तु शास्त्रीयेत्यादिना** । तस्मात् सोपहासं दूषयितुमुपक्रमते—**नूनमित्यादिना** । जीवेश्वरादिविभागस्य शास्त्रप्रमेयत्वाभावं वक्तुमादावद्वितीयात्मतत्त्वस्य प्राधान्यं प्रमेयत्वं च व्यवस्थापयति—**अद्वितीयेति** । प्रधानत्वे हेतुः—**फलवत्त्वादिति** । प्रमेयत्वे हेतुः—**अज्ञातत्वादिति** । जीवेश्वरादीनां शास्त्रप्रमेयत्वं दूषयति—**जीवेश्वरविभागादिति** । अथ कथं पुरुषबुद्धिमात्रप्रभवस्य श्रुत्यनुवादस्तत्राह—**भ्रमसिद्धस्यापीति** । **एतेनेति** । अज्ञानाद्वैतप्रधानविषयत्वेनेत्यर्थः । अज्ञानबोधकं चेत्प्रमाणं तर्हि घटादिबोधकस्य का गतिरत आह—**घटादिद्वैतज्ञानस्येति** । इदमेव प्रतिपादयति—**ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरित्यादिना** । उपसंहरति—**एवमिति** । यदुक्तं किमिव हेयं तत्राह—**श्रुतीति** । अतिमेधावीत्यादिना य उपालम्भः कृतस्तत्राह—**शतश इत्यादि** ।

तदेवं जीवस्योपाधिनाभिभूतत्वात्संसारोपलब्धिः, परमेश्वरस्य तूपाधिवशत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वादिकमिति सम्यगुपपद्यते व्यवस्था ।

ननु वस्तुनीत्यादिनाऽऽशङ्क्य यत् समाहितं तदिदानीमुपसंहरति—**तदेवमिति** ।

ननु भवत्वविद्यावशाज्जीवेश्वरादिविभागव्यवस्था मानमेयादिप्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था कथमिति चेत्, उच्यते । दृश्यत्वाद्विनाशित्वाच्च परिच्छिन्नाप्यविद्याऽनिर्वचनीयत्वेन विचारासहा आवरणविक्षेपशक्तिद्वयवती सर्वगतं चिदात्मानमावृणोति, अङ्गुलिरिव नयनपुरःस्थिता सूर्यमण्डलम् । तत्र चक्षुष एवावरणेऽङ्गुलेरप्यभानप्रसङ्गात् । अधिष्ठानावरणमन्तरेण च विक्षेपानुपपत्तेश्च । ततः सा पूर्वपूर्वसंस्कारजीवकर्मप्रयुक्ता सती निखिलजगदाकारेण परिणमते । सा च स्वगतचिदाभासद्वारा चित्तादात्म्यापन्नेति तत्कार्यमपि सर्वमाभासद्वारा चिदनुस्यूतमेव[3] । तथा च चैतन्यस्य दीपवत्स्वसम्बद्धसर्वभासकत्वा[4]

१. तयोरेव पुंस इति ।
२. खपुस्तके स्थिरस्थिता गपुस्तके च अनवस्थिता इति ।
३. कपुस्तके तत्कार्यमपि सर्वमायाद्वारा चिदनुस्यूतमेवेति पाठस्य लेखकस्य हस्तदोष एव ।
४. तथाच तस्मिन्नेव दीपवत्स्वयंबद्धसर्वभासकत्वादीत्यपि पाठस्य दोष एव ।

जगदुपादानचैतन्यं प्रमाणापेक्षामन्तरेणैव सर्वदा सर्वं भासयत् सर्वज्ञं भवति। तेन तत्र न मानमेयादिव्यवस्था। किन्तु जीवे तस्य बुद्ध्यवच्छिन्नत्वेन परिच्छिन्नत्वात् तेन चिदभिव्यक्तियोग्येन येनान्तःकरणेन यदा यत्सम्बद्धं भवति तदेव तदा तदवच्छिन्नो जीवोऽनुभवतीति न साङ्कर्यप्रसङ्गः।

प्रतिकर्म व्यवस्थामुपपादयितुं भूमिकामारचयति[1]—**नन्विति। आवरणेति।** अविद्या आवरणशक्त्या सर्वगतमखण्डपरमानन्दसाक्षात्कारस्वरूपमात्मानमावृणोति। अत एव आत्मा स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपोऽपि तेन रूपेण न भासते, विक्षेपलक्षणशक्त्या वियदादिसावरणब्रह्माण्डान्तं प्रपञ्चमुद्भावयतीत्यवधेयम्। उभयशक्तिप्रयोजनमावृणोतीति अन्यथा अखण्डानन्दरूपेण ब्रह्मणः स्फूर्तिः स्यादित्यर्थः। अल्पदेशव्यापकेन बहुदेशव्यापकस्यावरणे दृष्टान्तमाह—**अङ्गुलिरिवेति।** अङ्गुलिनावृते चक्षुषि यथा सूर्यमण्डलमावृतमिति बुद्धिः, तथा अविद्यया बुद्धिपिधानेन ब्रह्म आवृतमिति बुद्धिरिति बोध्यम्। ननु तत्रैवं वक्तव्यम्, अङ्गुलिश्चक्षुरावृणोति, आवृतं च न ग्राहकं[2], अतो न सूर्यमण्डलदर्शनमित्यत आह—**तत्रेति।** ननु मास्त्वावरणं ब्रह्मणस्तत्राह—**अधिष्ठानावरणमिति।** यथा शुक्तित्वांशावरणं विना न रजतोत्पत्तिस्तथा ब्रह्मावरणं विना न प्रपञ्चोत्पत्तिरित्यर्थः। साऽविद्या चिदात्मानमावृत्य जगदात्मना परिणमत इत्याह—**ततश्चेति।** अग्रे वक्ष्यमाणस्वसम्बद्धभासकत्वोपपादनार्थमाह—**तत्कार्यमपीति। तदिति।** अविद्येत्यर्थः। ननु भवतु तत्कार्यं चिदनुस्यूतं किं तेन तत्राह—**तथा चेति।** ननु भवतु जगदुपादानं चैतन्यं एवं क्रमेण सर्वभासकत्वेन[3] प्रकृते किमायातमत आह—**तेनेति।** प्रमाणनिरपेक्षतया सर्वभासकत्वेनेत्यर्थः। **तत्र,** ईश्वरे। **तस्येति।** जीवस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वेन, न सर्वसम्बन्धाभावादिति भावः। फलितमाह—**तेनेति। चिदभिव्यक्तियोग्येनेति।** सर्वस्यैव चिदभिव्यक्तियोग्यत्वेन स्वरूपकथनमात्रपरम्। **येनेति।** येनान्तःकरणेन स्वपरिणामद्वारा यस्मिन्काले च घटादीनां मध्ये यद्वस्तु सम्बद्धं भवति विषयीक्रियते तदेव वस्तु तस्मिन्काले तदन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नो जीवोऽनुभवतीत्यर्थः। **न साङ्कर्येति।** न बुद्ध्यन्तरावच्छिन्नजीवस्यानुभवप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः।

एवमत्र प्रक्रिया–शरीरमध्ये स्थितः सर्वशरीरव्यापकः सत्त्वप्राधान्येन सूक्ष्मपञ्चभूतारब्धः अन्तःकरणाख्योऽविद्याविवर्तो दर्पणादिव-

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१. खगपुस्तकयोरवतारयतीति।

२. आवृतं चक्षुश्च न ग्राहकमिति गपुस्तके।

३. सर्वज्ञत्वेन इति खपुस्तके, सर्वज्ञं तेन इति च गपुस्तके।

द्गतिस्वच्छो नेत्रादिद्वारा निर्गत्य योग्यान्घटादीन्विषयान्व्याप्य तत्तदाकारो भवति द्रुतताम्रादिवत्। तस्य च सौरालोकादिवत् झटित्येव सङ्कोचविकासावुपपद्येते। स च सावयवत्वात्परिणममानो देहाभ्यन्तरे घटादौ च सम्यग्व्याप्य देहघटयोर्मध्येऽपि चक्षुर्वदविच्छिन्नोऽव्यवतिष्ठते। तत्र देहावच्छिन्नान्तःकरणभागोऽहङ्काराख्यः कर्तेत्युच्यते। देहविषयमध्यवर्ती दण्डायमानस्तद्भागो वृत्तिज्ञानाख्यः क्रियेत्युच्यते[1]। विषयव्यापकस्तद्भागो विषयस्य ज्ञानकर्मत्वसम्पादकमभिव्यक्तियोग्यत्वमित्युच्यते[2]। तस्य च त्रिभागस्यान्तःकरणस्यातिस्वच्छत्वात् चैतन्यं तत्राभिव्यज्यते। तस्य चाभिव्यक्तस्य चैतन्यस्य एकत्वेऽपि अभिव्यञ्जकान्तःकरणभागभेदात् त्रिधा व्यपदेशो भवति। कर्तृभागावच्छिन्नचिदंशः प्रमाता, क्रियाभागावच्छिन्नचिदंशः प्रमाणम्, विषयगताऽभिव्यक्तियोग्यत्वभागावच्छिन्नचिदंशः प्रमितिरिति। प्रमेयं तु विषयगतं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमेवाज्ञातम्। तदेव च ज्ञातं सत्, फलम्।

स्वपरिणामद्वारेति यदुक्तं तत्प्रकटयति—**एवमत्रेति**। सर्वशरीरावच्छेदेन ज्ञानमुपादानस्य सर्वशरीरसम्बन्धं विना न सम्भवत्यत उक्तम्—**सर्वशरीरव्यापक इति**। चिदभिव्यक्तियोग्यत्वप्रकटनायाह—**सत्त्वप्राधान्येनेति**। सत्त्वोद्रिक्ते स्वच्छ एव प्रतिबिम्बो भवति न रजस्तमोद्रिक्तेऽस्वच्छे लोष्टादौ इति भावः। भवत्वेवं तथापि कथं झटिति ध्रुवलोकादिगमनागमनं तत्राह—**तस्य चेति**। पञ्चभूतारब्धत्वं यदुक्तं तस्य फलमाह—**स चेति**। अन्तःकरणाख्य इत्यर्थः। प्रमात्रादिविभागाय तदुपाधिविभागमाह—**तत्र देहेति**। ननु आस्तामुपाधिविभागस्तथापि तत्र चैतन्याभिव्यक्तिः कुतस्तथा च कथं तदभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्य प्रमातृत्वादिकं तत्राह—**तस्य चेति**। औपनिषदमते तु सर्वत्र चक्षुरादिप्रयोज्यान्तःकरणवृत्तिः प्रमाणमित्यभिप्रेत्याह—**क्रियाभागावच्छिन्न इति**। अत्रापि मूलावच्छिन्नः प्रमाणं, मध्यभागस्तु इन्द्रियविषययोः सन्निकर्षः, सन्निकर्षजन्यं च ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्। तदुक्तमक्षपादाचार्यैः—'इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्'। अत्र भाष्यम्—इन्द्रियस्यार्थेन समं सन्निकर्षाद्यदुत्पद्यते ज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम्। नामधेयशब्देन व्यपदिश्यमानं शाब्दं प्रसज्यतेऽत आह—अव्यपदेश्यमिति। शब्द-

१. कपुस्तके वृत्तिज्ञानाख्या क्रियेत्युच्यते इति पाठः सोऽनुपपन्नः भागशब्दस्य पुंलिङ्गत्वात्।

२. खपुस्तके ज्ञानकर्मत्वसम्पादकं कर्माभियोग्यत्वमिति।

सम्बन्धज्ञानानधीनमित्यर्थः । भ्रमवारणायाव्यभिचारीति, संशयवारणाय व्यवसायात्मकमिति । एवं च सन्निकर्षविधया विषयपर्यन्तान्तःकरणवृत्तिरपेक्षितेत्यवधेयम् । एतेनात्रापि अनुमानादिवदन्तर्धीसमुल्लास एव, न तु विषयपर्यन्तान्तःकरणवृत्तिरित्यपास्तम् ।

अत्र च यस्मिन्पक्षे अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नो जीवः, यस्मिंश्च पक्षे सर्वगतोऽसङ्गोऽविद्याप्रतिबिम्बो जीवः, तत्रोभयत्रापि प्रमातृचैतन्योपरागार्था विषयगतचैतन्यावरणभङ्गार्था चान्तःकरणवृत्तिः । यस्मिंश्च[1] पक्षे अविद्यावच्छिन्नः सर्वगतो जीवः आवृत्तः तस्मिन्पक्षे जीवस्यैव जगदुपादानत्वेन सर्वसम्बद्धत्वात् आवरणभङ्गार्था वृत्तिरिति विवेकः ।

सन्निकर्षाजन्यत्वेन अनुमित्यादिवत् प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावाच्च कस्मिन्पक्षे वृत्तेः किं प्रयोजनमिति विविच्य वक्तुमुपक्रमते—**अत्र चेति** । अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नजीवपक्षे परिच्छिन्नत्वात् तस्यैव परिच्छिन्नजीवस्य वृत्तिमदन्तःकरणरूपाधिककञ्चुकप्रवेशात् प्रमातृत्वम् । एवं च प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नजीवस्य विषयसम्बन्धार्थावृत्तिः । एवं सर्वगतस्यापि स्वतोऽसङ्गस्य वृत्तिमदन्तःकरणरूपाधिककञ्चुकप्रवेशात् प्रमातृत्वम् । तस्य च[2] स्वतोऽसङ्गस्य विनावृत्तिं विषयासम्बन्धाभावात्, असङ्गसर्वगतपक्षेऽपि वृत्तिरपेक्षिता । प्रमेयचैतन्यप्रमातृचैतन्ययोः सम्बन्धपक्षेऽपि वृत्तिरपेक्षिता । अन्यथा मयाऽयं विदितो घट इति प्रमेयचैतन्यासम्बन्धे प्रमातृचैतन्यस्य प्रत्ययो न स्यात् । अत उभयपक्षेऽपि प्रमातृचैतन्योपरागार्था वृत्तिरावश्यकीति मन्तव्यं सूरिभिः । सर्वगतः, प्रपञ्चव्यापकः । **असङ्ग इति** । असङ्गः, अविद्यासङ्गरहितः, अनावृतः इत्यर्थः । विषयस्य प्रमातृचैतन्येन सह यः सम्बन्धः स विनावृत्तिं न सम्भवति, एकलोलीभावाभावात् । विना च प्रमातृचैतन्यसम्बन्धं मयाऽयं विदितो घटः इत्यादिप्रत्ययो न भवति इत्यतः प्रमातृचैतन्यसम्बन्धो विषयस्य आवश्यक इत्याह—**प्रमातृचैतन्योपरागार्थेत्यन्तेन** । अत्र चेत्यादिना पूर्वोक्तोभयमते विषयस्तु ब्रह्मचैतन्येऽध्यस्त इत्यवधेयम् । उपरागः, सम्बन्धः । **विषयगतेति** । विषयचैतन्यावरणभङ्गस्तु विनावृत्तिं न सम्भवतीति । उक्तोभयपक्षेऽपि विषयावरणभङ्गार्था वृत्तिरावश्यकीत्यर्थः । वाचस्पतिमिश्रमते तु आवरणभङ्गार्थैव वृत्तिर्न सम्बन्धार्था सर्वेषां पदार्थानां तत्सम्बन्धत्वादित्याह—**यस्मिंश्चेति** ।

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१. कपुस्तके इदं वाक्यं न दृश्यते ।

२. खगयोस्तथा चेति ।

ननु चिदुपरागार्था वृत्तिरिति पक्षे स्वतोऽन्तःकरणसम्बद्धानां धर्माधर्मादीनां ब्रह्मणश्च वृत्तिमन्तरेणैव सर्वदा भानं स्यात्। न स्यात्, चैतन्यस्य तत्तदाकारत्वाभावात्। तदभावश्च स्वच्छेऽपि ब्रह्मचैतन्ये आवरणात्, अनावृतेऽपि शुक्तिरजतादावस्वच्छत्वात्[1], धर्माधर्मादौ तु अस्वच्छत्वादावृतत्वाद्वा। तेन स्वच्छेऽप्यावृते प्रमाणवृत्त्या[2] तदाकारता, अनावृतेऽप्यस्वच्छे शुक्तिरजतादावविद्यावृत्त्या तदाकारता, अनावृते स्वच्छे तु सुखदुःखादौ स्वत इति नान्तःकरणसम्बन्धमात्रेण भानप्रसङ्गः।

प्रमातृचैतन्योपरागार्था वृत्तिरित्यत्राशङ्कते—**नन्विति**। वृत्तिव्यतिरेकेणापि सम्बन्धसत्त्वादिति भावः। धर्माधर्मादीनामित्युपलक्षणमनावृतचैतन्याध्यस्तानां शुक्तिरजतादीनाम्। परिहरति—**न स्यादिति**। **तदभावः**, तदाकारत्वाभावः। **आवृतत्वाद्वेति**। तदभावश्चेत्यनेनान्वयः। ब्रह्मणश्चेत्यादिना यदुक्तं तत्परिहरति—**स्वच्छेऽपीति**। तदाकारकत्वाभावप्रयोजकमुपपाद्य तदाकारकत्वप्रयोजनमाह—**तेन स्वच्छेऽप्यावृत इति**। ब्रह्मणि इति शेषः।

ननु, ब्रह्मणः कथमावरणम्, निरवयवस्वप्रकाशत्वेन सर्वज्ञत्वात्। सत्यम्, स्वसम्बद्धसर्वभासकतया सर्वज्ञमपि अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नजीवाज्ञानविषयतया आवृतमिति व्यपदेशात्। तस्माद्ब्रह्म जगदुपादानमिति पक्षे चिदुपरागार्था आवरणभङ्गार्था च वृत्तिः, जीवोपादानत्वपक्षे तु आवरणभङ्गार्थैवेति।

ननु, यदि ब्रह्मण्यावरणं संभवति तद्प्रमाणवृत्त्या तदाकारत्वं वक्तव्यं तदेव न संभवति तथा कथमुक्तं स्वच्छेऽपि ब्रह्मचैतन्ये आवरणादित्याशङ्कते—**ननु ब्रह्मण इति**। जीवाज्ञानविषयत्वेनावृतत्वादिति। यद्यप्यावरणशक्तिमती अविद्या ईश्वरोपाधिस्तथापि तस्या ईश्वरं प्रति नावरकत्वमन्यथा सार्वज्ञभङ्गापत्तेः किन्तु जीवं प्रतीत्यर्थः। अत्र चेत्यादिना यदुक्तं तदुपसंहरति[3]—**तस्मादिति**। यस्मिंश्च पक्ष इत्यनेन यदुक्तं तदुपसंहरति—**जीवोपादानत्व इति**।

ननु, एकेनैव घटादिज्ञानेनावरणभङ्गे सद्यो मोक्षप्रसङ्गः, अज्ञा-

१. गपुस्तके शुक्तिरजतादिवदिति।

२. कपुस्तके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्या इति।

३. खगयोस्तदुभयमुपसंहरतीति पाठः स न युक्तः।

नस्यैकत्वात्। नानाज्ञानपक्षेऽपि एकस्य जीवस्यैकाज्ञानोपाधित्वात्[1]। न, उत्तेजकेन मणेरिव[2] वृत्त्यावरणस्याभिभवाङ्गीकारात्। तथा च प्रमाणजन्यान्तःकरणवृत्त्यभावसहकृतमज्ञानं सति भात्यपि वस्तुनि नास्ति न भाति इति प्रतीतिजननसमर्थमावरणमित्युच्यते। वृत्तौ जातायां त्ववच्छेदकाभावाद्[3]विद्यमानमप्यविद्यमानसममेवेति न स्वकार्यसमर्थमज्ञानं तेनाभिभूतमित्युच्यते।

ननु विषयप्रकाशाय आवरणभङ्गार्था चेद्वृत्तिरङ्गीक्रियते तर्हि अतिप्रसङ्ग इत्याशङ्कते—**नन्विति**। ननु नानाज्ञानपक्षोऽप्यस्ति, तथा च नातिप्रसङ्गस्तत्राह—**नानाज्ञानपक्षेऽपीति**। फलितमाह—**तथा चेति**। आवरणपदार्थमाह—**सतीत्यारभ्य समर्थमित्यन्तेन**। नन्वेवं चेत् तर्हि कथमभिभवस्तत्राह—**वृत्तौ जातायामिति**।

ननु, एवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानेनाप्यविद्याया अनिवृत्तेरनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः। न, तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यार्थज्ञानादविद्यानिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात्, स्वविषयप्रमात्वेनैवा[5]विद्यानिवर्तकत्वान्महावाक्यार्थज्ञानस्यैवाबाधितविषयतया प्रमात्वात्। प्रत्यक्षादीनां तु बाधितविषयतया भ्रमत्वेऽपि व्यवहारसामर्थ्येन प्रामाण्याभिमानात्, ज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तेरन्यत्रादर्शनं चाकिञ्चित्करम्, स्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात्, अन्यथानुपपत्तेश्च सर्वतो बलवत्त्वात्। तदुक्तम् (ख. ख. खा. १)—

अन्यथानुपपत्तिश्चेदस्ति वस्तुप्रसाधिका।
पिनष्ट्यदृष्टिवैमत्यं[6] सैव सर्वबलाधिका॥ इति॥

अथवा मूलाज्ञानस्यैवावस्थाज्ञानानि घटादिविषयावरणानि। अज्ञानस्य प्रागभावस्थानीयत्वेन यावन्ति ज्ञानानि तावन्त्यज्ञानानीत्यभ्युपगमात् एकेन च ज्ञानेनैकाज्ञानस्यैव नाशात्, घटादिज्ञानेनावरणनाशेऽपि न काचिदनुपपत्तिः।

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१. कपुस्तके नानाज्ञानपक्षेऽपि एकाज्ञानोपाधिकत्वादिति।
२. खगपुस्तकयोरुत्तेजकत्वेन मणेरिव इति पाठः स न युक्तः।
३. कपुस्तकेऽवच्छेदकत्वाभावादिति, खपुस्तके चाज्ञानलक्षणावच्छेदकाभावादिति।
४. क,पुस्तके विषयप्रकाशावरणभङ्गार्था वृत्तिरिति।
५. खपुस्तके स्वविषयविषयप्रमात्वेनैव इति।
६. तस्मिन्नेव पिनष्ट्यदृष्टवैमत्यमिति, कलिकातायां मुद्रिते खण्डनखण्डखाद्ये च पिनष्टिदृष्टवैमत्यमिति।

शङ्कते—**नन्विति**। **एवं**, अभिभवाङ्गिकारे। अथ घटज्ञानाच्चैकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिस्तर्हि कथं वाक्यार्थज्ञानादनिवृत्तिः, उभयोरपि ज्ञानत्वाविशेषादत आह[1]—**स्वविषयेति**। घटमात्रविशेष्यघटत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्यापि प्रमात्वमव्याहतं तत्राह—**महावाक्यार्थेति**। प्रातीतिकस्याधिष्ठानज्ञानबाध्यत्ववत् व्यावहारिकस्यापि ब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्यत्वात् घटादिज्ञानानां बाधितविषयत्वेनाप्रामाण्यं[2], ब्रह्मज्ञानं तु न तथा, ब्रह्मणः कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वादित्याशयेनोक्तं—**वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्यैवाबाधितविषयतया प्रमात्वादिति**[3]। ब्रह्मज्ञानातिरिक्तस्याप्रमात्वे जगति प्रमाव्यवहारोच्छेदस्तत्राह—**प्रत्यक्षादीनां त्विति**। विशेष्यावृत्तिप्रकारकत्वादिरूपप्रामाण्यमादाय प्रामाण्यव्यवहार इत्यपि बोध्यम्। ननु घटादिज्ञानानामप्रामाण्येनानाशकत्वे ज्ञानाज्ञानयोर्नाश्यनाशकभावः कुतः क्लृप्तः यद्बलाद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्याज्ञाननाशकत्वं कल्प्यते तत्राह—**ज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तेरिति**। **स्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात्**, जीवन्मुक्तानुभवसिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः। ज्ञानादज्ञानानिवृत्तौ अज्ञानमूलकसंसारानुच्छेद इत्याह—**अन्यथानुपपत्तेश्चेति**। स्वोक्तसम्पादनाय खण्डनकारिकामवतारयति—**अन्यथेति**। **पिनष्टि** नाशयति, पिष्लृ संचूर्णने इति धातोर्निष्पन्नत्वेन नाशार्थत्वात्। सम्प्रदायमनुरुन्ध्याह—**अथवेति**। तर्हि एकेन ज्ञानेन एकाज्ञाननाशे सद्यो मुक्तिप्रसङ्गस्तत्राह—**मूलाज्ञानस्येति**। एवं च मूलाज्ञानस्यानाशात् एकस्यावस्थाज्ञानस्य नाशेऽप्यपरावस्थाज्ञानसत्वाच्च न सद्यो मोक्षप्रसङ्गो न वा सर्वदा घटस्य भानमिति भावः। प्रघट्टकार्थमुपसंहरति—**घटादिज्ञानेनेति**। **न काचिदनुपपत्तिरिति**, न सद्यो मोक्षप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः। अथवा एकेन घटादिज्ञानेन एकावस्थाज्ञाननाशे सर्वदाघटादेर्भानं स्यात्, आवरकान्तराभावात्तत्राह—**घटादिज्ञानेनेति**। एकाज्ञाननाशेऽप्यज्ञानान्तरसत्त्वात्[4] न घटादेः सर्वदाभानप्रसङ्ग इति भावः। एवमप्यस्मिन्पक्षे घटाकारादिवृत्तिसत्त्वे अवस्थाज्ञानरूपावरकान्तरसत्त्वेन एकस्य मणेर्नाशेऽप्यपरमणिसत्त्वे दाहानुत्पत्तिवत् घटादिव्यवहारानुदयप्रसङ्गात् वृत्त्यभावसहकृता[5]वस्थाज्ञानस्यावरकत्वावश्यकत्वं वक्तव्यम्। तथा च पूर्वोक्तरीत्यैवोपपत्तौ, अलमनन्ताज्ञानकल्पनेन इति नव्याः। यदि च ज्ञानप्रागभावस्थानीयत्वेनाज्ञानमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति तन्न निवारयामः। यदि वा वाक्यार्थज्ञानादपि मूलाज्ञाननाशस्य दुरुपपादत्वापत्तेः प्रमाऽज्ञानयोर्नाश्यना-

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१. क₁खपुस्तकयोः कथं वाक्यार्थज्ञानादुभयोरपि ज्ञानत्वाविशेषादत आह इति।

२. क₁पुस्तके बाधितविषयत्वेन प्रामाण्यमिति पाठः स न युक्तः।

३. वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य चाबाधितविषयकत्वेन प्रामाण्यमिति टीकायास्त्रिष्वपि हस्तलेखेषु मूले तु उपरि मुद्रितं तथैव।

४. तस्मिन्नेव अज्ञानान्तरभावादिति।

५. खपुस्तके प्रसङ्गवृत्त्यभावसहकृता इति।

शकभावबलादज्ञानमिच्छन्ति तदपि न निराकुर्मः। किन्तु घटादिज्ञानेनाज्ञाननाशे सद्यो मुक्तिप्रसङ्ग इत्यभिमतमभिधाय यदवस्थाज्ञानाङ्गीकरणं तत्किमर्थमिति न जानीम इति दिक्।

ननु, अनुमानादिभिरावरणं निवर्तते न वा। आद्ये साक्षात्कारिभ्रमस्यापि शङ्खपीतत्वादेः श्वेतत्वाद्यनुमानादिना निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, अधिष्ठानाज्ञानोपादानकत्वेन भ्रमस्य तन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तेः। यौक्तिकज्ञानेन च ब्रह्मण्यविद्यानिवृत्तेः साक्षात्कारार्थं श्रवणमननाद्यपेक्षणं न स्यात्। द्वितीये च वह्न्यादिव्यवहारो न स्यात्, प्रतिबन्धकस्य विद्यमानत्वात्। उच्यते—द्विविधमावरणम्, एकमसत्त्वापादकमन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नसाक्षिनिष्ठम्, अन्यद्भानापादकं विषयावच्छिन्नब्रह्मचैतन्यनिष्ठं, घटमहं न जानामीत्युभयावच्छेदानुभवात्। तत्राद्यं परोक्षापरोक्षसाधारणप्रमामात्रेण निवर्तते। अनुमितेऽपि वह्न्यादौ नास्तीति प्रत्ययानुदयात्[1]। द्वितीयं तु साक्षात्कारेणैव निवर्तते। यन्निष्ठं यदाकारं ज्ञानं तन्निष्ठं तदाकारमज्ञानं नाशयतीति नियमात्[2], परोक्षापरोक्षनिष्ठत्वात्[3]। तदुक्तम् (पञ्च. ७.४५)—

परोक्षज्ञानतो नश्येदसत्त्वावृत्तिहेतुता।
अपरोक्षधिया नश्येद्भानावृत्तिहेतुता॥

तेनानुमानादेरसत्त्वावरणनाशात्[4] तत्र तद्व्यवहारः। अभानावरणनिवृत्त्या च सोपाधिकसाक्षात्कारिभ्रमनिवृत्तिरिति। तस्मान्निर्धर्मकस्याप्यात्मनोऽविद्यान्तःकरणतादात्म्याध्यासात्तद्धर्मकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाद्यध्यास उपपद्यते।

प्रकृतं समाप्य विचारान्तरमारभते—**नन्विति**। **आद्य इति**। अज्ञानं निवर्तत इति पक्ष इत्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह—**अधिष्ठान इति**। दूषणान्तरमाह—**यौक्तिक इति**। अज्ञानं न निवर्तत इति पक्षमाह—**द्वितीय इति**। वह्न्यादिव्यवहाराभावे हेतुमाह—**प्रतिबन्धकस्येति**। आवरकस्याज्ञानस्येत्यर्थः। **अस-**

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१. खगयोः प्रतीत्यनुदयादिति पाठः।

२. खपुस्तके यदाश्रयं यदाकारं ज्ञानं तदाश्रयं तदाकारमज्ञानं नाशयतीति। कपुस्तके यन्निष्ठा यदाकारा च वृत्तिर्भवति तन्निष्ठं तदाकारमज्ञानं नश्यतीति।

३. कपुस्तके परोक्षवृत्तेश्चान्तर्धीसमुल्लासमात्रत्वेन विषयनिष्ठत्वाभावादपरोक्षवृत्तेश्च विषयान्तःकरणोभयजन्यत्वेन तदुभयनिष्ठत्वादिति।

४. खगपुस्तकयोरनुमानादावसत्त्वावरणनाशादिति।

त्वापादकमिति । असत्त्वं, सत्त्वाभावः । एवं च इदमत्र नास्तीति प्रत्ययापादकमावरणमित्यर्थः । **अभानापादकमिति** । ज्ञानं अपरोक्षज्ञानं तदभावोऽभानं तदापादकं, तथा चाप्रत्यक्षत्वापादकमावरणमित्यर्थः । ननु, कीदृशं ज्ञानं कीदृशमज्ञानं नाशयति तत्राह—**यन्निष्ठमिति** । **तदुक्तं**, वार्त्तिककारपादैः[1] इत्यर्थः । साक्षात्कारिशंखपीतत्वादिभ्रमोऽपि निवर्तते तत्राह—**अभानावरणेति** । अविद्यया कर्तृत्वादिभाक् परमार्थतो निर्धर्मक इत्यौपनिषदमते यदुक्तं प्राक् तदिदानीमुपपादयति—**तस्मादिति** । **तादात्म्येति** । तादात्म्येनान्तःकरणाध्यासादित्यर्थः ।

ननु त्वन्मतेऽनिर्वचनीयख्यात्यभ्युगमात्, ये कर्तृत्वादयोऽन्तःकरणधर्मा आत्मन्यध्यस्यन्ते तेऽनिर्वचनीयास्तत्रोत्पद्यन्त इति वक्तव्यम्। तथा च व्यावहारिकप्रातीतिकभेदेन कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादीनां द्वैधावभासः स्यात्। न स्यात्, तादात्म्याभिमानेनाविवेकात्। सकलधर्मविशिष्टस्यैवान्तःकरणस्यात्मन्ययस्तत्वेन द्वयाभावाद्वा। तस्मादेकस्यैवात्मन उपाधिभेदेन प्रमात्रादिव्यवस्थोपपत्तेर्न सौगतमतापत्तिर्न वा विरोधः। अन्यापि व्यवस्थाः स्पष्टतरमुपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यन्ते। तस्माज्ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यात्मनः सुषुप्तावव्यभिचाराद्देहेन्द्रियादीनां च व्यभिचाराद्दृश्यत्वाच्च तत्र तत्रात्मबुद्धिस्तेषां तेषां वादिनां भ्रान्तिरित्यौपनिषदमतमेव प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥ १ ॥

ननु यथा व्यावहारिकं रजतमेकं, अपरं च प्रातीतिकं तथा कर्तृत्वादिकमप्युभयं वक्तव्यमित्याशङ्कते—**ननु त्वन्मत इति**। ये कर्तृत्वादय इति येषां धर्मा अध्यस्यन्ते ते तद्व्यावहारिका इति भावः । परिहरति—**न स्यादिति** । यदुक्तं द्विधावभासः स्यादिति तदपनुदति—**तादात्म्येति** । द्वितीयमेव नास्तीत्याह[2]—**सकलधर्मेति** । यदुक्तमेकस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमितिरूपता च विरुद्धा, अविरोधाभ्युपगमे वा सौगतमतापत्तिरिति तदपनुदति—**तस्मादेकस्यैवेति** । प्रथमोक्तस्य विरोधस्य **व्यवस्थोपपत्तेरित्यन्तेन** प्रथमो दूषितत्वान्न विरोध इत्यनुवादमात्रम् । एतेन प्रथममुक्तो विरोधः प्रथमतः किमिति न दूषित इत्यपास्तम् । परमप्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**तस्माज्ज्ञानस्वरूपस्येति** । इति प्रथमश्लोकविवरणम् ।

स्यादेतत्। आत्मनोनिर्धर्मकत्वे प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारस्याध्यासमूलत्वे च 'ब्राह्मणो यजेत' इत्येवमादीनां शास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः,

१. अयं श्लोको न वार्त्तिकेऽपि तु पञ्चदश्यामुपलभ्यते ।
२. क१पुस्तके द्वितीयेन नास्तीत्याह इति पाठः स न समीचीनः ।

अकर्तुरभोक्तुश्चात्मनः प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः, वेदाप्रामाण्ये च कुतो ब्रह्मसिद्धिरपि, तस्य तन्मात्रगम्यत्वात्, शास्त्रयोनित्वादिति न्यायात्। तथा च वेदप्रामाण्यार्थं प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारस्य सत्यत्वमभ्युपेयमित्याशङ्क्य, किं तत्त्वज्ञानात्पूर्वमप्रामाण्यमापद्यते ऊर्ध्वं वा। तत्राद्ये यावदविद्यानिवृत्तिव्यवस्थाया उपपादितत्वात्सर्वेषां प्रमाणानामविद्यावद्विषयत्वेन तद्दशायां बाधाभावान्निष्प्रत्यूहं प्रामाण्यम्। द्वितीये त्विष्टापत्तिरेवेत्याह—

न वर्णा न वर्णाश्रमाचारधर्मा
न मे धारणाध्यानयोगादयोऽपि।
अनात्माश्रयाहंममाध्यासहानात्
तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥ २ ॥

श्लोकार्थः। वर्णा ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियवैश्यशूद्राः। आश्रमाश्च ब्रह्मचारिगृहस्थवानप्रस्थभिक्षवः। आचाराः शौचस्नानादयः। धर्माः ब्रह्मचर्यगुरुसेवादयः। अत्र द्वन्द्वद्वयगर्भषष्ठितत्पुरुषेण वर्णानामाचाराः धर्माश्च आश्रमाणामप्याचाराः धर्माश्च लभ्यन्ते। धारणा ब्रह्मणि[1] बाह्यविषयत्यागेन मनसस्स्थैर्यम्। ध्यानं परमात्मचिन्तनम्। योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः[2]। आदिशब्देन श्रवणमननादयो गृह्यन्ते। सर्वेषां ज्ञानोत्तरकालमसत्त्वे हेतुमाह—अनात्माश्रयाहंममाध्यासहानादिति। अनात्मा आत्मविरोधिनी अविद्या, तदाश्रयस्तदुपादानो योऽहंममकाराद्यध्यासस्[3]तस्य समूलस्यापि तत्त्वज्ञानेन हानात् तत्प्रयुक्तवर्णाश्रमादिव्यवहारो नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ २ ॥

द्वितीयश्लोकावतरणिकामाह—**स्यादेतदित्यादिना**। उभयमभिप्रेत्याह—**ब्राह्मण इति**। निर्धर्मकस्यात्मनो ब्राह्मणत्वयागानुकूलकृत्यादीनां वैशिष्ट्यबोधनेन कृत्याक्षिप्तज्ञानेच्छादीनां बोधनेन च शास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यमध्यस्तबोधने च शुक्तिरजतबोधकवाक्यवदाहत्यैवाप्रामाण्यमित्यर्थः। निर्धर्मकत्वमभिप्रेत्याह—**अकर्तुरिति**। कर्ता हि स्वेष्टसाधनतामनुसन्धाय प्रवर्तते नाकर्ता, तथा च श्रवणादावपि

१. कपुस्तके ब्रह्मणि इत्येतच्छब्दो न वर्तते तथापि स आवश्यक इति खगयोर्गृहीतः।
२. तस्मिन्नेव चित्तवृत्तेर्निरोधः इति पाठः।
३. कपुस्तके योऽहंकारस्तदाश्रयो ममकाराद्यध्यासस्तस्य इति।

प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यादित्याशयः। ननु भवतु कर्मकाण्डाप्रामाण्यं किं तेन तत्राह—**वेदाप्रामाण्ये चेति**। कर्मकाण्डाप्रामाण्ये उपनिषदामप्यप्रामाण्यं वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथा अर्धजरतीयन्याय आपतेत्। किं चोपनिषद्भागमध्येऽपि बहून्युपासनाप्रतिपादकानि वाक्यानि। तेषां प्रामाण्यस्वीकारे किमप्यपराद्धं कर्मकाण्डेन। तथा च सर्ववेदस्याप्रामाण्यं वक्तव्यम्। तथा च न ब्रह्मसिद्धिरपीत्यर्थः। तन्मात्रगम्यत्वे बादरायणीयसूत्रं[1] प्रमाणत्वेनाह—**शास्त्रयोनित्वादिति**। अस्यार्थः यथोक्तं ऋग्वेदादिशास्त्रं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत् स्वरूपाधिगमे, शास्त्रादेव प्रामाण्याज्जगतो[2] जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्मावगम्यते इत्यनेन भगवता भाष्यकारेण प्रकटित इति बोध्यम्। अयमर्थः कुतो लब्ध इत्यत आह—**अत्र द्वन्द्व इति**। वर्णाश्च आश्रमाश्च आचाराश्च धर्माश्च वर्णाश्रमाचारधर्माः वर्णाश्रमाणामाचारधर्माः इत्यर्थः। पतञ्जलिसूत्रेण योगपदार्थं व्याख्याति—**योग इति**। **आत्मविरोधिनी,** आत्मबोधविरोधिनी। इति द्वितीयः श्लोकः।

वर्णाश्रमादिव्यवहारस्य मिथ्याज्ञानमात्रमूलत्वेन मिथ्यात्वं द्रढयितुं तद्व्यतिरेके सुषुप्तौ, व्यतिरेकमाह—

न माता पिता वा न देवा न लोका
न वेदा न यज्ञा न तीर्थं ब्रुवन्ति।
सुषुप्तौ निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वात्
तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम्॥ ३॥

श्लोकार्थः। माता जनकस्त्री। पिता जनकः पुमान्। देवा इन्द्रादयः आराध्याः। लोकास्तदाराधनफलानि स्वर्गादीनि। वेदाः अलौकिकहिताहितसाधनप्रतिपादकानि ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकानि च प्रमाणवाक्यानि[3]। यज्ञाः स्वर्गादिसाधनीभूता ज्योतिष्टोमादयः। तीर्थं यज्ञसाधनीभूतः कुरुक्षेत्रादिदेशः। एवं पापकर्मसाधनान्यप्युपलक्षणीयानि। सर्वेषां देहाभिमानमूलकत्वात्[4] तदभावे स्वतःसम्बन्धाभावाद्-

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१. खगयोर्बादरायणप्रणीतमिति पाठः।

२. गपुस्तके प्रमाणादिति।

३. कपुस्तके वेदाः लौकिकप्रमाणाः प्रतिपन्नहिताहितसाधनप्रमाणवाक्यानि इति।

४. कपुस्तके सर्वेषां प्राणिनां पुण्यपापाभ्यां सम्बन्धस्य देहाभिमानमूलत्वादिति पाठः।

विद्यमानतेत्यर्थः। तथा च सुषुप्तिं प्रकृत्य श्रुतिः—'अत्र पिताऽपिता भवति माताऽमाता देवा अदेवा वेदा अवेदाः स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति भ्रूणहाऽभ्रूणहा चाण्डालोऽचाण्डालः पौल्कसोऽपौल्कसः श्रमणोऽश्रमणस्तापसोऽतापसोऽनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान् हृदयस्य भवति' (बृ. आ. ४।३।२२) इत्याद्या अभिमानाभावे सर्वानर्थनिवृत्तिमनुवदन्ति।

तृतीयश्लोकावतारणिकामाह—**वर्णाश्रमादीति**। पितुरपेक्षया मातुरभ्यर्हितत्वादादावाह—**न मातेति**। तदर्थमाह—**माता जनकस्त्रीति**। प्रमाणवाक्यानीत्युपलक्षणं तदुपजीविनामर्थवादवाक्यादीनां तथा च चत्वारो वेदा इत्यर्थः। अथवा, चतुर्ष्वेव वेदेषु यानि प्रमाणवाक्यानि तानि चेन्न सन्ति तर्हि का कथाऽर्थवादानामित्याशयः। **यज्ञा इति**। एतेन तत्साध्यमपूर्वादिकमपि व्याख्यातम्। **एवं पापकर्मेति**। पापकर्माभावात् कुतः पापं तदभावाच्च कुतो नरकादिकमित्यनुसन्धेयम्। एतेषामभावे हेतुमाह—**सर्वेषामिति**। आचार्योक्तमर्थमतिप्रामाणिकीकर्तुं बृहदारण्यकश्रुतिमुदाहरति—**तथा चेत्यादिना**। **अनन्वागतमिति**। असम्बद्धमित्यर्थः।

ननु, सर्वव्यवहाराभावे शून्यतैव स्यात्। न, इत्याह—निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वादिति। निरस्तमतिशून्यात्मकत्वं यस्मात्तत्तथा। भावप्रधानो निर्देशः। तस्य सुषुप्तिसाधकत्वात्पुनरुत्थानानुपपत्तेश्च। 'अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनुच्छित्तिधर्मा' (बृ. आ. ४।५।१४), 'मात्रा संसर्गस्त्वस्य भवति', 'यद्वैतन्न पश्यति पश्यन्वैतन्न पश्यति' (सैव ४।३।२३), 'न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते, अविनाशित्वात्, न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत्' (सैव) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्चात्मचैतन्यस्य न सुषुप्तौ शून्यतेत्यर्थः। निराकृतमप्येतत्पुनरपि स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन निराक्रियते। यद्वा निरस्तमशनायाद्यतीतमद्वितीयमतिशून्यं यद्ब्रह्म तदात्मकत्वात्। तथा च श्रुतिः—'यदा पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति, तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम् एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम्' (छां.


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१. क₁ पुस्तके अर्थवादऊंफडादीनामिति।

२. खगयोरतिशून्यनिर्धर्मकं यद्ब्रह्म इति।

६।८।१) इति । तेन जगत्कारणीभूतसर्वज्ञसर्वशक्तिपरिपूर्णानन्द-बोधरूपेण ब्रह्मणा सहैकत्वादसंसार्येव जीव इति सिद्धम् ॥ ३ ॥

यस्मादिति । चैतन्यादित्यर्थः । बृहदारण्यकश्रुतिमाह—**अविनाशी वा इति । मात्रेति ।** मीयते इति मात्राशब्दस्तेनासम्बन्ध इत्यर्थः । **यद्वै इति ।** वै, अव्ययम् । तत्तदा सुषुप्तौ यन्न पश्यतीत्यन्वयः । अतिशून्यात्मकत्वाभावे ग्रन्थकारः स्वातन्त्र्येण हेतुमाह—**तस्येत्यादिना ।** तस्य, चैतन्यस्य । न खमित्यादिना प्रथमश्लोके शून्यवादस्य निराकृतत्वात् पौनरुक्त्यमित्याशङ्क्याह—**निराकृतमपीति ।** उक्तपौनरुक्त्यभिया प्रकारान्तरेण व्याकरोति—**यद्वा इति । अतिशून्यमिति ।** 'कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म' इति श्रुत्या खशब्दस्य ब्रह्मवाचकत्ववद[1]तिशून्यपदस्यापि ब्रह्मवाचकत्वमित्यर्थः । अनेन यज्जीवस्य ब्रह्मभाव उक्तस्तत्र बृहदारण्यकश्रुतिं प्रमाणयति—**तथा च श्रुतिरिति । सता इति ।** सच्छब्दवाच्येन ब्रह्मणा इत्यर्थः । श्लोकश्रुत्योस्तात्पर्यमाह—**तेन जगत्कारणीभूतेति ।** इति तृतीयः श्लोकः ।



१ क, पुस्तके ब्रह्मवाचकत्वादिति पाठः स न समीचीनः ।

द्वितीयो विभागः ।

तत्पदार्थनिर्णयः ।

एवं तावत् त्रिभिः श्लोकैः वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणपूर्वकं त्वम्पदार्थौ निर्धारितः[1] । सम्प्रति तत्पदार्थस्तथैव निर्धारणीयः । तत्र निराकरणीया वादिविप्रतिपत्तयः प्रदर्श्यन्ते । ननु, न ब्रह्मणा सह जीवस्यैक्यमुपपद्यते[2] । तथा हि सच्छब्दवाच्यं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म 'सदेव सोम्य इदमग्र आसीत्' (छां. ६।२।१) इत्यादिवाक्येन प्रतिपादितम् । जगत्कारणं च प्रधानमचेतनमिति साङ्ख्याः । पशुपतिरेव जगत्कारणम्, स च चेतनोऽपि जीवाद्भिन्नः स उपास्य एवेति पाशुपताः । भगवान्वासुदेव ईश्वरो जगत्कारणम्, तस्मादुत्पद्यते सङ्कर्षणाख्यो जीवः, तस्मान्मनः प्रद्युम्नः, ततोऽहङ्कारोऽनिरुद्धः, तेन कार्यत्वाज्जीवस्य तेन सह न ब्रह्मणो वासुदेवस्यात्यन्ताभेद इति पाञ्चरात्रिकाः । परिणामी नित्यः सर्वज्ञो भिन्नाभिन्न इति जैनास्त्रिदण्डिनश्च । नास्ति सर्वज्ञाद्युपेतं ब्रह्म, आम्नायस्य क्रियापरत्वेन तत्र तात्पर्याभावात्, किन्तु वाग्धेन्वादिवत् सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणविशिष्टतया जगत्कारणं परमाण्वादि वा जीवो वा उपास्य इति मीमांसकाः । अस्ति नित्यज्ञानादिमानीश्वरः सर्वज्ञः पृथिव्यादिकार्यलिङ्गानुमितः, स च जीवाद्भिन्न एवेति तार्किकाः । क्षणिकः सर्वज्ञ इति सौगताः । क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टो नित्यज्ञानरूपः प्रधानांशसत्त्वगुणप्रतिफलिततया सर्वज्ञः संसारिपुरुषविलक्षण एवेति पातञ्जलाः । अद्वितीयपरमानन्द एव ब्रह्म, तच्च जीवस्य वास्तवं स्वरूपं मायया च सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टं जगदुपादानं निमित्तं चेति औपनिषदाः ।

ननु, उक्तक्रमेण सिद्धे जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्ये जीवस्यासंसारित्वे च अलं न साङ्ख्यमित्याद्युत्तरश्लोकेन इत्याशङ्क्याह—**एवं तावदिति** । न साङ्ख्यमित्यादिश्लोकमवतारयितुं तन्निरस्याशङ्कामाह—**नन्विति** । अथ मदभिमतमेव त्वयोदाहृतं न तु

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१. खगयोर्निर्धारयितव्य इति ।

२. तयोरेव ऐक्यमभ्युपपद्यत इति ।

मदनभिमतं जीवब्रह्मणोरनैक्यप्रतिपादकं वाक्यं[1] तत्राह—**जगत्कारणं च प्रधानमिति**। एवं च न चेतनाचेतनयोरैक्यमिति सुचिरं विभाव्य संतोष्टव्यमायुष्मन्नभवदनभिमतमुक्तम्, अनुक्तं चेति भावः[2]। एवमैक्याभावे पाशुपतमतमुदाहरति—**पशुपतिरेवेति**। न हि कचित् श्रुतमुपपद्यते वा उपास्योपासकयोरैक्येन उपासनेति भावः। ऐक्याभावसाधकत्वेन मतान्तरमाह—**भगवानित्यादिना**। ननु, भवत्वेवं तथापि जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्याभावे किं साधकमत आह—**तेन कार्यत्वादिति**। **नित्य इति**। परिणामी नित्यस्य शुद्धजीवेन सहात्यन्ताभेदाभावादस्मिन्मतेऽपि न जीवब्रह्मणोरत्यन्ताभेदसिद्धिरिति भावः।—**नास्तीति**। एवं च केन सहाभेदः, न हि शशविषाणेन सह कस्यचिद्भेद इति कश्चिद्वदतीति भावः। आदिपदग्राह्यमाह—**अस्तीति**। अत्यन्तभिन्नयोरभेदे गजगगनयोरप्यभेदः स्यात्, अतो न जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यमिति भावः। **क्षणिक इति**। न हि क्षणिककूटस्थयोरभेदस्ततो न जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यमिति भावः।—**क्लेशकर्मेति**। न हि वास्तवसर्वज्ञत्ववास्तवाज्ञयोरभेद इति भावः।—**अद्वितीय इति**। ननु, भवन्मते जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यं कथं सर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिन्मात्रज्ञत्वादिरूपवैधर्म्यादत आह—**माययेति**। एवं च सर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादीनां मायिकत्वेनावास्तवत्वमित्यर्थः।

एवं वादिविप्रतिपत्तिभिः सन्दिग्धे तत्पदार्थे औपनिषदपक्षस्य परिशेषेण तन्निर्णयायाह भगवान्—

न साङ्ख्यं न शैवं न तत्पाञ्चरात्रं
न जैनं न मीमांसकादेर्मतं वा।
विशिष्टानुभूत्या विशुद्धात्मकत्वात्
तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥ ४ ॥

* आदिशब्देनानुक्तानां सङ्ग्रहः। न तावदचेतनं जगदुपादानम्, 'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (छां. ६।२।३) इति ईक्षणपूर्वकसृष्टिश्रवणात्, 'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छां. ६।३।२) इति जीवात्मत्वव्यपदेशात्, 'यस्मिन्विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति' (मुं. १।१।३) इति चैकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रति-

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१. क१पुस्तके जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यप्रतिपादकत्वमिति।

२. गपुस्तकेऽनुक्तं वेति भाव इति।

ज्ञानात्, प्रधानज्ञानेन च तद्प्रकृतिकानां पुरुषाणां ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्, 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि' (छां. ६।८।७) इति च तद्भेदस्य नवकृत्वोपदेशात्, 'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः' (तै. २।१) इति श्रुत्यन्तरादचेतनस्य जगत्कारणत्वे विचित्ररचनानुपपत्तेः, प्रधानमहदादेरप्रामाणिकत्वाच्च न साङ्ख्यमतं साधु। एवं पाशुपतं पाञ्चरात्रिकं जैनं च मतं श्रुतियुक्तिबाधितत्वादयुक्तम्। न च विधिशेषत्वाच्छ्रुतिर्न ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयतीति मीमांसकमतं युक्तमसिद्धत्वाद्विधिशेषत्वस्य। न चार्थवादाधिकरणन्यायाद्विधिशेषत्वम्, वैषम्यात्। स्वतःप्रयोजनवदर्थप्रतिपादकानां 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता' (तै. सं. २।१।१।१) इत्येवमादीनां स्वाध्यायविधिग्रहणान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रयोजनवदर्थपरत्वे कल्पनीये शब्दभावनेतिकर्तव्यतांशसाकांक्षस्य विधेः सम्प्रदानभूतदेवतादिस्तुतिद्वारेण तदंशपूरकत्वान्नष्टाश्वदग्धरथन्यायेन तदुभयैकवाक्यता इत्यर्थवादाधिकरणे निर्णीतम्। वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यज्ञानाच्च साक्षादेव परमानन्दप्राप्तिर्निःशेषदुःखनिवृत्तिश्च पुरुषार्थो लभ्यत इति निराकांक्षत्वान्नान्यशेषत्वसम्भावना, प्रत्युत विधय एवान्तःकरणशुद्धिद्वारा तच्छेषतां भजन्त इति। तस्मात्प्रयोजनवदबाधिताज्ञातज्ञापकत्वेन वेदान्तानां स्वत एव प्रामाण्यादस्त्येव ब्रह्मेति न मीमांसकमतसिद्धिः। तार्किकादीनां च मतं 'तत्त्वमसि' (छां. ६।८।७), 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' (बृ. आ. १।४।१०), 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (सैव. २।५।१९), 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१) इत्यादिश्रुतिबाधितम्, 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' (छां. ६।२।१), 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' (बृ. आ. ४।४।१९) इत्यादिश्रुतिबाधितं च। भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं क्षणिकत्वं च 'आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्यः' इत्यादिश्रुतिबाधितम्। अत्र च सर्वेषां मतस्यासत्त्वे प्रतिज्ञाते विशुद्धात्मकत्वादिति हेतुः। निर्विकल्पकाद्वितीयचैतन्यरूपत्वादित्यर्थः। अत्र हेतुः विशिष्टानुभूत्येति। विशिष्टा सविकल्पकानुभूतिभ्यो व्यावृत्ता या तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्याखण्डानुभूतिस्तयेत्यर्थः। तेन सर्वव्यापकमद्वितीयं परमानन्दबोधरूपं च ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम्॥ ४॥

उक्तमतदूषणाय चतुर्थश्लोकमवतारयति—**एवं वादीति**। क्रमप्राप्तं साङ्ख्यमतं प्रथमतो दूषयति—**न तावदचेतनमिति**। छान्दोग्यवाक्येन समाधत्ते—**तदैक्ष-**

तेति। पुनश्छान्दोग्यवाक्येन दूषणमाह—**अनेनेति**। **जीवात्मनेति** सामानाधिकरण्याज्जीवात्मलाभादचेतनप्रधानव्युदास इति भावः। 'कस्मिन्नु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति' इत्यादिना यदेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुक्तं मुण्डके तद्विरुद्धं भवति प्रधानोपादानकत्व इत्याह—**यस्मिन्नित्यादिना**। विरोधं प्रकटयति—**प्रधानेति**। छान्दोग्यवाक्यमाह—**ऐतदात्म्यमिति**। तैत्तिरीयकवाक्यमुदाहरति—**तस्माद्वा इति**। युक्तिमाह—**अचेतनस्येति**। साङ्ख्यमतदूषणमुपसंहरति—**प्रधानेति। अप्रामाणिकत्वादिति**। प्रमाणं, वेदः, तदबोधितत्वादित्यर्थः। मतत्रयमेकदूषणेन दूषयितुमाह—**एवमिति**। श्रुतिरत्र 'तत्त्वमसि,' 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि', 'तद्ब्रह्माहमिति ज्ञात्वा सर्वबन्धैः प्रमुच्यते', 'नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन' 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' इत्यादिका। युक्तिश्च, लाघवादभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानकत्ववत् चैतन्यैक्ये सिद्धे तस्य चौपाधिकभेदेनैव व्यवस्थोपपत्तौ वास्तवभेदकल्पनमयुक्तं, कूटस्थचैतन्यस्य मायां विना जगत्कारणत्वानुपपत्तिः, तद्वज्जीवस्यापि कर्तृत्वादेः सत्यत्वेऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्ग इत्यादिका। भिन्नाभिन्न इति पक्षे च विरुद्धयोर्भेदतदभावयोरेकत्रासत्वादेतदन्ययोर्भेदाभेदयोरङ्गीकारे परिभाषामात्रत्वाचेत्यनुसन्धेयम्। मीमांसकमतमनूद्य दूषयति—**न च विधीत्यादिना**। तर्हि अर्थवादाधिकरणविरोध इत्याशङ्क्य परिहरति—**न चेत्यादिना**। 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानां तस्मादनित्यमित्युच्यते' इत्यत्र कार्यपरवाक्यानां सप्रयोजनानामेव प्रामाण्यं, तदितरेषां निष्प्रयोजनानामर्थवादादीनामप्रामाण्यमित्याशङ्क्य गुणवादस्त्वित्यादिना विधिस्तावकतया प्रयोजनसाकाङ्क्षाणामर्थवादादीनां प्रामाण्यमित्यर्थवादाधिकरणे सिद्धं, अतस्तद्विरोध इत्यर्थः। तत्र प्रयोजनविरहिणामप्रामाण्यप्रतिपादनेऽपि नात्र तथा, परमपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिसाधनत्वादात्मज्ञानस्यैवेत्याह[1]—**वैषम्यादित्यादिना**। न केवलमन्यशेषता किन्तु वैपरीत्यमपीत्याह—**प्रत्युतेति। तार्किकादीनां चेति**। आदिपदात्पूर्वमनुक्तमपि वैशेषिकमतम्, उक्तं च पातञ्जलमतं ग्राह्यम्। पातञ्जलमतस्यापि एता उक्ताः श्रुतयो बाधिकास्तन्मते जीवेश्वरजगतां सत्यत्वादिति। **'तत्त्वमसि'** इति छान्दोग्यस्थम्। **'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि'** इति बृहदारण्यकस्थं। **'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म'** इति च। **'सत्यं ज्ञानं'** इति तैत्तिरीयकस्थम्। जैनत्रिदण्डिनो मतं दूषयति—**एकमिति**। इदं वाक्यं छान्दोग्यस्थम्। **'नेह नाना'** इति बृहदारण्यकस्थं मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यमित्यादि। सौगतमतमपाकरोति—**क्षणिकत्वं चेति**। आदिपदात् 'नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिकं ग्राह्यम्। ज्ञातस्य क्षणिकत्वकल्पनेऽनन्तकोटिज्ञानतद्धंसादिकल्पनमपि बाधकम्। श्रुतिप्रामाण्यं चापौरुषेयत्वेन दोष-

१. खगयोरात्मज्ञानस्येव इति पाठः स न युक्तः।

वत्पुरुषाप्रणीतत्वादास्तिकनास्तिकसाधारणतया साधितमित्यवधेयम् । विशिष्टशब्दस्य व्यावृत्त्यर्थकत्वाभिप्रायेणार्थमाह—**विशिष्टेति** । (इति) चतुर्थः श्लोकः ।

ननु 'स य एषोऽणिमा' (छां. ६।८।१९), 'अणोरणीयान्' (तै. आ. १०।१२।१, कठ. १।२।२०, श्वेता. ३।२०) इति ब्रह्मणोऽणुत्व-श्रुतेः, 'अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः' (कठ. २।४।१२), 'आराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोपि दृष्टः' (श्वेता. ५।८) इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रतिपादिताणुजीवाभिन्नत्वाच न ब्रह्मणः सर्वव्यापकत्वमित्याशङ्क्य 'ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात् ब्रह्म पश्चात् ब्रह्म दक्षिणतश्चोत्तरेण । अधश्चोर्ध्वं च प्रसृतं ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्व-मिदं वरिष्ठम्' (मुं. २।२।११), 'तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम्' (बृ. आ. २।५।११) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयो निर्विशेषमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपादय-न्तीति पूर्वोक्तमेव द्रढयन्नाह—

न चोर्ध्वं न चाधो न चान्तर्न बाह्यं
न मध्यं न तिर्यङ् न पूर्वापरा दिक् ।
वियद्व्यापकत्वादखण्डैकरूप-
स्तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥ ५ ॥

श्लोकार्थः । वियद्व्यापकत्वात् वियद्वद्व्यापकत्वात् 'आकाशवत्सर्व-गतश्च नित्य' इति श्रुतेः, वियतो व्यापकत्वादिति वा 'ज्यायानाका-शात्' (शत. ब्रा. १०।६।३।२), 'महतो महीयान्' (कठ. २।२०) इ-त्यादिश्रुतेः । जीवस्यापि[1] सकलदेहव्यापिचैतन्योपलब्ध्या महत्त्वेऽपि, उपाधिधर्माध्यासेनाराग्रमात्रत्वाभिधानात्, 'बुद्धेर्गुणेनात्मगुणेन चैव ह्याराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोऽपि दृष्टः' (श्वेता. ५।८) इति श्रुतेर्ब्रह्मणश्च सूक्ष्मत्वाभिप्रायेणाणुत्वव्यपदेशात् । शेषमतिरोहितार्थम् ॥ ५ ॥

पञ्चमश्लोकमवतारयति—**नन्वित्यादिना । स (य) एष** इति बृहदारण्य-कस्थम् (? छान्दोग्यस्थम्), **अणोरणीयान्** इति तु श्वेताश्वतरतृतीयाध्यायस्थम् । कठवल्लीप्रथमाध्यायस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽणुत्वप्रतिपादिकां श्रुतिमुदाहृत्य जीवाणुत्वप्रतिपा-दिकां श्रुतिमाह—**अङ्गुष्ठमात्र इति** । इदं च वाक्यं श्वेताश्वतरस्थं कठव-ल्लीस्थं च । **वियद्व्यापकत्वादिति** । व्याकरोति—वियद्(वद्)व्यापकत्वात्

१. क१पुस्तके जीवस्येति ।

इति । **आराग्रमात्र** इति च श्वेताश्वतरपञ्चमाध्यायस्थम् । इदमेव साधयति—**आकाशवदिति** । न चाकाशदृष्टान्तेनात्मनः सर्वगतत्वादिसाधने आकाशस्यापि नित्यत्वमापतितं तथा च द्वैतापत्तिरिति वाच्यं, यावत्कालस्थायित्वरूपनित्यत्वेऽपि[1] कालनाशोत्तरं तस्य नाशेन द्वैतापत्तेः । न चैवं ब्रह्मणोऽपि नाशः स्यादिति वाच्यं 'अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मा' इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधात् । एकस्य वाक्यस्योभयपरत्वे वाक्यभेदापत्तेः । वस्तुतस्तु नेदं वाक्यमाकाशनित्य(त्व)प्रतिपादकतर्कपरमपि[2] तु तदर्थापत्तिः । सा द्वैतश्रुतिः, आकाशोत्पत्तिविरोधकश्रुतिजन्यस्य भावस्य विनाशप्रतिपादकतर्कसहकृत 'ज्यायानाकाशात्' इत्यादिश्रुत्या, पराहता इति दिक्[3] । तत्पदाध्याहारापरितोषमाशङ्क्याह—**वियतो व्यापकत्वादिति वेति** । बृहदारण्यकवाक्यमाह—**ज्यायानिति** । श्वेताश्वतरकठवल्लीस्थमाह—**महत इति** । मध्यमपरिणामत्वे विनाशित्वापत्तिरतः 'अङ्गुष्ठमात्र' श्रुतिमुपेत्य 'आराग्रमात्र' श्रुतितर्कविरोधेनोपचारितया व्याकरोति—**जीवस्यापीति** । उपचारे बीजमाह—**बुद्धेर्गुणेनेति** । ब्रह्मणोऽणुत्वप्रतिपादकायाश्च 'य एषोऽणिमा' इत्यादिश्रुतेरविरोधमाह—**ब्रह्मणश्चेति** । इति पञ्चमः श्लोकः ।

ननु[4], ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वादुपादानोपादेययोश्चाभेदाद्विचित्रजगदभिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मणः दुःखरूपत्वात् न तदभिन्नत्वेन जीवस्य परमपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिरित्याशङ्क्य ब्रह्मणः स्वप्रकाशपरमानन्दरूपत्वान्निखिलजगद्भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वेन कारणत्वव्यपदेशादध्यस्तेन च समं सम्बन्धाभावान्न[5] तत्रानर्थलेशोप्यस्तीत्याह—

न शुक्लं न कृष्णं न रक्तं न पीतं
न कुब्जं न पीनं न ह्रस्वं न दीर्घम् ।
अरूपं तथा ज्योतिराकारकत्वात्
तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥ ६ ॥

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१. गपुस्तके नित्यत्वे सत्त्वेऽपीति ।

२. क१खपुस्तकयोः प्रतिपादकमिति ।

३. क१पुस्तके नित्यत्वप्रतिपादकमपि तु तदर्थो या आकाशोत्पत्तिबाधकश्रुतिः जन्यभावस्य जनकस्य च विनाशप्रतिपादकतर्कसहकृत 'ज्यायानाकाशा'दित्यादिश्रुत्या पराहता इति दिक् इति पाठः स न सम्यगर्थबोधकः । गपुस्तके विनाशप्रतिपादकतर्कसहकृत इत्येतत्समासो न वर्तते ।

४. खगयोर्ननु स्यादेतद्ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वादिति ।

५. गपुस्तके अध्यस्तेन च सह सम्बन्धाभावादिति ।

कुब्जमणु। पीनं महत्। तेनाणु महत् ह्रस्वं दीर्घं चेति चतुर्विधपरिमाणनिषेधात् द्रव्यत्वप्रतिषेधः[1]। रूप्यत इति रूपं प्रमेयम्। न प्रमेयं अरूपम्। तेन सर्वेषामेव द्रव्यगुणकर्मादिपदार्थानां तत्तद्वाद्यभ्युपगतानां निषेधः। तथा च श्रुतयः—'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घमलोहितम्' (बृ. आ. ३।८।८) इत्याद्याः 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत्' (कठ. १।३।१५) इत्याद्याश्च सर्वानर्थशून्यं परमात्मस्वरूपं प्रतिपादयन्ति। श्रौतस्याप्यर्थस्य न्यायेन निर्णयाय हेतुमाह–ज्योतिराकारकत्वादिति। स्वप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वेनाप्रमेयत्वात्, प्रमेयत्वे घटादिवज्जडत्वापत्तेः, 'एतदप्रमेयं ध्रुवम्' (बृ. आ. ४।४।२०) इत्यादिश्रुतेश्चेत्यर्थः॥ ६॥

षष्ठं श्लोकमवतारयति[2]—**नन्वित्यादिना**। द्रव्यत्वं निषिध्य प्रमेयत्वं निषेधति—**रूप्यत इति रूपमिति**। **अस्थूलमिति** बृहदारण्यकस्थं, **अशब्दमिति** कठवल्लीस्थम्। श्रौतेऽर्थे हेतुर्निरर्थकस्तत्राह—**श्रौतस्येति**। तर्कमाह—**प्रमेयत्व इति**। न केवलमर्थसिद्धः किन्तु श्रौतोऽपीत्याह—**एतदप्रमेयमिति**। इदं च वाक्यं बृहदारण्यकस्थम्। इति षष्ठः श्लोकः।



१. कपुस्तके द्रव्यप्रतिषेध इति।

२. क१पुस्तके श्लोकमुदाहरतीत्यशुद्धः पाठः।

तृतीयो विभागः ।

तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थनिर्णयः ।

ननु, कस्य ब्रह्मभाव उपदिश्यते, ब्रह्मणोऽब्रह्मणो वा । नान्त्यः, तस्य जडत्वादसत्त्वाच्च, न प्रथमः उपदेशानर्थक्यात्, ब्रह्मभावस्य स्वतःसिद्धत्वात् । जीवस्य स्वतो ब्रह्मभावेऽप्यविद्याव्यवधानं ज्ञानेन निवर्त्यत इति चेत्, न, अविद्यानिवृत्तेरात्मभिन्नत्वे द्वैतापत्तेर्ब्रह्मणोऽसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । तदुक्तं वार्तिके—(बृ. आ. भा. वा. २।४।१४)

'अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मेति भण्यते ।
ब्रह्मार्थो दुर्लभोऽत्र स्याद्द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ॥' इति ॥

अभिन्नत्वे चोपदेशानर्थक्यमित्युक्तम् । अत्र किं परमार्थतः फलाभावमभिप्रैषि किंवा प्रतीतितोऽपि । तत्राद्यमिष्टापत्त्या परिहरति—

न शास्ता न शास्त्रं न शिष्यो न शिक्षा
न च त्वं न चाहं न चायं प्रपञ्चः ।
स्वरूपावबोधो विकल्पासहिष्णु-
स्तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥ ७ ॥

शास्ता उपदेशकर्ता गुरुः । शास्त्रमुपदेशकरणम् । शिष्य उपदेशकर्म । शिक्षा उपदेशक्रिया । त्वं श्रोता । अहं वक्ता । अयं सर्वप्रमाणसन्निधापितः प्रपञ्चो, देहेन्द्रियादिरनर्थः, परमार्थतो नास्तीत्यर्थः । द्वितीयं निराकरोति—स्वरूपेति । अयमर्थः—यद्यप्यविद्यानिवृत्तिरात्मानात्मा वेति विकल्पने किमपि फलं निरूपयितुं न शक्यते तथापि स्वरूपावबोधो विज्ञानफलमनुभूयते[२] । न चैतत्कथमिति विकल्पनीयं सर्वद्वैतोपमर्देन विकल्पासहिष्णुत्वात् । न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम । तथा च श्रुतिः (१ गौ. का. २।३२)

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१. खगयोर्जडत्वादसत्त्वापत्तेरिति ।

२. कपुस्तके ज्ञानफलमनुभूयत इति पाठः ।

'न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता' ॥

'ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत्, तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति, तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्' (बृ. आ. १।४।७) इत्याद्या पूर्वमपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव सतो जीवस्य ज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मभावं दर्शयति सर्वं च द्वैतं वारयति ॥ ७ ॥

सप्तमश्लोकावतरणिकायां शङ्कते—**ननु कस्येति** । ननु 'तत्त्वमसि' आदिवाक्यानां न जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावोपदेशमात्रं फलम्[1], अपि तु अज्ञाननिवृत्तिरित्याशङ्कते—**जीवस्येत्यादिना** । ब्रह्मणः कथमसिद्धिप्रसङ्ग[2]स्तत्राह—**तदुक्तमिति** । उक्ताक्षेपास्कन्दकत्वेन श्लोकमवतारयति—**अत्र किमिति** । न चायमितिपदस्य पदार्थमाह—**सर्वप्रमाणेति** । 'किंवा प्रतीतितोऽपि' इत्यनेन य उक्तः पक्षस्तं दूषयति—**द्वितीयं निराकरोतीति** । इति सप्तमः श्लोकः ।

नन्वात्मनः स्वप्रकाशरूपत्वे सर्वदा समाने जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यादिव्यवस्था कथम् । न च भ्रान्त्यैव व्यवस्थेति वाच्यम्, तथा सति सर्वस्यैव स्वप्नत्वापत्तेरिति चेत्, न, लक्षणतस्त्रयाणामपि स्वप्नत्वेऽपि प्रतिभासतोऽविद्यात्मकविशेषसम्भवादसद्विलक्षणत्वेन तु सविशेषत्वाद्व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः । परमार्थतस्तु न कापि व्यवस्थेत्याह—

न जाग्रन्न मे स्वप्नको वा सुषुप्ति-
र्न विश्वो न वा तैजसः प्राज्ञको वा ।
अविद्यात्मकत्वात्त्रयाणां तुरीय-
स्तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥ ८ ॥

अष्टमश्लोकमवतारयितुं भूमिमारचयति[3]—**नन्वात्मन इति** । इष्टापत्त्या परिहरति—**न, लक्षणत इति** । **लक्षणं**, आविद्यकत्वम् । **प्रतिभासतः**, ज्ञानतः । स्वप्नवदसत्त्वे कथं विलक्षणत्वं[4] तत्राह—**असद्विलक्षणत्वेन त्विति** । तर्हि किं सविशेषत्वं पारमार्थिकं तत्राह—**परमार्थतस्त्विति** ।

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१. गपुस्तके उपदेशमात्रं प्रयोजनमिति ।
२. क१पुस्तके असिद्धिसङ्ग इति पाठः स हस्तदोष इव दृश्यते ।
३. तस्मिन्नेव भूमिभूमिमाचरति इति पाठः स हस्तदोष एव ।
४. तस्मिन्नेव कथं विलक्षणमिति पाठः स न युक्तः ।

अत्र लयक्रमेण पौर्वापर्यनिर्देशः। तथा हि—अस्मन्मते पदार्थो द्विविधः, दृक् दृश्यश्च, अन्यवादिपरिकल्पितानां पदार्थानामत्रैवान्तर्भावात्। तत्र दृक्पदार्थ आत्मा पारमार्थिक एकः सर्वदैकरूपो[1]ऽप्यौपाधिकभेदेन त्रिविधः, ईश्वरो जीवः साक्षी चेति। तत्र कारणीभूताज्ञानोपाधिरीश्वरः, अन्तःकरणतत्संस्कारावच्छिन्नाज्ञानोपहितो जीवः। प्रपञ्चितं चैतदधस्तात्। अविद्याप्रतिबिम्बेश्वरपक्षे बिम्बचैतन्यं, बिम्बेश्वरपक्षे च बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बमुखानुगतमुखस्वरूपवज्जीवेश्वरानुगतं सर्वानुसन्धातृ चैतन्यं, साक्षीत्युच्यते। वार्तिककारमते त्वीश्वर एव साक्षीति द्वैविध्यमेव जीवेश्वरभेदेन दृशः। तत्रेश्वरोऽपि त्रिविधः। स्वोपाधिभूताविद्यागुणत्रयभेदेन विष्णुब्रह्मरुद्रभेदात्। कारणीभूतसत्त्वगुणावच्छिन्नो विष्णुः पालयिता। कारणीभूतरजउपहितो ब्रह्मा स्रष्टा। हिरण्यगर्भस्तु महाभूतकारणत्वाभावान्न ब्रह्मा तथापि स्थूलभूतस्रष्टृत्वात्क्वचिद्ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते। कारणीभूततमउपहितो रुद्रः संहर्ता। एवं चैकस्यैव चतुर्भुजचतुर्मुखपञ्चमुखाद्याः पुमाकाराः श्रीभारतीभवान्याद्याश्च स्त्र्याकाराः। अन्ये च मत्स्यकूर्मादयोऽनन्तावताराः लीलयैवाविर्भवन्ति भक्तानुग्रहार्थमित्यवधेयम्,

'चिन्मयस्याद्वितीयस्य निष्कलस्याशरीरिणः।
उपासकानां कार्यार्थं ब्रह्मणो रूपकल्पना॥' इति श्रुतेः[2]॥

जीवोऽपि त्रिविधः, स्वोपाध्यवान्तरभेदेन विश्वतैजसप्राज्ञभेदात्। तत्राविद्यान्तःकरणस्थूलशरीरावच्छिन्नो जाग्रदवस्थाभिमानी विश्वः। स एव स्थूलशरीराभिमानरहित उपाधिद्वयोपहितः स्वप्नाभिमानी तैजसः। शरीरान्तःकरणोपाधिद्वयरहितोऽन्तःकरणसंस्कारावच्छिन्नाविद्यामात्रोपहितः सुषुप्त्यभिमानी प्राज्ञः। एतेषां च स्वतन्त्रोपाधिभेदाभावेन स्वतन्त्रभेदाभावेऽप्यवान्तरोपाधिभेदादेकत्वेऽप्यवान्तरभेदो व्यवह्रियते। साक्षी तु सर्वानुसन्धाता सर्वानुगतस्तुरीयाख्य एकविध एव। तत्रोपाधिभेदेनापि न क्वचिद्भेदस्तदुपाधेरेकरूपत्वात्। अविद्यातद्व्याप्यतत्कार्यात्मकः प्रपञ्चो दृश्यपदार्थः। तस्य चापारमा-

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१. गपुस्तके एकः सर्वगतः सर्वदैकरूप इति।
२. खगयोरयं श्लोको न दृश्यते।

र्थिकत्वेऽपि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् न स्वाप्निकपदार्थवन्निरूपणं व्यर्थम्, उपासनादावुपयोगादिति। सोऽपि त्रिविधः, अव्याकृतामूर्तमूर्तभेदात्[1]। तत्र साभासाविद्या मूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चबीजशक्तिरूपा तदजन्यत्वेऽपि[2] तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तमानत्वेन तद्व्याप्यैश्चैतन्यतत्सम्बन्धजीवेश्वरविभागचिदाभासैः सहानादित्वादव्याकृतमित्युच्यते। सा च स्वयं जडाऽप्यजडेन चिदाभासेनोज्ज्वलितपूर्वपूर्वसंस्कारजीवकर्मप्रयुक्ता सती शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धात्मकान्याकाशवायुतेजोजलपृथिव्याख्यानि पञ्चमहाभूतानि जनयति। तत्र पूर्वपूर्वभूतभावापन्नाया अविद्याया उत्तरोत्तरं प्रति कारणत्वात्[3] पूर्वपूर्वभूतगुणानामुत्तरोत्तरभूतेष्वनुप्रवेशः। एवमविद्यात एवान्धकारोऽपि भावरूप एवावरणात्मा चाक्षुषज्ञानविरोधी आलोकनाश्यश्च झटिति महाविद्युदादिवदाविर्भवति तिरोभवति चेति सिद्धान्तः। संसारहेतुदेहोपादानत्वाभावाच्च न श्रुतिषु सृष्टिप्रक्रियायामाम्नायत इत्यविरोधः। दिक्कालौ त्वप्रामाणिकत्वान्नोक्तौ, आकाशस्यैव दिग्व्यवहारजनकत्वव्यवस्थासम्भवात् 'दिशः श्रोत्रम्' (बृ. आ. ३।२।१३) इति श्रुतेश्च। कालस्त्वविद्यैव तस्या एव सर्वाधारत्वादिति। अयं चाव्याकृतपदार्थ ईश्वरोपाधिः।

प्रसङ्गात् वैशेषिकादिवत्पदार्थं निरूपयति—**तथा हीति**। दृक् चेतनो ज्ञानात्मकः, दृश्यस्तदितरत्वाज्जडः। ननु, वैशेषिकाः अभावसप्तकाः पदार्थाः सप्तेति वदन्ति, अक्षपादाचार्यास्तु षोडश, तथा च कथं पदार्थद्वैविध्याङ्गीकारे निस्तारस्तत्राह—**अन्यवादीति**। इदानीं दृक्पदार्थं विभजते—**तत्र दृक्पदार्थ आत्मा पारमार्थिक एक इत्यादिना**। पारमार्थिकत्वं, कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वम्। एकः पारमार्थिकश्चेत्तर्हि कथं जीवेश्वरादिव्यवस्था तत्राह—**सर्वदैकरूपोऽपीति**। अत्रार्थे 'यथा स्वयंज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपो भिन्ना बहुधैकोनुगच्छन्। उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपो देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा' इति श्रुतिः प्रमाणम्। याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृतिरपि (प्रायश्चित्ताध्यायः १४४)—

'आकाशमेकं हि यथा घटादिषु पृथग्भवेत्।
तथात्मैकोऽप्यनेकश्च जलधारास्विवांशुमान्॥' इति॥

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१. कपुस्तके अव्याकृतमूतामूर्तभेदादिति पाठः।
२. तस्मिन्नेव तज्जन्यत्वेऽपीति पाठः स न सम्यगर्थबोधकः।
३. खगपुस्तकयोरुत्तरोत्तरं कार्यं प्रति कारणत्वादिति।

एवमत्रार्थे अन्या अपि श्रुतयः स्मृतयश्च ऊह्याः। क्रमप्राप्तमीश्वरं लक्षयति—**कारणीभूताज्ञानोपाधिरिति**। कारणीभूतं यदज्ञानं तदेवोपाधिर्यत्र सः। तथा जीवेश्वरलक्षणं विधाय साक्षिलक्षणं विधत्ते—**अविद्येति**। संक्षेपशारीरकमत इत्यर्थः। **बिम्बचैतन्यमिति**। साक्षीत्यनेनान्वयः। विवरणकारैकजीववादिनो मतमनुगतीकृत्याह—**बिम्बेश्वरपक्षे चेति**। ईश्वरपदार्थं विभजते—**तत्रेश्वरोऽपीति**। उक्तं विवृणोति—**कारणीभूत इत्यादिना**। ननु, हिरण्यगर्भोऽत्र ब्रह्मा तदतिरिक्तो वा तत्राह—**हिरण्यगर्भस्त्विति**। **महाभूतेति**। सूक्ष्ममहाभूतेत्यर्थः। **एकस्यैवेति**। ईश्वरस्येति शेषः। ईश्वरस्य पुमाकारमूर्तीरुक्त्वा स्त्र्याकारमूर्तीराह—**श्रीभारतीभवान्याद्याश्चेति**। सर्वशक्तिमदवतारानुक्त्वा (? अल्पशक्तिमत्) अवतारानाह—**मत्स्येति**। ईश्वरत्रैविध्यमुपपाद्य जीवत्रैविध्यमुपपादयति—**जीवोऽपीति**। उक्तत्रिविधं जीवं विभजते—**तत्रेति**। एतेषां मध्य इत्यर्थः। विश्वलक्षणमाह[1]—**जाग्रदवस्थाभिमानी (जीव) इति**। **अविद्यान्तःकरणस्थूलशरीरावच्छिन्न इति** स्वरूपकथनं न तु लक्षणप्रविष्टम्। एवं **स्वप्नावस्थाभिमानी तैजसो (जीव) इति** लक्षणं, शेषं तु स्वरूपकथनपरम्। **उपाधिद्वयोपहितः** अविद्यान्तःकरणोपहितः। प्राज्ञलक्षणमाह—**सुषुप्त्यभिमानीति**। शेषं स्वरूपकथनार्थम्। तर्हि किं जीवेश्वराः स्वतन्त्रा न[2] इत्याह—**एतेषां चेति**। ननु जीवेश्वरवत् साक्षी कियत्प्रकारस्तत्राह—**साक्षी त्विति**। दृक्पदार्थं निरूप्य दृश्यं निरूपयति—**अविद्यातद्व्याप्येति**। ननु त्वन्मते आविद्यकपदार्थस्य स्वाप्निकपदार्थतुल्यत्वात् स्वाप्नपदार्थनिरूपणवदाविद्यकनिरूपणं विफलमत आह—**तस्य चेति**। निरूपणप्रयोजनमाह—**उपासनादाविति**। **सोऽपि** दृश्यपदार्थोऽपि। त्रयाणां मध्येऽव्याकृतपदार्थमाह—**तत्रेति**। साभासाऽविद्याऽव्याकृतमुच्यते इत्यन्वयः। तद्व्याप्यं, अविद्याव्याप्यम्। तच्च ग्रन्थकार एव वक्ष्यति—**तद्व्याप्यैश्चैतन्येत्यादिना**। सूक्ष्मात्तद्व्याप्यत्वे हेतुमाह—**तदजन्यत्वेऽपीत्यादिना**। **सा चेति**। अविद्येत्यर्थः। प्रपञ्चबीजशक्तिरूपत्वं यदव्याकृतस्योक्तं तदिदानीं प्रकटयति—**शब्देत्यादिना**। एवं चौपनिषदमते शब्दाद्यात्मक एव सूक्ष्माकाशादिर्न तु साङ्ख्यवत् शब्दादिगुणवदाकाशादेरुत्पत्तिरिति[3]। नन्वेवमपि शब्दाकाशयोस्तादात्म्याद्भवतु शब्दगुण आकाशः, एवं स्पर्शगुणो वायुर्न तु शब्दगुणा पृथिवी तत्राह—**तत्र पूर्वपूर्वेति**। एवं च कारणगुणक्रमेण पृथिव्यां शब्दगुणसिद्धिः। एवं वाय्वादावपीत्य-

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१. क, खयोर्लक्षणमाहेत्येतावन्मात्रम्।

२. गपुस्तके तर्हि किं ईश्वरवत्त्रिविधो जीवः स्वतन्त्रो न इति पाठः।

३. क, खपुस्तकयोः शब्दादिगुणादाकाशादेरुत्पत्तिरिति।

वधेयम् । एवमप्यौपनिषदमते प्रसङ्गादन्धकारोऽपि भावरूप एव इति प्रतिपादयति—**एवमविद्यात इति**। तर्हि गगनादिवदन्धकारः किमिति सृष्टिप्रकरणे नोक्तस्तत्राह—**संसारेति**। दिक्कालौ किमिति नोक्तौ तत्राह—**दिक्कालाविति**। आकाश एव दिगिति भावः। **कालस्त्वविद्यैवेति**। वस्तुतस्तु अविद्यावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यमीश्वरः स एव कालः, पुराणादौ तथा दर्शनादिति।

तानि च सूक्ष्माण्यपञ्चीकृतानि पञ्चमहाभूतान्यमूर्ताख्यानि कारणैक्यात्सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणात्मकानि सत्त्वांशप्राधान्येन ज्ञानक्रियाशक्त्यात्मकमेकं स्वच्छद्रव्यं चित्ररूपमिव मिलित्वा जनयन्ति। तस्य च ज्ञानशक्तिप्रधानांशोऽन्तःकरणम्। तच्च बुद्धिर्मन इति द्विधोच्यते। क्रियाशक्तिप्रधानांशः प्राणः। स च पञ्चधा, प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदानः समान इति। एवमेकैकभूतेभ्यो ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिभेदात् प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियद्वयं जायते[1]। आकाशाच्छ्रोत्रवाचौ, वायोस्त्वक्पाणी, तेजसश्चक्षुःपादौ, अद्भ्यो रसनपायू, पृथिव्या घ्राणोपस्थौ चेति। अत्र 'तेजोमयी वाक्' (छां. ६।५।४) इति श्रुतेस्तैजसी वाक्, पादस्तु नाभस इति केचित्। शब्दव्यञ्जकेन्द्रियत्वेन तु श्रोत्रवद्वाचो नाभसत्वम्, पादचिकित्सया च चक्षुषः स्वास्थ्यदर्शनाच्चक्षुर्वत्पादस्यापि तैजसत्वमिति तु युक्तमुत्पश्यामः। तेजोमयत्वश्रुतिस्तु मनसः पञ्चभूतकार्यस्यापि[2] अन्नमयत्वश्रुतिरिव तदुपकार्यतया व्याख्येया। मनसश्च पञ्चभूतगुणग्राहकत्वेन तद्व्रत्त्वनिश्चयात्पञ्चभूतात्मकत्वमित्यन्यदेतत्[3]। एतेषामधिष्ठातारो देवा अपि ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिप्रधानाः, दिगग्नी, वातेन्द्रौ, आदित्यविष्णू, वरुणमित्रौ, अश्विप्रजापती। तत्र ज्ञानशक्तिसमष्टिरन्तःकरणं, क्रियाशक्तिसमष्टिः प्राणः। शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धग्राहकाणि श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसनघ्राणाख्यानि पञ्चज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि। त्वक्चक्षुषी स्वग्राह्यगुणाश्रयद्रव्यमपि गृह्णीतः। श्रोत्रमपि चक्षुर्वत् गत्वा शब्दग्राहकम् दूरे शब्द इति प्रत्ययात्। वचनादानगतिविसर्गानन्दजनकानि वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाख्यानि पञ्चकर्मेन्द्रियाणि। एतच्च सर्वं मिलित्वा सप्तदशकं लिङ्गं ज्ञानशक्ति-

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१. कपुस्तके इन्द्रियद्वयं द्वयं जायत इति।

२. तस्मिन्नेव मनसः पञ्चमहाभूततत्तत्कार्यस्य इति पाठः स न सम्यगर्थबोधकः।

३. तस्मिन्नेव पञ्चभूतग्राहकत्वेन तद्व्रत्त्वनिश्चयादित्यन्यदेतदिति, गपुस्तके च वाक्यान्ते इत्यन्यदिति।

प्राधान्येन हिरण्यगर्भ इति क्रियाशक्तिप्राधान्येन सूत्रमिति चोच्यते। अयममूर्तपदार्थः कार्यत्वात् व्यष्टौ समष्टौ च जीवोपाधिरेव।

अव्याकृतपदार्थमुक्त्वा अमूर्तपदार्थमाह—**तानि चेति**। जनयन्ति तानीति सम्बध्यते। **तस्य चेति**। ज्ञानक्रियाशक्त्यात्मकस्य स्वच्छद्रव्यस्येत्यर्थः। एवं च प्राणान्तःकरणयोरैक्यं धर्मभेदाद्भेद इति तत्त्वम्। द्वयं द्वयमित्यादि वा ज्ञानशक्तिप्राधान्येनैकं ज्ञानेन्द्रियं, क्रियाशक्तिप्राधान्येनापरं कर्मेन्द्रियमिति वाग्विभागः। तदेवाह—'आकाशात् श्रोत्रवाचौ' इत्यादिना। प्राचो मतमाह—**अत्रेति**। एषु मध्य इत्यर्थः। एकदेशिमतेऽस्वरसं व्यञ्जयन्स्वमतमाह—**शब्दव्यञ्जकेन्द्रियत्वेनेति**। एवं च प्रयोगः, वाग्नाभसी शब्दव्यञ्जकेन्द्रियत्वात् (?त्वेन)श्रोत्रवत्। अदृष्टादिसामान्यकारणे[1] व्यभिचारमाह—**इन्द्रियत्वादिति (?त्वेनेति)**। तर्कस्तु लाघवाख्य एव, धूमत्वावच्छेदेन वह्निजन्यत्ववत्, शब्दव्यञ्जकेन्द्रियत्वावच्छेदेन नाभसत्वमिति। तर्हि 'तेजोमयी वाक्' इति श्रुतेः का गतिरिति चेत्, तत्राह—**तेजोमयत्वश्रुतिस्त्विति**। तत्र 'अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मनः' इति श्रुतेरन्नमयत्वश्रवणेऽपि मनसः अन्नोपकार्यत्ववदत्रापि वाचस्तेजस उपकार्यत्वमित्यर्थः। ननु मनसः पञ्चभूतकार्यत्वे किं प्रमाणं तत्राह—**मनसश्चेति**। **तद्भूतत्वनिश्चयात्**, पञ्चभूतकार्यत्वनिश्चयात्। श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रसिद्धाधिष्ठातृदेवान्प्रसङ्गादाह—**एतेषामिति**। **ज्ञानक्रियेति**। ज्ञानशक्तिप्राधान्यं ज्ञानेन्द्रियाद्यधिष्ठातृदेवानां, क्रियाशक्तिप्राधान्यं कर्मेन्द्रियाधिष्ठातृदेवानामिति विवेकः। **दिगग्नीति**। श्रोत्रस्य दिगधिष्ठातृदेवता, 'दिशः श्रोत्रम्' इति श्रुतेः। एवं वागिन्द्रियस्याधिष्ठातृदेवता अग्निः। एवमुत्तरत्रापि यथासङ्ख्येन बोध्यम्। प्राणान्तःकरणयोर्विशेषमाह—**तत्रेति**। यथासङ्ख्येन शब्दादीनां ग्राहकाणीन्द्रियाण्याह—**शब्देत्यादिना**। त्वक्चक्षुषोस्तु द्रव्यग्राहकरूपविशेषमाह—**त्वक्चक्षुषीति**। चक्षुर्वत् श्रोत्रस्यापि पञ्चभूतकार्यत्वेन क्रियाशक्तिमत्त्वात् दूरदेशगमनसामर्थ्यं, अतो गत्वैव गृह्यते इत्याह—**चक्षुर्वदिति**। तर्कमाह—**दूरे शब्द इति**। सकार्याणि ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि विविच्य कार्यसहितानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याह—**वचनेति**। एषु चेन्द्रियेषु प्रमाणं स्मृतयः। तासु याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृतिः (प्रायश्चित्ताध्यायः ९१–९२)

'गन्धरूपरसस्पर्शशब्दाश्च विषयाः स्मृताः।
नासिका लोचने जिह्वा त्वक् श्रोत्रं चेन्द्रियाणि तु॥
हस्तौ पायुरुपस्थश्च वाक् च पादौ च पञ्च वै।
कर्मेन्द्रियाणि जानीयान्मनश्चैवोभयात्मकम्॥'

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१. क[1]पुस्तके अदृष्टादिसामान्याकारेणेति।

एवं च मनुस्मृत्यादावपि बोध्यम् । इदानीं प्रसङ्गादिहलोकपरलोकगामि लिङ्गशरीरं जीवोपाधिभूतमाह—**एतच्चेति** । तस्यापि द्वैविध्यमाह—**ज्ञानशक्तिप्राधान्येनेत्यादिना** । ननु, किमयं पदार्थो मूर्तं अमूर्तो वा तत्रान्त्यमेव सिद्धान्त्यभिमतमित्यभिप्रेत्याह—**अयममूर्तः पदार्थ इति** ।

तानि च तथाभूतानि भूतानि भोगायतनं शरीरं भोग्यं च विषयमन्तरेण भोगं जनयितुमशक्नुवन्ति जीवकर्मप्रयुक्तत्वात् स्थौल्याय पञ्चीकृतानि भवन्ति । तत्र च प्रत्येकं पञ्चभूतानि द्विधा विभज्यते । तत्र एकैको भागश्चतुर्धा विभज्यते । तद्भागचतुष्टयं च स्वभागं विहाय इतरभूतचतुष्टयार्धभागेषु प्रविशति इति स्वस्यार्धभागेनेतरेषामष्टमभागेन च पञ्चीकरणान्मेलनेऽप्याधिक्यादाकाशादिशब्दप्रयोगः ।

तानि चेति । पञ्चीकृतानि भवन्तीत्यतीनेनान्वयः । किमर्थं पञ्चीकरणं तत्राह—**स्थौल्यायेति** । स्थौल्यस्यापि फलमाह—**भोगायतनमित्यादि** । **शरीरं**, स्थूलशरीरं भोगस्य कारणमत आह—**जीवेति** । जीवकर्मप्रयुक्तत्वाद्भोगस्येत्यर्थः । सूक्ष्मस्य भोगायतनत्वं न सम्भवतीत्यत इदमुक्तमिति बोध्यम् । पञ्चीकरणमेवाह—**तत्र चेति** । ननु, भवतु नाम मेलनं तथाप्याकाशादिभागस्य[1] सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् क्वचिदाकाशादिपदप्रयोगः क्वचिन्नेति वैचित्र्यं कुतस्तत्राह—**आधिक्यादिति** । यत्राकाशभागाधिक्यं[2] तत्र आकाशपदप्रयोगः, यत्र वायुभागाधिक्यं तत्र वायुपदप्रयोग इत्यर्थः । एवं तेजःप्रभृतिष्वपि बोध्यम् । अत्रार्थे बादरायणसूत्रं (२–४–२२) 'वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः' इत्यपि प्रमाणं वेदितव्यम् ।

अत्र 'त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकां करवाणि' (छां. ६।३।३) इति श्रुतेः 'त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्' (ब्र. सू. २।४।२०) इति सूत्राच्च त्रयाणामेव मेलनप्रतीतेश्च त्रिवृत्करणमेव केचिन्मन्यन्ते ते वियदधिकरणन्यायेनैव निराकृताः । तथा हि तैत्तिरीयके 'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः, आकाशाद्वायुः' (तै. २।१।१) इत्यादिश्रुतेः छान्दोग्ये च त्रयाणां तेजोबन्नानां सृष्टिश्रवणेऽपि द्वयोरुपसंहारः, तेजसः प्राथम्यपदार्थधर्मापेक्षया आकाशवायुपदार्थयोर्बलीयस्त्वात्, छान्दोग्ये चैकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञानात्, आकाशवाय्वोरचेतनयोर्ब्रह्मकार्यत्वस्यावश्यं वाच्यत्वात्[3] । तत्र पञ्चानामेव मेलनेऽप्यवयुत्या-

१. खगयोराकाशभागस्येति ।
२. क१पुस्तके यत्राकाशफलभागाधिक्यमिति ।
३. कपुस्तके अवश्यं वक्तव्यत्वादिति ।

नुवादेन त्रिवृत्करणोपपत्तिः। त्रिवृतमेवेति तु कल्पनायां वाक्यभेद-प्रसङ्गः। 'त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्' (ब्र. सू. २।४।२०) इति सूत्रं त्वनुवादकत्वान्न पञ्चीकरणं न्यायसिद्धं बाधितुमुत्सहते। मेलनप्रतीतिश्च शरीरादौ पञ्चानामविशिष्टैव, पञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतानीति च भाष्यकारवचनम्। तस्मादलमनेनानात्मचिन्तनेनेति दिक्।

तत्र शङ्कते—**अत्र त्रिवृतमिति**। एकैकां पृथिव्यादिव्यक्तिं त्रिवृतं पृथिव्यप्तेजोभागसंयुक्तां करोमीत्यर्थः। **श्रुतेः**, छान्दोग्यश्रुतेः। **'त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्'** इति सूत्रात्, 'संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्' इति सूत्रैकदेशार्थादित्यर्थः। इदमधिकरणं द्वितीयाध्यायस्य चतुर्थपादे। सत्प्रक्रियां तेजोबन्नानां सृष्टिं विधायोपदिश्यते, 'सेयं दैवतेक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकां करवाणि' इति। तत्र संशयः—किं जीवकर्तृकमिदं नामरूपमाहोस्वित्परमेश्वरकर्तृकमिति। तत्र प्राप्तं तावत् जीवकर्तृकमेवेदं नामरूपव्याकरणमिति। कुतः? 'अनेन जीवेनात्मना' इति विशेषणात्। यथा लोके चारेणाहं परसैन्यमनुप्रविश्य संकलयामि इत्येवंजातीयके प्रयोगे चारकर्तृकमेव तत्सैन्यसंकलनं हेतुकर्तृत्वात् देवतावद्राजात्मन्यध्यारोपयति, संकलयामि इत्युत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण, एवं जीवकर्तृकमेव सन्नामरूपव्याकरणं, हेतुकर्तृत्वात् देवतात्मन्यध्यारोपयति व्याकरवाणीत्युत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण। अपि च डित्थकपित्थादिषु नामसु घटकपाटादिषु[1] च रूपेषु जीवस्यैव व्याकर्तृत्वं दृष्टं, तस्माज्जीवकर्तृकमेवेदं व्याकरणं इत्येवं प्राप्तेऽभिधत्ते—संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत इति। तुशब्देन पक्षं व्यावर्तयति। संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिरिति नामरूपव्याक्रिया इत्येतत्। त्रिवृत्कुर्वत इति परमेश्वरं लक्षयति त्रिवृत्करणे तस्य निरपवादात्कर्तृत्वनिर्देशात्। येयं संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिश्चाग्निरादित्यश्चन्द्रमाविद्युदिति तथा कुशकाशपलाशादिषु पशुमृगमनुष्यादिषु च प्रत्याकृति प्रतिव्यक्ति चानेकप्रकारा[2]। सा खलु परमेश्वरस्यैव तेजोबन्नानां निर्मातुः क्लृप्तिर्[3]भवितुमर्हति, कुतः? उपदेशात्। तथा हि सेयं देवतैक्षत इत्युपक्रम्य व्याकरवाणीत्युत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण परस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्याकर्तृत्वमिहोपदिश्यत इति वियदधिकरणार्थमाह—**तथा हीति**। 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम्। तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति। तत्तेजोऽसृजत। तत्तेज ऐक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति। तदपोऽसृजत' इत्यनेन, तदनन्तरं 'ता आप ऐक्षन्त बह्वयः स्याम प्रजायेमहीति। ता अन्नमसृजन्त' इत्यनेन च छान्दोग्ये त्रयाणां

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१. खगयोर्घटशकटादिष्विति।

२. क१पुस्तके पशुमृगमनुष्यादिषु च प्राप्ता क्लृप्तिः प्रत्याकृति प्रतिव्यक्ति चानेकप्रकारा इति।

३. कृतिरिति गपुस्तके।

सृष्टिश्रवणेऽपि द्वयोरुपसंहारः। अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह—**'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः, आकाशाद्वायुः' इत्यादिश्रुतेरिति**। त्रयाणां पृथिव्यप्तेजसां द्वयोर्वाय्वाकाशयोर्यद्युपसंहारेणापाततः छान्दोग्यश्रुतिविरोधपरिहारस्तथापि छान्दोग्ये तेजसः प्राथम्यभङ्गस्तथा च कथमुपसंहारस्तत्राह—**तेजसः प्राथम्येति**। तेजोनिष्ठं यत्प्राप्तं पाठक्रमेण प्राथम्यं तस्य तेजोरूपस्य तेजःपदार्थस्य धर्मत्वात् तदपेक्षया वाय्वाकाशयोः प्राबल्यं वाय्वाकाशपदार्थत्वादित्यर्थः। दृष्टं च पूर्वमीमांसायां पदार्थधर्मापेक्षया पदार्थस्य बलवत्त्वम्। वाय्वाकाशयोरुभयोरावश्यकोपसंहारे छान्दोग्यश्रुतिसम्मतिमाह—**छान्दोग्ये चेति**। 'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति अमतं मतं अविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' इत्यादि प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत वाय्वाकाशयोर्ब्रह्मकार्यत्वाभावेन ब्रह्मज्ञानेन तयोर्ज्ञानं न स्यात्, नह्यकारणस्य कनकधौतस्य[1] ज्ञानादेतदकार्यस्य कनकवलयस्य ज्ञानमिति कश्चित्प्रेक्षावानङ्गीकरोति इति दृष्टम्। कथं तर्हि त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतं करवाणीत्युक्तिस्तत्राह—**तत्रेति। अवयुत्यानुवादेनेति**। सम्भवत्येकवाक्यत्वे वाक्यभेदो हि नेष्यते इति न्यायमनुसृत्याह—**त्रिवृतमिति**। सृष्टिप्रतिपादकछान्दोग्यबृहदारण्यकादिश्रुतिजाते वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गो दोष इत्यर्थः। इदं च स्पष्टमाकरे। एवमपि भगवद्बादरायणमेवास्तु त्रिवृत्करणे प्रमाणमत आह—**त्रिवृत्कुर्वत इति**। अत्र च त्रिवृत्कुर्वत इत्यंशेन त्रिवृत्कुर्वतः सतः परमेश्वरस्य नामसृष्टिरुक्ता[2] न तु त्रिवृत्करणम्। तथा च त्रिवृत्करणांशे तस्य तात्पर्याभावात् न तत्र प्रमाणमित्यर्थः। **मेलनेति**। अत्र च प्रमाणं 'पञ्चभूतात्मके देहे पञ्चसु प्रलयं गते' इत्याद्याः स्मृतयः। पञ्चीकरणे भगवत्पादवचनमपि प्रमाणमित्याह—**पञ्चीकृतेति**। पञ्चीकरणमुपसंहरति—**तस्मादिति**।

तानि च पञ्चीकृतानि पञ्चमहाभूतानि मूर्ताख्यानि मिलित्वा एकं कार्यमिन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठानं भोगायतनमुत्पादयन्ति। तदेव शरीरमित्युच्यते। तत्र सत्त्वप्रधानं देवशरीरं, रजःप्रधानं मनुष्यशरीरं, तमःप्रधानं तिर्यगादिस्थावरान्तं शरीरम्। तस्य च शरीरस्य पाञ्चभौतिकस्यापि चित्ररूपस्येव क्वचिन्न्यूनाधिकभावो भूतानां न विरुध्यते। एवं विषया अपि पञ्चीकृतैकैकभूतजन्याश्चतुर्दशभुवनाख्या ऊर्ध्वमध्याधोभावेन सत्त्वरजस्तमोंशप्रधानाः[3] घटादयश्च। एतत्सर्वं ब्रह्माण्डाख्यं विराडिति मूर्तमिति चोच्यते।

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१. क१खयोर्कलधौतस्येति।

२. खगपुस्तकयोर्परमेश्वरस्यनामरूपसृष्टिरुक्ता इति।

३. कपुस्तके प्रधानाश्च घटादयश्चेति।

'तानि च तथाभूतानि भोगायतनं शरीरं भोग्यं च विषयमन्तरेण' इत्यादिना यच्छरीरमुक्तं तदिदानीं कथयति—**तानि चेति**। इन्द्रियं विना न भोगः सम्भवतीत्यत उक्तं—**इन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठानमित्यादि**। तत्रापि देवादिशरीरविभागानाह—**तत्रेति**। पाञ्चभौतिकत्वे समाने कस्यचित्पृथिवीभागाधिक्यं कस्यचिज्जलभागाधिक्यं कस्यचित्तेजोभागाधिक्यमित्यादिभेदः कथं तत्राह—**तस्य चेति**। शरीरमुक्त्वा विषयानाह—**एवं विषया अपीति**। चतुर्दश भुवनानि—भूः, भुवः, स्वः, महः, जनः, तपः, सत्याख्यानि सप्त उपरि; अतल, वितल, सुतल, रसातल, तलातल, महातल, पातालाख्यानि सप्ताधोधः। सत्त्वरजस्तमोंशप्रधाना इत्यस्य पूर्वेणान्वयः।

अयमौपनिषदः सृष्टिक्रमः। तद्विपरीतो लयक्रमः। पञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूततत्कार्यात्मकं विराडाख्यं मूर्तं पृथिव्याद्येकैकभूतलयेनामूर्तेऽपञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतात्मके हिरण्यगर्भाख्ये स्वकारणे लीयते। स एव दैनन्दिनः प्रलयः। अमूर्तं चाव्याकृते परमेश्वरोपाधौ। अव्याकृतस्य त्वनादित्वेन कारणाभावान्न लयः, स्वकारणे सूक्ष्मरूपेणावस्थानं लय इति तल्लक्षणात्। अयमेव प्राकृतः प्रलयः। ब्रह्मज्ञानादात्यन्तिक उच्छेदस्तु आत्यन्तिकः प्रलयः। स च कारणक्रमेणैव, कारणोच्छेदादेव कार्योच्छेदात्। सर्वं च सृष्टिप्रलयादिकं स्वप्नसृष्टिप्रलयवदपारमार्थिकमपि वासनादार्ढ्यात् व्यवहारक्षममिति न मायिकत्वेऽपि तुच्छत्वप्रसङ्गः। यथा चैतत्तथा व्यक्तमाकरे।

ननु घटादयश्चेत्यत्र, ननु पुराणादौ महदादिक्रमेणापि सृष्टिः श्रूयतेऽत आह—**अयमौपनिषदः सृष्टिक्रम इति**। भवत्वेवं सृष्टिक्रमो लयक्रमस्तु कीदृश इत्यत आह—**एतद्विपरीत इति**। स्वस्वकारणे लयात्तत्कार्यस्य सूक्ष्मरूपेणावस्थानमेव वैपरीत्यं तदेवाह—**पञ्चीकृतेति**। तत्रापि क्रममाह—**पृथिव्यादीति**। प्रलयो हि त्रिविधः श्रूयते तत्रायं कतमस्तत्राह[1]—**स एवेति**। अयं यः क्रम उक्तः स एवेत्यर्थः। भवत्वेवममूर्ते मूर्तस्य लयः, अमूर्तं तु कुत्र प्रलीयते तत्राह—**अमूर्तं चेति**। पूर्वोक्तपरमेश्वरस्योपाधौ अव्याकृत इत्यन्वयः। एवमव्याकृतस्य क लय इत्याह—**अव्याकृतस्य त्विति**। तृतीयो लयः कतमः कुतो वा तत्राह—**ब्रह्मज्ञानादिति**। ब्रह्मज्ञानाद्योऽत्यन्तोच्छेदः स कार्याविद्यायाः, स आत्यन्तिको लयो महाप्रलय इत्यर्थः। तत्रापि क्रममाह—**स चेति**। एवकारार्थस्तु कारणोच्छेदं विना न कार्यात्यन्तोच्छेद[2] इति द्योतयितुम्। ननु, सृष्ट्यादेर्मायिकत्वेनापारमार्थिकत्वं वदता भवता

१. क१पुस्तके कतमः स कुत्रेत्यत्राहेति।
२. गपुस्तके कारणोच्छेदेन कार्यस्यात्यन्तोच्छेद इति।

किं तुच्छत्वमङ्गीकृतं, तत्र न इत्याह—**सर्वं चेति**। अत्र हेतुमाह—**व्यवहारक्षममिति**। एवं च नेदं तुच्छं व्यवहारसमर्थत्वात्, यत्तुच्छं तन्न व्यवहारसमर्थं यथा गगनकमलादीति[1] व्यतिरेके दृष्टान्तः। किमिदं भवतैवोच्यते कश्चित्केनचित्प्रतिपादितं वा तत्राह—**यथा चेति**। न केवलं यथाकथंचित्प्रतिपादितमपि तु भाष्यादौ प्रकटं प्रतिपादितमिति व्यक्तपदार्थः[2]।

एवं स्थिते जागरणादिव्यवस्थोच्यते। इन्द्रियवृत्तिकालीनार्थोपलम्भो जागरणम्। तत्र च मूर्तं विराडाख्यं भोग्यं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणषट्केन व्यवह्रियमाणत्वात् व्यावहारिकं विश्वाख्येन जीवेनोपभुज्यते। स च देहेन्द्रियादिषु[3] प्रवेशात् व्यापनाद्वा विश्व इत्युच्यते, विश प्रवेशने विष्लृ व्याप्तौ[4]विति च स्मरणात्। अत्र यद्यपि विश्वेनामूर्तमव्याकृतं चानुमानादिनानुभूयते, तथापि व्यावहारिकं सर्वं विश्वेनैव ज्ञायत इति नियमात् स्थूलशरीरोपाध्यभिमानित्वाच्च न तस्य अवस्थान्तरव्यापकत्वम्। शुक्तिरजतादिज्ञानानामप्रामाणिकत्वात्तद्विषयस्याव्यावहारिकत्वेऽपि इन्द्रियव्यापारकालीनत्वाज्जागरणोपपत्तिः। ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यादिप्रक्रिया चाधस्तादुक्तैव।

एवं स्थित इति। एवमुक्तक्रमेण प्रपञ्चस्य तुच्छविलक्षणत्वे स्थित इत्यर्थः। अन्यथा प्रपञ्चस्य तुच्छत्वे जाग्रत्स्वप्नादिविभागो न स्यादिति हृदयम् (?हार्दम्)। **इन्द्रियेति**। इन्द्रियद्वारा निःसृतान्तःकरणमेव वृत्तिस्तत्कालीनार्थोपलम्भो जागरणमित्यर्थः। इन्द्रियद्वारा निःसृतान्तःकरणस्य वृत्तेर्भावान्निःसृतान्तःकरणमेव वृत्तिरिति व्याततम्। अत्र[5] **जागरणमिति** लक्ष्यवाचकं पदम्[6]। परिशिष्टं तु लक्षणम्। स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यादौ घटसुखाद्युपलम्भसत्त्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय **वृत्तिरिति**। नन्वेतावता प्रबन्धेन भोग्यवर्ग एवोक्तो न तु भोक्तेत्याह—**तत्र चेति**। औपनिषदेऽतिप्रसङ्गात्प्रमाणानि प्रतिपादयति—**प्रत्यक्षादीति**। कियन्तीत्यपेक्षायामाह—**षट्केनेति**। षट् च, प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दार्थापत्त्यनुपलब्ध्याख्यानीति। **स चेति**। विश्वाख्य-

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१. खपुस्तके कमलादीति।

२. खपुस्तके इति व्यक्तं पदं, गपुस्तके च इत्यर्थकं व्यक्तं पदमिति।

३. कपुस्तके सर्वदेहेन्द्रियादिषु इति पाठः स न युक्तः।

४. तस्मिन्नेव विष व्याप्ताविति।

५. खपुस्तके इन्द्रियद्वारा इत्यारभ्य वृत्तिरिति इतिपर्यन्तं वाक्यचतुष्टयं नास्त्येव, गपुस्तके प्रथममात्रं नास्ति, क$_1$पुस्तके च तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय इत्यनन्तरं इन्द्रियवृत्तिकालीनेति स्वप्नेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय वृत्तिरिति इति पाठः।

६. क$_1$पुस्तके लक्ष्यवाच्यं पदमिति।

जीव इत्यर्थः। उभयत्रैव हेतुमाह—**विश्व प्रवेशन इति**। ननु, मूर्तवत्सूक्ष्मपञ्च-भूततत्कार्यात्मकममूर्तमव्याकृतमपि च विश्वज्ञेयम्। तथा च कथमुक्तं स्थूलं पञ्चभूत-तत्कार्यं मूर्तं विराडाख्यं विश्वज्ञेयमित्याशङ्कते—**अत्र यद्यपीत्यादिना**। परिह-रति—**तथापीत्यादिना**। विश्वज्ञेयत्वमित्यत्र तात्पर्यात् व्यावहारिकत्वावच्छेदेन व्यावहारिकमात्रं विश्वस्य ज्ञेयं न तैजसादि(? देः)। इदं तु 'विश्वेनैव' इत्येवकारल-भ्यम्। प्रसङ्गादवस्थान्तरसम्बन्धित्वाभावं विश्वस्य साधयति—**स्थूलेति**। ननु, इन्द्रियवृत्तिघटितं चेज्जागरणलक्षणं तदा यस्मिन्पक्षे इदन्त्वमपि प्रातीतिकं तदा इद-न्त्वांशे रजतांशे च इन्द्रियवृत्त्यभावात् प्रातीतिकभानकाले इन्द्रियवृत्तिकालीनार्थोप-लम्भ इति जागरणलक्षणमव्याप्तमित्याशङ्क्य परिहरति—**शुक्तिरजतादिज्ञानाना-मित्यादिना**। **तद्विषयस्येति**। रजतादिज्ञानविषयस्य रजतादेरित्यर्थः। **इन्द्रि-येति**। एवं च इन्द्रियवृत्तिकालीनार्थोपलम्भ इति लक्षणं न कर्तव्यमपि तु इन्द्रि-यव्यापारकालीनार्थोपलम्भ इति। तथा च नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः।

एवं जाग्रद्भोगजनककर्मक्षये स्वप्नभोगजनककर्मोदये च सति निद्राख्यया तामस्या वृत्त्या स्थूलदेहाभिमाने दूरीकृते सर्वेन्द्रियेषु देव-तानुग्रहाभावान्निर्व्यापारतया लीनेषु विश्वोऽपि लीन इत्युच्यते। तदा च स्वप्नावस्था। तत्रान्तःकरणवासनानिमित्तइन्द्रियवृत्त्यभावका-लीनोऽर्थोपलम्भः स्वप्नः। तत्र च मन एव गजतुरगाद्यर्थाकारेण विव-र्तते अविद्यावृत्त्या च ज्ञायत इति केचित्। अविद्यैव शुक्तिरजतादि-वत् स्वप्नार्थाकारेण परिणमते ज्ञायते चाविद्यावृत्त्येत्यन्ये। कः पक्षः श्रेयान्? उत्तरः। अविद्याया एव सर्वत्रार्थाध्यासाज्ञानाध्यासोपा-दानत्वेन कल्पितत्वान्मनोगतवासनानिमित्तत्वे च क्वचिन्मनःपरि-णामत्वव्यपदेशात्। ननु, तदा मनसो दृश्याकारपरिणामानभ्यु-पगमे द्रष्टृत्वसम्भवेनात्मनः स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वासिद्धिरिति चेत्, न, बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यवृत्त्यभावेन तदानीं मनसोऽग्राहकत्वात् तत्सहका-रेणैव तस्य ग्राहकत्वनियमात्, सवृत्तिकान्तःकरणावच्छिन्नस्यैव चैतन्यस्य प्रमातृत्वनियमात् तदान्तःकरणसत्त्वेऽपि प्रमात्रभावः।

आदिपदग्राह्यां स्वप्नावस्थां निरूपयितुमारभते—**एवमिति**। जाग्रद्भोगजनके कर्मणि क्षीण इत्यर्थः। **सर्वेन्द्रियेष्विति**। लीनेष्वित्यनेनान्वयः। **तत्रेति**। लक्षणा-दिभिर्निरूपणीय इत्यर्थः। जाग्रदतिव्याप्तिवारणायाह—**इन्द्रियवृत्त्यभावकालीन**

1. खपुस्तके क्षुप्तत्वादिति।

इति । सुखाद्युपलम्भकालीनसुषुप्तावतिव्याप्तिवारणायाह—**तत्रान्तःकरणेत्यादि** । ननु, स्वप्नस्य किमुपादानमतस्तदेव मतभेदेनाह—**तत्र चेति** । स्वप्न इत्यर्थः । प्रश्नोत्तरमाह—**उत्तर इति** । उत्तरः पक्षः श्रेयानित्यर्थः । हेतुमाह—**अविद्याया इति** । तर्हि शास्त्रे स्वप्नस्य मनःपरिणामत्वव्यपदेशः कथं तत्राह—**मनोगतेति** । स्वप्ने मनसः परिणामानभ्युपगमे बाधकमाशङ्कते—**नन्विति** । ननु, परेषामिव नास्माकं मनः स्वतन्त्रमिन्द्रियं किन्तु ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रियसहकारि[1] । तथा च ज्ञानेन्द्रियव्यापाराभावे कथमापद्यते मनसो ग्राहकत्वमित्याह—**न, बहिरिति** । तर्हि तदानीं मनसः कथं प्रमातृत्वं न इत्याह—**सवृत्तिकेति** । एवं च वृत्त्यभावात्तदानीं मनसो न प्रमातृत्वमित्यर्थः । एवं च स्वाप्नप्रपञ्चो न प्रमातृभास्यः, अपि तु अविद्यावृत्तिसहकारेण साक्षिभास्य इत्यवधेयम् ।

किमधिष्ठानं स्वप्नाध्यासस्य मनोवच्छिन्नं जीवचैतन्यमित्येके, मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमित्यपरे । किं श्रेयः ? मतभेदेनोभयमपि । तथा हि—जाग्रद्बोधेन स्वप्नभ्रमनिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमादधिष्ठानज्ञानादेव च भ्रमनिवृत्तेः, ब्रह्मचैतन्यस्य चाधिष्ठानत्वे संसारदशायां तज्ज्ञानत्वाभावात् ज्ञानेन च सर्वद्वैतनिवृत्तेः न जाग्रद्बोधात्स्वप्ननिवृत्तिः स्यात् । 'स हि कर्ता' (बृ. आ. ४।३।१०) इति च जीवकर्तृत्वश्रुतेः आकाशादिप्रपञ्चवत् सर्वसाधारण्यापत्तेश्च न मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमधिष्ठानम् ।

उपादानं निरूप्याधिष्ठानं निरूपयति—**किमधिष्ठानमिति । मनोवच्छिन्नं जीवचैतन्यमिति** । अज्ञानावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं जीव इति बोध्यम् । **किं श्रेय** इति प्रश्नस्योत्तरमाह—**मतभेदेनेति** । अधिष्ठानज्ञानाद्भ्रमनिवृत्तिरित्येकं[2] मतं, अधिष्ठानज्ञानाद्भ्रमतिरोभाव इत्यपरम् । तत्राद्ये पक्षे मनोवच्छिन्नं जीवचैतन्यमधिष्ठानमन्त्ये च मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमिति । इदानीं जीवचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वं साधयितुं ब्रह्मचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वं दूषयति—**तथा हीति** । किं तेन तत्राह—**अधिष्ठानज्ञानादिति** । ततोऽपि किं तत्राह—**ब्रह्मचैतन्यस्येति । ज्ञानेन चेति** । तथा च ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां नाधिष्ठानत्वमिति मन्तव्यम् । ब्रह्माधिष्ठानत्वसाधकं दूषयित्वा जीवाधिष्ठानत्वसाधकमाह—**स हीति** । 'योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः' इत्युक्त्वा तदनन्तरं 'न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानः' इत्युक्त्वा 'स हि' इत्युक्तम् जीवप्रकरणे

१. गपुस्तके ज्ञानकर्मोभयेन्द्रियसहकारीति ।
२. क१पुस्तके अधिष्ठानभ्रमस्य ज्ञानादिति पाठः स न समीचीनः ।

बृहदारण्यके। अतो जीवकर्तृकमित्यर्थः। पुनरपि ब्रह्माधिष्ठानत्वसम्पादकं दूषणमाह—**आकाशादीति**। आकाशादिप्रपञ्चस्य यथा सर्वजनव्यवहारविषयत्वं तथा स्वप्नप्रपञ्चस्यापि सर्वजनव्यवहारविषयत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः। एवं च पूर्वग्रन्थेन जीवचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वमुक्तं वेदितव्यम्।

ननु, जीवचैतन्यस्यानावृतत्वेन सर्वदाभासमानत्वात्कथमधिष्ठानत्वम्? सत्यं, तत्रापि स्वप्नाध्यासानुकूलव्यावहारिकसंघातभानविरोध्यवस्थाज्ञानाभ्युपगमात्, स्वप्नदशायां चाहं मनुष्य इत्यादिप्रातीतिकसंघातान्तरभानाभ्युपगमात्[1] शय्यां स्वपिमीति शय्यान्तरवत्। भानसामग्र्यभावश्च तुल्य एव।

ब्रह्मचैतन्ये बाधकमिव जीवचैतन्येऽपि बाधकमविकलमिति शङ्कते—**नन्विति**। ननु, तर्हि विरोधिन्यवस्थाज्ञाने जागरूके कथं व्यावहारिकमनुष्यादिसंघातभानं तत्राह—**स्वप्नदशायामिति**। व्यावहारिकसंघातभानसामग्र्यां[2] विद्यमानायां कथं व्यावहारिकसंघातभानाभावः, अत आह—**शय्यायां स्वपिमीति**। शय्यायां स्वपिमीत्यत्र बोधे यथा व्यावहारिकशय्या न भासते किन्तु प्रातीतिकशय्या तथाऽहं मनुष्य इत्यादिबोधेऽपि प्रातीतिको मनुष्यो भासते न व्यावहारिकः, तथा च क्व व्यावहारिकभानसामग्री, सामग्र्याः फलनियतत्वादित्यर्थः। **शय्यान्तरवत्**, शय्यान्तरभानवत्।

ननु, अहं मनुष्य इत्यादिव्यावहारिकसंघातज्ञानस्य प्रमाणाजन्यत्वात्कथमज्ञाननिवर्तकता। अवस्थान्तरान्यथानुपपत्त्या तत्कल्पने सुषुप्तावपि स्वप्नबाधकज्ञानमास्थीयेत[3], तच्चानिष्टं जाग्रत्त्वापत्तेरिति चेत्, साध्ववोचः[4], स्वप्नावस्थाज्ञानस्यैवान्तःकरणलयसहितस्य सुषुप्तिरूपत्वान्न तत्र तद्बाधः[5]। जागरणे तु मिथ्यैव स्वप्नोऽभादित्यनुभवादहमितिज्ञानस्य प्रमाणाजन्यत्वेऽपि[6] यथार्थत्वात् शरीरादिज्ञानस्य च प्रमाणजन्यत्वादवस्थाज्ञानविरोधित्वमनुभवसिद्धम्। विशेषाज्ञानं तु न प्रमाणजन्यवृत्तिमन्तरेण निवर्तते। साक्षिण-

१. कपुस्तके संघान्तराभानाभ्युपगमादिति।
२. खपुस्तके अव्यावहारिकसंघातभानसामग्र्यामिति, गपुस्तके च अथ व्यावहारिकेत्यादि।
३. कपुस्तके स्वप्नबोधकज्ञानमास्थीयत इति।
४. नासौ विरोध इति तस्मिन्नेव, खपुस्तके च साध्ववोचः, नासौ विरोध इति।
५. कपुस्तके तद्बोध इति।
६. खगयोर्ज्ञानस्याप्रमाणजन्यत्वेऽपीति।

श्चाविद्यानिर्वतकत्वाभावोऽविद्यासाधकत्वेनैव धर्मिग्राहकमानसिद्ध इति न किञ्चिद्वद्यम्। यावन्ति ज्ञानानि तावन्त्यज्ञानानीति चाभ्युपगमात् शुक्तिज्ञानेनेव व्यावहारिकसंघातज्ञानेनाज्ञाननिवृत्तावपि पुनरपि कदाचिद्रजतभ्रमवन्न स्वप्नाध्यासानुपपत्तिरिति जीवचैतन्यमेवाधिष्ठानमिति पक्षे न कोऽपि दोषः।

अथ जीवचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वपक्षेऽहं मनुष्य इत्यादिस्वप्नाव्यवहितोत्तरज्ञानस्य न स्वप्नकारणीभूतावस्थाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वं चक्षुरादीन्द्रियपञ्चकजन्यवृत्तिरूपकारणाभावादित्याशङ्कते[1]—**नन्विति**। आशङ्क्य परिहरति—**अवस्थान्तरेति**। **तत्कल्पने,** प्रमाणाजन्यज्ञानस्यापि[2] बाधकत्वकल्पने। **सुषुप्तावपीति**। यदा स्वप्नोत्तरं सुषुप्तिस्तस्यामित्यर्थः। ननु, भवतु नाम बाधकज्ञानं किं तेन तत्राह—**तच्चेति**। प्रमाणाजन्यज्ञानस्य नाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्व यदुक्तं तत्समीचीनमित्याह—**साध्ववोच इति**। स्वप्नज्ञानानिवृत्तौ कथं सुषुप्तिस्तत्राह—**स्वप्नावस्थेति**। **न तत्रेति**। तस्यां सुषुप्तौ न स्वप्नाज्ञानबाध इत्यर्थः। **अहमितिज्ञानस्येति**। एवं च न प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानत्वेनाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वमपि तु यथार्थज्ञानत्वेनेति भावः। यदि वदसि विशेषाज्ञानं शुक्त्याद्यज्ञानं न प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानमन्तरेण निवर्तते तथापि न नः क्षतिः[3]। अहमिति साक्षिज्ञानस्य प्रमाणाजन्यत्वेऽपि प्रमाणजन्यशरीरादिज्ञानस्य सत्वादित्याह—**शरीरादिज्ञानस्य चेति**। अहमिति साक्षिज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वेऽपि नाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वमित्याह—**साक्षिणश्चेति**। ननु, व्यावहारिकपदार्थज्ञानेन स्वप्नाज्ञाननिवृत्तौ कथं पुनः स्वप्नस्तत्राह—**यावन्तीति**। **शुक्तिज्ञानेनै(?ने)वेति**। यथैकेन शुक्तिज्ञानेनैकस्मिन्नज्ञाने नाशितेऽन्यावस्थाऽज्ञानाद्रजतादिभ्रमोत्पत्तिस्तथापि (?तथैव) एकस्मिन्स्वप्नाज्ञाने नाशिते अन्यस्मादज्ञानात्स्वप्नोत्पत्तिरित्यर्थः। जीवचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानपक्षमुपसंहरति—**जीवचैतन्यमिति**।

यदा पुनर्ब्रह्मज्ञानादेवाज्ञाननिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमस्तदा रज्ज्वां दण्डभ्रमेण सर्पभ्रमतिरोधानवदधिष्ठानज्ञानाभावेऽपि जाग्रद्भ्रमेण स्वप्नभ्रमतिरोभावोपपत्तेः ब्रह्मचैतन्यमेव स्वप्नाध्यासाधिष्ठानमिति पक्षेऽपि न कश्चिद्दोषः। प्रतिजीवं स्वप्नाध्यासासाधारण्यं तु मनोगतवासनानामसाधारण्यादेव।

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१. गपुस्तके इन्द्रियपञ्चकजन्यत्वात् इत्याशङ्कत इति।

२. तस्मिन्नेव प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानस्यापीति।

३. क१पुस्तके तथापि न क्षतिरिति।

जीवचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानपक्षमुपपाद्य मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नसाक्षिचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानपक्षमुपपादयन्पूर्वोक्तदोषं परिहरति—**यदा पुनरिति**। ननु, ब्रह्माधिष्ठानकजाग्रत्प्रपञ्चस्य सर्वपुरुषसाधारण्यमिव ब्रह्माधिष्ठानकस्वप्नस्यापि सकलपुरुषसाधारण्यं स्यात्। न च कल्पकजीवस्यैव तत्प्रत्यक्षं नाकल्पकस्येति वाच्यं, मनोभेदेनैव जीवभेदात्तत्राह—**प्रतिजीवमिति**। तथा च जीवस्यावच्छेदकस्य मनसो वासनानिमित्तको यः स्वप्नः स तस्य प्रत्यक्ष इति भावः।

मनोवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमेवाधिष्ठानमेतस्मिन्नपि पक्षेऽवस्थाज्ञानस्यावरकत्वाङ्गीकारान्न काप्यनुपपत्तिः। अत एव शास्त्रेषु क्वचित्क्वचित्तथा व्यपदेशः। ननु, मनोवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वे अहं गज इत्याहङ्कारसामानाधिकरण्येन गजप्रतीतिः[2] स्यात् इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिसामानाधिकरण्येन रजतप्रतीतिवत् नत्वयं गज इति। ब्रह्मचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वपक्षेऽपि गज इत्याकारैव प्रतीतिः स्यान्न त्वयं गज इति तत्रापीदङ्कारास्पदीभूतबाह्यार्थाभावस्य समानत्वादिति चेत्, न, आद्ये पक्षे अहङ्कारस्य शुक्तिवदधिष्ठानानवच्छेदकत्वात् शुक्ती रजतमितिवदहं गज इति न भ्रमाकारप्रसङ्गः। अहमिति ज्ञानस्येयं शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानस्येव भ्रमविरोधित्वात्, इदमंशस्य च भ्रमाविरोधिन एव तत्र भानाभ्युपगमात्। अन्त्ये तु गज इत्याकारवदयमित्याकारोऽपि कल्पित एव। उभयाकारबाधेऽप्यधिष्ठानभूतचैतन्याबाधान्न शून्यवादप्रसङ्गः। जाग्रद्दशायामपि शुक्तीदङ्कारविलक्षणस्य प्रातीतिकस्यैव रजतेदङ्कारस्य भानाभ्युपगमाच्च। 'अध्यस्तमेव हि परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु' (सं० शा० १-३६) इति न्यायात्। शुक्तीदमंशभानपक्षेऽपि न इदमंशसत्यत्वमध्यासे प्रयोजकम्, किन्त्वधिष्ठानसत्यत्वम्। अधिष्ठानं च तत्राज्ञातशुक्तिचैतन्यमिवात्रापि[3] साक्षिचैतन्यं विद्यत एवेत्युपपादितम्। तस्मान्न पक्षद्वयेऽपि काप्यनुपपत्तिः।

यथा मनोवच्छिन्नं जीवचैतन्यमधिष्ठानमिति पक्षे न दोषस्तथा मनोवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमधिष्ठानमिति पक्षेऽपि न दोष इत्याह—**मनोवच्छिन्नमिति**। ब्रह्मचै-

१. गपुस्तके ब्रह्मचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानपक्षमुपपादयन्निति।

२. कपुस्तके सामानाधिकरण्येनैव प्रतीतिः स्यादिति।

३. तस्मिन्नेवाधिष्ठानं च तत्राज्ञानं शुक्तिचैतन्यमिवेति पाठः स न समीचीनः।

तन्यस्य सर्वदा भासमानत्वेन कथमधिष्ठानत्वमज्ञानत्वाभावात्तत्राह—**एतस्मिन्नपि पक्ष इति**। मनोवच्छिन्नजीवचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वपक्षे यथावस्थाज्ञानस्यावरकत्वेन न दोषस्तथा ब्रह्मचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानपक्षेऽप्यावरकत्वान्न दोष इत्यर्थः। मनोवच्छिन्नजीवचैतन्याधिष्ठानपक्षे, मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नब्रह्मचैतन्याधिष्ठानपक्षे[1], मनोवच्छिन्नब्रह्मचैतन्याधिष्ठानपक्षे[2] च प्राचीनसम्मतिमाह—**अत एवेति**। अधुना उक्तपक्षयो[3]राशङ्कते—**नन्विति**। **मनोवच्छिन्नेति**। मनोवच्छिन्नजीवचैतन्यस्येत्यर्थः। अधिष्ठानतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येनारोप्यमाणे[4] निदर्शनमाह—**इदमिति**। इदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वे यथेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानं तथाऽहमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वेऽहं गज इति ज्ञानं स्यादित्यर्थः। सामानाधिकरण्येनैव इत्येवकारव्यावर्त्यमाह—**न त्वयं गज इतीति**। **ब्रह्मचैतन्यस्येति**। मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नब्रह्मचैतन्यस्य मनोवच्छिन्नब्रह्मचैतन्यस्य चेत्यर्थः। हेतुमाह—**तत्रापीति**। **नाद्य इति**। यथा रजताधिष्ठाने शुक्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्ये शुक्त्यज्ञानावच्छिन्नचैतन्ये वा शुक्तिरवच्छेदिका तथा स्वप्नगजाधिष्ठानेऽहङ्कारावच्छिन्नचैतन्येऽहङ्कारोऽवच्छेदकस्तथा च यथा शुक्तौ रजतमिति ज्ञानं न भवति तथाऽहं गज इति ज्ञानं न भवतीत्यर्थः। उक्तेऽर्थे हेतुमाह—**अहमिति ज्ञानस्येति**। तर्हि कथं तत्रेदमंशभानं तत्राह—**इदमंशस्य चेति**। कल्पितेदमंशस्य चेत्यर्थः। एवं च कल्पितेदमंशभानं न भ्रमविरोधि किन्तु शुक्त्यवच्छेदकेदमंशभानमित्यवधेयम्[5]। अथवा तत्रेदन्त्वेन रूपेणेदमंशभानं न तु शुक्तित्वादिरूपेणेति भावः। स्यादेतत्, तथापि स्वाप्नगजभ्रमेऽविद्यमान इदमाकारः कथं भासते तत्राह—**स्वप्ने (? अन्त्ये) त्विति**। तर्हि उभयाकारस्य कल्पितत्वेन बाधितत्वाच्छून्यवादिमतप्रवेशस्तत्राह—**उभयाकारेति**। तर्हि भ्रमस्य द्वैरूप्यं स्वप्नजाग्रद्भ्रमयोः कल्पिताकल्पितेदमंशभानात्तत्राह—**जाग्रद्दशायामपीति**। अत्र संक्षेपशारीरकोक्तं प्रमाणमाह—**अध्यस्तमेवेति**।

> अध्यस्तमेव हि परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु, नान्यत्कथंचन परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु।
> रज्जुत्वशुक्तिशकलत्वमरुक्षितित्वचन्द्रैकताप्रभृतिकानुपलम्भनेन (सं० शा० १—३६)

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१. क₁पुस्तके साक्षिचैतन्याधिष्ठानपक्ष इति।

२. तस्मिन्नेव मनोवच्छिन्नसाक्षिचैतन्याधिष्ठानपक्ष इति।

३. गपुस्तके उक्तेषु त्रिष्वपि पक्षेष्विति पाठः स न समीचीन इति मन्ये यतोऽधस्तात्टीकाकार एव कथयति 'तस्मात्' इत्यस्य व्याख्याने ब्रह्मचैतन्याधिष्ठानपक्षे यद्यप्यवच्छेदकभेदेन द्वाववान्तरभेदौ भवतस्तथापि तत्रोभयोरेक एवावच्छेद्यवस्तुसत्त्वेन ग्रन्थकर्ताऽप्युभयोः पक्षयोरिति वदतीति।

४. क₁पुस्तके सामानाधिकरण्येनोभयभान इति।

५. खगयोः शुक्तिनिष्ठेदमंशभानमित्यवधेयमिति।

इत्यन्तः श्लोको बोध्यः। ननूक्तक्रमेण शून्यवादपरिहारेऽपि स्वप्नाध्यासो न समर्थितः, अध्यासप्रयोजकत्वे सत्येदमंशाभानादत आह—**शुक्तीदमंशेति**। मतत्रयमुपसंहरति—**तस्मादिति**। मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नब्रह्मचैतन्यमनोवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोरवच्छेदकभेदेऽप्यवच्छेद्यभेदाभावादुभयोः पक्षयोरैक्यमभिसंधाय पक्षद्वयेऽपीत्युक्तमिति बोध्यम्।

अत्र च स्वाप्निकपदार्थभोक्ता तैजस इत्युच्यते। पित्ताख्यतेजःप्रधानत्वादादित्यादिज्योतिरन्तरेणापि भासकत्वादिति वा।

स्वप्नाधिष्ठानं निरूप्य स्वप्नभोक्तारमाह—**अत्रेति**। स्वाप्नभोक्तुस्तैजसत्वमुपपादयति—**पित्ताख्येनेति (?ख्येति)**। तेजःशब्दस्य पित्तपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वं याज्ञवल्क्यादौ[1] सुप्रसिद्धम्। इति स्वप्नावस्थानिरूपणम्।

एवं जाग्रत्स्वप्नभोगद्वयेन श्रान्तस्य जीवस्य तदुभयकारणकर्मक्षये ज्ञानशक्त्यवच्छिन्नस्य सवासनस्यान्तःकरणस्य कारणात्मनावस्थाने सति विश्रामस्थानं सुषुप्त्यवस्था। न किञ्चिद्वेदिषमिति कारणमात्रोपलम्भः सुषुप्तिः। तत्र जाग्रत्स्वप्नभोग्यपदार्थज्ञानाभावेऽपि साक्ष्याकारं, सुखाकारं, अवस्थाऽज्ञानाकारं चाविद्यायाः वृत्तित्रयमभ्युपेयते। अहङ्काराभावाच्च नैका विशिष्टवृत्तिः सुषुप्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात्। अत एव वृत्तिरूपस्योपलम्भस्याभावान्न प्रलयेऽतिव्याप्तिः, तत्र तत्कल्पनाबीजाभावात्, इह च सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिद्वेदिषमिति सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शात्, अननुभवे च परामर्शानुपपत्तेः। अन्तःकरणोपरागकालीनानुभवजन्यत्वाभावाच्च न तत्तोल्लेखाभावेऽपि स्मरणत्वानुपपत्तिः। स्मरणे तत्तोल्लेखनियमाभावाच्च जाग्रद्दशायामस्वाप्समित्यनुभवानुपपत्तेः लिङ्गाभावेन च आश्रयासिद्ध्यां[2] चानुमानस्यासंभवात्। अहङ्कारस्तु उत्थानसमय एवानुभूयते। सुषुप्तौ लीनत्वेन तस्याननुभूतत्वात् स्मरणानुपपत्तेः। मुखप्रतिबिम्बाश्रये दर्पणे जपाकुसुमलौहित्याध्यासे रक्तं मुखमिति प्रतीतिवदहङ्काराश्रयं[3] साक्षिचैतन्यस्य स्मरणाश्रयत्वात् अहमस्वाप्समिति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतिः, न पुनरहं सुखीति वाश्रयतयां[4]। स्मृतिसंशयविपर्ययाणां

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१. या. स्मृ. ३-७७.

२. खपुस्तके लिङ्गाभावे चाश्रयासिद्ध्येति।

३. खगयोरहङ्काराश्रयतयेति।

४. खगपुस्तकयोर्नपुनरहं सुखीवदाश्रयतयेति।

साक्षिचैतन्याश्रयत्वनियमादहङ्कारस्य च प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानाश्रयत्वात् प्रमात्वेनैव तत्कार्यतावच्छेदात्, अप्रमात्वावच्छेदेन च अविद्याया एव कारणत्वात्। अत एव अनाप्तवाक्यादिजन्यपरोक्षविभ्रमोऽपि अविद्यावृत्तिरेवेत्यभ्युपगमो वेदान्तविदाम्। तत्रान्तःकरणवृत्तिजनकसामग्रीसम्भवेऽपि प्रमात्वाभावावरोधेनान्तःकरणस्यासामर्थ्यात्। नामादिषु ब्रह्माध्यासस्तु इच्छाधीनतया भ्रमप्रमाविलक्षणा मनोवृत्तिरेव कामादिवत्। तदुक्तं 'अत एव चोदनाजन्यत्वान्मानसी क्रियैव सा, न ज्ञानम्' इति। एतेन तर्कस्यापि मनोवृत्तित्वं व्याख्यातम्। व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकप्रसञ्जनात्मकस्य तस्य इच्छाधीनतया भ्रमप्रमाविलक्षणत्वात्। अत एव मनननिदिध्यासनसहिते श्रवणाख्ये वेदान्तविचारे श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्य इत्यादिविधिरुपपद्यते, तस्य चतुर्विधान्वयव्यतिरेकादितर्करूपत्वात्। दृग्दृश्यान्वयव्यतिरेकः, साक्षिसाक्ष्यान्वयव्यतिरेकः, आगमापायितदवध्यन्वयव्यतिरेकः, दुःखिपरमप्रेमास्पदान्वयव्यतिरेक इति। अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तान्वयव्यतिरेकः पञ्चमः। एतच्च सर्वेषां वेदान्तानुकूलतर्काणां चतुर्लक्षणीमीमांसाप्रतिपादितानामुपलक्षणमित्यभियुक्ताः। विस्तरस्तु वेदान्तकल्पलतिकायामनुसन्धेयः।

क्रमप्राप्तां सुषुप्त्यवस्थां निरूपयितुमुपक्रमते—**एवमिति**। **जीवस्येति**। विश्रामस्थानं सुषुप्त्यवस्था इत्यनेनान्वयः। **तदुभयेति**। तदुभयं, जाग्रत्स्वप्नोभयम्। जाग्रत्स्वप्नोभयकर्मक्षये कर्मणि लीने। अन्यथा पुनः स्वाप्नान्तरानुपपत्तिः। प्राणमनसोरैक्यमभिप्रेत्याह—**ज्ञानशक्त्यवच्छिन्नस्येति**। एवं च तदेवैकं वस्तु ज्ञानशक्त्यवच्छिन्नमन्तःकरणमुच्यते क्रियाशक्त्यवच्छिन्नं सत्प्राण इत्यवधेयम्। बुद्धेः कारणात्मनावस्थानं सुषुप्तिरिति प्राचीनलक्षणं प्रलयेऽतिव्याप्तमत उपलम्भघटितं सुषुप्तिलक्षणमाह—**कारणेति**। **उपलम्भः**, वृत्तिरूपं ज्ञानम्। ननु, सुषुप्तौ विषयान्तरस्यानुभवाभाव इव सुखस्यानुभवाभावात्कथं सुप्तोत्थितस्य सुखस्मरणमत आह—**तत्रेति**। ननु विशिष्टवृत्तिमुपेक्ष्य किमिति वृत्तित्रयमङ्गीक्रियते तत्राह—**अहङ्काराभावाचेति**। अहङ्काराभाव एव कुतस्तत्राह—**सुषुप्त्यभावेति**। सम्प्रदायमनुरुन्ध्य वृत्तित्रयमुक्तं वस्तुतस्तु एकैव वृत्तिः। इदं च प्रतिपादितं श्रीपादैरद्वैतसिद्धौ मयापि विस्तृतमद्वैतसिद्धिटीकायां सिद्धिसाधके। उपलम्भपदकृत्यमाह—

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१. कपुस्तके प्रमात्वाभावापराधेनेति।

वृत्तिरूपस्येति। ननु, सुषुप्ताविव प्रलयेऽपि वृत्तिः कल्पनीया तत्राह—**तत्रेति**। प्रलय इत्यर्थः। सुषुप्तौ किं बीजं तत्राह—**इह चेति**। **परामर्शः**, स्मरणम्। अनुभवं विनैव भवतु परामर्श(स्तत्राह–) **अननुभव इति**। नन्वयं परामर्श एव न भवति, तत्तोल्लेखाभावादत आह—**अन्तःकरणेति**। एवं चान्तःकरणोपरागकालीनानुभवजन्यस्मरण एव तत्तोल्लेखो न स्मरणमात्र इति भावः। वस्तुतस्तु नैयायिकादिभिरपि प्रमुषित[1]तत्ताकस्मरणाङ्गीकारान्न केषामपि स्मरणे तत्तोल्लेखनियम इत्याह—**स्मरण इति**। **जाग्रद्दशायामिति**। सुषुप्त्यव्यवहितोत्तरक्षण इति शेषः। अन्यथा किञ्चित्कालानन्तरं जाग्रत्यप्यस्वाप्समिति प्रत्ययस्य नानुपपत्तिगन्धोऽपीति बोध्यम्। शब्दाद्यभावेऽप्यनुमानमस्तु तत्राह—**लिङ्गाभावेनेति**। ईदृशस्मरणविषयस्य हेतोराश्रयस्याहङ्कारस्य लिङ्गाभावेनेत्यर्थः। भवतु वा यथाकथंचिल्लिङ्गं तथापि हेतोराश्रयस्याहङ्कारस्य सुषुप्त्यव्यवहितक्षणेऽसिद्धेरित्याह—**आश्रयासिद्ध्या चेति**। सुषुप्तावहङ्कारस्य लीनत्वादिति भावः। तर्हि स्मरणे कथमहङ्कारभानं तत्राह—**अहङ्कारस्त्विति**। **तस्य**, अहङ्कारस्य। तर्हि अहमस्वाप्समिति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतिः कथं तत्राह—**मुखप्रतिबिम्बाश्रय इति**। एवं च एकाश्रयसामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धेन यथा जातिः[2] सती समवायः सन्निति प्रत्ययः[3] यथा वा उक्तसम्बन्धेन मुखप्रतिबिम्बाश्रये दर्पणे लौहित्याध्यासेन रक्तं मुखमिति प्रत्ययस्तथा उत्थानसमये साक्षिचैतन्ये स्वापाहङ्कारयोः सामानाधिकरण्यात्प्रत्यय इत्यर्थः। **आश्रयतया**, सुखाश्रयतया। ननु, भवन्मतेऽहङ्कार एव ज्ञानाश्रयो न तु साक्षिचैतन्यं तत्राह—**स्मृतिसंशयेति**। तर्हि ज्ञानाश्रयो न अहङ्कारस्तत्राह—**अहङ्कारस्येति**। ननु नियामकाभावात्साङ्कर्यं स्यात्तत्राह—**प्रमात्वेनैवेत्यादि**। एवञ्चेदहङ्कारकालीनभ्रमात्मकशब्दानुमित्यादौ का गतिस्तत्राह—**अत एवेति**। एवमपि नामब्रह्मेत्युपासीतेत्यादौ का गतिस्तज्जन्याया नामनि ब्रह्मदृष्टेर्भ्रमत्वाभावादित्याह—**नामादिष्विति**। यद्यपि तस्याः प्रमात्वेऽपि न क्षतिः, अन्तःकरणवृत्तित्वात्तथापि वस्तुगतिमनुरुन्ध्य ज्ञानभिन्नत्वमुक्तमिति बोध्यम्। **तदुक्तमिति**। आचार्यैः शारीरकभाष्ये इति शेषः। **एतेनेति**। एतेन मानसज्ञानत्वं तर्कस्य प्रत्युक्तमित्यर्थः। **व्याप्यारोपेणेति**। तथा च नामनि ब्रह्मदृष्टिवितर्कोऽपि मनोवृत्तिविशेष एव न तु ज्ञानमित्यर्थः। **अत एवेति**। तर्कस्य ज्ञानविलक्षणमनोवृत्तिविशेषत्वादेवेत्यर्थः। श्रवणं त्वद्वितीये ब्रह्मणि निखिलवेदान्तानां तात्पर्यावधारणा-

१. खगयोः प्रमुष्ट इति।
२. गपुस्तके यथा ज्योतिरिति।
३. खपुस्तके यथा जातिः सती तर्हि समवायः सन्निति प्रत्यय इति।

नुकूलो व्यापारविशेषो न श्रोत्रजन्यं ज्ञानं, शब्दः श्रुत इत्यादिप्रत्ययसिद्धमिति। उक्तेऽर्थे हेतुमाह—**तस्येति**। वेदान्तविचारस्येत्यर्थः। एवं भाष्यकारैर्ज्ञानविधिरेव निराकृतो न तु श्रवणादिविधिरिति भावः। चतुर्विधान्वयव्यतिरेकं दर्शयति—**दृग्दृश्येत्यादि**। दृक्पदार्थस्त्वद्वितीयात्मस्वरूपप्रकाशविशुद्धानुभवमात्रः। दृश्यपदार्थस्त्वविद्यातत्कार्यपञ्चभूततदारब्धानि सर्वाण्यविद्यासम्बन्धश्च। दृश्यत्वं तु शब्दाजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वं शब्दाजन्यान्तःकरणपरिणामरूपज्ञानविषयत्वं वा। न चाद्यस्य लक्षणस्य ब्रह्मण्यतिव्याप्तिः सुषुप्तिकालीनसुखाकाराविद्यावृत्तिविषयत्वादिति वाच्यं, विषयत्वरूपधर्मस्य लक्षणस्य निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मण्यभावात्। अविद्यावृत्तिविषयसंभावना तु स्वप्रात्मिकैव[1], अतो नातिव्याप्तिः। द्वितीये तु लक्षणेऽतिव्याप्तिसंभावनैव नास्ति, अविद्यावृत्तेरन्तःकरणपरिणामत्वासम्भवात्। नापि श्रवणादिजन्यान्तःकरणपरिणामरूपज्ञानविषयत्वादतिव्याप्तिः तदवस्थाश्रवणादिजन्याया वृत्तेर्ज्ञानभिन्नत्वस्य ग्रन्थकृद्भिरेवोक्तत्वात्। विषयत्वरूपधर्माभावाच्च नाद्यलक्षणेऽतिव्याप्तिः। यद्यपि दृश्यादिकाले दृगादिसत्वेनान्वयः सुमिलस्तथापि नित्यानां दृगादीनां व्यतीरेकाप्रसिद्ध्या अन्वयव्यतीरेकासिद्धेरयं ग्रन्थस्तर्कपरतया व्याख्येयः। उक्तं च गुरुचरणैः 'चतुर्विधान्वयव्यतिरेकादितर्करूपत्वात्' इत्यनेन ग्रन्थेन। तर्कश्च, दृक् यदि दृश्यभिन्नं न स्यात्तदा दृश्याभावकाले दृकालो न स्यादित्यादिरूपः। एवमुत्तरत्रापि बोध्यम्। परे तु दृश्यादिकाले दृगादिसत्त्वेनान्वयत्वेऽपि दृगादिव्यतिरेकाप्रसिद्धेर्न व्यतिरेके तात्पर्यम्, अपि तु अन्वये। एवमपि व्याप्तेर्भेदघटितत्वेन सिद्धो दृग्दृश्यादिभेद इति वदन्ति। नव्यास्तु सकृत्श्रुतपदस्यार्थद्वयक्लृप्तिर्न दुष्यतीति न्यायेन दृग्दृश्यान्वयशब्दो दृग्दृश्ययोः कालिकसामानाधिकरण्यमुक्त्वा अवशिष्टव्यतिरिक्तपदेनान्वितः सन् दृग्दृश्ययोरभावं तयोरभावयोर्व्याप्तिरूपस्यान्वयस्याभावं च वक्ति। तेन चायमर्थो लब्धः। यदा यदा दृश्यं तदा तदा दृगित्यादिव्याप्त्या दृश्यसम्बन्धिकालस्य दृक्सम्बन्धे लब्धेऽपि दृश्यस्य दृश्यसम्बन्धिकालान्वयत्वाभावाद्दृग्दृश्यभिन्नं दृग्दृश्ययोर्व्याप्तावपि तदभावयोर्व्याप्त्यभावादिति दृग्दृश्यान्वयव्यतिरेकशब्दस्यार्थं वर्णयन्ति। वस्तुतस्तु दृक् च दृश्यं च दृग्दृश्ये, अन्वयश्च व्यतिरेकश्च अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ। व्यतिरेकोऽपि सामान्याभावः, दृग्दृश्ययोरन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामन्वयस्तु यथासङ्ख्येन, ततश्च दृगन्वयो दृश्यव्यतिरेकस्तत्सामान्याभाव इत्यर्थो लब्धः। तथा च यदा दृश्यसामान्याभावस्तदा दृगिति व्याप्तौ सिद्धायां क दृग्दृश्ययोरैक्यसम्भावना। एवं च सिद्धोऽहङ्कारादिभिन्न आत्मा। सिद्धे च भावरूपे आत्मनि शून्यवादोऽपि परास्त इति वदन्ति। एवं सिद्धेऽपि दृग्रूपे आत्मनि तस्य

१. स्वगयोरविद्यावृत्तिविषयता तु स्वप्रात्मिका एवेति।

जडत्वं न परिहृतं परप्रकाश्यत्वरूपजडत्वेऽपि तस्यानिर्वाहादत आह—**साक्षीति**। एवं चाविद्योपलक्षितचैतन्यरूपस्य साक्षिणः स्वपरप्रकाश्यत्वेन[1] स्वव्यवहारेऽन्यानपेक्षत्वरूपस्वप्रकाश्यत्वे सिद्धे क जडत्वसम्भावनेति भावः[2]। साक्ष्यं त्वविद्यादितत्सम्बन्धान्तं पूर्वोक्तं वेदितव्यम्। निरस्ते जडत्वे परिहृते च शून्यवादे विज्ञानवादो न निरस्तस्तथा चागतं क्षणिकत्वमात्मनोऽत आह—**आगमापायीति**। **आगमः**, उत्पत्तिः। **अपायः**, विनाशः। तथा च उत्पत्तेराकस्मिकत्वाभावेन[3] तस्य किञ्चित्पूर्वावधिभूतं कारणं वक्तव्यम्। एवं विनाशस्यापि प्रतियोग्यतिरिक्तं कारणं वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथोत्तरक्षणे विनाशापत्तेः। एवमपि तस्य कारणस्य जन्यत्वे तस्यापि कारणान्तरं तथा चानवस्था, अतस्तत्परिहारायानया रीत्या नित्यत्वं कारणस्य साध्यते। यदा आगमापायि ततः पूर्वमवधिभूतं ब्रह्म यदा चागमापायिसामान्याभावस्तदापि तदवधिभूतं ब्रह्म। एवं च कालपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वरूपमागतं नित्यत्वमात्मनः, तथा च न क्षणिकत्ववार्ता। अथवा क्षणिकत्ववादिनाऽपि नाशस्योत्तरावध्याश्रयभूतं किञ्चिद्वक्तव्यं निराश्रयनाशानुपपत्तेः, नाशपरम्पराकल्पने गौरवं च। अतो यदा आगमापायि तदा तदवधिभूतं ब्रह्म। यदा चागमापायिव्यतिरेकस्तदापि तदवधिभूतं ब्रह्मेत्यवधृतेरागतं कालपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वरूपं नित्यत्वमात्मन इति सर्वं निरवद्यम्। सर्वत्र चाभावोऽपि आत्मरूप एव, अतो न द्वैतापत्तिः। व्याप्तिग्रहस्तु यदा घटस्तदा कम्बुग्रीवादिमानितिवद्यदा दृश्यादिव्यतिरेकस्तदा दृगादीति। **एकस्यैव प्रकारभेदेनेति**। नन्वेतावता प्रबन्धेन नित्यानुभवस्वरूप एवात्मेति साङ्ख्यमतमेवोपपादितं न सुखस्वरूप आत्मेति तत्राह—**दुःखीति**। दुःखी अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यमहङ्कारो वा परमप्रेमास्पदं देशकालानवच्छिन्नं सुखं निरतिशयानन्दापरपर्यायः। एवं च यदा दुःखिव्यतिरेकस्तदापि परमप्रेमास्पदम्। अतः सिद्धं नित्यवत्वादात्मनः सुखस्वरूपत्वमिति। नन्वेवमपि परिच्छिन्नत्वेन विनाशित्वादिकमापतितमत आह—**अनुवृत्तेति**। **अनुवृत्तत्वं**, अनुगतत्वमत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं वा। इदं तु ब्रह्मण एव न जडस्य। **व्यावृत्तत्वं**, अननुगतत्वमत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं वा। इदं तु जडस्य न ब्रह्मणः। तथा च यदा व्यावृत्तव्यतिरेकस्तदानुवृत्तम्। अतः सिद्धमात्मनोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वमतश्च सिद्धमात्मनोऽविनाशित्वादिकमिति दिक्। तर्हि किं वेदान्तशास्त्रे पञ्चैव तर्का, न, इत्याह—**एतच्चेति**। **अभियुक्ताः**, वेदान्तशास्त्रनिपुणाः।

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१. खपुस्तके स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वेनेति।

२. गपुस्तके तस्य जडत्वं न परिहृतमित्यनन्तरं स्वप्रकाश्यत्वे सिद्धे क जडत्वसम्भावनेति भाव इति तन्न समञ्जसम्।

३. खगपुस्तकयोराकस्मिकत्वासम्भवेनेति।

तदेवं सुषुप्त्यवस्थायामस्त्यानन्दभोगस्तद्भोक्ता च सुषुप्त्यभिमानी प्राज्ञ इत्युच्यते। प्रकर्षेणाज्ञत्वात्तदानीं विशेषावच्छेदाभावेन प्रकृष्टज्ञत्वाद्वा। तदानीं चान्तःकरणस्य लयेऽपि तत्संस्कारेणावच्छेदान्न जीवाभावप्रसङ्गः, न वा सार्वज्ञापत्तिः। ईश्वराभेदप्रतिपादनं[1] च शरीरेन्द्रियाद्यभिमानरहितत्वेनोपचारात्। संस्कारस्य च निमित्तकारणत्वेन साक्ष्याश्रितकार्योपादानकोटावप्रवेशान्न तद्भेदेऽपि साक्षिभेदः। जागरणेत्वन्तःकरणस्य प्रमाश्रितकार्योपादानकोटौ प्रवेशात्तद्भेदेन प्रमातृभेद एव। साक्षिण एव चाधिकोपाधिविशिष्टस्य प्रमातृत्वान्न प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तिरिति।

मातृमानप्रभेदेऽपि प्रतिदेहं न भिद्यते।
साक्षी बाह्यार्थवद्यस्मात्स आत्मेत्युच्यते ततः॥
व्यभिचारो मिथो यद्वत्प्रमात्रादेः स्वसाक्षिकः।
सर्वमात्राद्यभावार्थसाक्षित्वान्न तथात्मनः॥

(बृ. आ. भा. वा. ३।४।९४-९५)

इति वार्तिककारपादैर्व्यवहारदशायामपि साक्षिभेदनिराकरणात् सुषुप्तौ तद्भेदकल्पनं केषाञ्चिद्व्यामोहमात्रमित्यवधेयम्।

प्रासङ्गिकं समाप्य प्रकृतमनुसरति—**तदेवमिति**। 'आनन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञ' इत्यादिश्रुत्यवष्टम्भेन भोगं भोक्तारं च प्रतिपाद्य प्राज्ञशब्दस्य योगार्थमाह— **प्रकर्षेणेति**। सकलविशेषावच्छेदकाभावे जीवोपाधेरन्तःकरणस्याप्यभावेन जीवनाशः। ईश्वराभेदेन ईश्वरवत् सुषुप्तस्य सार्वज्ञं च स्यादिति शङ्कामपनुदति— **तदानीं चेति**। तर्हि 'सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति' इत्यादिश्रुतेः का गतिरत आह—**ईश्वराभेदेति**। एकाविद्या तत्प्रतिबिम्ब एको जीवः, बिम्बमीश्वरः, स एव जीवो वृत्तिमदन्तःकरणविशिष्टः[2], प्रमाताऽन्तःकरणोपहितः, साक्षी अन्तःकरणस्य। साक्षिकोटौ च प्रवेशे एकप्रमातृसुखादिकं सकलप्रमातृवेद्यं स्यात्, एकस्य भासकस्य प्रतिबिम्बचैतन्यस्य सर्वत्राप्यविशिष्टत्वात्[3]। एवं चान्तःकरणस्य विशेषणत्वोपहितत्वाभ्यां द्वेधा प्रवेश इति केषाञ्चिन्मतं दूषयति—**संस्कारस्य चेति**। **साक्ष्येति**। साक्ष्याश्रितं यत्कार्यं स्मरणादिस्तदुपादानं तत्कोटावित्यर्थः। संस्कारापे-

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१. तस्मिन्नेव ईश्वरभेदप्रतिपादनमिति पाठः स न समीचीनः।
२. खपुस्तकेऽन्तःकरणविशिष्ट इति।
३. खगपुस्तकयोः सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वादिति।

क्षया प्रमातुरुपाधेरन्तःकरणस्य वैलक्षण्यं प्रदर्शयन्प्रमातृभेदमुपपादयति—**जागरणे त्विति**। ननु, प्रमातॄणामनुभवाश्रयाणां यथा परस्परं भेदस्तथा स्मर्तुः साक्षिणोऽपि भेदः प्रमातृनिष्ठस्तथा चानुभवस्मरणयोर्वैयधिकरण्यान्न साक्षिणः स्मरणमत आह—**साक्षिण एवेति (?साक्षिण इति)**। **प्रतिसन्धानं**, स्मरणम्। वस्तुतस्तु प्रमातुरुपाधेरन्तःकरणस्य साक्ष्युपाधित्वानङ्गीकारे सकलभासकात्साक्षिणः भिन्नः प्रमाता, तथा च कथं प्रमात्राश्रितकार्यभानं भासकासन्निकृष्टत्वात्तदसन्निकृष्टभासने चातिप्रसङ्गा[1]दत आह—**साक्षिण एवेति**। न चैवमपि प्रमातुः स्वप्रपञ्चसाक्षात्कार इव प्रमात्रन्तरप्रपञ्चस्यापि साक्षात्कारः स्यात् प्रमात्रभिन्नसाक्षिणो भासकत्वादिति वाच्यम्[2], यत्प्रमात्रन्तःकरणे साक्षिप्रतिबिम्बं तस्यैव भाननियमेन सर्वसामञ्जस्यात्। प्रमात्रभिन्नसाक्षिणो भासकत्वादित्युक्तेऽर्थे वार्तिककारसम्मतिमाह—**मातृमानेत्यादिना**। देहभेदेन प्रमातृप्रमाणयोर्भेदेऽपि बाह्यार्थो घटादिर्यथा न भिद्यते तथा साक्ष्यपि न भिद्यते, ततस्तस्मात्कारणात् साक्षी ते तव आत्मा इत्यर्थः। व्यतिरेके दृष्टान्तमाह—**व्यभिचार इति**। यथा परस्परं प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयाणां भेदः स्वसाक्षिकः अज्ञानावच्छिन्नचैतन्यसाक्षिक इत्यर्थः। दृष्टान्तं प्रतिपाद्य दार्ष्टान्तिकमाह—**न तथात्मन इति**। तथात्मनः साक्षिणो भेदो नास्तीत्यर्थः। अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह—**सर्वेति**। सकलप्रमाणप्रमात्रादीनां तेषामभावानां च साक्षित्वादित्यर्थः। **सुषुप्ताविति**। सुषुप्तावपीत्यर्थः। जागरणे साक्षिभेदाभावे कुतः सुषुप्तौ साक्षिभेद इत्यन्वयः।

ननु, दुःखमहमस्वाप्समिति कस्यचित्कदाचित्परामर्शात्सुषुप्तौ दुःखानुभवोऽप्यस्तु। न, तदानीं दुःखसामग्रीविरहेण तदभावात्। सुखस्य चात्मस्वरूपत्वेन नित्यत्वात् शय्यादेरसमीचीनत्वे च दुःखमित्युपचारात् दुःखमहमस्वाप्समिति प्रत्ययोपपत्तिः। अथवा अवस्थात्रयस्यापि त्रैविध्याङ्गीकारात्सुषुप्तावपि दुःखमुपपद्यते। तथा हि प्रमाज्ञानं जाग्रज्जाग्रत्, शुक्तिरजतादिविभ्रमो जाग्रत्स्वप्नः, श्रमादिना स्तब्धीभावो[3] जाग्रत्सुषुप्तिः। एवं स्वप्ने मन्त्रादिप्राप्तिः स्वप्नजाग्रत्, स्वप्नेऽपि स्वप्नो मया दृष्ट इति बुद्धिः स्वप्नस्वप्नः, जाग्रद्दशायां कथयितुं न शक्यते स्वप्नावस्थायां च यत्किञ्चिदनुभूयते तत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिः। एवं

१. क१पुस्तके भासकासन्निकृष्टभासनेचातिप्रसङ्गादिति, गपुस्तके च भासकासन्निकृष्टत्वात्तदभासने चातिप्रसङ्गादिति पाठः।

२. क१पुस्तके भासकमित्येकत्वादिति वाच्यमिति पाठः स नास्मिन्सन्दर्भे युक्तः।

३. कपुस्तके तल्लीनभाव इति पाठः स न समीचीनः।

सुषुप्त्यवस्थायामपि सात्विकी या सुखाकारा वृत्तिः सा सुषुप्ति-जाग्रत्, तदनन्तरं सुखमहमस्वाप्समिति परामर्शः; तत्रैव या राजसी वृत्तिः सा सुषुप्तिस्वप्नः, तदनन्तरमेव दुःखमहमस्वाप्स-मिति परामर्शोपपत्तिः; तत्रैव या तामसी वृत्तिः सा सुषुप्तिः, तदनन्तरं गाढं मूढोऽहमासमिति परामर्शः । यथा चैतत्तथा वासि-ष्ठवार्तिकामृतादौ स्पष्टम् ।

सुखमहमस्वाप्समिति परामर्शाद्यथा सुषुप्तौ सुखानुभवस्तथा दुःखानुभवोप्यस्त्वि-त्याशङ्कते—**नन्विति** । परिहरति—**न इति** । हेतुमाह—**तदानीमिति** । ननु, तदानीं दुःखाभावेन तदनुभवाभावात्कथं दुःखपरामर्शस्तत्राह—**शय्यादेरिति** । वस्तुतो दुःखाभावेऽपि दुःखोपचारात्तत्परामर्श इत्यर्थः । उपचारमसहमानो वार्ति-कोक्तरीत्या समाधातुं षष्ठाध्यायान्तर्गतज्योतिर्ब्राह्मणस्थमर्थमाह—**अथवेति** । अ-वस्थात्रैविध्यं वक्तुं प्रथमतः जाग्रदवस्थाकालीनान्तर्गतां जाग्रदवस्थामाह—**प्रमा-ज्ञानमिति** । क्रमप्राप्तां स्वप्नान्तर्गतां जाग्रदवस्थामाह—**एवमिति** । क्रमप्राप्तां सुषुप्त्यन्तर्गतां जाग्रदवस्थामाह—**एवं सुषुप्ताविति** । इदमर्थं प्रमाणीकर्तुमाह—**यथा चैतदिति** ।

एवमध्यात्मं विश्वः, अधिभूतं विराट्, अधिदैवं विष्णुः; अध्यात्मं जाग्रत्, अधिदैवं पालनं, अधिभूतं सत्त्वगुणः । एवमध्यात्मं तैजसः, अधिभूतं हिरण्यगर्भः, अधिदैवं ब्रह्मा; अध्यात्मं स्वप्नः, अधिदैवं सृष्टिः, अधिभूतं रजोगुणः । एवमध्यात्मं प्राज्ञः, अधिभूतमव्या-कृतं, अधिदैवं रुद्रः; अध्यात्मं सुषुप्तिः, अधिदैवं प्रलयः, अधिभूतं तमोगुणः । एवमध्यात्माधिभूताधिदेवानामेकत्वात्प्रणवावयवत्रय-सहितानामेतेषामुपहितानामैक्योपासनया हिरण्यगर्भलोकप्राप्तिः, अन्तःकरणशुद्धिद्वारा क्रममुक्तिश्च । एतत्सर्वोपाधिनिराकरणेन सा-क्षिचैतन्यमात्रज्ञानेन तु साक्षादेव मोक्ष इति । तदेवं त्रयाणामप्यव-स्थात्रयसहितानां विश्वतैजसप्राज्ञानामविद्यात्मकत्वात् दृश्यत्वेन च मिथ्यात्वादनुपहितः केवलः साक्षी तुरीयाख्योऽहमस्मीत्यर्थः । एवं व्यवहारतः सर्वव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः परमार्थतः कस्या अप्यवस्थाया अभावान्न काप्यनुपपत्तिः । विस्तरेण चैतत्प्रपञ्चितमस्माभिर्वेदान्त-कल्पलतिकायामित्युपरम्यते ॥ ८ ॥

प्रसङ्गादन्तःकरणशुद्ध्यर्थं वार्तिकाद्युक्तामुपासनामाह—**एवमध्यात्ममिति** ।

क्रममुक्त्युपायमुक्त्वा साक्षान्मुक्त्युपायमाह—एतत्सर्वोपाधीति। अविद्यात्मकत्वादित्यादि द्वितीयार्धस्यार्धं वदन्नुपसंहरति—तदेवं त्रयाणामिति। इत्यष्टमः श्लोकः।

ननु, जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यवस्थासहितानां त्रयाणामपि तदभिमानिनां मिथ्यात्वात्, तत्साक्षिणोऽपि मिथ्यात्वं स्यात्, अविशेषात्, इत्याशङ्क्य विशेषाभिधानेन साक्षिणः सत्यत्वमाह—

अपि व्यापकत्वाद्धितत्वप्रयोगात्
स्वतः सिद्धभावादनन्याश्रयत्वात्।
जगत्तुच्छमेतत्समस्तं तदन्यत्
तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम्॥ ९॥

'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः' (बृ. आ. ३।४।२) इति साक्षिणं प्रकृत्य 'अतोऽन्यदार्तम्' (सैव) इति श्रुतेः साक्षिणोऽन्यत्साक्ष्यं सर्वं जगत्तुच्छं, न तु साक्षी। बाधावधित्वात्भ्रमाधिष्ठानतया ज्ञातत्वाच्च, तद्बाधग्राहकाभावाच्चेत्याद्यनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थः अपिशब्दः। 'अथ यदल्पं तन्मर्त्यम्' (छां. ७।२४।१) इति श्रुतेः परिच्छिन्नत्वतुच्छत्वयोः समव्याप्तत्वात्परिच्छिन्नत्वनिवृत्त्या तुच्छत्वनिवृत्तिरित्याह—व्यापकत्वादिति। 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' (छां. ३।१४।१) इति सर्वात्मत्वोपदेशेन देशकालापरिच्छिन्नत्वात्, आकाशादीनां च देशकालापरिच्छिन्नत्वेऽप्यापेक्षिकमहत्त्वेन व्यापकत्वोपचारात्। ननु, सर्वव्यापकत्वेन नित्यत्वाद्भावरूपत्वाच्चात्मा न दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपः, नापि सुखरूपः, सुखस्यानित्यत्वेन नित्यात्मरूपत्वानुपपत्तेः, तथा चात्मस्वरूपो मोक्षोऽपुरुषार्थ एवेत्याशङ्क्य, न, इत्याह—हितत्वप्रयोगादिति। हितत्वं, पुरुषार्थत्वम्। 'तदेतत्प्रेयः पुत्रात्प्रेयो वित्तात्प्रेयोऽन्यस्मात्सर्वस्मादन्तरतरं यदयमात्मेति' (बृ. आ. १।४।८), 'यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं' (छां. ७।२३।१), 'एष एव परम आनन्दः' (बृ. आ. ४।३।३३), 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ. आ. ३।९।२८) इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यस्तस्य परमानन्दरूपत्वोपदेशात्। तस्य च नित्यत्वेऽपि लोके धर्मजन्यततदन्तःकरणवृत्तिव्यङ्ग्यतया तदुत्पत्तिविनाशोपचारः। अज्ञानव्यवहितस्य च तस्याप्राप्तस्येव ज्ञानमात्राद्विद्यानिवृत्त्या प्राप्तिरिव भवतीति तदुद्देशेन मुमुक्षुप्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिः। अध्यस्तस्य प्रपञ्चस्य दुःख-

स्वरूपस्याधिष्ठानत्वात् स एवाभाव इति दुःखाभावरूपत्वेनापि तस्य पुरुषार्थता ।

नवमश्लोकस्यावतारिकामाह—**ननु जाग्रदिति । अपीति ।** प्रथमं पदं व्याकरोति—**न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारमिति ।** इयं तु बृहदारण्यकीयउषस्तब्राह्मणस्था श्रुतिः । छान्दोग्यसप्तमाध्यायस्थं 'अथ यदल्पम्' इतिवाक्यमादाय व्यापकत्वादिति पदं व्याकरोति—**अथेति ।** छान्दोग्यतृतीयाध्यायस्थं 'सर्वं खलु' इति वाक्यमादाय व्यापकत्वं साधयति—**सर्वमिति ।** ननु, देशकालपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वं चेद्व्यापकत्वं तर्हि कथमाकाशादेर्व्यापकत्वप्रथा तत्राह—**आकाशादीनां चेति ।** नन्वेवमप्यस्मिन्शास्त्रे प्रवृत्तिर्न युक्ता तत्प्रतिपाद्यमोक्षस्यापुरुषार्थत्वादित्याशङ्क्य परिहरति—**ननु, सर्वव्यापकत्वेत्यादिना । पुरुषार्थत्वं,** परमपुरुषार्थत्वम् । परमपुरुषार्थत्वे बृहदारण्यकप्रथमाध्यायद्वितीयब्राह्मणस्थं वाक्यं प्रमाणमाह—**तदेतदिति ।** तत्रैव छान्दोग्यसप्तमाध्यायस्थवाक्यं प्रमाणयति—**यो वै भूमेति ।** बृहदारण्यकवाक्यमाह—**एष एव परमानन्द इति विज्ञानमानन्द इति च ।** ननु सुखस्यात्मस्वरूपत्वेन नित्यत्वात्कथमुत्पन्नं सुखं विनष्टं सुखमित्यादिप्रत्ययस्तत्राह—**तस्य चेति ।** यथा पाकान्नीलो घटो नष्टः, रक्त उत्पन्न इत्यत्र नाशोत्पादयोर्नीलरक्तविषयत्वं यथा वा ककारो नष्ट इत्यादेर्नाशकस्य व्यञ्जकवायुविषयकत्वं यथा वा घटापसरणकालीनघटो नास्तीतिप्रत्ययस्य घटसंयोगध्वंसविषयकत्वं तथा सुखं नष्टमित्यादिप्रत्ययस्य व्यञ्जकवृत्तिध्वंसविषयकत्वमित्यर्थः । यद्यप्युक्तमात्मस्वरूपस्य मोक्षस्याप्यपुरुषार्थत्वान्न प्रवृत्तिस्तत्राह—**अज्ञानव्यवहितस्य चेति ।** इदं तु मत्कृतसिद्धान्तभास्करादौ विविच्य प्रकटितम् । सुखात्मकत्वेन प्रवृत्तिमुपपाद्य दुःखाभावत्वेनाप्युपपादयति—**अध्यस्तस्येति ।**

ननु, मोक्षे सुखं संवेद्यते न वा[1] । नाद्यः, तदानीं देहेन्द्रियाद्यभावेन तद्व्यञ्जकाभावात्, व्यञ्जकाभावेऽपि तत्संवेदनाभ्युपगमे संसारदशायामपि तथा प्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः, अपुरुषार्थत्वापत्तेः, ज्ञायमानस्यैव तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वात् । अत एव शर्करातद्भोजिनोरिवेति[2] वैष्णवं मन्यमानानामुद्गार इति चेत्, न, इत्याह—स्वतः सिद्धभावादिति । स्वप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वादित्यर्थः । यद्यपि संसारदशायामविद्यावृतरूपत्वादात्मा परमानन्दरूपतया न प्रथते तथापि तत्त्वविद्ययाऽविद्या-

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१. कपुस्तके सुखसंवेदनं विद्यते न वा इति पाठः ।
२. तस्मिन्नेव शर्कराश्रोतृतद्भोजिरिवेति ।

निवृत्तौ स्वप्रकाशतया स्वयमेव परमानन्दरूपेण प्रकाशत इति न व्यञ्जकापेक्षा। ननु, सुखस्य स्वप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वेऽपि नात्मरूपता, ज्ञानस्य धात्वर्थरूपतया क्रियात्वेन साश्रयत्वात् जानामीति प्रतीतेः; ज्ञानमहमसीत्यप्रतीतेश्च। तथा च कथमद्वैतवाद इत्याशङ्क्य, न, इत्याह—अनन्याश्रयत्वादिति। 'यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः' (बृ. आ. ३।४।१), 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१), 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ. आ. ३।९।२८) इत्यादि श्रुतेः स्वप्रकाशज्ञानानन्दरूप एवात्मा, अन्तःकरणतादात्म्याध्यासेन च तद्वृत्तौ ज्ञानाध्यासाज्जानामीति तदाश्रयत्वप्रतीतिः। धात्वर्थत्वमुत्पत्तिविनाशवत्त्वं चान्तःकरणवृत्तेरेव इति ज्ञप्तिरूपमुख्यज्ञानस्य सर्वाधिष्ठानत्वेनान्याश्रयत्वाभावान्न द्वैतापत्तिः। तेन ज्ञानसुखात्मक आत्मा सत्यस्तद्भिन्नं च सर्वं जगदसत्यमिति सिद्धम्॥ ९॥

तत्संवेदनाभ्युपगमे, अखण्डानन्दसाक्षात्काराभ्युपगमे[1]। संसारदशायामिति। आवरणकाले चन्दनसंयोगोत्तरकालीनसुखाभिव्यक्तिवदखण्डपरमानन्दसाक्षात्कारप्रसङ्गः स्यादित्यर्थः। हेतुमाह—जानामीति। आश्रयत्वसम्बन्धेन ज्ञानवान् ज्ञानाश्रयत्वं वेत्यर्थः[2]। ज्ञानस्य साश्रयत्वे[3] प्रतीतिमुपन्यस्यात्मनो ज्ञानात्मत्वे बाधकमाह—ज्ञानमिति। बृहदारण्यककहोलोषस्तब्राह्मणयोर्वाक्यमाह—यत्साक्षादित्याद्यं सर्वान्तर इत्यन्तम्। तैत्तिरीयकब्रह्मवल्लीस्थवाक्यमाह—सत्यं ज्ञानमिति। बृहदारण्यकपञ्चमाध्यायस्थवाक्यमाह—विज्ञानमानन्दमिति। यद्यात्मस्वरूपं ज्ञानं तर्हि जानामीतिप्रत्ययसाक्षिकज्ञानाश्रयत्वं कथं तत्राह—अन्तःकरणेति। तद्वृत्तौ, अन्तःकरणवृत्तौ। एवमप्यात्मस्वरूपज्ञानस्य धात्वर्थत्वं कथं तत्राह—धात्वर्थत्वमिति। यदप्युक्तं कथमद्वैतवादस्तत्राह—इति ज्ञप्तिरूपेति। उपसंहरति—तेन ज्ञान इति। इति नवमः श्लोकः।

ननु, सर्वस्य जगतस्तुच्छत्वे तन्निषेधेनात्मतत्त्वप्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यात्। न हि शशविषाणं निषिध्यते, क्वचित्प्रमितं क्वचिन्निषिध्यत इति न्यायात्। तथा च निषेधानुपपत्त्यैव न जगतस्तुच्छत्वमिति, न, इत्याह—

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१. क१पुस्तके अखण्डसाक्षात्काराभ्युपगम इति।

२. खपुस्तके ज्ञानाश्रयत्वं चेत्यर्थ इति।

३. तस्मिन्नेव ज्ञानस्याश्रयत्व इति।

न चैकं तदन्यद्द्वितीयं कुतः स्यात्
न वा केवलत्वं न चाकेवलत्वम् ।
न शून्यं न चाशून्यमद्वैतकत्वात्
कथं सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धं ब्रवीमि ॥ १० ॥

एकत्वसङ्ख्यायोगि एकम् । तदपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यद्वित्वसङ्ख्यायोगि द्वितीयम् । तत एकाभावे द्वितीयं कुतः स्यात् । द्वितीयं च तृतीयादीनामप्युपलक्षणम् । ननु, 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छां. ६।२।१) इति श्रुत्या एकत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । न, इत्याह—न वा केवलत्वमिति । केवलत्वमेकत्वं, तस्याविद्यकत्वात् । यद्यात्मन एकत्वं श्रुत्या न प्रतिपाद्यते, तर्हि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणवशादनेकत्वं स्यादिति चेत्, न, इत्याह—न चाकेवलत्वमिति । अकेवलत्वमनेकत्वं, 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' (बृ. आ. ४।४।१९), 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छां. ६।२।१), 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' (बृ. आ. २।३।६) इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः । तर्हि सर्वप्रतिषेधाच्छून्यमेव स्यादिति, न, इत्याह—न शून्यमिति, 'असन्नेव स भवति असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत्, अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति,' (तै. २।६), 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (सैव २।१) 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छां. ६।२।१) इत्युपक्रम्य 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि' (सैव. ६।८।७) इत्यादि श्रुतिभिः सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात्, सर्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वात्सर्वबाधावधित्वाच्च । तर्हि सत्यत्वज्ञानत्वादिधर्मवदपि स्यात्, न, इत्याह—न चाशून्यमिति । एकमद्वितीयमिति पदद्वयेन सर्वभेदप्रतिषेधेऽप्येवकारेण धर्मधर्मिभावादिभेदाभेदप्रतिषेधात् । सर्वत्र हेतुमाह—अद्वैतकत्वादिति । द्विधा इतं द्वीतं, तस्य भावो द्वैतम् । तदुक्तं वार्तिके—'द्विधेतं द्वीतमित्याहुस्तद्भावो द्वैतमुच्यते' (बृ- आ. भा. वा. ४।३।१८०७) इति । न विद्यते द्वैतं द्विधाभावो यत्र तदद्वैतमित्यक्षरार्थः । 'सलिल एको द्रष्टाऽद्वैतः' (बृ. आ. ४।३।३२) इति श्रुतेः । प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्यैव लाघवेनाभावबुद्धौ कारणत्वात् द्वैतस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वाङ्गीकारेण प्रत्यक्षादिवेद्यत्वान्निषेधोपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । तर्ह्येतादृश आत्मा अङ्गुलिनिर्देशेन प्रतिपाद्यतामिति, न, इत्याह—कथं ब्रवीमीति । किमाक्षेपे ? अद्वै-

तकत्वेन वागविषयत्वात्, 'अवचनेनैव प्रोवाच' (बृ. उ. ७), 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह' (तै. २।४), 'न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः' (बृ. आ. ३।४।२) इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः। वागविषयत्वे कथं वेदान्तानां तत्र प्रामाण्यमिति चेत्, न, अविषयेऽप्यात्मनि तदाकारवृत्तिमात्रेण तदविद्यानिवर्तकत्वादित्याह— सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धमिति। तथा च श्रुतिः—'यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्' (केन. २।३), 'यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतं, तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते' (सैव. १।५) इत्यादिरविषयत्वमात्मनो दर्शयति। तदेवं वेदान्तवाक्यजन्याखण्डाकारवृत्त्या अविद्यानिवृत्तौ तत्कल्पितसकलानर्थनिवृत्तौ परमानन्दरूपःसन् कृतकृत्यो भवतीति सिद्धम् ॥ १० ॥

दशमश्लोकमवतारयति—**ननु सर्वस्येति**। तदन्यद्वितीयं कुतः स्यादिति व्याकर्तुं (आह)—**न चैकमिति**। वाक्यस्थमेकपदं व्याकरोति—**एकत्वसङ्ख्यायोगि एकमिति**। न चानेकत्वमिति[1] (? चाकेवलत्वमिति) प्रतिज्ञायां बृहदारण्यकषष्ठाध्यायस्थवाक्यं कठवल्लीस्थं च हेतुत्वेनाह—**नेह नानेति**। छान्दोग्यषष्ठाध्यायीयवाक्यमाह **एकमेवाद्वितीयमिति**। 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्,' इत्यादि बृहदारण्यकीयचतुर्थाध्यायस्थमूर्तामूर्तब्राह्मणवर्तिवाक्यमपि तत्रैव हेतुत्वमा(त्वेना)ह—**अथात इति**। तैत्तिरीयकब्रह्मवल्लीस्थवाक्यमाह—**असन्नेवेति**। सत्यत्वे तैत्तिरीयकवाक्यमुदाहरति—**सत्यमिति**। छान्दोग्यवाक्यमाह—**सदेवेति**। बृहदारण्यकीयषष्ठाध्यायीयज्योतिर्ब्राह्मणवर्तिवाक्यमाह—**सलिल एक इति**। यदपि कचित्प्रमितं क्वचिन्निषिध्यत इत्यनेन प्रतियोगिप्रमात्वेन कारणत्वमुक्तं तदपनुदति—**प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्यैवेति**। यदप्युक्तं निषेधानुपपत्त्यैव न जगतस्तुच्छत्वं तत्राह—**द्वैतस्येति**। **किमाक्षेप इति**। वाग्विषयत्वं नास्तीत्यर्थः। एतदेवाह—**अद्वैतकत्वेनेति**[2]। वागविषयत्वे हेतुत्वेन श्रुतिमुदाहरति—**अवचनेनैवेति**। ब्रह्मवल्लीस्थवाक्यमाह— **यत इति**। उषस्तब्राह्मणस्थवाक्यमाह—**न विज्ञातेरिति**। **वागविषयत्व इति**। एवं च ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यत्वं व्याहतमिति भावः। **तदाकारेति**। वृत्तेस्तदाकारत्वं न तु ज्ञानावयवत्वं ब्रह्मणः। एवं च नाप्रामाण्यं वेदान्तस्येति भावः। केनस्थि-

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१. क१पुस्तके न वानेकत्वमिति।

२. क१पुस्तके प्रमात्वेन कारणत्वमुक्तमित्यनन्तरं तदयमर्थ एतदेवाह—अद्वैतकत्वेनेतीति। तस्मान्न किञ्चिदर्थबोधो भवति।

तवाक्यमाह—**यस्यामतमिति**। तत्र वाक्यान्तरमाह—**यन्मनसेति**। ग्रन्थस्य पर्यवसितं परमपुरुषार्थप्रयोजनत्वमुपसंहारव्याजेनाह—**तदेवमिति**।

न स्तौमि तं व्यासमशेषमर्थं सम्यङ् न सूत्रैरपि यो बबन्ध।
विनापि तैः सङ्ग्रथिताखिलार्थं तं शङ्करं स्तौमि सुरेश्वरं च॥ १॥

लघुरपि बह्वर्थवहैश्चिन्तामणिरिव निबन्धोऽयम्।
मधुसूदनेन मुनिना विहितो गुणिनां विनोदाय॥ २॥

यदत्र सौष्ठवं किञ्चित्तद्गुरोरेव मे न हि।
यदत्रासौष्ठवं किञ्चित्तन्ममैव गुरोर्न हि॥ ३॥

बहुयाचनया मयाऽयमल्पो बलभद्रस्य कृते कृतो निबन्धः।
यददुष्टमिहास्ति यच्च दुष्टं तदुदाराः सुधियो विवेचयन्तु॥ ४॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीविश्वेश्वरसरस्वतीभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्यश्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीविरचितः सिद्धान्तबिन्दुनामा ग्रन्थः समाप्तः।

स्वव्याख्यातुर्दशश्लोकीकर्तुः प्रकृतवेदान्तशास्त्रज्ञप्रधानीभूतवार्तिककर्तुश्च नुतिरूपमत्यन्तमङ्गलं सम्यक्कृतग्रन्थप्रसिद्धये करोति—**न स्तौमीति**। तं व्यासं न स्तौमि अशेषमर्थं सूत्रैरपि (यो)न सम्यग्बबन्ध, तैः सूत्रैर्विनाऽपि ग्रथिताखिलार्थं तं प्रसिद्धं शङ्करं सुरेश्वरं च स्तौमीति सम्बन्धः। अयं चार्थो मौक्तिकादिः। प्रकृतग्रन्थाभिधेयं च सूत्रं तूलादिभवं पदसमूहरूपं च बन्धनं संयोगविशेषरूपनिबन्धनं च तथा संग्रथनमपि। अत्र चैतादृशश्लेषमहिमद्योतनमर्थबन्धनसमर्थैः सूत्रैरप्यर्थबन्धनासमर्थात् व्यासात्, बन्धनसामग्रीसूत्रं विना कृताखिलार्थग्रथनप्रकाशनरूपविभावनालङ्कारद्योत्यं दशश्लोकीव्याख्यानकर्तुराधिक्यरूपव्यतिरेकालङ्काररूपं व्यङ्ग्यमिति बोध्यम्। अथ प्रवर्तकज्ञानसम्पत्तये चिन्तामणिसाम्येन स्वकृतग्रन्थोत्कर्षं प्रतिपादयति—**लघुरिति**। लाघवमपकृष्टगुरुत्वं बाहुल्याभावश्च। **अर्थः**, स्वर्णादिः प्रकृतग्रन्थाभिधेयं च। **मुनिना**, मननशीलेन। एतावता लघुतरप्रकृतग्रन्थाद्बह्वर्थप्रतिपत्त्या विनोदरूपं प्रयोजनमनवद्यमावेदितम्। अत्रत्य सौष्ठवस्य गुरुपरम्परासिद्धत्वद्योतनेन विपरीतसम्भावनया असौष्ठवस्यासत्त्वेऽपि स्वकृतत्वप्रथनेन[3] स्वाविनयं प्रत्याचष्टे—**यदत्रेति**। **किञ्चित्**, अनिर्वाच्यं, किञ्चित्स्वल्पं। **गुरोर्न हि** इत्यनेन सम्यग्गुणरूपदेशभाजो ममापि तदसम्भावितमेवेति ध्वनितम्। स्वस्य महतोऽपि लघुतरनिबन्धसूचनीयन्यूनतां

१. कपुस्तके नौमीति पाठः।
२. तस्मिन्नेव बह्वर्थकर इति।
३. खगयोः स्वकृतत्वेनेति।

शिष्यसमीहितसम्पादने सहिष्णोः[1] परमकारुणिकत्वं स्वस्य प्रतिपादयति—**बहुयाचनयेति । बलभद्रः**, भट्टाचार्यः कश्चन सम्यग्भक्तिः शिष्यैः[2] परमवेदान्तशास्त्रे निष्णातः ।

तं न स्तौमि विधिं यदीयजलधौ[3]विध्यस्तदेहं क्वचित्
मूर्तं ब्रह्म कदाचिदेव विबुधैर्लब्धं न वा लभ्यते ।
तं वन्दे मधुसूदनं यदुदिते बिन्दौ चिदानन्दितं
ब्रह्म स्थायि सदा मुदैव विबुधैर्नूनं समालभ्यते ॥ १ ॥
बालार्थं विहितास्तथापि च गुरोः संदर्भगर्भा गिरो
बुध्यन्ते किल कैश्चिदेव सुचिराद्वृद्धैः समृद्धैरपि ।
तस्मादत्र निगूढ[4]मर्थग्रहणं[5] प्रद्योतयन्ती स्फुटम्
भूयः श्रीपुरुषोत्तमप्रणिहिता वाणी समुज्जृम्भते ॥ २ ॥
यद्व्याख्यान[6]निरस्तदोषमचिरादुल्लंघ्यमानं बुधै-
र्यैः सिद्धान्तदुरन्तसिन्धुमकरोदाहृत्य[7] बिन्दूपमम्[8] ।
सम्यग्लब्धसुदर्शनाय विलसद्वाणिप्रणीतश्रिये
निर्व्याजं मधुसूदनाय गुरवे तस्मै परस्मै नमः ॥ ३ ॥
अलमन्याम्बुधिभ्रान्तैर्मुह्यतां विबुधैरिह ।
बिन्दुसन्दीपनाभ्यासे युक्तिमौक्तिकपंक्तयः ॥ ४ ॥

इति श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीश्रीपादशिष्यपुरुषोत्तमविरचितो बिन्दुसंदीपनाख्यो ग्रन्थः । श्रीरस्तु[9] ।



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१. क१पुस्तके सम्पादने न सहिष्णोरिति खपुस्तके च सम्पादनेऽसहिष्णोरिति ।
२. तयोरेव सम्यग्भक्तशिष्य इति ।
३. गपुस्तके प्रदीपजलधाविति ।
४. क१पुस्तके निगृह्यमिति ।
५. तस्मिन्नेवार्थगहनमिति ।
६. गपुस्तके प्रश्लिष्टभानं चिरादिति ।
७. तस्मिन्नेव सद्याख्यान इति ।
८. तस्मिन्नेव बिन्दुमयमिति ।
९. खगपुस्तकयोरीदृशः पाठः—इति श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीश्रीश्रीधरसरस्वतीपूज्यपादशिष्यपरमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीपुरुषोत्तमसरस्वतीश्रीपादविरचितो बिन्दुसंदीपनाख्यो ग्रन्थः समाप्तः । श्रीरस्तु ।

Alphabetical Index of Quotations.

(a) Siddhantabindu.

(b) *Bindusaṁdīpana.*

Alphabetical List of Abbreviations (Sanskrit Section).

ऐ. = ऐतरेयोपनिषत्.
कठ. = कठोपनिषत्.
केन. = केनोपनिषत्.
ख. ख. खा. = खण्डनखण्डखाद्यम्.
गौ. का. = गौडपादकारिका.
छां. = छान्दोग्योपनिषत्.
तै. = तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत्.
तै. आ. = तैत्तिरीयारण्यकम्.
तै. सं. = तैत्तिरीयसंहिता.
नृ. उ. = नृसिंहोत्तरतापिन्युपनिषत्.
पञ्च. = पञ्चदशी.
बृ. आ. = बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत्.
बृ. आ. भा. वा. = बृहदारण्यकभाष्यवार्त्तिकम्.
ब्र. बिं. = ब्रह्मबिन्दूपनिषत्.
ब्र. सू. = ब्रह्मसूत्रम्.
मुं. = मुण्डकोपनिषत्.
शत. ब्रा. = शतपथब्राह्मणम्.
शा. भा. = शारीरकभाष्यम्.
श्वे. वा श्वेता. = श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत्.
सं. शा. = संक्षेपशारीरकम्.

List of Corrections (Sanskrit Section).

Page.	Line.	Printed Reading.	Correct Reading.
२	18	चिन्मात्रमात्मैव व्यवहार्यम्	चिन्मात्रमात्मैवाव्यवहार्यम्
३	14	**ब्रह्मैक्यज्ञानेन**	**ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञानेन**
६	1	तैत्तरीयकस्य	तैत्तिरीयकस्य
,,	5	तैत्तरीयश्रुतिम्	तैत्तिरीयश्रुतिम्
,,	21	मोहात्	मोषात्
७	1	घटं	घटो
,,	,,	विधेयतावच्छेक	विधेयतावच्छेदक
,,	8	सम्बन्ध	सम्बद्ध
९	7	**तदेकोऽवशिष्टश्शिवः**	**तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः**
,,	10	**अद्वितीयस्सर्वप्रमाणाबाध्यः**	**अद्वितीयः सर्वप्रमाणाबाध्यः**
१२	3	ग्राहकभावादपि	ग्राहकाभावादपि
,,	13	सम्बन्धत्वेन	सम्बद्धत्वेन
१३	13	साक्षि	साक्षी
१४	12	**प्रतिबिम्बतत्वात्**	**प्रतिबिम्बितत्वात्**
,,	18	साक्षिभाष्यत्वे	साक्षिभास्यत्वे
१५	11	तैत्तरीयक	तैत्तिरीयक
,,	13	यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपोभिन्ना	यथा स्वयं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानापोभिन्ना
१६	8	दृष्टान्तिभूतः	दृष्टान्तीभूतः
,,	9	प्रतिबिम्बस्य चैतनत्वम्	प्रतिबिम्बस्याचेतनत्वम्
१९	20	इत्यन्तां	इत्यन्ता.
,,	25	प्रसाध्यते । नानात्वं साधयति	प्रसाध्य तेनानात्मत्वं साधयति
२०	5	नन्वज्ञानं विषयासम्बन्धमेव	ननु ज्ञानं विषयासम्बद्धमेव
२१	12	एकत्वाभ्युपगमे इति	एकत्वाभ्युपगमे चेति
२४	11	स्वप्राध्यायस्थकण्डिकावृत्तिवाक्यम्	स्वप्राध्यायस्थकण्डिकावर्तिवाक्यम्
२७	19	(१–३६)	(१–१६९)
२८	12	आभासानतिरिक्तं	आभासातिरिक्तं
३१	17	**तूपाधिवशत्वात्**	**तूपाधिवशित्वात्**
३३	16	रजस्तमोद्रिक्ते	रजस्तम उद्रिक्ते
३४	26	सम्भवतीति । उक्तोभयपक्षेऽपि	सम्भवतीत्युक्तोभयपक्षेऽपि
३५	13	तदाकारत्वप्रयोजनमाह	तदाकारत्वप्रयोजकमाह
३९	2	ज्ञानं अपरोक्षज्ञानं	भानं, अपरोक्षज्ञानम्

Page.	Line.	Printed Reading.	Correct Reading.
३९	11	द्वेषावभासः	द्वेधावभासः
,,	12	आत्मन्ययस्तत्वेन	आत्मन्यध्यस्तत्वेन
४२	20	मात्रासंसर्गः	मात्राऽसंसर्गः
,,	28	(छां.	(बृ. आ.
४३	1	६-८-१)	४-३-२१)
४४	14	सर्वज्ञाद्युपेतं	सर्वज्ञत्वाद्युपेतं
४६	9	प्रयोजनवदर्थ-	प्रयोजनवदर्था-
४९	4	द्वैतापत्तेः	द्वैतानापत्तेः
५०	14	केवलमर्थसिद्धः	केवलं तर्कसिद्धः
५८	3	मूर्तै अमूर्तौ वा	मूर्तोऽमूर्तौ वा
,,	11	भवन्तीत्यतीनेनान्वयः	भवन्तीत्यनेनान्वयः
५९	2	बृ. सू.	ब्र. सू.
,,	9	सत्प्रक्रियां	सत्प्रक्रियायां
६३	20	सर्वत्रार्थाध्यासाज्ञानाध्यास	सर्वत्रार्थाध्यासज्ञानाध्यास
,,	22	मनोगतवासनानिमित्तत्वे	मनोगतवासनानिमित्तत्वेन
६५	8	शय्यां	शय्यायां
६८	1	अज्ञानत्वाभावात्	अज्ञातत्वाभावात्
७३	2	स्वपरप्रकाश्यत्वेन	स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वेन
,,	6	तस्य	तस्याः
,,	17	दृगादीति । एकस्यैव प्रकारभेदेनेति	दृगादीत्येकस्यैव प्रकारभेदेनेति
,,	23	अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं	अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं
७६	4	सा सुषुप्तिः	सा सुषुप्तिसुषुप्तिः,
७७	2	द्वितीयार्धस्यार्धे	द्वितीयार्धस्यार्थं
,,	17	देशकालापरिच्छिन्नत्वे	देशकालपरिच्छिन्नत्वे
,,	22–23	सर्वस्मादनन्तरतरं	सर्वस्मादन्तरतरं
७८	13	विज्ञानमानन्द इति	विज्ञानमानन्दमिति
८०	29	the sign ?	the sign ।
८२	14	स्वव्याख्यातुर्दशश्लोकीकर्तुः	स्वव्याख्यातदशश्लोकीकर्तुः
,,	21	व्याख्यानकर्तुः	कर्तुः.
९	foot-note 1	परमानन्दबोधस्सन्	परमानन्दबोधः सन्
,,	,, 2	पाठस्तन्न युक्तः	पाठः स न युक्तः
२४	,, 3	तस्मिन्नेव	तयोरेव
२५	,, 1	पाठस्स	पाठः स
,,	,, 2	पाठस्सो	पाठः सो
२७	,, 3	पाठस्सो	पाठः सो
,,	,, 4	तवावित्यत्रेव	तवासावित्यत्रेव.

Page.	Line.	Printed Reading.	Correct Reading.
२८	foot-note 1	पाठस्सो	पाठः सो
३१	„ 3 & 4	पाठस्स	पाठः स
६९	3	खगयोरङ्काराश्रयतयेति	खगयोरहङ्काराश्रयतयेति
७३	1	खपुस्तके स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वेन	क$_1$ पुस्तके स्वपरप्रकाश्यत्वेन
८१	2	कारणत्वमुक्तितिव्यनन्तरं	कारणत्वमुक्तमित्यनन्तरं
१६	line 5	*put* the figure १ on the letter नः in the word	आभासवादिनः.
„	17	„ २ „ न	„ भ्रमज्ञानेन.
२७	26	„ ५ „ ति	„ इति.
४८	25	„ १ „ वा	„ जीवाणुत्व.
७०	2	„ १ „ न	„ अप्रमात्वावच्छेदेन
८	7	*read* the portion of the com. beginning with the words तत्रत्वंपदार्थ &c. below the next passage of the text.	
१५	5	*delete* the sign , after the word तदेतत्.	
„	9	„ „ word इति at the end.	
„	24	after the word भागवते	*add* (३-७-११).
१६	1	„ याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृतिरपि	„ (३-१४४).
४२	26	„ भवति	„ (छां. ६-८-१)
५९	25	„ इति	„ the sign ।
६१	8	„ पूर्वेणान्वयः	„ न तु घटादयश्चेत्यत्र and *delete* the same words from line 19.
६८	7	„ आरोप्यमाणे	„ (? आरोप्यमाने).
२८	22	*delete* the sign । after the word विशेषणम् and *for*	सम्पादनायां *substitute* सम्पादनाय.
३३	12	„ ऽ „	विषयगता.
३४	4	„ । „	अपास्तम् and *add* the words सन्निकर्षाजन्यत्वेन अनुमित्यादिवत् प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावाच्च । and *delete* the same words from line 11.

English Section.

EXPLANATORY AND CRITICAL NOTES.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

The *Siddhāntabindu* is a commentary by Madhusūdana Saraswatī on the *Das'as'lokī* of the first S'ankarāchārya which as its name implies consists of ten verses only. All those verses are in the भुजङ्गप्रयातवृत्त which consists of four lines each of 12 syllables and arranged so as to form four य Gaṇas, the definition of that वृत्त being भुजङ्गप्रयातं चतुर्भिर्यकारैः. Each Gaṇa has 3 syllables and a य Gaṇa has the first syllable short and the other two long. The verses in this Stotra can therefore be scanned thus;—

न भूमि,र्न तोयं, न तेजो, न वायु-,
र्न खं ने,न्द्रियं वा, न तेषां, समूहः ।

The object of the author seems to be to expound the true nature of the Self and this he has chosen to do in the form of the expression of the firm conviction which arises in the mind of one who has realized the true nature of the Self within and roundabout him.

The commentator Madhusūdana holds firmly the view that the knowledge of the true nature of the Self arises from that of true meaning of the principal sentences in the Upanishads such as तत्त्वमसि. He has expressed that view not only in this commentary but also in those on the भगवद्गीता and संक्षेपशारीरक. He also holds that the true meaning of those sentences which is that the Self as seen in the individual and Brahma as lying hidden in the works of nature are identical, cannot be ascertained without ascertaining that of the principal words त्वम् and तत् occurring therein. His commentary is therefore divisible into four parts namely, (1) the introductory remarks setting forth the above view (2) the ascertainment of the meaning of the term त्वम् which is done in the commentary on the first three verses (3) that of the term तत् which occupies the commentary on the next three verses and (4) that of the sentence as a whole which covers the commentary on the remaining verses.

In the Introduction, he further establishes the utility of an inquiry into the true nature of the Self by saying that it leads to

the knowledge of that which is not known to ordinary mortals, that the said knowledge has the specific purpose of freeing one from the bondage of transmigration and that it arises from the true understanding of the meaning of the principal sentences of the Upanishads above-referred to and that of a work of a polemical nature like this by saying that it is necessary in order to set at rest doubts which are likely to arise in the minds of men of average intelligence on their coming to know of the diverse theories as to the significance of the terms त्वम् and तत् profounded by various learned men.

P. 1. श्रीशङ्कराचार्यं...विश्वगुरुं प्रणम्य—This is an introductory verse setting forth the object the commentator had in view in proceeding to compose the commentary.

Brahmānanda Saraswatī, the author of the gloss called *Nyāya-ratnāvali*, following Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, the author of *Laghuvyākhyā*, understands श्रीशङ्कराचार्यनवावतारम् to be a Karmadhāraya compound and solves it as श्रीशङ्करश्चासौ नवावतारश्चेति rejecting the view that it is a Tadguṇa Saṁvijnāna Bahuvrīhi on the ground that though by solving it as such we get an obeisance to S'ankarāchārya, it proves too much and the compound नवावतारम् as नवं यथास्यात्तथाऽवतरत्यस्मिन्निति नवं शरीरमवतरति गच्छतीति वा नवावतारस्तम्. According to both the above commentators the verse contains an obeisance to the Lord of the Universe in His new incarnation of S'ankara, the propositus in the line of teachers of the Adwaita doctrine. According to this interpretation the term विश्वेश्वर is not a proper but a common noun meaning 'the Lord of the Universe' and नव implies freshness in comparison with the Rāma, Krishṇa and other incarnations.

Purushottama Saraswatī, the author of the gloss *Bindusaṁdī-pana*, treats the same compound as a S'aṣṭi Tatpurusha and solves it as श्रीशङ्कराचार्याणां नवावतारम्. Thus according to him the term विश्वेश्वर is a proper noun meaning विश्वेश्वरसरस्वती the spiritual preceptor of the author. He also opines that the term विश्वेश्वर can be treated as a common noun meaning Saguṇa Brahma and says that in that case the term श्री would mean वाणी or भवानि, the term शङ्कर would mean ब्रह्मा, विष्णु and रुद्र and the term आचार्याः would stand for व्यास, वैयासिक (*i. e.* शुक), कपिल, शङ्कराचार्य and other learned exponents of the Vedānta philosophy, the compound नवावतारम् would go with विश्वेश्वरम् and it would have to be dissolved as नवीना उत्कृष्टा एते (व्यासादि) आधुनिका

अवतारा यस्य तम्. The latter is obviously a very strained and fanciful interpretation and must be rejected. The two remaining ones hinge upon that put upon the term विश्वेश्वर. If it is taken to be a common noun the author must be deemed to have paid homage to the Lord of the Universe who has already been believed to have become incarnated as S'ankara and to be a Jagadguru. If on the other hand it is taken to be a proper noun, then the author must be deemed to have paid homage to his own Guru Vis'wes'wara exalting him to the position of an incarnation of S'ankarāchārya and a Jagadguru.

वेदान्तशास्त्र...बोधाय—For the edification of those who are indolent in studying the Vedāntas'āstra *i. e.* to say, of those who have no inclination to study that S'āstra from the standard works.

Brahmānanda and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explain this term as संक्षिप्तसाररूपेण तदर्थं श्रोतुकामानाम्. It is clear however that that is not the literal meaning of that compound.

The term Vedāntas'āstra according to the former means the *Brahma Sūtras*, *S'ankara's Bhāshya* thereon, the commentary on the latter called *Vāchaspatya* or *Bhāmati*, the gloss on the latter called *Kalpataru* and that on the last called *Parimala*. All of these have been edited in one volume by Mahāmahopādhyāya Ananta Krishna S'āstri with a masterly Introduction in Sanskrit and published by the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.

कमपि—Extraordinary. Nārayaṇa Tīrtha says that this work is such because all the doctrines are collected together in it.

Abhyankara, the author of *Binduprapāta*, the latest commentary on this work, passes over the whole of this verse altogether.

इह—It may either mean 'in this world' as in ordinary parlance or 'on the earth' as Narāyaṇa Tīrtha has explained or 'in the domain of the Vedānta Philosophy' as Purushottama has done. Abhyankara's explanation, namely, 'in the discussion of the true nature of the Self which is the means for the attainment of salvation', substantially agrees with the last.

साक्षात्परम्परया वा—Purushottama understands that the first term has been used with reference to the उत्तमाधिकारि's who are devoid of असम्भावना (want of the faculty of right understanding) or विपरीत-

भावना (perverted understanding)[1] and the second one with reference to the मध्यमाधिकारि's who may have any of those shortcomings. He also suggests another explanation, namely, that the first may be referring to the direct pupils of the author *i. e.* of S'ankarāchārya and the second, to his pupil's pupils whether in existence at the time of composition or prospective. Abhyankara agrees with Purushottama in the first explanation but according to him the second term has reference to कनिष्ठाधिकारि's also. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha understands the term साक्षात् to mean the four classes, Brāhmaṇa &c. and the term परम्परा to mean worms &c. who have been born as human beings.

समुद्दिधीर्षुः—Desiderative third person singular of the root हृ with सम् and उत् meaning 'being desirous of completely delivering from bondage'.

श्रीशङ्करः—The Illustrious S'ankara *i. e.* the first S'ankarāchārya. He is known to have been a native of a village named Kālaṭi in in Southern India, to have been born in 788 A. D. and to have died at the early age of 32. He is reputed to be the author of several works and Stotras but the most notable amongst the former are his Bhāshyas on the प्रस्थानत्रयी *i. e.* the principal *Upanishads* which are eleven or twelve in number, the *Brahma* or *S'ārīraka Sūtras* and the *Bhagawadgītā* and those amongst the latter are *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi*, *Aparoks'ānubhūti* and *Daks'iṇāmūrti*. The *Das'asloki* is only a minor Stotra composed by him.

अनात्मभ्यः—From the non-selfs. Everything which has either a name or a form, whether physical or metaphysical, is included in this term. It may be remarked that this is not a positive term. The reason is that philosophy aims at expounding the true nature of the Self within us which is the seer or witness of everything within and around us. It cannot therefore be identified with any of them. Hence whether it is the intellect or the mind, or the senses, or any other thing which is called an object in ordinary parlance, so far as the Self is concerned, it is an object of perception for it, is to be distinguished from it and is therefore a non-self.

विवेक—Discrimination, *i. e.* the power to distinguish between the Self and the non-selfs.

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1. For the exect technical meanings of these terms and the ways in which the faults signified by them can be remedied *vide* the author's com. on *Saṁksepa S'ārīraka* III. 1. (Kās'i Sans. Series No. 18, Vol. II. pp. 145-46.).

According to S'ankara it is one of the four qualifications which must be possessed by an aspirant for the knowledge of the Self. (vide *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi* 16–17).

नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावम्—Purushottama gives in his commentary all the Upanishad texts on which each of these epithets is based and says further on the authority of a verse in संक्षेपशारीरक (I. 173) that the epithets सत्यः, सूक्ष्मः, सत्, विभुः, अद्वितीयः and परमानन्दः should be taken to be understood here.

Really speaking Brahma or Ātmā which is incapable of being the subject-matter of speech which consists of relative terms only, can have no epithets applicable to it. But since some words are necessary to convey the ideas about it these have been selected in order to make as near an approach to its true conception as is possible on contrasting it with the non-selfs which have opposite characteristics such as अनित्यत्व, अशुद्धत्व &c.

सङ्क्षेपेण—In brief. According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha this term has been used to convey the idea that incidental subjects such as उपासना &c. are not treated in this work.

प्रणिनाय—Reduplicative perfect of the root नि with प्र meaning 'promulgated' or 'composed'.

P. 3. इदङ्कारास्पदत्वम्—The quality of being the seat of thisness *i. e.* objective perception.

Purushottama explains it as इदमितिप्रतीतिविषयत्वम् (the being the subject of objective perception as 'this'). Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's explanation is the same with this difference that he uses the word धी in place of प्रतीति. He has also used an alternative term इदभिन्न to explain this.

All the non-selfs *i. e.* the objects of knowledge are the seats of objective perception as opposed to one's own self in the ordinary sense, which is the seat of subjective perception or egotism.

ज्ञातज्ञापकत्व—The quality of being the imparter of the knowledge of that which is already known.

According to the objector, an exposition of the nature of the Self would be liable to this fault because everybody can without outside help discriminate one's own self from the non-selfs.

प्रत्येति—Present third person singular of इ with प्रति, meaning 'becomes conscious of' or 'experiences'.

चिद्भास्यत्वम्—The quality of being made to appear or made manifest by the Spirit.

All the organs, the mind and the body are चिद्भास्य because they are the products of the elements.

आत्मतत्त्वप्रतिपादनम्—An exposition of the true nature of the Self.

प्रतिभासतः—प्रतिभास means 'illusion'. Hence this term means 'through illusion'. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains it as गौरोऽहं काणोऽहं कर्तास्मीत्यादिभ्रमात्.

One is apt to identify oneself with the body, the organs of sense, or the mind through illusion. It is a common experience that we feel ourselves inclined to and do actually identify ourselves when speaking ordinarily, sometimes with our body, sometimes with our mind and sometimes with the one or other of our organs. This is especially the case when any of them is affected with an ailment.

शास्त्रीयेणैव ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञानेन—By the knowledge of the identity of Brahma and the Self which is derived from the Scriptures alone.

Summary—An exposition of the true nature of the Self is not useless because man is apt to identify himself with his body, senses or mind and feel himself miserable although as a matter of fact they are distinct from the Self and misery attaches to them only because they are ever-changing and not to the Self which is eternal and is bliss pure and simple. Man would never feel miserable if he were to understand the true nature of the Self within him which it is the object of all the works on the Vedānta philosophy to expound.

P. 4. वेदान्तमहावाक्यम्—The principal sentences in the Vedāntas *i. e.* the end of the Vedas, hence the Upanishads.

Each of the four Vedas, Rik, Yajus (S'ukla and Krishna), Sāma and Atharvaṇa, has several S'ākhās and each S'ākhā has its Brāhmaṇa and Upanishad. The total number of the original Upanishads cannot be definitely ascertained as there are several later additions made by sectarians in order to give a colour of antiquity to their doctrines. Thus for instance in the collection of 109 Upanishads published by Tukārām Tātyā for the Tattvavivechaka Grantha-Prasāraka Samīti in Shake 1817 (A. D. 1895) there are to be found such Upanishads as *Kālāgnirudra, Sītā, Skanda,*

Rāma Pūrvatāpini, Rāma Uttaratāpini, Annapūrṇā, Kaṇṭharudra, Bhasmajābāla, Gaṇapati and others. But even if these are excluded their number is about fifty. Thereout the eleven or twelve on which S'ankara has written commentaries in order to make them the basis of his Adwaita doctrine along with the *S'ārīraka Sutras* and *Bhagavadgītā*, are considered the principal ones. They are:—*Chhāndogya, Brihadāraṇyaka, Īs'a, Kéna*, or *Talavakara, Kaṭha, Māṇḍūkya, Muṇḍaka, Pras'na, Taittirīya, Aitareya, S'wetās'watara* and *Kaus'ītaki Brāhmaṇa*.

The principal sentences here referred to, which form the basis of the Adwaita doctrine, are:—तत्त्वमसि, अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, अयमात्मा ब्रह्म, and प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म. They aim at establishing the great Truth that the soul in the individual is identical in essence with Brahma.

प्रमापकम्—That which furnishes proof or authority, or as Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains, leads to the correct knowledge in the shape of realization of.

In amplifying this statement that commentator says that knowledge is either direct or indirect according to the nature of the object to which it relates, not that of the means; hence Brahma itself being directly realizable as stated in the text यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म the knowledge thereof which arises from the sentences तत्त्वमसि &c. is direct as that arising from such sentences as दशमस्त्वमसि &c.

पदार्थज्ञान—The knowledge of the senses of words such as तत् and त्वम् in the sentence तत्त्वमसि.

प्रकृतवाक्यार्थानुकूल—Agreeable to the sense of the sentence in hand.

The senses of the words which are to be established must be such as would suit that of the sentence as a whole, otherwise they are of no use. Thus here, those of the words तत् and त्वम् must be such as would help to establish the fact appearing from the sentence as a whole that the soul in the individual is the same as that in the universe around him.

The sentence तत्त्वमसि occurs 9 times in Chhāndogya Upanishad VI. 8 wherein the sage Uddālaka impresses the above Truth on his son S'wetaketu's mind by giving 9 different illustrations.

प्रमातव्यौ—Should be correctly known. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains this term to mean प्रमार्हौ श्रुतिप्रमाणमात्रजन्यप्रमाविषयाविति यावत्.

यूपाहवनीयादिपदार्थवत्—Like the senses of words such as यूप (a post) and आहवनीय (a kind of domestic fire) and others.

There is a reference in this expression to the Vedic texts यूपे पशु बध्नाति andआहवनीये जुहोति. The sense of the word यूप in the first is known to be a sacrificial post (made of bamboo or khadīra wood) which has undergone the operation of being cut and moulded into proper shape, on taking into consideration the facts appearing from such sentences as यूपं तक्षति, यूपमष्टास्त्रीकरोति &c. Similarly that of the word आहवनीय in the second is known to be the fire which has been duly propitiated by offerings made during the day &c, on taking into consideration the facts appearing from the sentences वसन्ते ब्राह्मणोऽग्नीनादधीत, नक्तं गार्हपत्यमादधाति दिवाहवनीयम् and others.

The meaning of the sentence is that just as the meanings of these words are rightly known by a reference to other cognate texts, so must those of the words तत् and त्वम् occurring in the sentence in hand.

This view seems to have been based on *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* I. 290 which reads thus:—

लोकप्रसिद्धार्थपदान्तराणां
समीपसङ्कीर्तनतोऽपि शक्तिः ।
ब्रह्मादिशब्दस्य सुखावसेया
यथा हि यूपादिगिरस्तथैव ॥

Madhusūdana in his commentary on this verse explains the verse in the same way as his commentators explain his brief statement here. (*Vide* Kās'i Sanskrit Series No. 18. Vol. I. p. 218).

सृष्ट्यादि श्रुतयः—Vedic texts relating to creation &c. *i. e.* those of which the primary object is to impart a knowledge about creation. As to how the texts यतो वा इमानि भूतानि &c. lead to the correct knowledge of the primary sense of the term तत् *vide Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* I. 496–548.

वाच्यार्थ and लक्ष्यार्थ—The primary and secondary senses (of words).

Each word has two kinds of senses, primary and secondary. The first is that which is undersood immediately a word is uttered without reference to context &c., the second that which can be comprehended in view of the context or the circumstances in which the word is uttered. Thus the word गङ्गा primarily means the river of that name but secondarily it may mean either the bank of that

river or even a woman or any other object to which that name may have been given. That particular sense can only be ascertained by a reference to the context or the circumstances in which the word is uttered.

The secondary sense is called लक्षणा. It has three varieties जहत्, अजहत् and जहदजहत्. The first is that in which the primary sense is abandoned altogether, the second that in which it is retained completely and the last that in which it is partly retained and partly abandoned. For remembering these meanings, the following verse from the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* would be useful :—

शब्दस्य लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरपि त्रिधैषा
काचिज्जहाति न जहाति च वाच्यमन्या।
भागं जहाति न जहाति च भागमन्या
सोऽयं त्रिधा भवति लाक्षणिकप्रकारः ॥ १-१५४ ॥

समर्पिकाः—Those which give, confer or bestow. According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha it means प्रमापिकाः, *i. e.* those which lead to the correct knowledge of.

अवान्तरवाक्य—A subordinate sentence.

The sentences यतो वा इमानि भूतानि, सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं, तद्यथा महामत्स्य, योऽयं विज्ञानमयः &c. which impart a knowledge of either the pure Brahma or the pure individual soul are considered subordinate to तत्त्वमसि &c. because the latter impart a knowledge of the identity of both which is the aim of the Vedāntas.

शुद्धजीवब्रह्मणोः—Of the pure individual soul and Brahma.

The adjective शुद्ध has been added in order to convey the idea that the individual soul and Brahma referred to in the text above-mentioned are free from their respective qualifications.

मुख्यार्थान्वयानुपपत्तेः—Brahmānanda explains it thus :—मुख्यवृत्त्युपस्थितयोर्विशिष्टजीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यबोधस्य प्रमात्वानुपपत्तिज्ञानेनेत्यर्थः। It can therefore be taken to mean 'owing to (the consciousness of) the impossibility of an agreement of the primary senses'.

मुख्यार्थ is the same as वाच्यार्थ.

स्मरणोपपत्तिः—Recollection of the pure Self and Brahma becomes possible when the impossibility of the identity of the qualified individual and Brahma which are indicated by the primary senses, becomes apparent. It is not fresh knowledge but only recollection that takes place because knowledge of the pure Self and Brahma

had previously arisen from the subordinate sentences, सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं &c. and this recollection arises from the secondary senses which have to be resorted to when it becomes apparent that the qualified Self and Brahma which are indicated by the primary senses cannot be identical owing to the difference between their qualifications such as limitedness of knowledge on the one hand and omniscience on the other, the environment of the body on the one hand and that of the universe on the other &c.

सुषुप्तौ—अङ्गीकाराच्च—And it having been admitted that in the state of deep sleep one has the experience of the undifferentiated Spirit which is the Witness.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is of the opinion that this remark has been added in order to state that the realization of the pure individual soul and Brahma arises not only from the subordinate sentences but is also experienced in the state of deep sleep in which the inner organ ceases to function.

The admission here referred to is, according to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda, that of the author of the *Vivaraṇa* which is a commentary by Prakās'ātma Muni on the *Pancha-pādikā*, a commentary on the Bhāshya of S'ri S'ankarāchārya on the *S'ārīraka Sūtras* by one of his principal pupils named Padmapāda. He says that in the state of deep sleep there arise three Vrittis (functions) of Nescience, namely, those of one's being a witness, of one's being happy and of one's being ignorant. This view is based upon the common experience of all men that he or she slept so happily that he or she did not know anything. The Vritti of being a witness is inferred from the fact that on one's rising from sleep one recollects what expriences one had while in the state of deep sleep, that of being happy while in that state, from the fact that the recollection is that of a past state of happiness and that of being ignorant of everything, from the recollection being that of the suspension of all knowledge of duality for the time being.

Between this state and that of Samādhi, there is only a slight difference, which is that in the former there is while in the latter there is not, the inpediment of Nescience, in the way of the rise of knowledge of the true nature of the Self.

The earliest works in which this theory seems to have been

advanced are the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* (Ch. VI.), *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (Ch. IV.) and the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* (5). It was subsequently developed in the *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda on the last Upanishad and in the works of S'ankarāchārya.

अद्वितीयब्रह्मजिज्ञापयिषया प्रवृत्तानां सत्यज्ञानादिपदानाम्—The words सत्य, ज्ञान and अनन्त in the text सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म have for their primary object the imparting of the knowledge of the unqualified Brahma which is without a second.

उपाधिविशिष्टचैतन्ये शक्तत्वेऽपि—Although the above words have the power to impart a knowledge of the Spirit as qualified by limitations such as सत्यत्व &c.

For the significance of the said words separately and together *vide Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* I. 176–91.

There is a reference here to the शक्तिवाद of the Naiyāyikas. According to them each word has an inherent power to express a thing or each word has such a power owing to a convention in accordance with the will of God that a certain meaning shall be conveyed by a certain word. The modern Naiyāyikas say the will of man has an equal power to set up such a convention.

For an elaborate discussion of this doctrine *vide Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* I. 343–68.

चैतन्यमात्रे तात्पर्येण—Owing to their purport lying in the pure Spirit only.

This is only a repetition because in the same sentence it has been stated that the words in question have been made use of with the desire to impart the knowledge of the absolute Brahma.

संस्कारोद्बोधः—The awakening or rousing up of the recollection.

इच्छन्ति हि...स्मरणम्—There is a reference here to the opinion of Ganges'a more popularly known as the मणिकार from his great work named *Tattvachintāmaṇi* and the other Naiyāyikas of the new school which is to the effect that the word आकाश has at times an inherent power to convey the idea of ether not only as characterized by the quality of being the conveyor of sound but also as not so characterized as in the sentence आकाशः शब्दाश्रयः.

The line of reasoning according to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is that just as the Naiyāyikas say that the word आकाश in the above

sentence denotes unqualified space so the words सत्य, ज्ञान and others denote according to us unqualified Brahma.

तात्पर्याधीनत्वांच्छब्दवृत्तेः—Brahmānanda explains the term तात्पर्याधीनत्वात् as meaning तात्पर्यविषयवाक्यार्थप्रमानिर्वाहकयथासम्भवकल्पनाविषयत्वात्. The whole expression must therefore according to him be taken to mean 'owing to the knowledge arising from a word being dependent upon the (probable) purport of the sentence as a whole in which it occurs'. Purushottama is silent on this point. According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha the word वृत्तिः has been used in the sense of प्रवृत्तिः or बोधानुकूलसामर्थ्यम् and तात्पर्याधीनत्वात् in that of प्रतीत्यनुसारात्. An alternative explanation given by him is:—तात्पर्यगोचरप्रमानुसारिकल्पनाविषयत्वात् शब्दवृत्तेः—शब्दसम्बन्धस्य शक्तिलक्षणान्यतरसम्बन्धस्य अत्रान्वयप्रतियोग्युपस्थितेरेव लक्षणात्वाङ्गीकारात् and it is supported by the following quotation:—

अन्वयप्रतियोगिनो या स्यात्स्मृतिः सा निगद्यते ।
लक्षणा न तु शक्यस्याशक्ये वृत्तिरिहोच्यते ॥

The first explanation does not seem to be correct because the word वृत्ति seems to have been used in its technical sense not in that of प्रवृत्ति. The second is almost the same as that given by Brahmānanda, the only difference being that it goes further and supplies the reason why लक्षणा is said to have been resorted to here when as a matter of fact what is availed of is what is technically called मोष. Abhyankara's explanation is simple enough. He does not bother himself about the meaning of the word शब्दवृत्ति but at once proceeds to establish that शक्ति as well as लक्षणा is to a more or less extent dependent upon the gist of a sentence as gathered from the context as in the case of the word गङ्गा in the sentence गङ्गायां घोषः. According to him therefore this sentence means 'owing to the sense of a word being dependent upon the purport'.

एतेन...अपास्तम्—By this (reasoning) the cognizance of knowledge and the knower (as distinct entities) when the knowledge of the principal sentence arises, is avoided.

The rationale here is that the words सत्य, ज्ञान and others, having been originally intended to impart the knowledge of the pure Brahma, give rise to the recollection of such Brahma although they have the power to convey the idea of Brahma qualified by limitations, as do words like आकाश. This is the opinion of the author of the *Tattvachintāmani*. It has been mentioned here in order to refute that of प्रभाकर who is a त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्षवादी. The त्रिपुटी is ज्ञाता, ज्ञान and ज्ञेय, or प्रमाता, प्रमिति and प्रमेय.

P. 5. असम्प्रज्ञात...सिद्धत्वाच्च—Moreover the possibility of a trance in which there is no consciousness of the distinction between subject and object is proved by Vedic and Smriti texts.

समाधि (trance) is the last of the eight stages of Rāja-yoga. (*vide Yoga Sūtra* II. 29). According to Patanjali it means a peculiar concentration of the mind. It is of two sorts, namely, सम्प्रज्ञात and असम्प्रज्ञात. The first has four varieties, namely, सवितर्क, सविचार, सानन्द and सस्मित. The second is that state in which the true knowledge in the form नेति नेति arises after the disappearance of अस्मिता *i. e.* self-consciousness which persists till the last stage of सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधि (*vide* Ch. I. 17–18 and the commentary of Bhójadeva thereon).

The possibility of the second kind of समाधि is established by such Upanishad texts as:—

लयविक्षेपरहितं मनः कृत्वा सुनिश्चलम् ।
यदायात्यमनीभावं तदा तत्परमं पदम् ॥
तावदेव निरोद्धव्यं हृदि यावत्क्षयं गतम् ।
एतज्ज्ञानं च मोक्षं च शेषास्तु ग्रन्थविस्तराः ॥
समाधिनिर्धूतमलस्य चेतसो निवेशितस्यात्मनि यत्सुखं भवेत् ।
न शक्यते वर्णयितुं गिरा तदा स्वयं तदन्तःकरणेन गृह्यते ॥
(मैत्रा. ४-४, ७, ८, ९).

यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।
अप्रमत्तस्तदा भवति योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ ॥
(कठ. २, ९-१०).

and such Smriti texts as:—

यत्रोपरमते चित्तं निरुद्धं योगसेवया ।
यत्र चैवात्मनात्मानं पश्यन्नात्मनि तुष्यति ॥
सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्तद्बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ।
वेत्ति यत्र न चैवायं स्थितश्चलति तत्त्वतः ॥
यल्लब्ध्वा नापरं लाभं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः ।
यस्मिन्स्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणाऽपि विचाल्यते ॥
तं विद्याद्दुःखसंयोगवियोगं योगसंज्ञितम् ।
स निश्चयेन योक्तव्यो योगो निर्विण्णचेतसा ॥
(भ. गी. ६, २०-२३).

पारोक्ष्यसद्वितीयत्वाभ्यां च न...कृतकृत्यता—And owing to the obscurity (of Brahma) and the duality (of the individual soul) one's object is not attained simply on the acquisition of the knowledge of the

senses of the words तत् and त्वम् as gathered from the subordinate sentences. In other words one must know the sense of the sentence तत्वमसि as well.

This argument seems to have been borrowed from the *Saṁkṣ'epa S'ārīraka* I. Therein a preceptor says to his pupil:—

त्वं प्रत्यगव्यवहितं तव सुप्रसिद्धं
ब्रह्माद्वितीयमुदितं च तदस्यजस्रम् ॥ ९३ ॥

Then in the next verse he invites objections from this pupil to the above doctrine. The latter sets them forth elaborately in Verses 95 to 144. The principal one amongst them is that Brahma being obscure and the souls being diverse, their identity is not possible. The refutation thereof is given in Verses 145 to 172 and it is established that though this objection may appear to be stupendous when the senses of the words only are considered it disappears when the sense of the sentence as a whole is considered.

वाच्यार्थस्य च भेदावभासान्न पौनरुक्त्यम्—Owing to the cognizance of a difference between the primary senses, there is no repetition. Another reading is वाच्यार्थाभेदावभासान्न पौनरुक्त्यम्. which means 'owing to the cognizance of the identity of the primary senses there is no repetition'. Both the readings can be justified if the first is understood to refer to the primary senses of the words तत् and त्वम् and the second to those of the words सत्य, ज्ञान and others. In either case the meaning of the passage as a whole would remain the same.

Purushottama and Abhyankara prefer the first reading with this difference only that the latter omits the च after वाच्यार्थस्य. The latter however notices the other reading also and says that it means 'owing to the primary senses having for their fruit the knowledge of the identity'. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda prefer the second. The former again notes the first reading also with the omission of the च and explains that too as referring to the primary senses of the words सत्य, ज्ञान and others and says that while in the former case there is, in the latter there is not an identity of senses in the shape of pointing to one common object. I think the first is the only correct reading whether with or without the च because in the next sentence the author himself says:—लक्ष्यार्थस्य चैकत्वात् which implies that there is a difference between the primary senses.

लक्ष्यार्थस्य च...अखण्डार्थता—And there is continuity of sense (in the sentence) owing to the identity of the secondary senses.

The process by which the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul with Brahma arises has been described very vividly in the following verses of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* (I. 196–7):—

सामानाधिकरण्यमत्र भवति प्राथम्यभागन्वयः
पश्चादेव विशेषणेतरतया पश्चाद्विरोधोद्भवः ।
उत्पन्ने च विरोध एकरसके वस्तुन्यखण्डात्मके
वृत्तिर्लक्षणया भवत्ययमिह ज्ञेयः क्रमः सूरिभिः ॥

सामानाधिकरण्यमत्र पदयोर्ज्ञेयस्तदीयार्थयोः
सम्बन्धस्तु विशेषणेतरतया ताभ्यां सहास्यात्मनः ।
सम्बन्धोऽप्यथ लक्ष्यलक्षणतया विज्ञेय एवं बुधै-
रेतान्यर्थपदानि बुद्धिपदवीमारोहणीयानि तु ॥

Madhusūdana Saraswatī while explaining the first verse in his commentary on this work called सारसङ्ग्रह says that in the sentence तत्त्वमसि, there first takes place, an अन्वय called सामानाधिकरण्य of the words तत् and त्वम्, then this अन्वय takes place by विशेषणविशेष्यभाव which is the same thing as अभेद of the senses of those words, then there arises a contradiction between these two, that having arisen, knowledge arises by लक्षणा of the आत्मवस्तु which is One and Indivisible and thence knowledge of the sense of the sentence as a whole. The second verse merely explains what is left doubtful in the first. (*Vide* Kas'i Sanskrit Series No. 18. Vol. I. pp. 155-56).

पदजन्यस्य—Both Nārayaṇa and Brahmānanda say that the word पद here refers to the words सत्य, ज्ञान and others. The other commentators are silent on this point.

निर्विकल्पकवाक्यार्थानुकूलस्य—(Recollection) which is in accord with the undifferentiated or pure sense of the sentence.

According to Nārāyaṇa the term वाक्यार्थानुकूलस्य has been used in the sense of वाक्यार्थबोधहेतोः.

निर्विकल्पकवाक्यार्थ means such sense of a sentence as does not admit of a distinction between subject and object *i. e.* such as leads to the identification of both as opposed to the सविकल्पक which admits of such a distinction *i. e.* makes them known as two distinct entities.

अनुभववदेव—Like the experience itself (that is generated by the sense of the sentences such as तत्त्वमसि and others).

अविरुद्धम्—Unobjectionable *i. e.*, as Nārāyaṇa says, authoritative. Abhyankara explains that the author having anticipated the

objection that it is unheard of elsewhere that the recollection produced by the primary senses should be सविकल्पक while that produced by the secondary ones should be निर्विकल्पक has added this remark which is based on the view that though it may not have been heard of elsewhere there is no objection in accepting it since it is not opposed to S'ruti texts.

सविकल्पकवाक्यार्थबोधे—In the case of the differentiated knowledge of the sense of a sentence, *i. e.* to say, in the case of the knowledge of words produced by such sentences as घटमानय.

उपस्थितिः—Presence.

अङ्गम्—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha this term means हेतुः *i. e.* means.

प्रकृते च......अज्ञाननिवर्तनासामर्थ्यात्—Here प्रकृत means the sentence तत्त्वमसि. In that sentence a knowledge of none other except the pure sense of the sentence arises because that alone is capable of dispelling ignorance owing to its being the correct knowledge.

अतः—Hence *i. e.* since undifferentiated recollection in accord with the purport of the Vedic texts is useful in the case in hand owing to its being the parent of the knowledge which dispels ignorance.

लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक—Something which would put a limit on the secondary sense *i. e.* to say, would prevent it from arising.

The meaning intended to be conveyed by sentence अतो...लक्षणानुपपत्तिः is that since in this case there is nothing to obstruct the rise of the secondary sense, that sense must arise.

Brahmānanda's commentary on the whole of this passage is very elaborate and instructive.

वाक्यार्थानुकूल according to him means the one that would give rise to the experience indicated by the sense of the sentence.

Summary:—These are some texts such as यतो वा इमानि भूतानि &c. which lead to the correct knowledge of the primary sense of the word तत् and there are others such as सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम् which lead to that of the secondary sense of the same word. Similarly there are some such as तद्यथा महामत्स्य &c. which impart the correct knowledge the primary sense of the word त्वम् and others like योऽयं विज्ञानमयः &c. which lead to such knowledge of the secondary sense

of that word. Now the object of the sentence as a whole being to establish the identity of the known *i. e.* the Jīwa and the Unknown *i. e.* Brahma the primary senses are not agreeable to the rise of such a sense from the sentence. Hence we understand the words in their secondary senses which remind us of the pure Brahma and Jīwa of which we had acquired knowledge from the subordinate sentences. Moreover it is not enough that we know the senses of words because Brahma is not directly knowable and the Jīwas are many and so long as the knowledge of this identity does not arise, ignorance cannot be dispelled. Hence the sense of the sentence as a whole must be understood and that does arise according to the usual logical method.

P. 7. किं विचारेण—What purpose would be served by a discussion (in treatises like this which purport to expound that which can be known from the sentences themselves)?

It has been established above that there is a purpose in expounding the true nature of the Self. It is further stated that this knowledge of the Self arises from a comprehension of the meanings of certain Upanishad texts. Hence the question arises:—If the knowledge of the Self arises from the texts themselves where is the room for such a philosophic discussion as is contained in treatises like this? The purport of the answer which is given in the remaining portion of this paragraph of the text is that though self-realization does take place in that manner, all men are not endowed with such powerful intelligence as is required to solve the doubts which necessarily arise owing to such divergent theories having been propounded as to the significance of the words त्वम् and तत् as are mentioned in the commentary on Verses I and IV. Hence, their ignorance which is fostered by doubts is not dispelled. The discussions contained in such treatises serve to dispel the doubts that arise in the minds of such men.

P. 8. आत्मसाक्षात्कारः—Literally, visualization of one's own Self; hence self-realization or knowing the true nature of the Self.

वादिविप्रतिपत्तिः—Diversity of views of learned men.

निरपवादम्—Without exception.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha takes this word to mean प्रतिबन्धरहितम्.

Purushottama while commenting on this passage raises a question, namely, why should Madhusūdana have mentioned the

divergent views of learned men when the Āchārya (S'ankara) has simply denied that the earth &c. are not the Self without referring to the views of any specific schools and answers it by saying that the views are set forth by Madhusūdana in his commentary because if the views that the elements are the Self &c. are refuted without mentioning the names of the schools holding them there would be a censure of a thing not mentioned.

It is obvious that this explanation is not quite satisfactory for if 'a censure of a thing not mentioned' was a fault it was S'ankara who was guilty of it and it could not have been removed by his commentator mentioning the names of the various schools which hold the views refuted in the Stotra. Moreover it appears rather doubtful whether by saying न भूमिर्न तोयं &c. S'ankara really intended to refer to the different schools of thought named in the commentary. Reading the verse as a whole his intention appears to be simply to express the conviction which arises in the mind of a man who has realized his Self and owing to the peculiar nature of the Self it is best expressed in the language of negation, such as 'I am not this', 'I am not that', &c. Now the object with which an ignorant man identifies himself is primarily his physical body which is made up of the five elements. It is therefore that the author has begun with saying "I am not the earth, nor the water" &c. The next object with which he identifies himself is any one of the five senses or their group. Hence the author further says "I am not any sense organ or their group". The third line of the verse supplies the reason for that negation and the fourth lays down that the Self is the One that remains over after the negation of aught else and is of the nature of absolute bliss. It is not necessary for such a purpose to refer to the opinions of any schools of thought and I think that Madhusūdana's attempt to spell out a refutation of the views of some of the schools of thought existing in S'ankara's time is a laboured one. It seems from his remarks :—यद्यपि वादिना प्रत्येकं भूम्यादेः &c. at page ९ and यद्यपि भूतचतुष्टयवादिनो मते &c. at page १०—that he himself found difficulties in making out the case set up by him and has given explanations which would not perhaps satisfy an independent thinker. There is some basis however for his view and that is that in Verse IV some of the schools are distinctly mentioned in

order to bring out in bold relief that the view of the Upanishad or Vedānta school is the only one which is acceptable. It may therefore be that in the first verse the author may have intended to refute the views of some of the schools. But in presuming such an intention the above difficulties are met with. It is therefore advisedly that I have said that it is rather doubtful whether he really intended to do so.

DETERMINATION OF THE SENSE OF THE TERM 'TWAM'.

P. 8 (*continued*). तत्र—Thereout.

According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha this word has been used in the sense of 'out of the terms Twam and Tat'.

तत्पदार्थस्य......अभ्यर्हितत्वेऽपि—Although the sense of the term Tat has been honoured (with priority) owing to its being the subject of the purport of the Scriptures.

According to the Vedāntins, the aim of the Scriptures can be only to impart a knowledge of that which cannot be known by any other means of proof. What cannot be known by such means is Brāhma as qualified by the attributes, omnipresence, omniscience &c. *i. e.* that which is primarily denoted by the term Tat. Hence the aim of the Scriptures can only be to impart a knowledge of the nature of the Supreme not the individual soul of which every human being is conscious. Such being the case Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa the author of the *Brahma Sūtras* has honoured the sense of the term Tat by designating it as worthy of knowledge by the Sūtra अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. (Br. Su. I. 1. 1.).

त्वम्पदार्थस्य......ततोऽप्यभ्यर्हितत्वात्—The sense of the term Twam having been honoured more than that owing to its (*i. e.* the individual soul's) being the partaker of final absolution which is the fruit of (the knowledge of) the Scriptures.

Although the above is a fact, the Scriptures are mainly intended for the benefit of the individual souls who have duly qualified themselves for the reception of the knowledge contained therein. The highest knowledge contained therein is that the individual soul and Brahma are in essence identical and they further promise

that whoever acquires that knowledge becomes liberated from the bond of trnsmigration and declare that there is no other way of liberation from it. The individual soul who acquires it becomes therefore the partaker of the fruit derived from the knowledge of the Scriptures. It is therefore that S'ankarāchārya has honoured the sense of the term Twam by granting it priority in the first verse of this Stotra. Madhusūdana following him, as he ought to as being his commentator, therefore proceeds to mention the different views of the philosophers as to the sense of that term.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda and Abhyankara give reasons why S'ankarāchārya has done so. The first says that one qualified for the reception of knowledge is superior to the knowledge itself because without him no idea of knowledge can arise. The second says that the desire for a fruit is more important than the fruit itself because it is desire which brings about the enjoyment of the fruit which consists of self-realization. Both these commentators substantially agree. That given by the third is quite a different one. It is that the primary object of this Stotra is to impart the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul with Brahma. This can be done by a negation of the attributes popularly attached to each which bring out the difference between them. Thereout those attached to the individual soul being patent can be negatived at once while those attached to Brahma being latent would be capable of being negatived easily after the former. This according to him is the reason why S'ankarachārya has first dealt with the different views as to the sense of the term Twam.

तत्र—As to that.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha says that तत्र here stands for तत्पदार्थत्वंपदार्थ-योर्मध्ये. That however does not seem to be correct because the preceding remark shows that in any statement that would follow it, the writer would leave out of account for the time being the sense of the term Tat and confine himself only to a mention of the theories prevalent as to that of the term Twam.

देहाकारपरिणतानि.........इति चार्वाकाः—The Chārvākās hold that the import of the term Twam is the four primary elements themselves transformed as the body.

The Chārvākās were a school of heterodox philosophers which is believed to have been founded by a man named Chārvāka.

probably in the pre-epic period of Indian history. There is now no extant work composed by him nor is there any of any of his disciples Abhāṇaka and Brihaspati although there is reason to believe that the latter at least had composed Sūtras embodying his preceptor's doctrine. In the absence of such an authoritative treatise the views of this class of philosophers must be gathered from the references to them contained in the *S'wetās'watara Upanishad*, *Mahābhārata*, *Sarvadars'anasaṁgraha* of Mādhava, *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta and *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratna. They are that nothing should be believed to be true unless it is percieved by any of the five organs of sense because even inferences if based on false major premises may turn out to be wrong, that there is no soul apart from the body which is but a product of the four primary elements, earth, water, light and air, that the consciousness of human beings is only a result of the combination of those elements like the red juice of a betel-leaf or like the intoxicating power generated in cereals, molasses &c., that the aim of life should therefore only be to gratify the senses and that all efforts should be directed towards the acquisition of the means necessary for their gratification. Those who advocate such materialistic views could not of course have believed in the theory of transmigration and the law of Karma and therefore it is very natural that the Vedic religion of sacrifices should have seemed to them meaningless and that they should have believed that there was no necessity to profess any religion whatever and that man's conduct should be guided only by the dictates of the sciences of politics (अर्थ) and erotics (काम), and they did in fact believe so.[1]

From the fact that this class of philosophers was also known as the Lokāyatikās it appears that the above views had become prevalent among a section of the masses who having been shut out from the religious literature of the Vedic period had raised a revolt against the sacerdotal class.

Prof. Dās Guptā notes that there were two schools only of this class, one known as the Dhūrtās and the other as the Sus'iks'itās and that the only difference between their views was that the former believed that there was no soul in human beings and the latter believed that there was one but it perished with the body.[2]

1. *Vide Sarvadars'anasaṁgraha*. I. p. 155. (*Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series*).
2. *History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I. pp. 78-79.

Madhusūdana however takes note of the views of four schools of these philosophers. That it is the followers of Chārvāka who are referred to by the words अपरे, अन्ये, एके and अन्ये in the next four sentences, is made clear by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda and Abhyankara in their commentaries.

क्षणिकं विज्ञानमिति सौगताः शून्यमिति माध्यमिकाः—The Saugatās hold that it is the momentary consciousness (and) the Mādhyamikās that it is the void.

सुगत means the Buddha. Hence सौगताः means the followers of the Buddha generally. The term has however been used here in the restricted sense of those from amongst the Buddhists who were the advocates of the Ks'aṇika Vijnānavāda, briefly spoken of at times as the Vijnānavāda from their doctrine that the soul is not a fixed and permanent entity but a succession of momentary phenomena of consciousness. They are also known as the Yogāchārās. The Mādhyamikās were another school of Buddhism which held that the soul of man was a void and that it was in that void that the phenomena of consciousness arose every moment. They were therefore also known as S'ūnyavādins. Both these schools are the offshoots of the Mahāyāna school which arose out of the Mahāsaṁghikas which was the designation given to the Vṛijin monks (Vajjiputtakas), who having seceded from the council of Vais'āli, which according to Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief was held about 400 B. C., held another called the Mahāsaṁgha and made their own resolutions and monastic rules.[1] It seems that within a hundred years of their secession they were sub-divided first of all into three schools, which were known as the Ekavyavahārikās, Lokottaravādins, and Kukkulikās. Subsequently during the same period there arose a fourth known as the Bahus'rutīyās. During the next hundred years there arose from them four other schools known as Prajnāptīvādins, Chaittikās, Aparas'ailās and Uttaras'ailās. These schools having gradually disappeared, there came into existence that

1 This statement is made in accordance with an account given in *Dīpavaṁsa*. According to that given in *Mahāvaṁsa*, the term Mahāsaṁghikas was applied to those who not being Vajjiputtakas seceded first and held their own council and the term Vajjiputtakas was applied to the Vṛijin monks who seceded later on (*Vide Dās Guptā's History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I. Ch. V. p. 112 *foot-note* 1).

known as the Mahāyāna whose doctrine is embodied in a number of works which are given the name of the Mahāyāna or Vaipulya Sūtras and some of which are probably as old as 100 B. C. and others as late as 300 to 400 A. D. That doctrine became subsequently developed on two lines namely, those of the S'ūnyavāda and the Vijnānavāda. The difference between them is not of any fundamental principles but one of method only. Both agree in holding that there is no truth in anything and that everything is only a passing phenomenon as in the case of a dream or a magical performance. But while the S'ūnyavādins were occupied more with the indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijnānavādins taking that for granted busied themselves with the phenomena of consciousness by the theory of beginningless illusory root ideas or impulses called Vāsanā.

The S'ūnyavāda or the doctrine of the Mādhyamikās which underlies all theories propounded by the Mahāyāna Buddhists found its greatest and most powerful exponent in Nāgārjuna, a writer of the first century A. D. His masterpiece is his *Kārikās.* They were later commented upon by his disciple Āryadeva, by Kumārajīva, Buddhapalīta and Chandrakīrtti (550 A. D.). Āryadeva has written at least three other works viz. *Chatuhs'ataka, Hastabālaprakaraṇavritti* and *Chittavis'uddhi-prakaraṇa.* Although it is not known whether any great writer succeeded Chandrakīrtti and who were the living S'ūnyavādins at the times when Kumārila and S'ankara went about propagating their own doctrines still it is sufficiently clear from the works of the former that the S'ūnyavāda was such a living force in his time that he could not ignore it.

The earliest work in which the doctrine of the Yogāchāra school,namely, the Vijnānavāda was embodied was the *Lankāvatara-sūtra.* A powerful later writer of this school was Asanga who lived about 400 A. D. and who is believed to have written *Saptadas'abhūmisūtra, Mahāyānasūtra, Upades'a, Mahāyānasaṁparigrahas'āstra, Yogāchārabhūmis'āstra* and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra.* Asanga's brother Vasubandhu whose biography has been written by Paramārtha (499-569 A. D.) was formerly a Sarvāstivādin or a Vaibhās'ika and had written the standard work of that school called *Abhidharmakos'a* but latterly he was converted by his said brother to the Vijnānavāda and it was probably thereafter that he commented upon a number of Mahāyānasūtras such as *Avataṁsaka,*

Nirvāṇa, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Prajñāpāramitā, Vimalakīrti, and *S'rīmālāsiṁhanāda* and compiled some Mahāyānasūtras such as *Vijñānamātrāsiddhi, Ratnatraya* &c. This school continued for at least a century or two after Vasubandhu but no work of great fame of that school composed by any later writer is available.

The Hindu writers on philosophy take note of the views of two other schools of Buddhist philosophy, namely, the Sautrāntikās or Saṁkrāntikās and Vaibhāsikās or Sarvāstivādins. The first was one of the six schools which had arisen about the second or first century B. C. out of the Theravāda or Sthavīravāda, the doctrine of those elders whose views prevailed at the council of Vaiśāli above-referred to. The second had much in common with the first and probably arose out of the same stock. Both are at times referred to by Hindu writers by their common name Sarvāstivādins *i. e.* those who believed in the existence of everything and as amongst themselves also they did not make much of the slight difference of doctrine which existed between them. Thus we find Yaśomitra, a Sautrāntika commenting on *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* of Vasubandhu, a Vaibhāśika. The views of these two schools are not referred to herein because they had no distinct theories about the nature of the individual soul.

Brahmānanda while commenting on these statements says that the general doctrine underlying the theories of all the four schools above-mentioned is that everything is transitory, that still the Self is knowledge itself for there is no proof of its being different from the latter, that therein the consciousness in the form 'I am' is produced by each momentary impulse following each other successively, that in order to attain to the state of liberation which is the result of the eradication of the deep-rooted notion of permanence it is necessary that one should be thoroughly imbued with the sense of the momentariness of everything and that it is but fit that one should cease to do any active work. Then while comparing the divergent views of those schools he says that that of the Sautrāntikās is the worst, that of the Vaibhāshikās better than that, that of the Yogāchārās better still and that of the Mādhyamikās the best of them all.

Abhyankara says that the term सौगताः has been used here to denote the three schools of the Buddhists other than that of the Mādhyamikās.

For a more detailed account of the Buddhist schools the inquisitive reader may with profit refer to *Sarvadars'nasaṁgraha* pp. 5-20, *S'ankar's Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra* II. 2, and *Dās Guptā's History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I. Ch. V., *Introduction to Mr. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids's Translation of Kathāvatthu, Systems of Buddhistic Thought* (Calcutta University) and *A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu by Takakusu* (J. R. A. S. 1905).

देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्तो देहपरिमाण इति दिगम्बराः—The Jainas hold that it is one different from the body and the organs of sense (but) of the size of the body.

From the fact that the term 'Digambarās' has been used here to denote the Jainās it would appear that both are convertible terms but as a matter of fact it is not so. The Jainās *i. e.* the followers of the religion whose latest and twenty-fourth apostle was Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, a contemporary of King Bindusāra of the S'iśunāga dynasty of Magadha, and Gautama Buddha, are now divided into two principal sects, the Digambarās and the S'wetāmbarās. Both agree that their original sacred literature was contained in fourteen Pūrvas and eleven Angas and that all the Pūrvas are lost. But the S'wetāmbarās say that the Angas are in existence while the Digambarās say that they too are lost and that the works which are put forward as the Angas by the rival sect are spurious ones. There are also other differences between them. Thus for instance, the Digambarās unlike their rivals believe that a monk who owns any property or wears any clothes cannot attain to the highest bliss called Mokśa, that a woman also cannot do so, that the Tīrthankarās, perfect souls, can live without food &c.

But so far as the fundamental principles of their philosophy are concerned there is no difference between them. Thus both believe that all the things in the world can be divided into two classes, the living (Jīwas) and the non-living (Ajīwas), that in the former the principle of life is quite distinct from the body and is not its product, that this principle, the Jīwa, in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (ananta-darśana), infinite knowledge (ananta-jnāna) infinite bliss (ananta-sukha) and infinite power (*anantavīrya*), that all liberated souls possess these characteristics but the unliberated ones have their purity and power covered over by a thin veil of *Karma* matter which has

been accumulating in them from beginningless time, that each soul is separate from the others and will remain so even after liberation as an eternal substance, that it is neither all-pervasive (*Vibhu*) nor atomic (*aṇu*) but of a medium size (*Madhyama-parimāṇa*) and has the power to become expanded and contracted according to the size of the body which envelopes it for the time being and that by the observance of certain vows, the practice of certain austerities, Yaugic exercises &c., it can destroy the veil of Karma which limits its powers of action and knowledge and attain to perfection.

The Jainas are sometimes called Arhatās from their being the followers of Arhat, who is an eternal perfect Purusha.

For a more detailed exposition of the Jaina philosophy *Vide Guṇaratna's Commentary on Saḍḍars'anasamuchchaya, Sarvadar-s'anasaṁgraha pp. 20-36, Jacobi's Article on 'Jainism'* (*E. R. E.*), *Umāsvatī's Tattwārthādhigamasūtra, Hemachandra's Yogas'āstra, Syādvādamanjari with Hemachandra's Commentary, Vis'es'āvas'ya-ka Bhās'ya* and *Dās Guptā's History of Indian Philosophy* Ch. VI.

कर्ता भोक्ता जडो विभुरिति वैशेषिकतार्किकप्राभाकराः—The Viśeshikās, Naiyāyikās and Prābhākarās hold that it is the doer, the enjoyer and all-pervasive.

The Vaiśeshikās are a school of philosophers founded by Kaṇāda also called Kaṇabhuk and Aulukya. The principles of their philosophy are embodied in a collection of Sūtrās (aphorisms) called *Vais'eshikasūtras.* Prof. Dās Guptā has collected a mass of internal evidence to prove that they are pre-Buddhistic and represent a school of Mīmānsā thought existing prior to the time of the composition of the extant *Pūrvamīmānsāsūtras*[1]. Kaṇāda appears from the Vāyu Purāṇa to have been born in Prabhāsapātaṇa in Kāthiāwād and to have been a disciple of one Somaśarmā. The earliest Bhāshya on his Sūtras is that of Pras'astapāda. Commentaries have been written thereon by Jagadīs'a Bhattāchārya and S'ankara Mis'ra. The latter has also written an independent commentary on the Sutrās named *Upaskāra.* There were also *Rāvanabhāshya* and *Bhāradwājavritti* on the Sūtras which are now probably lost. There are four commentaries on the former namely, *Vyomavatī* by Vyomaśekharāchārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* by

1. *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol I. Ch. VI. pp. 280-85.

Udayana, *Līlāvatī* by S'rivatsāchārya and *Nyāyakandalī* by S'rīdhara. Of these the last being simple in style and eleborate in exposition is the best for a modern student of the Vaiseshika philosophy[2].

The ostensible purpose of the composition of those Sūtras like that of the *Pūrvamīmānsāsūtras* is that of explaining Dharma which is said to be that by which prosperity (अभ्युदय) and salvation (निःश्रेयस) are attained. The Veda according to it is the source of Dharma and so prosperity can be attained by acting up to its injunctions and salvation which consists of the total cessation of suffering arises from the total destruction of Karma which occurs on the realization of the knowledge of the Self which again arises on understanding the characteristic features of the six categories Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Vis'esha and Samavāya. The later Vais'eshikas added to these a seventh category, Abhāva. According to Kaṇāda, the soul is a Dravya like the earth, water, light, air, ether, quarters, time, and mind. It acts, and enjoys the fruits of its actions through the sense-organs. It acquires knowledge and retains it. Its existence is known as well from the Scriptures as from the notion of 'I'. Each individual has his own soul and works out his own salvation.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda say that the term जडः has been used here in the sense of ज्ञानभिन्नः *i. e.* not identical with knowledge as the Buddhists say but different from it, that in fact knowledge is one of its characteristics and that it is therefore its possessor. The term विभुः has according to them been used in the sense of being capable of coming in contact with all the मूर्तद्रव्य's.

Abhyankara in explaining the first term says that since in the opinion of the Vais'eshikas and others, the Self is not self-resplendent but is dependent for its manifestation on knowledge which is different from it, it is held to be inert like a stone.

The Tārkikās or Naiyāyikās are the adherents of the school of Nyāya founded by Gautama also called Aks'apādāchārya. Their principles are embodied in the *Nyāyasūtras*. The collection thereof which is now available and which is commented upon by Vātsyāyana has been shown by Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasād

2. *History of Indian Philosophy* Ch. VIII. p. 306.

S'āstrī[1] to contain two interpolated portions, one interpolated by a Buddhist and the other by a Hindu. He is however silent as to their dates. Prof. Dās Guptā[2] agreeing with his view and comparing those Sūtras with the *Charaka Saṁhitā* and the *Vais'eshikasūtras* holds that the earliest part must have been composed subsequent to the *Charaka Saṁhitā* (80 A. D.). He too does not proceed to fix the dates of the two interpolations. Dr. J. C. Vidyābhūs'aṇa[3] on the other hand, thought that the *Nyāyasūtras* were divisible into two parts, old and new, that Gautama and Aks'apāda were two different individuals and that the first composed the old one about 550 B. C. and the second the new one about 150 A. D. Prof. Jacobi[4] too has opined that the metaphysical portion of those Sūtras is a later addition. Thus all scholars agree so far that the *Nyāyasūtras* as originally composed whatever may be the time of their composition, concerned themselves with the science of dialectics only.

The earliest commentary (*Bhāshya*) on these Sūtras is that of Vātsyāyana who lived about 300 A. D. On his *Bhāshya* Udyotakara (about 635 A. D.) has written a *Vārttika*. On the latter Vāchaspati Miśra (840 A. D.) has written a sub-commentary named *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*. Udayana (984 A. D.) has written a further sub-commentary on the latter called *Tātparyaṭīkāparis'uddhi* and Vardhamāna (1225 A. D.) has written a sub-commentary called *Nyāyanibandhaprakās'a*. Padmanābha has written a commentary on that called *Vardhamānendu* and S'aṅkara Mis'ra has written a sub-commentary on it called *Nyāyatātparyamaṇḍana*. In the seventeenth century Viśwanātha wrote a short independent commentary on the Sūtrās known as *Vis'wanāthavritti* and Rādhāmohana another called *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*. Other independent works of this system are Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (880 A. D.), Udayana's *Kusumāñjali* which is commented upon by Vardhamāna and Ruchidatta (1275 A. D.) and *Ātmatattwaviveka*, a work written for the specific purpose of establishing the Nyāya view of the nature of the Self refuting that of the Buddhists, *Bhās'āparichchheda* of Vis'wanātha with its three commenta-

1. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905.
2. *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I. Ch. VIII. pp. 301–5.
3. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1918.
4. *The Early History of Indian Philosophy* (*Indian A'ntiquary*, 1918).

ries, *Tarkasaṁgraha* with *Nyāyanirṇaya*, *Tarkabhāshā* of Kes'ava Mis'ra, *Saptapadārthī* of S'ivāditya, *Tārkikaraks'ā* of Varadarāja with a commentary by Mallināthа, *Nyāyasāra* of Mādhava Deva and *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* of Jānakīnātha Bhattāchārya with commentaries by Yādavāchārya and S'as'adhara and a sub-commentary on the latter by S'eshāntāchārya.

The doctrine contained in the metaphysical portion of the Sūtras is that the highest good (निःश्रेयस) which is Moks'a (salvation) is attained by a thorough knowledge of the sixteen categories, Pramāṇa, Prameya, Saṁs'aya &c. enumerated therein because it leads to the successive disappearance of false knowledge, defects, activity, births and lastly, misery. Aks'apāda's notion of the Self is much the same as that of Kaṇāda. It has desires and antipathies. For the attainment of the former and the avoidance of the latter it acts through the mind, the sense-organs and body and enjoys pleasure and pain through them. Acquisition of knowledge and recollection are its principle characteristics. Purification of the mind by the practice of Yoga is considered essential for the attainment of the right knowledge as above-mentioned which leads by successive stages to the attainment of salvation.

The new School of Naiyāyikās known as Navya-Nyāya began with Gangeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā who lived about 1200 A. D. His masterpiece is *Tattwachintāmaṇi* already referred to herein at p. 11, which treats of only the four means of proof, namely, Pratyakśa, Anumāna, Upamāna and S'abda[1], thus leaving out of account the Ādhyātmic (metaphysical) portion of the Nyāya philosophy. His discussions on Anumāna attracted so much notice in Navadvīpa (Nadiā in Bengal) that numerous commentaries and commentaries upon commentaries were written on that portion of his work and many independent treatises were also written after his time on Anumāna and S'abda in Bengal which from the fifteenth century onwards became the home of Nyāya studies. The principle amongst the writers thereof were Raghunātha S'iromaṇi,

1. The Chārvākās admitted Pratyaks'a (ditect preception) only as a source of knowledge, the Buddhists and Vais'es'ikās added one more, namely, Anumāna (inference), the Sāmkhyās added a third, namely, S'abda (revelation) and the Naiyāyikās added a fourth, namely, Upamāna (analogy).

Mathurā Bhattāchārya, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya with whom Madhusūdana had once a hot discussion and Jagadīśa Bhattāchārya.

It is remarkable that there is no Hindu work on logic between Vātsyāyana's *Bhāshya* and Udyotakara's *Vārttika*. The explanation is that during this period the science was in the hands of the Jainās and Buddhists of whom Bhadrabāhu, Umās'vāti, Siddhasena Divākara, Māṇikya Nandī, Deva Sūri, Prabhāchandra Diñnāga, Dharmakīrtti and Dharmottara were the principle ones. These writers treated Nyāya (pure logic) as an independent subject as did Gangeśa and his followers from amongst the Hindu writers from the twelfth century onwards. For a bibliography of the Jaina and Buddhist works on logic *vide* Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūshaṇa's *Indian Logic, Medieval School.*

The Prābhākarās are the followers of Prabhākara who founded a separate school of Mīmānsā, differing on many points from Kumārila Bhatta who is believed to be his Guru.

The Mīmānsā or more properly Pūrva Mīmānsā is a system of philosophy founded by Jaimini about 200 B. C. He has embodied the principles of that system in a collection of aphorisms known as the *Pūrvamīmānsāsūtras* and these aphorisms have been explained at length in his *Bhāshya* by S'abara Swami who according to Dr. Gangānāth Jhā flourished in 57 B. C. There were other commentaries on them written by several persons such as Bhartrimitra, Bhavadāsa, Hari and Upavarsha some of which at least were older than that of S'abara but all these are lost and the later Mīmānsā schools of Kumārila and Prabhākara, both of whom flourished immediately before S'ankarāchārya, arose out of differences of interpretation as to the statements contained in S'abara's *Bhāshya*. It seems that one Vārttikakāra whose name is unknown preceded them and Dr. Gangānāth Jhā is of opinion that *Brihatī*, the commentary by Prabhākara is essentially based on his *Vārttika*. S'ālināth Miśra has written a sub-commentary on it called *Rijuvimālā* and an independent treatise called *Prakaraṇapañchikā* based on Prabhākara's interpretation of the Mīmānsā. Prabhākara is also known as the Nibandhakāra and his view is at times referred to as the 'Gurumata.' Tradition has it that though Kumārila was his Guru, the S'ishya turned out to be so intelligent as to be able to find out faults in his Guru's arguments and raise doubts which

the latter could not solve and that therefore he wrote his own commentary on the *Sūtrās* and founded a separate school in the lifetime of his Guru. There is also a legend that once Kumārila was much intrigued as to the right meaning of the sentence अत्र तु नोक्तं तत्रापि नोक्तमिति पौनरुक्तम्. The ordinary construction which would suggest itself to any one is अत्र तु न उक्तं, तत्रापि न उक्तं, इति पौनरुक्तम्. (Neither said here nor even said there, hence said twice). This however yields no sense. Kumārila therefore tried hard to construe it in some other manner but could not and referred the matter to Prabhākara. The latter at once said that what was meant was अत्र 'तु'ना उक्तं, तत्र 'अपि'ना उक्तं, इति पौनरुक्तम् (Here spoken with the particle 'Tu', there spoken with the particle 'Api'; hence spoken twice). Kumārila was so much pleased with this explanation that he acknowledged Prabhākara to be his 'Guru.' It seems that this is an invention of some later Pandit made with a view to explain why the 'S'ishya' was called a 'Guru'.

The general doctrine of the system which is accepted by both of them is that the Veda which contains some directive and some prohibitory injunctions and some laudatory hymns, must be interpreted according to a definite set of rules as to making out the meanings of sentences and of the words occurring in them, that the purpose of doing so is that by following out the injunctions and refraining from the prohibited acts man's fourfold purpose in life, namely, Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokśa is attained. The first three are attained by the performance of Nitya-karma (daily duties) and Sakāmya Karma (actions prompted by desires for worldly objects), but the last which means the resting of the Self in the state of mere existence without knowledge and without bliss is attained by the exhaustion of the bundle of Karmas, good and bad, accumulated upto the moment of salvation and the stoppage of the accrual of the fruits of further Karmas by the performance of Nitya-karma and Nis'kāmya-karma (actions not prompted by desires for any worldly objects) which puts an end to the present body and to the cycle of future births and re-births.

This system though classed as Āstika (orthodox) does not admit the existence of God either as a creator, preserver and destroyer of the world or as the supervisor of man's actions, good and bad. The Universe is held to be a reality and to consist of parts and not to be a whole having unity in diversity, to have no beginning

and no end and the elements are believed to do their work from their very nature. The Karmas of man are also held to bear their respective fruits without the intervention of any external agency because it is the very nature of Karma to bear fruit and it will bear it so long as it is not stopped from doing so by dissociation. This system is however classed amongst the orthodox ones because the division into orthodox and heterodox is based upon the acceptance and non-acceptance of the Vedas as authoritative works and the caste system. Although since the conversion of Maṇḍana Mis'ra to Vedāntism by S'ankara the Pūrva Mīmānsā system found no adherent so far as its metaphysical side was concerned the rules of interpretation contained in Jaimini's Sūtras are accepted as authoritative by all the orthodox philosophers to this day and are even utilized in the interpretation of the Dharmasūtras and Smritis by all the writers on Dharmas'āstra.

There are many points of difference between the two great Mīmānsakās but what we are here concerned with is that as regards the nature of the individual soul. Both agree on that point to this extent that each individual has a soul quite distinct from the body, mind, and intelligence and that the soul of each individual is omnipresent yet distinct from that of each other individual but while Kumārila held that though in relation to the objects the soul was inert it was percieved in all cognitions as distinct from the body by a mental perception (मानसप्रत्यक्ष) as the substratum of the notion of 'I' and that it was therefore made up of two parts, namely, a Chidaṁs'a which enabled it to become the knower and the substratum of the notion of 'I' and (2) an Achidaṁs'a by which it became transformed as knowledge, happiness &c., became the subject of self-consciousness and the agent of producing the quality of being cognized in the object by an ultra-sensual operation consisting of knowledge[1], Prabhākara held that the Self as the cognizer was never percieved apart from the cognized object nor was the object ever cognized without the cognizer entering into the cognition as a necessary factor but both the Self and the object shone forth in the self-luminous knowledge in the form of what was described as Tripuṭi-pratyaks'a, namely, the perception of the cognizer, the object cognized and the act

1. *Vide* Brahmānanda's commentary as to the view of Kumārila. (*Kās'i Sanskrit Series* Vol. LXV. p. 111).

of cognition (प्रमाता, प्रमेय and प्रमिति). According to him the Self is not self-luminous but knowledge illumines both the Self and the object in one operation; cognition is not therefore the Self but it appears in it as its substratum and as the cognitive element 'I' which is inseparable from all cognitions and is therefore inert or non-luminous (जड).

It should be remarked that Madhusūdana has first set forth the view of the Chārvāka school which is that the soul is identical with the body and dies with it; then that of the Bauddhās who hold that though distinct from the body it is either of the nature of temporary impulses or a void, then that of the Jainās who hold that though distinct from the body and of a permanant positive nature it is of the size of the body only and lastly, that of the Vais'eshikās, Naiyāyikās and Prabhākarās who hold that though distinct from the body, permanent and all-pervading it is inert *i. e.* not self-luminous. Although the systems adhered to by the last three classes of philosophers are three distinct ones, they have been bracketted together here owing to the similarity of their views as regards the nature of the Self which is the subject under consideration here.

जडो बोधात्मक इति भाट्टाः—The Bhāttās say that it is inert (yet) of the nature of knowledge.

The Bhāttās are the school of Mīmānsā founded by Kumārila Bhatta who is already referred to in the note on the 'Prābhākarās', He is believed to have burnt himself alive in fire as a penance for having entered an order of Buddhist monks in order to know their doctrine at first hand with a view to refute it. Mādhava, the author of *S'ankarajaya* (a biography of S'ankarāchārya) records a tradition that while Kumārila was preparing to immolate himself S'ankara appeared before him and asked him to defer his immolation and either accept his doctrine or enter into a discussion with him and that thereupon the former replied that he could not defer his immolation but that if the latter conquered his disciple Maṇḍana Mis'ra in debate it would be as good as conquering him.

In the note on the 'Prābhākarās' it has been stated that Kumārila and Prabhākara were the founders of two separate schools of Mīmānsā and that they expounded their views in their respective commentaries on the Sūtras of Jaimini as explained by

S'abara Swāmi. Though that of Prabhākara was in one volume only, that of Kumārila was in three parts, namely, (1) *S'lokavārttika* which dealt with the philosophical portion of S'abara's work which occupied the first chapter of the first book entitled *Tarkapāda*, (2) *Tantra-vārttika* dealing with the remaining three chapters of the first book and the second and third books and (3) *Tuptikā* dealing with the subject-matter of the remaining nine books. His disciple Manḍana Mis'ra who was converted by S'ankara to Vedāntism has written a commentary on *Tantravārttika* and two independent treatises named *Vidhiviveka* and *Mīmānsānukramaṇī*. Pārathāsārathi (about the ninth century A. D.) though not his direct pupil was a follower of Kumārila and has written *S'āstradīpikā*, *Tantraratna* and *Nyāyaratnamālā* on his line of reasoning. Sucharita Mis'ra, the author of *Kās'ikā* and Some-s'vara, that of *Nyāyasudhā* were also his followers. Moreover Ramakrishṇa Bhatta has written a commentary on the *Tarkapāda* portion of *S'āstradīpikā* called *Siddhāntachandrikā* and Somanātha has written *Mayūkhamālikā* on the remaining portion thereof.

Kumārila's view as to the nature of the individual soul has already been explained in the note on the 'Prābhākaras'. (*Vide* pp. 12–13 *Supra*).

भोक्तैव केवलबोधात्मक इति साङ्ख्याः पातञ्जलाश्च—The Sāṃkhyās and Pātanjalās say that it is only the enjoyer (and) of the nature of knowledge, pure and simple.

The Sāṁkhyās are the adherents of the system of philosophy founded by Kapila, son of Devahūti and Kardama in pre-historic times. His teaching is not found embodied in any independent work now extant but the principles underlying it have been explained in such old works as the *Mahābhāratā* (xii. 219) including the *Bhagawadgītā* (xiii, xiv, xvii & xviii), *Charaka Saṁhitā* &c. He had a pupil named Āsuri. Pancha̍śikha who is said to have expounded the Sāṁkhya doctrine contained in the *Mahābhārata* was a pupil of Āsuri. The exposition given in the *Mahābhārata* agrees in the main with that given in the *Charaka Saṁhitā* but differs from that contained in the *Kārikās* of Īshwara Krishṇa (200 A.D.) which is the oldest work on the Sāṁkhya philosophy available at present. Moreover Guṇaratna, a commentator of *Saḍdars'anasamuchchaya* mentions two schools of Sāṁkhya, the Maulikya (original) and the Uttara (later). The doctrine of the former

is said to have been characterized by a belief in a separate Pradhāna (primordial matter) for each Purusha. This agrees with the Sāṁkhya doctrine expounded in Charaka. From these data Prof. Dās Guptā has drawn an inference[1] that there was a school of Saṁkhya earlier than that whose doctrine is found embodied in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikās.*

Those *kārikās* were commented upon by Gauḍapāda and Rājā and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has written a sub-commentary on that of the former. The other which is referred to by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* is lost. The commentary now much referred to is that of Vāchaspati Mis'ra (ninth century A. D.) who is well-known as the writer of important commentaries on the standard works of the Nyāya, Mīmānsā, Yoga and Vedānta systems of philosophy. Beside the *Kārikās,* there is another authoritative work of this system known as the *Sāṁkhyasūtras.* Their authorship is unknown and there is much dispute as to their date. Prof. Dās Guptā thinks[2] that they were composed about the ninth century A. D. They have been commented upon by Vijnāna Bhiks'u. Another commentary thereon is that of Aniruddha. Vijnāna Bhikshu has also written an epitome called *Sāṁkhyasāra.* Other works of this system are *Tattwasamāsa, Sāṁkhyatattwa-vivechana* and *Sāmkhyatattwayāthāryadīpana.*

The Sāṁkhya doctrine as expounded in the *Kārikās* is that the whole universe is made up of the consequences of the association of the two permanent substances, Prakriti and Purusha, that the former is blind because she is inert and the latter is lame because he is simply intelligence or knowledge, that therefore action of any kind whatever is possible only if the lame one sitting on the shoulders of the blind directs her to do a particular thing, that though the Purusha does not act he does enjoy the fruits of the actions done under his directions, that he is therefore subject to the law of transmigration, that in order to be freed from it he must acquire the true knowledge of his own nature and that of the Prakriti, their respective shares in creation, their respective functions in the universe created by them &c. According to this system also each individual has his own soul *i. e.* is a separate Purusha and that there is no limit to their

1. *History of Indian Philosophy.* Vol. I. Ch. VII. pp. 212-13.
2. *History of Indian Philosophy.* Vol. I. p. 212.

number. In the state of Pralaya (involution), the Purushas live separate from the Prakriti also called Pradha'na which means the three Guṇas, Sattwa (knowledge) Rajas (passion) and Tamas (darkness) in a state of equipoise. On the association of the Purushas with it, this equipoise is disturbed and there is produced what is called Mahat or Buddhi. From the latter is produced Ahaṁkāra or Ego. And so on are produced the five Tanmātras (subtle elements), the five gross elements, the minds and the ten organs of sense, each succeeding from each preceding one. Thus are made up the twenty-five categories enumerated in the Sāṁkhya works as forming the basis of the evolution of all products, physical and metaphysical, terrestrial and celestial. Īs'wara Krishṇa does not believe in the existence of any universal intelligence guiding and controlling the Prakriti. But it seems that the Sāṁkhya doctrine as originally expounded in *S'as'tītantras'āstra*, an old work not available now in its pure form, was theistic, that Panchas'ikha, a pupil of Āsuri, made it atheistic, and that Īśwara Krishṇa modified the doctrine in other respects in order to fill up the gaps in the line of reasoning adopted by Panchas'ikha which may have been noticed by other thinkers during the interval that had passed between them. Of the three later authoritative writers, Gauḍapāda and Vāchaspati had in their commentaries remained silent on certain difficult points but Vijnāna Bhiks'u cleared them up by treating the three Guṇas of Prakriti as reals or super-subtle substances.

The Pātanjalās are the followers of Patanjali who propounded the Yoga system. The principles of that system are put in a systematized form in the *Yogasūtras* which are believed to have been composed in the second century before Christ. That system is otherwise known as S'eswara Sāṁkhya from the fact that it admits all the twenty-five categories of the Sāṁkhya system but adds one more, namely, Īs'wara. But the doctrinal difference between the two systems is that while the Sāṁkhya lays stress on the necessity of knowledge for freeing the soul from the cycle of births and deaths, the Yoga emphasizes the necessity of certain Yoga practices of a sober type (Rāja-Yoga) for attaining to a state of perfection. The Sūtras warn aspirants against the blandishments of the Ashtasiddhis because they obstruct a Yogi in the attainment of the highest goal and

say that it depends upon the firmness of one's determination as to whether one would rise above them and reach the goal or would succumb to any of them and have one's further progress stopped.

The Sūtras of Patanjali have been commented upon by Vyāsa (400 A. D.). The latter's *Bhāshya* has a commentary thereon by Vāchaspati Mis'ra (ninth century A. D.) named *Tattwa-vais'āradi*, that of Bhojadeva (tenth century A. D.) named *Bhojavritti*, that of Vijnāna Bhiks'u named *Yogavārttika*, and that of Nāges'a (seventeenth century A. D.) named *Chhāyāvyākhyā*.

The line of reasoning adopted by the Sāṁkhyās and Pātanjalās in order to establish their view of the nature of the Self, according to the commentator Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is this:—Since the S'ruti says:—निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं &c., the Self must be without parts. That being so, it is impossible that it should be partly intelligent and partly devoid of intelligence. Hence it must be of the nature of eternal knowledge. And it must be only the enjoyer as it is the knower and not also the doer because it is not a product of Prakriti but its existence is independent of that of the latter. There is no objection in holding it to be the enjoyer though by its nature it is incapable of doing any action because the Prakriti who is non-intelligent cannot be the enjoyer of the body &c., for otherwise a dead body &c. also would be in a position to enjoy pleasures &c.

Brahmānanda proves this by another method. He says that the Self is of the nature of the Spirit which is unattached, self-luminous and immutahle, that for that very reason it is the enjoyer as the quality of being the enjoyer is of the nature of experience generated from pleasures and pains which are the attributes of the Buddhi owing to want of discrimination and that experience is undoubtedly real. Be it recollected that salvation according to this system consists of the total extinction of Nescience which occurs on the removal of indiscrimination by the discriminative knowledge ending with the perfect attainment of the states of Saṁprajnāta and Asamprajnāta Samādhis.

This commentator has before proceeding to comment upon the next sentence compared the views of all the Āstika philosophers mentioned upto now and remarked that as amongst those views, that of the Vais'eshikās is the worst because they do not believe

in the Vedas as a source of proof[1], that out of those who believe in the Vedas as such the Naiyāyikās are on the lowest rung of the ladder because they admit that S'rutis like असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः &c. which establish that the individual soul is pure and S'rutis like तत्त्वमसि &c. are intended to give an idea of the want of distinction between the individual soul and Brahma and that S'rutis like इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा, सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म &c. have the meaning that the universe has been created by Brahma, that the Mīmānsakās have no antipathy towards the Vedāntādars'ana and Prābhākara has even cited in his work the saying of the Lord S'rī Krishna in the *Bhagawadgītā* that one should not divert the minds of ignorant people addicted to actions but that since Kumārila Bhatta has suggested that the Self may be of the nature of the Spirit covered over by Nescience, and Prabhākara has stated in his work that the Self is of the nature of non-Spirit which is the receptacle of knowledge produced by its light and has not mentioned even so much that there occurs अन्यथाख्याति in the act of knowledge of the phenomena his view is inferior to that of Bhatta, that that of the former is inferior to that of the Sāṁkhyās and Pātanjalās because like the latter, Bhatta has not stated in his work that the Self is unattached &c. and that as between the Sāṁkhyās and Pātanjalās, the former are inferior to the latter because the latter have admitted the existence of Īs'wara who has been defined as a specific Purusha unaffected by affliction &c.

अविद्यया......इत्यौपनिषदाः—The Aupaṇishadās hold that though affected by agency &c. on account of Nescience, it is really without any attributes and is of the nature of supreme bliss and knowledge alone.

The Aupanishadās are the followers of the Upanishad, Vedānta or Uttara Mimānsā system founded by Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa. The doctrine of that system is expounded in the *S'ārīraka or Brahma Sūtras* which attempt to put in a systematic form the principles underlying the Upanishads. As happens in the case of the teachings of all the great teachers, differences arose between his followers as to

1. The Vais'eshikās do believe in the validity of the Vedas but they do so because they believe that they are of trustworthy authorship and hence in their view their authoritativeness is based upon an inference as to the trustworthy character of their author and therefore they are not a separate source of proof in their eyes.

the right interpretation of some of the Sūtras and also as to certain Sūtras forming or not forming a part of the *S'ārīraka Sūtras.* In later times Gauḍapādāchārya, the Guru of Gowindāchārya, who was the Guru of the Illustrious S'ankarāchārya, led the school which held that the doctrine expounded in the *Brahma Sūtras* must be the same as that which underlay the Upanishads. This view he elaborated in his *Kārikās* which though appended to the Mandūkya Upanishad is a work in four chapters three of which are independent of the Upanishad. The doctrine underlying the Upanishads according to him is that there is only one thing that exists and that is Brahma which is existence, knowledge and bliss (Sat-chit-ānanda), that the world was never created and will never be destroyed, that the appearences that we percieve are of the same nature as those which we see in dreams, that the individual soul has no existence separate from that of Brahma, that there is neither birth nor re-birth, that Brahma is not bound and no attempt need be made to free it, that evil consists in believing as true that which is merely illusory and that when real knowledge arises the illusion vanishes and one realizes the Great Truth as above-explained and such knowledge arises when by Abhya'sa (mental excercises) and Vairāgya the mind becomes steady. It was reserved for his pupil's pupil S'ankarāchārya to put this Adwaita doctrine on a more solid basis and to work it out in all its details by writing commentaries (*Bhāshyas*) on *eleven or twelve principal Upanishads*, the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagwadgītā.* It was from that time forth that the ability to write Bhāshyas on those works came to be regarded as the essential qualification for any one claiming to be known as an Āchārya *i..e.* the founder of a new school of Vedānta. Some Vaishṇava followers of Bādarāyaṇa had written commentaries on *the Sūtras* and *Bhagawadgītā* prior to S'ankara, the principal ones among whom were Bodhāyana and Draviḍāchārya but their works are probably lost and therefore the *Bhāshyas* of S'ankara are the earliest Vedānta works after *the Sūtras* that are now available. His followers who are here referred to as the Aupanishadās have written several commentaries on his *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma Sūtras* and commentaries on commentaries explaining the new points raised by the followers of the partly or wholly dualistic Vaishṇava schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva founded between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Many have written several

independent treatises also. The literature of the Adwaita school alone has therefore increased to such an extent that a mere mention of the names of the books and of their authors would occupy several pages. The principal amongst the commentaries are *Nyāyanirṇaya* of Ānandagiri, *Bhāmatī* or *Vāchaspatya* of Vāchaspati Mis'ra (about 841 A. D.) who is already referred to as the writer of commentaries on works on Nyāya, Mīmānsā, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, *Pañchapādikā* of Padmapāda, one of the four pupils of S'ankarāchārya whom he installed on the Gādīs founded by him at S'ringeri, Jagannātha Puri, Dwārkā and Badarikās'rama, *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa* of Prakās'ātmā (1200 A. D.), *Tattwadīpana* of Akhandānanda, *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakās'ikā* of Nrisimhās'rama (1500 A. D.), *Pañchapādikādarpaṇa* of Amalānanda, *Pañchapādikāṭīkā* of Vīdyāsāgara, *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha* of Vidyāraṇya, *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda and *Kalpataruparimala* of Appaya Dikshit (fourteenth or fifteenth century A. D.). Amongst the independent treatises those considered authoritative are *Nais'karmyasiddhi* of Sures'warāchārya, another of the principal pupils of S'ankarāchārya, *Khanḍanakhanḍakhādya* of S'rihars'a (1190 A. D.) which has been commented by upon by Chitsukha (thirteenth century A. D.) and S'ankara Misra and Raghunatha, *Tattwadīpikā* of Chitsukha which is commented upon by Pratyagrūpa by his *Nayanaprasādini*, *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* of Sarvajnātma Muni (900 A. D.) *Siddhāntales'a* of Appaya Dikshit, *Jīvanmuktiviveka* and *Pañchadas'ī* of Vidyāraṇya, *Vedāntaparibhās'ā* of Dharmarājādhvarīndra (about 1550 A. D.) the commentaries whereon are *S'ikhāmaṇi* by his son Rāmakrishnādhvarindra and *Maṇiprabhā* by Amaradāsa, *Adwaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Saraswatī which has three commentaries known as *Gaudabrahmānandīya* of Brahmānanda Saraswatī, *Viṭṭhales'opādhyayī* and *Siddhivyākhyā*, *Adwaitasiddhisiddhāntasāra* and *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda Vyāsa, *Adwaitabrahmasiddhi* of Sadānanda Yati and *Bhedadhikkāra* of Nrisiṁhās'rama Muni.

Although the followers of S'ankara agree in the main theory that the Self is neither the doer nor the enjoyer but is of the nature of pure existence, knowledge and bliss and that the functions of the doer and knower are attributed to it on account of ignorance though as a matter of fact they pertain to the products of *Māyā*, and that it realizes its true nature on the rise of right knowledge from the principal sentences of the Vedāntas, there are

differences of opinion between them as to how the pure Spirit becomes the embodied soul and as to whether there is only one soul or a plurality of them. These will be founded discussed in the text of the *Siddhāntabindu* at pp. २६-३१.

The above is only a bird's-eye-view of the different theories about the nature of the Self that prevailed at the time of S'ankarāchārya. A complete statement thereof is found in *Gauḍapāda's Kārtikā* II. 19-28. Therein the specific names of the schools have not been given. For them the inquisitive reader may refer to *Ānandagiri's Commentary on the Bhāshya of S'ankarāchārya on the Kārikās* (*Ānandāsrama Sanskrit Series* No. X). For those that can be believed to have prevailed during the time of Vidyāraṇya who preceded Madhusūdana by about a century and a half he may refer to *Pañchadas'ī* VI wherein from Verses 58 to 77 are discussed the different views of philosophers as to what the Self is, from Verses 78 to 86 those as to its size and from verses 87 to 101 those as to whether it is of the nature of the Spirit (चित्) or the non-Spirit (अचित्) or both combined (चिदचित्).

अहम्प्रत्ययसिद्धचिदात्मनि—In the Self which is the Spirit (and) whose existence is proved by the notion of the ego.

For the proof of the existence of the Self one need not turn one's eyes to any external object but should reflect inwardly and one would at once be convinced that but for the existence of the Self the notion of the ego, of which every human being, howmuchsoever ignorant or humble, is fully concious, would not be possible at all.

अहम्प्रत्ययस्यालम्बनविशेषनिर्णयाय—For determining the particular basis of the notion of the ego.

Brahmānanda explains this expression as meaning 'for determining as distinct from the earth &c., the particular basis of the notion of the ego which appears as being identical with the body &c'.

भगवानाचार्यैः—The Revered Āchārya *i. e.* S'rī S'ankarāchārya.

P. 9. एकः अद्वितीयः—एकः means without a second.

According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha अद्वितीयः means devoid of duality which means Māyā and its products. Brahmānanda

says that though according to *Amarakosha* and other authorities the word एक has many meanings such as मुख्य, अन्य, and केवल the meaning appropriate here is केवलत्व (absoluteness) only because the facts that the Self is different from and superior to the phenomenal world are brought out by other words, that by केवलत्व is meant 'being devoid of other relations' and that in the case of the sentence एकेन घटेन जलमाहरेत्, the purport lies in the means as accompanied by घटत्व &c., and so the exclusion of other relations in the form of another pot arises owing to the idea of restriction to one substance but in this there is no restriction owing to the purport lying in the pure Self and so we understand that there is the absence of all duality which is different from the Self.

अवशिष्टः सर्वद्वैतबाधेऽप्यबाधितः—That which remains over uncontradicted although all duality is contradicted.

The underlying idea according to Nārāyana Tīrtha is that although by the knowledge of the Self all duality is destroyed root and branch, the Self being of the nature of truth its existence must be predicated even as the witness of the contradiction.

एकः—The One.

Brahmānanda commenting on this word raises a question whether the idea of oneness, is or is not accompanied by that of the negation of twoness or duality and answers it by saying that as in the first case there is a contradiction because accompaniment itself means duality and as if that were the case, the S'rutis सत्यकामः &c. would have to be understood to have been intended to convey an idea of the accompaniment of सत्यकामत्व &c. which cannot be done, the second is the right interpretation. Of course in that case the delusion as to duality would not be removed but in order to supply that deficiency the word केवलः which means निर्धर्मकः (devoid of attributes) has been used. In support of the use of two distinct words एकः and केवलः he says that the S'ruti एकमेवाद्वितीयम् contains a similar use, the word एकः there serving to exclude things of the same class, अद्वितीयः those of a different class and एव all attributes.

औपनिषदपक्षः—The view of the Aupanishadās. Ordinarily this word means the view of all the followers of Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa

but here it has been used, according to Brahmānanda, in the sense of those of S′rī S′ankarāchārya.

श्रेयान्—The best or most excellent.

अत्राहमिति......सम्बध्यते—Here the word अहम् goes with every negative particle.

In fact as Abhyankara says अहं न भूमिः is one sentence, अहं न तोयम् is another and so on.

या भूमि........द्रष्टव्यः—One should percieve that there is the absence of mutual identification (which can be expressed) in the form "that which is the earth is not 'I', that which is 'I' is not the earth".

In justifying this remark Abhyankara says that one might object that the Chārvāka does not experience the body in the Self just as a deluded man percieves silver in a mother-of-pearl for in that case there would not be the consciousness of the Self at all, nor does he experience the Self in the body because in that case there would not be the consciousness of the body but what he experiences is that there is identity in place of the apparent difference between the body and the Self; that being so, just as in order to shake off the delusion as to the existence of silver, it is said 'this is not silver', it ought, in this case to have been said 'there is not the identity of the two', why then does the Āchārya say "I am not the earth &c." and that in order to remove this objection, Madhūsūdana has made this remark which means that neither is any of the earth &c. identical with the Self nor is the Self identical with any of them.

वादिना—By the disputant or adversary i, e. the Chārvāka.

अभ्युपेयते—Is admitted acknowledged or accepted.

The root here is इ to go with अभि and उप.

संघात—Combination or union.

अभ्युपगमात्—Owing to admissious, acknowledgment or acceptance.

The root in this word is गम् to go with अभि and उप.

अवयविन्—One having limbs; a whole; a substance having several constituents.

The Chārvākas do not admit the existence of anything apart from the body which can be said to own or possess or to have been made up of limbs or parts.

पञ्चमतत्त्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गेन च संयोगादिसम्बन्धानभ्युपगमात्—And owing to the possibility of having to admit the existence of a fifth element they do not admit that of a connection such as combination &c.

The Chārvākas admit the existence of four elements only namely, earth, water, light and air. They do not admit that of आकाश (space). If they were to admit that of a connection such as combination &c, they would necessarily have to admit that of space without which no combination would be possible. They do not therefore admit any such connection.

संहन्तुरभावाच्च—And owing to the absence of a combining agent.

संहन्तृ means संघातकर्तृ (one who brings about a combination).

संघातो नोपपद्यते—A combination is not proved.

According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda a संघात (combination) can be of three sorts namely, (1) complete fusion of the elements, or a chemical combination thereof, (2) a mechanical mixture resulting in a new product and (3) a similar mixture in which the particles of the elements remain separate. Thereout according to the theory of the Chārvākās the first is not possible because they do not admit the existence of a separate soul and the last two are not possible because they do not admit the existence of a relation such as combination &c. The reason that there is nothing in their theory which can bring about a combination which is stated last is common to all the three kinds of combination.

इत्यभिप्रेत्य—Such being the view (of the author).

प्रत्येकं.........निराकृतः—The theory that the body is the Self has been refuted by refuting the view that each element is the Self.

Abhyankara's commentary on the whole of this passage under the heading अवयव्यनङ्गीकारादिति makes the above point very clear. He says therein that the Chārvākās do not postulate the identity of any of the elements with the Self but of the result of their combination namely, the body but Madhusūdana says that for the three reasons already mentioned, it is not possible that there should be a combination thereof according to the doctrine of the Chārvākās,

whether that combination is assumed to result in an object different from the elements in which the original atoms are destroyed as in the case of curds formed of milk or in one made up of the elements as parts as a cloth from yarn wherein the original atoms remain intact and that it is therefore that he has treated each element separately. Madhusūdana wants to make out that by saying 'I am not the earth' &c. the author intended to refute the view of the particular schools of philosophers which differed from that of the Aupanishadās. In doing so he meets with certain difficulties one of which is that the Chārvākas do not say that any of the elements is the Self. Still what the author has done is to deny that any of them is the Self. In order therefore to show that his explanation is consistent with what the author has done, he has added this passage the gist of which is that the author has done so because in the theory of the Chārvākas a combination of the elements is not possible for various reasons. Whether this explanation is correct or incorrect, I doubt whether the attempt to refute in this manner the Chārvāka view that the body is the Self would be considered successful. *Vide also the remarks at pp. 18–19 supra.*

P. 10. भूतचतुष्टयतत्त्ववादिनो मते—In the view of the opponents advocating that the four elements are the essence.

भूतचतुष्टयतत्त्ववादिन् means the Chārvāka.

आवरणाभावत्वेन......देहानुपादानत्वम्—आकाश (space) which is believed to be of the nature of the absence of a covering (and) which is (therefore) steady and unreal, is not the material cause of the body.

Brahmānanda explains that in the view of the Chārvakās, the four elements only constitute the essence and they too are transient, because anything that exists must be transient. This general proposition is proved thus:—If a thing is capable of bringing about a particular result it must be able to do so without delay *i. e.* in a single moment; if delay takes place then it should be inferred that it has not the requisite capacity; further the existence of a thing consists of the causing of a particular act or a plurality of acts to be done; this it must accomplish within a single moment; hence all existing things must be transient. As for आकाश it is non-existent and unreal because it is not

able to cause any act to be done; it is not also therefore transient but steady; and though its existence cannot be proved logically, it is spoken of as existing owing to its being the subject of doubt; the Chārvakās therefore admit the existence thereof in the shape of the absence of a covering which is explained by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as meaning an impediment in the motion of birds &c.

Abhyankara's explanation is more explicit. It is that the four elements are coverings and that what is spoken of as आकाश is nothing else but the absence of these coverings; hence wherever there are the four elements आकाश cannot exist and therefore it cannot be the material cause of the body which having existence must have as its material cause a substance or substances which has or have a positive existence.

तथापि.........अङ्गीकारात्—However there is its positive existence in the view of the author because it is admitted to be a material cause &c. of the body.

The Vedāntins believe that the body is a product of the quintupling (पञ्चीकरण) of the five elements of which आकाश is the fifth.

तत्राप्यात्मत्वप्रसक्त्या तन्निराकृतम्—It (i. e. the view that it is the Self) is refuted because it (i. e. आकाश) too is liable to be considered to be the Self.

The argument is that since the Chārvākās themselves do not admit the positive existence of आकाश as an element, it is not possible that they should speak of its being the Self; still the author has refuted such a view because he himself does admit its existence, it being the material cause of the body in his cosmology.

This is another fly in the ointment.

अथवा न वायुरिति.........शून्यवाचकत्वात्—Or it may be that there is the refutation of the theory that the body is the Self upto न वायुः and न खम् contains that of the theory that the void is the Self, the word ख meaning 'the void'.

For information as to who advocate the S'ūnyavāda *vide pp. 22-23 supra.*

The fact that Madhusūdana attempts to explain the denial

of आकाश as the Self in an alternative way shows that he was not himself sure as to what the intention of the author must have been.

निरासः—Refutation, rejection, repudiation.

The root here is निरस्. In निराकृतिः which has the same meaning the root is निराकृ.

भूतनिराकरणेन.........निरासः—By the rejection of the elements, is made also that of the vital breath and mind which are the products of the elements.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha says that the vital breath and the mind are admitted to be the products of the elements on account of there being the S'ruti अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः आपोमयः प्राणः.

मनोवृत्तेः क्षणिकविज्ञानस्य—Of momentary consciousness which is a function of the mind (i. e. of the view held by the Yogāchārās).

देहातिरिक्तस्य.........च—And (of the soul) different from the body as qualified by the attributes of being the doer, the enjoyer &c. (i. e. of the views of the Jainas, Vais'eshikās, Tarkikās and Prābhākarās).

The reason why all these views must be held to have been refuted by the rejection of the mind is supplied by the next sentence.

सिद्धान्ते......इति श्रुतेः—Because in the view of the author, knowledge, desire, happiness &c. are believed to be dependent upon the inner organ (i. e. the mind) owing to there being the Vedic text "(Everything) beginning with the desire, determination &c. is the mind only".

All the four commentators have explained this passage and their explanations substantially agree. They say that it is intelligible that by the rejection of the mind momentary consciousness should be deemed to have been rejected because it is only a function of the mind but what about the views of those who believe that the Self is different from the body and the mind? The answer is that though they believe the Self to be different from the body and the mind, they attribute the qualities of being the doer, the enjoyer &c. to it. These in the view of the author

are the attributes of the mind. Hence when it is denied that the mind is the Self, it must be understood that the denial of any of the attributes of the mind being the Self is also implied.

Abhyankara is of opinion that the reason सिद्धान्ते ज्ञानेच्छा &c. has been stated in order to obviate the following objection:—What is the proof of the mind being the doer and the enjoyer? On the contrary from the fact that man feels 'I am doing this' it ought to be held that the Self is the doer. The answer to it is that the above feeling itself is a proof of that fact in this manner that what is proved by it is that it is the 'I' that is the doer; that 'I' is not the Self but the 'Ego' which is but one aspect of the mind. To this the objector is imagined to say that in that case the 'I' in the feelings 'I know', 'I desire', 'I am happy' &c. would also be the mind and therefore knowledge, desire, happiness &c. would also occur to the mind and the commentator says that that is exactly what Madhusūdana has said by सिद्धान्ते ज्ञानेच्छा &c.

Purushottama in order to strengthen Madhusūdana's argument quotes two passages, one from the Bhāgawat Purāṇa and another from the Brahma Purāṇa (*vide p.* ११) and says to the objector that even if in the face of these S'ruti and Smriti texts you are prepared to hold that the Self must be the doer because we feel so, then you may as well accept the theory that the body is the Self since we also feel 'I am fair-looking', 'I am fat', 'I am going' &c.

Abhyankara goes a step further and argues that the objector might say that there would not be a contradiction of the Vedic text in question if the word मनः is taken by लक्षणा to mean मनोमूलकम् but that position cannot be accepted because there is no justification for understanding that word in that sense and there would be the violation of the rule न विधौ परः शब्दार्थः. He further says that it should not be argued that even if desire &c. are taken to be attributes of the mind the word मनः can be understood by लक्षणा to mean मनोनिष्ठम् and that if that is done the text would mean that these are attributes of the mind in the sense that they reside therein, and would therefore be describing an existing fact, because in that case, it would not be necessary to resort to लक्षणा for even without it that sense can be made out owing to the identity of an attribute and its possessor as in the sentence नीलं वस्त्रम्. In further

support of the author's view he quotes the same Purāṇa passages that Purushottama has quoted.

तेन देहमारभ्य.........प्रतिज्ञातं भवति—Thereby the fact that all objects beginning with the body and ending with the enjoyer only believed by different opponents (to be the Self) are not the Self is declared.

The word तेन may have been used with reference to the portion of the commentary commencing from भूतनिराकरणेन &c. as Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda opine or to that commencing from एतदुपपादनाय &c. I think the latter view to be correct because the former excludes the discussion as to the देहात्मवाद whereas the words देहमारभ्य in this sentence show that the author intended to include it in this remark.

It will appear on a reference to *p.* ८ that the classes of philosophers whose views were proposed to be refuted were the (1) Chārvakās, (2) Yogāchārās, (3) Mādhyamikās (4) Jainās, (5) Vaiśeshikās, Naiyāyikās and Prābhākarās, (6) Bhāttās and (7) Sāṁkhyās and Pātanjalās. Thereout the different aspects of the Chārvāka view have been refuted separately. So also is the view of the Yogāchārās. That of the Mādhyamikās can be deemed to have been refuted if the word खम् is understood to mean 'the void' as alternatively suggested. Those of the remaining philosophers must be deemed to have been referred to by the words देहातिरिक्तस्य कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिविशिष्टस्य. Purushottama says that the view of the Jainās is disregarded on account of the medium size of the Self. Abhyankara is on the other hand of opinion that the Self according to the view of the Jainās being subject to growth and destruction and these being the natural incidents of the body that view must be deemed to have been refuted by the refutation of the view that the body is the Self. I think that both these opinions are incorrect and that the said view is included in the above expression because whatever the size of their Self, it is different from the body and is the doer of actions and in the previous statement of the different views Madhusūdana has mentioned the Jaina view by its distinctive feature देहातिरिक्तः and here too he has repeated that expression for including all the views not expressly refuted previously. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda and Abhyankara agree that the Sāṁkhya view must be deemed to have been

refuted by the refutation of the view that the mind is the Self because according to the Vedānta theory pleasures and pains affect the mind not the Self. Abhyankara further thinks that the views of the Bhāttās and Pātanjalās must also be deemed to have been similarly refuted and I think he is right because the Pātanjalās have been bracketted with the Sāṁkhyās by Madhusūdana himself in the previous statement and the Self of the Bhāttās too is nothing else but the mind.

तत्र—Therefore.

Ordinarily तत्र would mean 'therein' but here that meaning does not suit the context.

अनैकान्तिकत्वात्—Owing to uncertainty or absence of permanence. अनेकान्तिकत्वात् which is found in some other editions has also the same meaning.

ऐकान्तिकत्वम् or एकान्तिकत्वम् means certainty, permanence or steadiness and अन् is a negative particle.

व्यभिचारित्वात्—Owing to being variable or changing.

Anything that does not retain the same nature at all times, past, present and future and at all places is called a व्यभिचारिन्. The body, senses &c. are such because they are subject to growth and decay. Even according to the modern science they undergo partial changes at every moment and all their atoms are completely changed within a period of seven years.

विनाशित्वात्—Owing to being destructible.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda derive the word विनाशः thus:— विविधो देशकालवस्तुगतो नाशोऽदर्शनं यतः स विनाशः and say that it is different from संसर्गाभाव and अन्योन्याभाव or तादात्म्याभाव.

From आत्मनो देशकालपरिच्छिन्नत्वात् to the end of the passage Madhusūdana proves that the body, senses &c. are non-selfs and indescribable substances having only an imaginary existence.

आत्मनो देशकालापरिच्छिन्नत्वात्—The Self being unlimited by space and time.

This supplies the reason for the next proposition namely, तत्परिच्छिन्नानां घटादिवदनात्मत्वात्. The argument therefore so far is this:—

The Self is unlimited by time and space. Whatever is limited by them is therefore a non-self. The body &c. are limited by them. Therefore they are non-selfs like a pot &c.

ध्वंसप्रागभावयोश्च ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्—It being impossible to know (its) destruction and previous non-existence.

ध्वंस means destruction as of a pot after it is broken. Thereafter it ceases to exist as a pot.

प्रागभाव is non-existence before production. A pot or chair or table or anything that is made at a particular time, cannot be said to have been in existence before production. Hence each such thing has a previous non-existence. It cannot be said of the Self that it is destroyed or that there ever was a time when it did not exist.

Cf.

न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन्नायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित् ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥

(कठ. १-२-१८).

न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचिन्नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥

(भ. गी. २-२०).

अनात्मनां जडत्वात्—Owing to the non-selfs being inert.

This statement supplies the reason why it is impossible to know the destructibility and previous non-existence of the Self.

In order to know something, there must be a knower. None of the things other than the Self can be a knower because they are not self-luminous but depend upon the Self itself for their illumination.

स्वभिन्नस्य चात्मत्वाभावात्—That which may be different from it not being the Self.

This is stated in order to obviate the objection that if no non-Self can cognize the destruction and previous non-existence of the Self let there be another Self to do so. But that is not possible as the Self being one only everything different from it is a non-Self.

आत्मनः एकत्वेऽपि.........व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः—It being possible to explain the phenomena by admitting a difference between the inner organs on which depend pleasures, pains &c. even though the Self be one.

This remark is added in order to obviate the objection that one must admit a plurality of selfs because the pleasures, pains and other experiences of one individual remain a sealed book to others unless communicated or objectively percieved.

Here ends the reasoning as to why there can be no separate knower of the Self's destruction and previous non-existence.

स्वेनैव स्वाभावग्रहणे विरोधात्—There being a contradiction in the cognition of one's own absence by oneself.

By this statement Madhusūdana answers the objection that the Self may itself know its destruction &c.

It is quite obvious that there is an apparent contradiction in saying that one may know one's own destruction and previous non-existence.

ग्राहककाले.........ग्राह्याभावात्—There being the non-existence of the knower at the time when the thing to be known exists and the absence of the thing to be known when there is the existence of the knower.

This explains the contradiction above-referred to.

कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गाच्च—And owing to the possibility of the destruction of that which may have been done and the accrual of that which may not have been done.

This shows the impossibility of there being the destruction and previous non-existence of the Self. The consequences stated herein would occur if it is believed that the Self is destroyed and that there was a time when it did not exist. For if it is believed that the Self is destroyed then there would be destruction along with it of all actions which have not borne fruit and if it is believed that there was a time when it did not exist then immediately on birth, it would be enjoying the fruits of actions not previously done. Brahmānanda anticipating the argument that the fruits enjoyed by a son are those of actions done by his father says that for such a belief there is no valid reason.

Summary—The Self is unlimited by space and time. Whatever is limited by them is therefore a non-Self like a pot. One of the reasons why the Self is unlimited by them is that it is impossible to know its destruction or previous non-existence. The impossibility can be proved thus;—The destruction or previous non-existence could be known either by something else than the Self or by the Self itself. In the first case, the extraneous thing may be either an inert substance like the mind or another self-luminous entity like the Self. Of these, the first cannot be the knower because it is inert. The existence of another Self is not possible because the Self is only one and indivisible. It is not necessary to predicate the existence of a plurality of selfs because it is possible to explain the phenomenal existence of separate individuals by admitting the oneness of the Self and the plurality of the mind which is the cause of the feelings of pleasure, pain, individual consciousness &c. In the second case, there arises a contradiction because when there is the knower, the thing to be known may be absent and when the latter is present, the former may not be. Moreover, if it is believed that the Self is liable to destruction and that there was a time when it did not exist, then there is the possibility of the destruction of actions done and the enjoyment of the fruits of others not done.

सद्रूपस्यात्मनः सर्वत्रानुगमाच्च नात्यन्ताभावसंभवः—Moreover, in asmuch as the Self which is of the nature of existence follows everywhere there is not the possibility of its absolute non-existence.

So far the unlimitedness of the Self by time only had been proved. Now begins the proof of its being unlimited by space. If it were limited, its absolute non-existence and relative non-existence would be possible. In this sentence it is shown why its absolute non-existence is not possible. It is easily intelligible that if the Self is of the nature of existence, then its absolute non-existence would not be possible, it being present in every object in one form or another and at every place.

द्वैतस्य मिथ्यात्वेन......तत्तादात्म्याभावानुपपत्तिः—(And) owing to duality being unreal its existence is proved only on being identified with the Sat which is its substratum. It is therefore superimposed (on the Self) like silver on a mother-of-pearl. Hence it is impossible that there should be an absence of its identity with it (i. e. the Self).

मिथ्यात्व—Unreality.

Duality meaning thereby the phenomenal world is unreal i. e. not real but it is not therefore false i. e. not existing but indescribable i. e. neither true nor false as will be explained later on. Owing to this nature, it has no existence apart from the Self but owes its very existence to its superimposition i. e. mistaken identification with the Self as that of silver with a mother-of-pearl. Such being the case, it is impossible to predicate its absence of identifacation with the Self.

तादात्म्याभाव is the same as अन्योन्याभाव or भेद. Just as we distinguish a cloth from a pot, a table from a carpet &c. we cannot distinguish any object whatever from the Self for the reason stated.

तेनात्मा नाभावप्रतियोगी—Hence the Self is not the counter-part of non-existence.

अभाव (non-existence) can be of four sorts, namely (1) प्रध्वंसाभाव (non-existence after destruction as of a pot after being broken); (2) प्रागभाव (non-existence previous to coming into existence as of a pot before being made), (3) अत्यन्ताभाव (absolute non-existence as of a pot &c. on the bare ground) and (4) तादात्म्याभाव or अन्योन्याभाव (absence of identity or mutual identification as of a pot where there is something other than it). None of these kinds of non-existence can be predicated of the Self. It is not therefore the counter-part of non-existence i. e. to say that it is above the limitations of time and space.

अभावप्रतियोगिनश्च देहेन्द्रियादयः—The body senses &c. are the counter-part of non-existence.

These are of a nature opposed to that of the Self because they cease to exist after destruction, were not in existence sometime ago, exist at particular places only and are distinguishable from one another.

तेनामी नात्मानः—Hence these are not selfs. This follows naturally from the two preceding propositions.

What then are they is the natural question that arises. The answer to it is contained in the following sentence namely, किन्तु स्वप्रकाशबोधरूपे &c.

आत्मनि अद्वैतेऽपि—Although the Self is without a second.

अनिर्वचनीयाऽविद्याकल्पिता अनिर्वचनीया एवेतिसिद्धान्तरहस्यम्—The gist of the author's view is that they are themselves indescribables brought into existence by Nescience which is indescribable.

The body &c. are said to be indescribable because it cannot be denied that all men feel that they have bodies &c. and all our worldly intercourse proceeds on the assumption that they do exist and yet when we try to analyse the ideas about them philosophically we find that we feel their existence only because we cannot rise above the veil of Nescience which obscures our inner vision. That Nescience too is said to be of the same nature because although we find that it exists and is beginningless it is capable of being eradicated by the knowledge of the true nature of the Self and so there does come a time when it does not exist.

Here ends the commentary on the word अनैकान्तिकत्वात् (owing to uncertainty or want of permanence) which is the reason assigned by the author for saying that the elements individually or collectively *i. e.* the physical body, or the senses either individually or collectively are not the Self. This reason has been explained in the commentary by contrasting the nature of the Self with their nature. As this would mean destructive criticism only the commentator has further asserted what is their nature according to the view of the Upanishad school.

P. 12. ननु बोधरूप आत्मेति········अव्यभिचारिता तस्य—If a thing is अव्यभिचारि as the Self is said to be, it must be present at all times and places. If it can be shown that there is a time or place when or where the Self cannot be deemed to exist then the above proposition would be proved to be false. This the objector tries to do by citing the instance of man's experience after rising from deep sleep.

बोध—Knowledge, from बुध् to know. It is the same as ज्ञान which is derived from ज्ञा to know. Hence बोधरूप means 'of the nature of knowledge'.

गाढं मूढो········अवेदिषम्—I was extremely senseless; I did not know anything.

सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शात्—Owing to the fact that on rising from deep sleep one recollects (what is above-stated).

परामर्शः (from परामृश् to reflect, think or consider) means reflection, thought or judgment. It is also used at times in the sense of recollection because the said root has several other meanings including 'to recollect'. As a matter of fact 'reflection' would be the proper English word for it, because what is sought to be asserted by the objector is that there is want of consciousness in the state of deep sleep; this would follow from the statement that one was completely senseless which could not have been a matter of experience but of a deduction made from an experience that one did not know anything while in that state. Madhusūdana does not however seem to have seperated the two ideas but treated them as constituting one idea only resulting from a recollection on waking up, of an experience while in the state of sleep (*vide* the remark अन्यथा मूढोऽहमासम् &c. further on). It would not therefore be wrong to translate this word as 'recollection.'

सुषुप्त्येकसिद्धः—This compound has not been solved by any of the commentators except Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. He solves it as सुषुप्तेन एकेन सिद्धः and explains the word सुषुप्तेन to mean स्वापात्मकेन, एकेन to mean मुख्येन असाधारणप्रमाणभूतेन and सिद्धः to mean निश्चितः. According to him therefore the compound must be understood to mean "The one whose existence is determined by the unique experience of deep sleep." I think an alternative solution is possible and that is सुषुप्त्या य एको सिद्धः. In that case the compound would mean "The one who is proved by the state of deep sleep."

आत्मनः सुषुप्ति······तदभावः—The self being the witness of the state of deep sleep, there is not its absence in that state.

The reasoning underlying this statement is that unless there is the presence of some other entity besides ignorance, there would not be the recollection that one did not know anything while in that state and that this entity which witnessed that state can be no other than the Self which is self-luminous and the illuminator of everything else, the recollection itself being such that the presence of any non-self is not possible. This is expressed by the next sentence अन्यथा मूढोऽहमासम् &c.

मातृमान···········अव्यभिचारात्—Although the knower, the means of knowledge, knowledge itself and the thing to be known may vary (at different times), the one who witnesses their existence and non-existence does not vary at all the three times.

मातृ, मान, मिति and मेय are other words for प्रमाता, प्रमाण, प्रमिति and प्रमेय which are explained hereinbelow.

It is possible that these may vary with the nature of every kind of knowledge but the Self which is present at all times and is therefore the witness of their existence and non-existence does not vary at any time. It is a constant entity at all times, otherwise it would be impossible to know whether they exist or not.

The times referred to here are those of waking, dreaming and sleeping.

The answer to the above objection may be summed up thus:— No, you are not right because the Self is present in the state of deep sleep also as the witness of the state of ignorance, it being inexplicable how otherwise the recollection you speak of would arise. You might say that when there is no knower, thing to be known &c. in that state, it is not possible that the Self as a witness should be there but that is not true because according to us the Self is a witness not only of their existence but of their non-existence as well in all the three states to which living beings are subject.

प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता·········न घटादिवत्साक्षिसापेक्षः—The knower who is the support of knowledge and is himself the doer, the enjoyer and the illuminator of everything being common to himself and other extraneous objects like a lamp, is not in need of a witness like a pot &c.

A प्रमा is that by which a thing becomes known exactly as it is and hence it means right knowledge. The person who knows the thing is called a प्रमातृ, the means by which it is known a प्रमाण, the act of knowledge a प्रमिति, and the thing to be known a प्रमेय. They are sometimes referred to succinctly as मातृ, मान, मिति and मेय as in the preceding passage of the commentary.

Knowledge itself is dependent upon the knower for if there were no knower there would be no knowledge, though the thing may be in existence.

According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha this kind of objection is raised by the Tārkikās and Prābhākarās. Brahmānanda ascribes it to the latter only and Abhyankara to the Vais'eshikās only.

Since their view of the nature of the Self is the same, I think this is an objection which would be raised by all of them. Their view is that since the Self not only knows itself but also all that comes in contact with it just as a lamp illumines itself and the objects within the orbit of its rays, there is no necessity in its case to assume the existence of a separate witness *i. e.* a knower thereof as in that of a pot &c. Hence even if it is believed that there is the experience of bliss in the state of deep sleep there is no necessity to assume the existence of a Self apart from the knower who is also the actor and enjoyer. The difference between this view and that of the Vedāntins is that in the former, knowledge is an attribute of the Self pure and simple, while in the latter it is that of the Self limited by the inner organ or mind. Hence in the former the mind is only an auxiliary of the Self in the act of knowledge and the Self is the principal actor and enjoyer and in the latter the mind is in fact the principal actor and enjoyer and owes its powers to the reflection therein of the complacent Self with which it is identified but the Self believes itself to be the doer and enjoyer through ignorance.

न, विकारित्वेन स्वविकारसाक्षित्वानुपपत्तेः—No ; (your Self) being liable to changes it is impossible that it should be the witness of its own changes.

This is a reply to the above objection.

The Self being in the opinion of the opponents, possessed of attributes such as doership &c. it naturally follows that it is liable to changes. Hence though their Self is the common illuminator of itself and other objects it is not fit to be the witness of the changes that take place in it.

It has been argued as against this that just as a lamp does not require anything else to make its presence felt so the Self also should not. This is answered by saying **दृश्यस्य द्रष्टृत्वाभावात्** which means that that which is an object of perception is not the perciever (in ordinary experience). That is so because whatever is an object of perception is always a thing different from knowledge and inert and such a thing cannot be the perciever. In fact the Self is **जड** according to the view of the Vais'eshikās, Naiyāyikās and Prābhākarās (*vide p.* ८).

प्रमातुश्च परिणामित्वेन दृश्यत्वात्—The knower being an object of perception owing to its being a product.

It might be argued as against the above reply that when knowledge arises the Self identifies itself with the knower and says 'I know' and so it is false that it becomes an object of perception. To this Madhusūdana replies that it becomes an object of perception because it becomes transformed.

Abhyankara while commenting on this passage says that since knowledge means the assumption by the knower of the form of the object to be known, if the Self is itself the knower, then it is liable to changes with every act of knowledge and that if it is argued as against that that is not the view held by the Vais'eshikās and others of the nature of knowledge and that according to them knowledge is a specific attribute arising in the Self on account of a connection being formed between an object and an organ of sense, it can still be proved that the Self is liable to transformation because according to those philosophers the Self is at one time devoid of attributes and at another time possessed of them and that means that transformations do take place in it from time to time.

एकस्य कूटस्थस्यैव सर्वसाक्षित्वात्—The one who is immutable is (therefore) the witness of everything.

कूटस्थस्य has been explained by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha here[1] to mean "of that which stands as the substratum of the phenomena" (कूटे प्रपञ्चेऽधिष्ठानतया स्थितस्य) and in another place[2] to mean "remaining like an anvil or immutable" (कूटवद्विद्यमानः, निर्विकार इति यावत्).

Although the senses of the word कूट in these explanations differ the underlying idea is the same in both. Brahmānanda does not give its derivation but gives its meaning as that which is different from that which becomes transformed into a substance having power similar to itself e. g. gold which is transformed into an ornament or the Prakriti in Sāṁkhya philosophy which becomes transformed into Mahat &c. The Self is like the anvil of the goldsmith or the Purusha of the Sāṁkhyas. Hence according to him too the meaning is immutable.

1. *Kās'i Sanskrit Series No. 65 p. 141.*
2. *Ibid p. 145.*

Cf. also

ज्ञानविज्ञानतृप्तात्मा कूटस्थो विजितेन्द्रियः।

(भ. गी. ६-८).

ये त्वक्षरमनिर्देश्यमव्यक्तं पर्युपासते।
सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यं च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम्॥

(सैव. १२-३).

That meaning fits in also with the context. For, the objector had said that since the Self could illumine both itself and the objects around it and was itself the doer and enjoyer there was no necessity to assume the existence of a separate witness and this was replied to by saying that since the Self is liable to changes it is itself an object of perception and therefore cannot be the perciever of its own changes and that therefore the one who is immutable is alone the witness of everything.

P. 13. आद्रियते—Is respected or honoured, or recieved respectfully.

The root is दृ with आ to honour or respect, or to take or recieve respectfully.

अप्रामाणिकत्वात्—Owing to its not having been proved by any means of proof.

The objection ननु, एकः कूटस्थो &c. has been inserted in order to get an opportunity to show that the existence of an independent absolute witness is borne out by the Upanished texts which follow.

अनुभाति—Shines, appears or becomes manifest after i. e. is dependent for manifestation upon.

The root here is भास् to shine, appear or become manifest with the prefix अनु which according to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha means आश्रित्य and according to Abhyankara अनुग्रहेण.

भासा—By (its) light.

The word भास् f. means light, lustre, splendour or glory and also a reflection or an image.

विभाति (from the same root as अनुभाति with the prefix वि) means shines, appears or becomes manifest. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains it as भानकर्तृ भवति.

The previous portion of this text is:—

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकौ नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः।

द्रष्टेर्द्रष्टारम्—The seer of the sight.

दृष्टि here means manifestation or sense-perception generally and द्रष्टा means the one to whom the senses owe their powers.

न पश्येः—Thou couldst not see.

Purushottama reads पश्येत् which is a potential third person singular. The text in that case can be translated as "One could not see the seer of the sight".

वेदान्तप्रमाणराजेन—By the Vedāntās which constitute the king of proofs.

According to the followers of the Upanishad school there are six means of proof namely, प्रत्यक्ष (direct perception by any of the organs of sense), अनुमान (inference), उपमान (analogy) शब्द (revelation) अर्थापत्ति (inference drawn from circumstances or implication) and अनुपलब्धि (non-perception). शब्द (revelation) consists of the Vedas which include Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upanishads. The Mīmānsakās too admit the validity of all these means but while they value the contents of the Saṁhitās more than the other parts of the Vedas, the Aupanishadās lay greater emphasis on those of the Upanishads which are called the Vedāntās. That is the reason why they are here called प्रमाणराज.

अभिषिक्तत्वात्—(Owing to its) having been consecrated or installed.

The root therein is सिच् with the prefix अभि.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains it as दर्शितयुक्तिभिः संशोध्य सर्वान्प्रति ज्ञापितत्वात्. Brahmānanda gives the same explanation but substitutes the expression दर्शितयुक्तिभिः by लाघवतर्कगङ्गाजलेन and adds that though the word साक्षिन् is used in ordinary parlance to denote one who having known a fact narrates it as it may have occurred, it is used with reference to the Self owing to the Vedic texts साक्षी चेता, सर्व साक्षी &c. in a secondary sense which is based upon a resemblance between the primary and secondary senses. The resemblance in this case is that just as a प्रमाता *i. e.* a man who has witnessed a particular occurance inspires several persons who are swayed by passions to adopt good or bad conduct towards others, so the Self too inspires the changing substances such as the mind &c. to have intercourse with the प्रमातृ's i. e. the जीव's. Abhyankara on the other hand explains away this contradiction by saying that the statement of Yājnavalkya in his Smriti (II. 69) that witnesses ought to be men devoted to the performance of acts prescribed by the Vedas and Smritis relates

to worldly intercourse while the Vedas which constitute the highest authority lay down that the Self is the witness of all and that the word कूट has been used by Yājnavalkya in the next verse in the sense of dishonest men while that word is used in the Upanishads in the sense of 'immobile' and quotes the following passages from the Amara Kosha and Medini Kosha:—

एकरूपतया तु यः कालव्यापी स कूटस्थः ।
(अ. को.)

कूटो स्त्री निश्चले राशौ ।
(मे. को.)

I think any of the explanations given by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda is more acceptable than that given by Abhyankara.

इन्द्रजालम्—The net of Indra; hence, jugglery or a trick.

The word इन्द्र here means the Supreme Lord.

प्रमाश्रयानकूटस्थान्—Those on which right knowledge depends and which are not immutable.

For the derivations and meanings of the word कूटस्थ *vide pp*. 59-60 *supra*.

अविद्याविलसितत्वात्—Being but a frolic of Nescience.

The word विलसित is derived from the root लस् with वि meaning to shine, flash, become manifest, sport, amuse, frolic about sportively, move about, dart or shoot forth &c.

The idea is that just as a dream is the result of Nescience, so is the world experienced in a state of wakefulness.

दृश्य—The visible world.

The root दृश् has here the sense of not merely to see but to percieve by any of the organs of sense.

चिद्बिम्बग्राहकत्वात्—Because it (i. e. the inner organ) is capable of reflecting the Spirit.

The previous expression दर्पणादिवदतिस्वच्छत्वेन supplies the reason for saying that it is capable of reflecting the Spirit.

चित्तादात्म्याध्यासाद्वा—Or owing to the superimposition of its identity with the Spirit.

Owing to the juxtaposition of the Self with the inner organ each becomes mistakenly identified with the other. This is called संसर्गाध्यास. Since the inner organ becomes identified with the Spirit, it becomes the means of arriving at right knowledge.

P 14. ननु नीरूपस्य······इति चेत्—It has been said above that the inner organ becomes the support of right knowledge because the Spirit is reflected therein as in a mirror &c. owing to its being pure or because there occurs the superimposition of its identity with the Spirit. So this objection has been raised that the Spirit being without form and without limbs, cannot be reflected.

The reasoning underlying the proposition that a thing without form and without limbs cannot be reflected, according to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, is this:—The delusion 'My face is inside the mirror', which consists of a belief in the existence of the disc in the object before one, arises on account of the faults of non-perception &c. of the face on the neck through the eyes by means of the ocular rays which are sent back owing to their being obstructed by the object in front of one; there the eyes which form the disc are dependent upon forms, and the quality of the object being in one's front is dependent upon one's having limbs; both these qualities are wanting in the Self; hence it cannot be reflected.

विभ्रमहेतूनां विचित्रत्वात्—The reader can understand now why the word विभ्रम is used here.

विचित्रत्वात् means being of various sorts.

जपाकुसुमरूपस्य······प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनात्—A जपाकुसुम is a china rose.

According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Abhyankara who out of the four commentators explain this passage, the रूप of a जपाकुसुम is its redness which is a property. This रूप has no form because properties have no properties and no limbs because a property does not possess the quality of being a substance. Still it is this redness not the flower which is seen reflected in a स्फटिक (quartz), that is to say, that it is seen as having gone inside the object in front of it. Such being the case the change that takes place is not in the object itself but in the object as it is found inside the स्फटिक.

The same is the case with sound which having no form and no limbs is found reflected when it is obstructed by some hollow structure as a dome.

तयोः सम्प्रतिपन्नप्रतिबिम्बवैलक्षण्यानिरूपणात्—There seems to be no distinction between them and the universally-accepted reflection, namely, that of the face in the mirror.

तथापि··········इति चेन्न—Now the author goes further and says

that it is not an invariable rule that it is only an object of sense-perception that is reflected and gives the instance of आकाश (sky) being reflected in water.

अन्यथा··········न स्यात्—It is our common experience that although the water of a tank or river is shallow the sky is reflected therein and that reflection appears to be very deep. This experience arises although the sky is not capable of being percieved by the senses.

तर्हि·········चक्षुषोऽपेक्षणात्—To the above an objection is raised that if as you say the object to be reflected need not be perceptible by the senses then a blind man ought to see the reflection of the sky. The answer is that it is impossible because what is reflected is the sky together with its appearance and the latter's portion in the reflection does stand in need of ocular vision for its perception.

आलोक means an appearance. In the case of आकाश it means the phenomenon of the sky which owing to its peculiarity enables us to distinguish it from those of the other elements such as the earth &c.

चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकौ—The presence or absence of the eye wherever there is the presence or absence of the object.

The above reason also explains why it is said that the delusion that the sky is blue arises only when the eye comes in contact with the object and not otherwise because there too the subtratum is the sky together with the appearance.

चाक्षुषप्रतिबिम्बम्—The reflection of an object of sight.

The conclusion drawn from the above reasoning is that what stands in need of a form is the reflection of only an object of sight not that of any other object.

Abbyankara's commentary on these two passages is very lucid and elaborate.

तथाप्यात्मनः·········किं प्रमाणमिति चेत्—The above reasoning only establishes the possibility of the Self being reflected. But that is not sufficient to convince one that it is reflected. This objection is therefore raised in order to mention the Vedic texts which go to prove that it is reflected.

रूपम्—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda and

Abhyankara this word here means the mind by the help whereof the Self becomes conscious of itself.

प्रतिरूपः—Of the nature of a reflection.

The meaning of the first portion of the text is that the Self becomes reflected in several minds.

प्रतिचक्षणाय—In order to give it currency as 'I.'

आभासेन—By means of the reflection (contained therein).

एकधा—In one way.

जलचन्द्रवत्—Like the moon in water.

Just as the moon appears sometimes as one sometimes as many when reflected in water so does the Self when reflected in Nescience.

The preceding line of this verse is :—

एक एव तु भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।

इत्यादि श्रुतिः—This expression refers to similar other texts one of which is the following :—

यथा ह्येको ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपो भिन्ना बहुधैकोनुगच्छन् ।
उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपो देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा ॥

It is found quoted by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda and Purushottama.

इह—Here *i. e.* in Brahmā down to a plant which has not a decided stem *i. e.* the smallest object having any sign of life.

P. 15. सीमानम्—सीमन् ordinarily means a boundary but here it means the suture of the skull i. e. the line in the middle of the skull dividing it into two parts.

अनुप्राविशत्—Entered.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains it as तदन्तर्गतत्वेनाभिव्यक्तो बभूव.

प्रवेशश्रुतिः—A Vedic text which speaks of the entering of Brahma (in the body).

अन्यथानुपपत्तिः—Inference from circumstances.

This is the same as अर्थापत्तिः which is believed to be a separate means of proof by the Mīmānsakās and Vedāntins. The stock-illustration thereof is पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते. As Devadatta is seen to be fat it is assumed that he must be eating some food at

some time. But it is said that he does not eat any at daytime. Hence the natural inference drawn from his fatness is that he must be eating some food at nighttime.

Similarly there are certain Vedic texts such as स एष &c. which say that Brahma has entered the human body. But the soul of man is not of the same nature as Brahma and the latter cannot on account of its nature be said to enter anything. At the same time the existence of Brahma in the body is proved by self-consciousness and by the fact that the body being mundane must have derived its life from Brahma. It is therefore inferred that what is spoken of as having entered the body must be not the pure Brahma but its reflection in the human mind or that when it is said that Brahma has entered the body, what is meant is that it is reflected therein. The latter is the explanation given by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. I do not think it plausible because 'to be reflected' is not 'to enter' and believe that the other explanation that what enters is the चिदाभास corresponding to the reflection of the sun in water which is referred to in Brahma Sūtra III. 2. 18 which is quoted further up to illustrate the theory is the preferable one.

This is the अन्यथानुपपत्ति referred to above.

आभास एव च—The meaning of this Sūtra is that the individual soul is only a reflection of, not a reality separate from, Brahma.

अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्—Hence it is that it is compared to the reflection of the sun in water &c.

Purushottama explains this Sūtra very clearly (*Vide p.* १५). S'ankara's Bhāshya on the previous and this Sūtra[1] may also be read for a thorough grasp of their meanings and the theory underlying them.

पारमर्षसूत्राणि—The Sūtras of the Great sage (Bādarāyaṇa).

P. 16. तस्य च—Having established the view that the Self is reflected the author now proceeds to explain the nature of the reflection.

प्रतिबिम्बवादिनः—The Vedāntins referred to here are the followers of the authors of संक्षेपशारीरक and विवरण. The first was Sarvajnātma Muni who lived about 900 A. D. and the latter Prakās'ātma

1. *Brahmasūtra-bhāshya, N. S. P. edition pp. 625-26 and 710.*

Muni who flourished about 1200 A. D. They believe that the reflection is a reality because what appears as a reflection is nothing else but the disc itself appearing as contained in the reflecting object owing to the latter's proximity.

आभासवादिनः—Those referred to here are the followers of Sures'warāchārya the author of the famous Vārttika on S'ankara's Bhāshya on the Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad. His view is that the reflection is similar to the disc but different from it and unreal in the sense that it has no existence of its own but only appears temporarily like a mirage on account of the juxtaposition of another object with the disc.

The first class of Vedāntins believes that the mirror &c. possess the power of giving rise to the belief that the same disc has gone inside them and appears as another. The latter class believes that the mirror &c. have the power of giving rise to the belief that another disc similar to the orginal one has come into existence inside them. It will appear from this that the difference between them lies only in explaining the occurrence of the phenomena not in its nature. According to both the mind acquires the power of knowledge on account of the reflection of the Self therein just as the water in which the sun's rays are reflected acquires the power of illumination. The theory of the former is known as the प्रतिबिम्बवाद because therein the reflection is the बिम्ब itself appearing in the object opposite to it while that of the latter is known as the आभासवाद because in it the reflection is not a reality but a chimera.

अन्यदेतत्—That is another matter.

अचेतनविलक्षणत्वम्—The quality of being possessed of characteristics different from those of the non-spirit.

What is meant here is that the fact that this reflection partakes of a nature akin to that of the Spirit rather than the non-spirit is proved by Vedic texts such as यो यं विज्ञानमयः &c. and by the consciousness "I am a thinking being".

Abhyankara says that this expression has been used here purposely in order to cover both the views. According to the प्रतिबिम्बवादि's the individual soul is the Spirit itself and is therefore possessed of characteristics different from that of the non-spirit. According to the आभासवादि's it is different from the Spirit but at the same time it is not a non-spirit but is different from that too.

Hence the above expression is applicable to the individual soul as understood by both the classes of philosophers.

तस्मात्सिद्धं......प्रमातृत्वम्—The author here winds up the argument, that the inner organ becomes the knower owing to the reflection of the Self therein and the superimposition of the latter on it, which was commenced at p. १३.

ननु, अध्यासोऽपि नोपपद्यते—Verily, superimposition itself is not established.

The author now begins to explain the theory of superimposition which is one of the most important portions of the Adwaita doctrine. Superimposition means mistaking one thing as another previously experienced at some other time. Thus when a rope is mistaken to be a snake there is the superimposition of the latter upon the former. This kind of mistake arises owing to darkness or want of sufficient light. Similarly the body, senses and mind are through ignorance mistaken to be the Self.

निःसामान्यविशेषत्वेन सर्वदा भासमानत्वेन—Owing to its being always manifest without any general or special characteristics.

निःसामान्यविशेषत्वम् has been explained by the commentators Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda and Purushottama as निर्गतौ सामान्यविशेषरूपौ धर्मौ यस्मात् तत्त्वम्. When an object becomes manifest completely it appears distinctly as that particular object (विशेषत्वेन). When it becomes manifest only partially it appears as some object (सामान्यत्वेन). Thus a mother-of-pearl appears as such when it is sufficiently near and in broad daylight but when it is distant or when the necessary amount of light is wanting, it appears as some glittering substance. In the latter case only there is the possibility of its being mistaken for silver on account of its similarity with it. Brahma is devoid of both these characteristics because it is eternal and self-resplendent and not an object of sense-perception.

सादृश्यादिरहितत्त्वेन—Being devoid of similarity &c.

Brahma being without a second, it can have no similarity of any sort with anything else.

अधिष्ठानत्वासम्भवात्—The objection is that Brahma cannot be the substratum of the superimposition of non-selfs as a mother-of-pearl becomes that of the superimposition of silver because it becomes

always manifest without any general or special characteristics and is devoid of similarity &c. with anything.

तस्य मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात्—It being admitted to be unreal.

An unreal object cannot be the substratum of the superimposition of another object because what is itself unreal cannot give rise to another unreality. There can be no doubt as to that for if an unreal object is believed to be a substratum, there would be no distinction between the Vedānta and Mādhyamika doctrines.

तस्य च सत्यत्वे—तस्य here means अनात्मनः.

If it is believed to be a reality then duality would never come to an end and there would be no possibility of deliverance from bondage.

नहि सत्यं.........भ्रमज्ञानेन—This supplies the reason for the first portion of the preceding statement that if the non-self is believed to be a reality then duality would never come to an end.

The characteristic of a thing being real is that it should remain अबाधित at all the three times, past, present and future. Hence the remark नहि सत्यं क्वचिन्निवर्तते.

To this the objector is imagined to reply that a pot though real is destroyed when struck with a stick or hammer. To obviate this objection it is added निवर्तमानं वा ज्ञानेन[1] which means that even if reality is found to be liable to be destroyed it cannot at least be destroyed by the knowledge of the substratum. In the case of the reading भ्रमज्ञानेन being accepted as is done in the text the meaning would be that even if reality is found liable to be destroyed, it cannot at least be destroyed by the knowledge of the delusion *i. e.* by the knowledge that one was deluded.

हृदयग्रन्थिः—The knot of the heart *i. e.* the ignorance which has become rooted like a knot of the mistaken identification of the ego with the Spirit.

भिद्यते—Is broken.

By the breaking of the knot of the heart is meant the complete destruction of the आवरणशक्ति of माया and the partial one of its विक्षेपशक्ति to such an extent that only so much of it is left as is necessary for the enjoyment of the remaining stock of प्रारब्धकर्म.

1. This is the reading adopted by Nārāyaṇa Tirtha, Brahmānada and Abhyankara.

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि—By the word कर्म are to be understood all the good and bad सञ्चितकर्म's only.

दृष्टे परावरे—Here दर्शनम् means साक्षात्कारः. परावरः means that compared with whom even the परः *i. e.* the Supreme Being is inferior.

The Supreme Being is said to be inferior to Bramha because according to the Vedānta doctrine as will be explained in the text itself later on He is the reflection of Bramha in the सत्त्वगुण of माया which is त्रिगुणात्मिका.

मृत्युः—In this Vedic text this word stands for Nescience which is of the nature of darkness.

अयनाय—अयन ordinarily means a way but it also means final emancipation and that is its meaning applicable here.

The meaning of this portion of the text is that there is no other road to final emancipation (except knowledge of Brahma).

शोकः—This word has the same sense in this text as the word मृत्युः in the preceding one.

संसार—The phenomena or phenomenal world.

सूचयन्ति—Mark the distinction between this verb and the preceding one which is दर्शयन्ति.

The author says that the texts themselves distinctly speak of the cessation of all phenomena but by doing so they also suggest that it is unreal.

एकमेवाद्वितीयम्—Here the word एकम् excludes the possibility of another of the same class, एव that of another comprised therein such as an attribute, and अद्वितीयम् that of another of a different class.

This is the description of सत् mentioned in the preceding portion of the text namely, सदेव सोम्य इदमग्र आसीत्.

अतोऽन्यदार्तम्—Other (things) than this (*i. e.* the Self) is afflicted (with misery) or perishable.

नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन—In this (*i. e.* Brahma) there is no diversity whatever.

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति—The teacher who says this had previously said that Brahma had two aspects, one tangible & the other intangible &c. "Now then" says he "I speak of this (*i. e.* the pure unqualified Brahma) as "not this" "not this".

These four texts beginning with एकमेवाद्वितीयम् lay down distinctly that the phenomena *i. e.* duality is unreal.

दृश्यत्वेन.........अनुमानाच्च—The unreality of the phenomena can be established not only by the help of the above Vedic texts but also by reasoning based on its being an object of perception.

आत्मन्यध्यस्ततयैव चानात्मनि सिद्धे—According to the सिद्धान्ती, the existence of a non-self can be established only on the basis of the superimposition of the Self thereon. Hence that superimposition must be a fact.

अनात्माध्यासेन च......सम्भवात्—Here by the word अनात्मानः are to be understood the primeval ignorance called Nescience, the inner organ &c. If these are believed to have been superimposed, it means that there are similarity and other faults in the Self for without them superimposition is not possible. Hence in order to avoid that you have to believe in another superimposition of a non-self. This would launch you in the fault of self-dependence (आत्माश्रय) for in order to establish one superimposition of a non-self you have to believe in another. Again in imagining the existence of another, each is made to stand in need of another and so there occurs the fault of mutual dependence (अन्योन्याश्रय). This latter non-self again being in the same position as the former, you have to assume the supereimposition of a third non-self. Hence there arises the fault of endlessness (अनवस्था).

एतेन—This refers to the faults above-mentioned.

The सिद्धान्ती is supposed to say that there is no room for the dual supposition, namely, whether the Self is superimposed upon the non-selfs or *vice versa* because both the kinds of superimposition are possible owing to their being the result of Nescience. The objector therefore remarks that by the above reasoning the possibility of both the kinds is removed. Then he goes further and remarks that the very existence of Nescience in the Self which is self-resplendent is not possible and proceeds to establish that.

P. 17. न विकल्पावसरः—There is no room for the alternatives.

स्वप्रकाशात्मनि......अनुपपत्तेः—This is easily intelligible since अविद्या is of the nature of darkness and आत्मा of that cf light and both of them cannot be present at the same time and place.

तथाहि—For or because,

तत्राद्ये.........दोषप्रसङ्गः—If Nescience is superimposed, it means that Bramha is affected by the faults of similarity &c. If to avoid that, another superimposition of Nescience is assumed then there occurs आत्माश्रयदोषः (fault of self-dependence) and each superimposition being dependent upon the other there also occurs अन्योन्याश्रयदोषः (fault of mutual dependence) and then अनवस्था (endlessness) as shown above (*vide p.* 71 *supra*).

अन्त्ये......अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः—In the latter case *i. e.* if Nescience is not believed to have been superimposed then it would be impossible to eradicate it like Brahma owing to permanence and so final absolution would not be possible.

सर्वस्य······न स्यात्—If every thing is taken to be the outcome of superimposition it would not be possible to distinguish between delusion and right knowledge.

एकस्यैव.........च विरुद्धा—The contradiction is apparent because a knower has a subjective existence while the means of knowledge, the thing to be known and the act of knowledge have objective existence and the latter three also have some distinguishing features which are an obstacle to the belief that they are identical in essence.

अविरोधाभ्युपगमे च सौगतमतोपपत्तिः—If on the other hand it is believed that there is no contradiction then there is the possibility of the view of the Bauddhās stepping in because they say that the Self which is of the nature of क्षणिकविज्ञान (temporary consciousness) itself becomes the knower, thing to be known etc.

The whole of this passage commencing from ननु, अध्यासोऽपि &c. sets forth the various logical objections to the theory of अध्यास which is resorted by the अद्वैतवादी's to make the existence of one Brahma without a second consistent with that of the phenomenal world.

Summary—It had been said above (*p.* १३) that the mind becomes the support of right knowledge owing to its taking a reflection of the Spirit or owing its being identified with it. To this an objection was raised that the Self could not be reflected. This was answered by giving instances of the reflections of colour and sound. Then the fact of the Self being actually reflected was proved by citing several Vedic texts saying that Brahma or the Self was the only reality and the discussion was wound up by saying तस्मात् सिद्धं etc. (*p.* १६).

It may be remarked that at *p.* १३ the two ideas of the Self being reflected in the mind and of there being the superimposition of the identity of the mind with the Self were stated distinctly as affording alternative explanations of the mind being the support of right knowledge or the knower. At p. १६ the two ideas were mixed together in saying that the inner organ or mind becomes the knower through the superimposition of the reflection (on the Self).

Having done so the author anticipates an objection which is in substance this:—The fact of superimposition itself is not established for it may be either of the non-selfs on the Self or *vice versā* ; thereout the first is not possible because the Self being ever resplendent and devoid of similarity with the non-selfs cannot be the substratum nor is the second for the non-selfs are admitted to be unreal substances; if it is believed that such a substance can be a substratum then the S'ūnyavāda steps in; if they are believed to be real then it would not be possible to eradicate them and there would never be final absolution for a real substance can never be eradicated and if it at all can, it cannot be by knowledge; moreover there are several Vedic texts some of which such as भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिः &c. suggest that the phenomenal world is a delusion and others such as एकमेवाद्वितीयम् &c which expressly say so; it is also proved to be such owing to its being an object of perception; again on reflection it would be found that such a superimposition involves the faults of self-dependence &c ; hence, the objection that there is no room for the alternatives assumed above owing to the superimposition having been assumed on account of Nescience, is not tenable; moreover the existence itself of Nescience in the self-resplendent Self is not possible; for it too is either superimposed or not superimposed; in the former case one cannot see how the faults of self-dependence &c. can be avoided and in the latter it would be impossible to eradicate it and so final absolution would not be possible; and if everything is the outcome of superimposition it would not be possible to explain the phenomena of delusion and right knowledge; lastly, there is a contradiction in one and the same Self being the knower, the thing to be known, the act of knowledge and the means of knowledge and if it is believed that there is no contradiction therein then there would step in the view of the Baudddhas.

P. 18. अत्रोच्यते—From here begins the reply of the सिद्धान्ती to the above objection. It extends upto the words न सौगतमतापत्तिः न वा विरोधः at p. ३९.

प्रतीतिः—Consciousness.

सा च..............भेदाग्रहपूर्वकत्वाच्च—That (consciousness) is not recollection because it appears to be subjective and is preceded by a non-comprehension of the difference (between the Self and the non-selfs).

Abhyankara's explanation of this passage is very lucid. He says that in the previous objection the impossibility of superimposition has been propounded not its want of necessity. The author therefore first proceeds to establish that and once that is done superimposition would be established by the प्रमाण known as अन्यथानुपपत्ति. Now, knowledge is of the nature of either recollection or fresh experience. The latter is also either right or wrong. It is to be established here that the consciousness अहं मनुष्यः &c is a wrong experience. The author therefore establishes that it is neither recollection nor right knowledge.

First as to its not being recollection. In its case consciousness can be objective only. Here the consciousness is subjective. Hence it cannot be recollection. Moreover, when a thing is percieved either as it is or as something other than what it is, it is the non-perception of a distinction between the thing percieved and the actual thing that is the cause of the rise of knowledge. Thus when silver is percieved the cause of its perception is the non-perception of a distinction between the silver that is percieved and the actual silver, whether the perception is right or wrong. In the case of recollection, the cause of its rise is not the non-perception of a distinction between the thing recollected and the actual thing. In the present case, the cause of the rise of the consciousness 'I am a man' is the non-perception of a distinction between the Self as it is and as it appears to be *i. e.* possessed of a human body &c. Hence too that consciousness cannot be recollection.

नापि प्रमा......बाधितत्वात्—That it is not right knowledge is established by certain Vedic texts and by reasoning.

योऽयं........पुरुषः—This is an answer to the question कतम आत्मा.

विज्ञानमयः—Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda explain it as meaning बुद्ध्यभिमानी. The latter quotes the text विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च and says that just as what is there meant by the word विज्ञान is the बुद्धि, so here too that word is used to convey the idea of the बुद्धि and that therefore the word विज्ञानमयः means बुद्ध्यभिमानी. Similarly according to them the words प्राणेषु हृदि are to be understood to mean प्राणाभिमानी and मनोऽभिमानी respectively.

अन्तर्ज्योतिः—This word according to them means स्वप्रकाशः and distinguishes the Self from the बहिर्ज्योतिः which is of the nature of knowledge produced by the senses.

पुरुषः—This word has been explained as पुरुषु दृश्येषु अनुस्यूतः (that which permeats all objects of perception).

Abhyankara explains the word विज्ञानमयः as ज्ञानस्वरूपः. He says the हृद् or अन्तःकरण makes objects known by going to them and assuming their shapes. But the आत्मा is the inner source of its power of making objects known. Thus according to him this text means that the Self is the light inside the vital breath and mind and is of the nature of knowledge itself.

अयमात्मा ब्रह्म—This Self is Brahma.

This is one of the four महावाक्य's. It occurs in the Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad. The word आत्मा there is understood by the commentators to mean the जीवात्मा (individual soul). It thus establishes the complete identity of the individual soul with Brahma like the Chhāndogya sentence तत्त्वमसि. Of course the soul there is not to be understood to be what is generally believed to be the soul but the pure Self.

अनन्तम्—Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains this term as meaning uncircumscribed (अपरिच्छिन्नः) and Abhyankara as meaning indestructible (अविनाशी).

विज्ञानम्—Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda both explain it as स्वप्रकाशचित्स्वरूपम् (of the nature of Spirit which is self-luminous).

अपहतपाप्मा—That which is devoid of all idea of action.

साक्षादपरोक्षात्—When any object is directly visible it is said to be अपरोक्ष or प्रत्यक्ष. It is not however साक्षादपरोक्ष because it owes its manifestation to the Self which alone is साक्षादपरोक्ष *i. e.* स्वप्रकाश.

अशनाया—Hunger.

पिपासा—Thirst.

अत्येति—Transcends.

तत्र—There *i. e.* in a dream.

अनन्वागतः—Unattached, unconnected or unaffected.

इत्याद्याः—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda the texts अमूढो मूढवद्भुङ्क्ते मायया, सलिल एको द्रष्टाऽद्वैतः and others of their type are to be understood by this word.

युक्तयश्च—The lines of reasoning which lead to the same conclusion are now set forth.

विकारिणः........अनात्मत्वापत्तेः—If the consciousness 'I am a man' &c. is taken to be right knowledge, then the embodied soul would be the Self which is not possible because the body &c. are subject to changes such as growth, decay and death and they presuppose limitedness by time and space which is a characteristic of the non-selfs not the Self.

This distinction had already been once established (*vide p.* ११).

स्वेनैव........विरोधात्—It is not possible that the body should be the Self because there is a contradiction between the functions of the subject and an object. A seer cannot be the thing to be seen and *vice versā*.

दृग्दृश्य........अनुपपत्तेः—The Self is the seer and the being the doer &c. is the thing to be seen. If it is believed that there is some connection between them, it can either be that of identity or an intimate connection between two distinct objects. The first is not possible because with the destruction of every object the Self would also be subject to destruction. If the attributes are believed to be indestructible there would be no final absolution. Nor is intimate connection possible because if the attribute itself is intimate connection then it would be connected by itself but that is not true because one does not feel so and if another connection is assumed for the connection of the Self with the attribute, namely, intimate connection, there would be endlessness.

भेदेनाभेदेन........अनुपपत्तेश्च—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha भेद here means आत्यन्तिकभेद (complete difference) and अभेद means such want of distinction or identity as would admit of a subsidiary distinction. Now if the Self and doership &c. are as distinct as the Himālaya and Vindhyā mountains there is no possibility of

there being the relation of an attribute and the thing to which it is attached between them. In the other case, the Self would not remain immutable or unaffected by the attribute.

ज्ञाननित्यत्वपक्षे—In the former argument it is assumed that the Self is of the nature of knowledge which is unchanging at all the three times. Now the author takes up the other alternative that it changes at every moment as the Yogāchārās believe. According to their theory knowledge arises at every moment through a connection between the mind and the Self.

तत्तद्व्यक्ति.........गौरवात्—In the above view two cases are possible, one that the knowledge of each moment is separate and the other that it is the same but the objects only are different. Here he treats of the first alternative. If each momentary knowledge is separate then for each of them there would be seperate individual differences, seperate destructions and previous non-existences, separate intimate connections &c. which means proving more than is necessary for the purpose in hand.

एकत्वाभ्युपगमे चातिलाघवात्—In the other case, too little would be proved, because when the Self itself is capable of being of the nature of knowledge there is no room for a belief in a distinction between a knower and knowledge.

घटज्ञानं.........ज्ञानभेदप्रतीतेः—Now he anticipates an objection to the theory that knowledge is the same in all cases. It is this that in that case one cannot account for the separate consciousness of knowledge of objects as distinct from one another as a pot, a cloth &c. His answer to it is that such consciousness brings into prominence the distinction between the objects not the knowledge itself.

तदुत्पत्ति.........उपपत्तेः—It may be objected that although such is the case and the knowledge itself is one and indivisible in every case, still you have to account for the apparent rise and destruction of knowledge. To avoid this objection the author says that these can be accounted for by believing them to be the subjects of a connection, between knowledge and the subjects of knowledge, which has necessarily to be assumed.

Purushottama explains this reasoning thus:—Just as when a man says दण्डी नष्टः though both the दण्ड and the पुरुष continue to be in existence, or स्वर्गी नष्टः though the soul is not destroyed, or घटाकाश

उत्पन्नः or कूपाकाशो नष्टः though in fact आकाश is neither produced nor destroyed, he is understood to mean that the connection between the दण्ड and पुरुष or स्वर्ग and पुरुष is destroyed or that between घट and आकाश is formed or that between the कूप and आकाश is destroyed, so too when one says ज्ञानं जातम् or ज्ञानं नष्टम् what should be understood is that the connection between the knower and knowledge is either produced or destroyed not that the knowledge itself is produced or destroyed *i. e.* to say, that the man and knowledge are both there and the production and destruction take place only of the connection between them. This connection is called a separate पदार्थ by the Naiyāyikās and a वृत्ति by the Vedāntins. This वृत्ति is an essential constituent of every act of knowledge, for no knowledge can arise unless a connection is formed between the inner organ and the object to be percieved. The process thereof will be explained latter on by the author himself (*vide pp.* ३२–३३ *infra*).

उपाधिपरामर्ष.........असम्भवात्—To the above an objection might be raised that in that case the existence of a difference of one pot from another may also be denied since when we say स घट एतद्घटाद्भिन्नः the difference between the one pot and the other is brought out by the demonstrative pronouns तत् and एतत्. This is avoided by saying that if the difference between one pot and another is brought out without the mention of the attendant circumstances such as time, place &c, it would be impossible to comprehend the unity of the pots.

The preposition तत् in the expression तत्प्रतिबन्दि refers to ज्ञान. A प्रतिबन्दिन् is a प्रतिद्वन्द्विन् *i. e.* an opposite or counter-part. When a dual takes place, each fighter is said to be the प्रतिद्वन्द्विन् of the other. So too when two objects are compared one is said to be the प्रतिद्वन्द्विन् of the other.

आकाश......नानात्वापत्तेश्च—What the objector tried to do was to establish a distinction between objects on the ground of the existence of one between the attendant circumstances. This the author has shown to be a mistake. Here he gives another reason why that is not possible. It is that if the conditions of time and space were taken to mark out individuality then आकाश in each of the cases of घटाकाश, मठाकाश &c. would be substantially different, which is not what we believe. Similarly in the cases

of पूर्वकाल, उत्तरकाल, पूर्वदिशा, उत्तरदिशा, &c. also the result would be undesirable.

कर्तृत्वादे.........अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात्—If the being the doer &c. is believed to be real then there would never come a time when the Self would cease to do acts and enjoy fruits and hence there would be no final absolution.

Having previously established that knowledge *i. e.* the Self is one and ever present, the author now establishes that it is devoid of the qualities of a doer &c. What then is its nature is the question that naturally arises. This is answered further up.

स्वप्रकाश.........जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात्—Unless the Self is believed to be self-resplendent, it would not be possible to account for our worldly activities for all phenomena is by nature inert and is therefore in need of an illuminator.

परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन.........रूपत्वात्—The Self is of the nature of joy because it is the seat of the highest wish.

The Self is not subject to the will of anybody else in creating the net in which it becomes involved like a spider but does so by its own wish.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains the word परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन as स्वत इच्छाविषयत्वेन. Brahmānanda expands it as—मा भूवमिति न, किन्तु भूयासं सदेतीच्छा प्रेमा, सा परमा अन्येच्छानधीना तद्विषयत्वेन. Nārāyaṇa has also further on explained the expression in the same way though in somewhat different words. It appears from Abhyaṅkara's commentary that this solution is based upon the following verses in the Pañchadaśī:—

अयमात्मा परानन्दः परप्रेमास्पदं यतः ।
मा न भूवं हि भूयासमिति प्रेमात्मनीक्ष्यते ॥ १-८ ॥
तत्प्रेमात्मार्थमन्यत्र नैवमन्यार्थमात्मनि ।
अतस्तत्परमं तेन परमानन्दतात्मनः ॥ १-९ ॥

Translation—This Self is the highest joy because it is the seat of the highest love. The kind of love seen in the Self is (expressed in) the longing 'There may not be a time when I may not exist (but) I may exist for ever.' The love for another is for the Self but that for the Self is not for another. Hence it is the highest and the Self's quality of being the highest joy is due to that.

Purushottama has not attempted to explain the expression but has only compared the statement in the text with that in a verse of the Bhāgawat Purāṇa (*Vide p.* २२).

निर्धर्मक.........एवात्मा—By these words he winds up his arguments.

Brahmānanda says that निर्धर्मकत्व is established by the discussion ending with the remark धर्मधर्मिभावानुपपत्तेश्च, and नित्यत्व by that ending with the remark नानात्वापत्तेश्च, that the reasoning ending with the words अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् applies to both the qualities and that स्वप्रकाशसुखरूपत्व is established by the reasoning in the rest of the above passage.

Here end the arguments as to why the feelings 'I am a man' 'I am a doer' &c. are not right knowledge.

Summary—The above feelings cannot be said to be recollection because the consciousness with respect to them is direct and is not accompanied by a comprehension of a distinction between oneself and the thing recollected. It is not right knowledge because it is against the purport of some and the express meaning of other Vedic texts and several well-founded arguments.

What then is its nature is the question that would demand an answer. That is supplied by the first sentence of next passage, namely, तस्मात्परिशेषात् &c.

P. 22. तस्मात्परिशेषात्.........कल्पनीयम्—Having demonstrated the impossibility of such a consciousness being a recollection and right knowledge, the author concludes that it is mistaken knowledge.

परिशेषात्—By the exclusion (of its being a recollection and right knowledge).

For a more detailed exposition of the subject of अध्यास *vide the Introduction to the S'ārīraka Bhāshya*[1] and *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* I. *27-57*[2].

तत्कारणमपि योग्यं...कल्पनीयम्—The reason to be assigned or inferred must be such as would be fit to account for the delusion to arise out of it.

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1. *N. S. P. Edition pp. 6-45.*

2. *Kās'i Sanskrit Series No. 18. Vol. I. pp. 34-59.*

According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, the inference would be drawn thus:—अहं मनुष्य इत्यादि भ्रमः सोपादानकः कार्यत्वाद्घटवत्. Abhyankara puts it as:—भ्रान्तिज्ञानं भावरूपोपादानकारणकम्, जन्यभावत्वाद्घटवत्.

कल्पमानं च.........सिध्यति—The material cause thus arrived at by inference is proved to be existing in the Self itself on which the effect, namely, the false knowledge, depends.

It must be marked that the fact of the consciousness of the knowledge being false was established by inference and that its material cause also is established by the same means of proof and that just as the knowledge is unreal so is its cause.

न जानामीति.........अज्ञानमेव तत्—It is the same Nescience whose existence is proved by the self-consciousness 'I do not know' and which is indescribable.

Nescience is indescribable because it is found to exist from time immemorial and yet it is not endless but capable of being eradicated by right knowledge and therefore neither philosophically true nor untrue.

न चेदमभावरूपम्.........उक्तत्वात्—अज्ञान (Nescience) can be the counter-part of ज्ञान (knowledge) only. That has been proved to be present at all times. Hence its non-existence is not possible. This has already been established in the preceding passage.

धर्मिप्रतियोगि.........व्याघातापत्तेः—In the sentence आत्मानमहं न जानामि the धर्मि is the अहमर्थ and the प्रतियोगि is its ज्ञान. Now, if you say there is their knowledge or the absence of knowledge thereof then in either case there arises a contradiction for in the former that kind of consciousness would not be right knowledge and in the latter right knowledge of the absence of knowledge is not possible.

नापि भ्रम ....रूपम्—Nor is it (*i.e.* Nescience) of the nature of a succession of delusions or doubts or of impressions left by either of them.

As it is found to persist from day to day it cannot be said to be of the nature simply of delusion or doubt. This is assumed to be true and it is stated that it is not even a succession of delusions or a succession of doubts or a succession of impressions left by delusions or a succession of impressions left by doubts because none of them is capable of being experienced directly as ignorance is in the consciousness 'I am ignorant'.

अतीतानागत........ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्—अतीत means past and अनागत not yet come into existence. Such delusions and doubts and their impressions cannot be known directly.

Abhyankara out of the four commentators has adopted the reading परोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्. But he has also noticed the other reading and shown the correctness of both by saying that in the case of the word परोक्षत्वेन being read there, the construction would be भ्रमसंशय........च परोक्षत्वेन, ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् and that in the other it would be भ्रमसंशय........चापरोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्. In the former the word परोक्षत्वेन would go with भ्रम &c. and in the second the word अपरोक्षत्वेन would go with ज्ञातुम्.

आवरणात्मकत्वात्—Being of the nature of a covering.

भ्रमाद्युत्पादनत्वाच्च—This Nescience itself is the material cause of delusion &c.

आत्मनो निर्विकारत्वात्—This excludes the possibility of the Self being the material cause of delusion &c.

निर्विकारत्वात् means being immutable.

अन्तःकरणादेश्च तज्जन्यत्वात्—This excludes the possibility of the inner organ being their material cause.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha says that the word आदिः refers to the effect in the form of the initial glance which precedes delusion &c.

देवात्मशक्तिं......निगूढाम्—The compound देवात्मशक्तिम् has been solved by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as देवस्य-स्वप्रकाशस्य-ब्रह्मणः-आत्मशक्तिः-निजशक्तिस्ताम् ।. Brahmānanda uses the expression सृष्ट्यादिक्रीडावतः instead of स्वप्रकाशस्य.

स्वगुणैः—The qualities Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas which are the constituent parts of that शक्ति.

गुणवत्त्वश्रुतिः—A text which speaks of (the Divine Power) consisting of Guṇas.

By saying that the Divine Power consists of the three Guṇas the author means to convey that this power which is the same as Nescience is not of the nature of non-existence but a positive entity.

प्रकृतिम्—This word has been explained by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda as meaning the primary material cause of all substances and the former has also given its root-meaning as प्रकर्षेण करोति.

मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते—Takes various forms by means of His powers.

ईयते is derived from ई to go.

P. 23. अनृतेन—By falsehood *i. e.* ignorance.

प्रत्यूढाः—Covered over.

This is the plural form of प्रत्यूढ a past participial adjective derived from the root प्रत्यूह् meaning to impede, obstruct, oppose, resist, disturb &c.

The preceding portion of the text is:—तद्यथा हिरण्यनिधिं निहितमक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्य्युपरि सञ्चरन्तो न विन्देयुरेवमेवेमाः प्रजा अहरहर्ब्रह्म गच्छन्त्यो न तं विन्दन्ति ।

नीहारेण—By hoar-frost.

The text of which this quotation forms a part is:—न तं विदाथ य इमा जजानान्यद्युष्माकमन्तरं बभूव । नीहारेणप्रावृता जल्प्या चासुतृप उक्थशासश्चरन्ति ॥

It is a Vedic text and means:—"You do not know Him who created all these (objects) because there is in you something which is different from Him, in that you are covered over by hoar-frost (in the shape of ignorance), are (generally) obsessed by wrong notions and roam about doing actions". The gist of it is that frail human beings cannot know the creator because their inner vision is clouded by ignorance and they have a tendency to be attracted towards the objects of sense and to strive to acquire them.

भूयः—Further or moreover.

अन्ते—At the end (of the existing stock of प्रारब्ध *i. e.* actions which have become ripe for bearing fruits).

विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः—(There occurs) the cessation of the universal illusion (known as विक्षेपशक्तिः).

The preceding portion of this text is—तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्वभावात्. Therein अभिध्यानम् means चिन्तनम् (meditation), योजनम् means योगः or निदिध्यासनम् (being joined or connected with the object of meditation), and तत्त्वभावः means being of the same essence as that object.

Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda say that this text says that by श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यासन the आवरणशक्ति of माया is destroyed while on the exhaustion of प्रारब्धकर्म, *i. e.* at death the विक्षेपशक्ति thereof is also destroyed.

According to Nārāyaṇa by the word आदि are to be understood the texts such as—एवमेवैषा माया स्वाव्यतिरिक्तानि परिपूर्णानि क्षेत्राणि दर्शयित्वा

जीवेशावाभासेन करोति माया चाविद्या च स्वयमेव भवति and according to Brahmānanda such as अमूढो मूढ इव व्यवहरन्नास्ते माययैव and अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमाना.

माया.........चाज्ञानमेव—Nescience alone which is spoken of as माया or अविद्या, which is an unreal substance and is capable of being eradicated by the knowledge of the Essence.

If the word after अविद्या is taken to be अनिर्वाच्यम् the meaning of the sentence would be "Nescience alone which is (of the nature of) माया and अविद्या, is indescribable, unreal and capable of being eradicated by the knowledge of the Essence."

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda and Abhyankara adopt the second reading which is given in foot-note 1 at p. २३.

न चात्माश्रयादि......ज्ञप्तिरूपत्वात्—One might object that the faults of self-dependence &c. would arise if Nescience is taken to be the cause of superimposition because it is of the nature of Nescience itself. This is obviated by saying that this Nescience is beginningless and therefore it can have no commencement. If it is said that the faults arise in the act of being known, that is also not true because it is the self-resplendent Self who becomes cognizant of it in the form of the feeling 'I do not know.'

Summary—It had been established at p. १६ that प्रमातृत्व (the being the knower) arises through the superimposition of the reflection of the Spirit on the Spirit itself. To this an objection was raised that the fact of superimposition itself is not established. That the author established by proving that the notions of doership &c. arose on account of delusion and that the cause thereof was Nescience. Then he examined the nature thereof. Now he resumes the main question namely, how does the knowership arise. Of course he has once established that the superimposition of Nescience is its cause but he proceeds to mention the different kinds of superimposition which contribute towards the rise of the notion of knowership.

P. 24. तेन—The superimposition of Nescience being thus proved to be faultless.

तद्विशिष्टे......अहङ्काराध्यासः—The notion of the ego is superimposed on the Self as qualified by Nescience.

कामसङ्कल्पादीनामहङ्कारधर्मत्वम्—Desire, determination &c. are said to be the attributes of the ego because according to the text कामः

सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा &c. they are nothing but the mind and the superimposition thereof cannot take place unless the notion of the ego is there.

Virtually, the notion of the ego is itself also an attribute of the mind but it precedes desire &c.

इन्द्रियाणां तु अपरोक्षधर्म्यध्यासः—This is stated in order to explain why no supereimposition of the senses is spoken of.

The अपरोक्षधर्मि here spoken of is the अहङ्कारविशिष्टचैतन्य.

It is believed by the Vedāntins that the senses are not superimposed on the qualified Self because we never feel 'I am the eyes', 'I am the ears' &c.

तद्विशिष्टे च स्थूलदेहाध्यासः—Upto now, the superimposition of the original cause *i. e.* the कारणदेह and the intermediate cause *i. e.* the सूक्ष्मदेह was spoken of.

The author now speaks of that of the स्थूलदेह (gross body).

धर्मपुरस्कारेणैव.........तथा प्रतीत्यभावात्—This supplies the reason for the above proposition that the superimposition of the gross body takes place in the Self as qualified by Nescience, the ego and the attributes of the ego and of the senses.

As a result of the superimposition of that body on the Self, one does not feel 'I am the body', *i. e.* to say, one does not identify oneself with the body but feels 'I am a human being', *i. e.* to say, it is humanity, an attribute of the body that comes forward.

The reading धर्मिपुरस्कारेणैव which is adopted in the text does not on further reflection and on seeing the commentaries of Nārāyaṇa, Brahmānanda and Abhyankara seem to be the correct one. That first mentioned is given in foot-note 3 at p. २४.

P. 25. साकल्यवैकल्य—Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda explain these terms as meaning the possession and non-possession of such qualities as civility &c. Purushottama on the other hand explains them as meaning good and bad fortune.

संसर्गतः—On account of contact.

अध्यास.........प्रेमतारतम्यम्—The intensity or otherwise of love depends upon the number of impediments in the way of its manifestation due to superimpositions.

वार्त्तिकामृते—The Vārttika referred to here is that by Sures'warāchārya on the Bhāshya of S'rī S'ankarāchārya on the Brihadāraṇyakopanishat.

तेन........अध्यासः—It has been explained above that the Self is superimposed upon the non-selfs and *vice versā.* Hence superimposition is of the nature of a knot of the Self and the non-selfs.

According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha the knot means a mutual connection based on each being limited by the other.

एकतरस्य........अभानप्रसङ्गात्—If the superimposition of any one of them only is accepted, then the other would not be manifest.

अध्यस्तस्यैव भ्रमे भाननियमात्—This rule is taken from Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka I. 36 which runs thus:—

अध्यस्तमेव हि परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु
नान्यत्कथंचन परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु ।
रज्जुत्वशुक्तिशकलत्वमरुक्षितित्व-
चन्द्रैकताप्रभृतिकानुपलम्भनेन ॥

इमे रङ्गरजते इति समूहालम्बनवत्—The bright colour of a mother-of-pearl which gives rise to the delusive perception of silver and the false silver itself are both indicated by the word इदम् (this) in the delusion 'this is silver.' Still it does happen that they appear as two distinct objects each dependent upon the other. So too when the delusion 'this is silver' arises, the delusiveness being similar, it is believed that there is mutual superimposition. The same is the case with this world-delusion where the phenomena stand for silver and the Self which is its substratum stands for the mother-of-pearl.

The introductory passage in the S'ārīraka Bhāshya of S'rī S'ankarāchārya contains a brief but very lucid exposition of this theory of mutual superimposition[1].

सर्वबाधावधिभूत........न शून्यवादापत्तिः—The superimposition of the Self on the non-selfs takes place by virtue of juxtaposition (संसर्गतः) only not essentially (स्वरूपतः) as in case of the non-selfs on the Self. Hence the latter remains unaffected by any superimpositions. Its nature remains the same throughout though it may appear to

1. *N. S. P. Edition p. 15 et. seq. Vide also Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka I. 34 and Pañchapādikā (Calcutta Edition) p. 35.*

have been changed. Hence even after the negation of all other entities, it remains over. If it is believed that it does not, then there would be no distinction between the Adwaita philosophy and that of the Mādhyamikās who believe that on the negation of all substances, nothing remains as a residue. They say that what remains is a void but it is not an entity but a non-entity and therefore nothing must be deemed to have remained over.

सत्यानृत.........अध्यासस्य—This statement is based on that of S'rī S'ankarāchārya in the S'ārīraka Bhāshya which is distinctly referred further on at p. २६.

सम्भेदः here means according to Nārāyaṇa, सम्बन्धः (connection).

तस्मात्.........एक एवानादिः—The superimpositions of the ego &c. are beginningless like the seed and the sprout each of which is the cause of the other but that of Nescience on the Self is beginningless in the sense that it is without cause. This is so because at the end of each Kalpa all the substances are destroyed but the original ignorance containing therein the impressions (संस्काराः) of the past actions of all beings remains. It is from these impressions that evolution begins afresh. This is explained later on at p. ५४ while defining the अव्याकृत.

P. 26. स्मृतिरूपः.........अध्यासः—स्मृतिरूपः means according to the commentators स्मृतिसदृशः (similar to or of the same nature as recollection). Purushottama adds that this meaning implies that the superimposition is generated by previous impressions. That seems to be true because there can be no recollection of a thing not previously seen and of one which has left no impression on one's mind.

Brahmānanda explains the word अवभासः as अवमतो भासो ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं वाऽवभासः and says that hence अवमतत्वम् is the characteristic of ज्ञानाध्यास and अर्थाध्यास.

कार्याध्यासाभिप्रायत्वात्तस्य—The superimposition which the author of the Bhāshya had in mind while making that remark is that of the effects *i. e.* the ego &c. which are the products of Nescience as opposed to that of Nescience itself which is the primary cause of all creation.

Purushottama says that this definition would apply to अर्थाध्यास if the word अध्यास is derived as अध्यस्यत इत्यध्यासः and to ज्ञानाध्यास if that word is derived as अध्यसनमध्यासः.

परत्र परावभासः—The appearance of another substance at a place other than that where it could be.

उभयानुगतस्य लक्षणत्वात्—This element which is common to both, the superimposition of the effects and that of the cause, constitutes the definition.

The objector says that if you say that superimposition is beginningless, the quality of being generated by previous impressions owing to its being of the nature of recollection which is spoken of by S'rī S'ankarāchārya would be contradicted. The reply of the author to it is that what is there meant is the superimposition of the effects, and the appearance of another substance at another place which is the common characteristic of both the kinds of superimposition, alone constitutes the definition of that word.

यद्वा......सिद्धान्तलक्षणम्—The author gives this other explanation of this apparent contradiction based upon another statement of the author of the S'ārīraka Bhāshya.

सम्भेदः according to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda means तादात्म्यम् (identity).

It should be remarked that what is said to take place is not identity itself but the appearance of identity between the true and false substances.

कारणाध्यासेऽपि न लक्षणाव्याप्तिः—The definition would not be too narrow so as not to include the superimposition of the cause or the superimposition which is the cause.

In the first sense it is the superimposition of the Nescience on the Self. But that is also the cause of that of the ego &c. Hence the other meaning is also correct.

कार्याध्यासस्य.........न कोऽपि दोषः—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha this remark has been added in order to obviate the objection that the author of the Bhāshya has said :—अहमिदं ममेदमिति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः. It is only a repetition of what has been explained in the preceding page, namely, that the superimposition of Nescience is beginningless in the sense that it has no cause while those of the ego &c. are so in the sense that they are related as a seed is to a sprout, each of which is the cause of the other. The specific seed or sprout has no doubt a beginning in that it comes into existence at a particular time but it gives rise to another of the class in which its cause

falls. Again the one cannot have come into existence without the previous existence of the other. It is not therefore possible to ascertain which came first into existence. Hence the conclusion that they are beginningless.

एवमध्यासे सिद्धे.........चोपपद्यते—The author having established the theory of superimposition in all its aspects now proceeds to establish its consistency with our ordinary beliefs and experiences. Now it is generally believed that the individual souls and the Cosmic Soul (जीव and ईश्वर) are different having different limitations and powers. Similarly in each act of knowledge there is a knower, thing to be known, means of knowledge and the act of knowledge itself. These phenomena are apparently irreconcileable with the doctrine of there being one Self only. The author therefore first proceeds to establish the consistency of there being different individual souls and a Cosmic Soul with the existence of one Self only.

In this connection it should be noted that there are 4 different theories current amongst the Adwaitins as to how this consistency can be brought about. First of all the author proceeds to explain that propounded by Sureśwarāchārya, the author of the Vārttika referred to at p. २५ *supra*, which is known as the आभासवाद.

चिदाभास is not the Self itself but its semblance. In this theory the Self is said to be the अन्तर्यामि (inner ruler) or साक्षी (witness) or जगत्कारण (the cause of the world) when being conditioned by Nescience it becomes identified with the latter and is not therefore distinguished from its own semblance. The same Self is called the जीव (individual soul) doing actions and enjoying the fruits thereof. When conditioned by the intellect i. e. the inner organ of an individual it becomes identified with it and is not distinguished from its semblance.

P. 27. प्रतिदेहं............भिन्नमिव प्रतीयते—In this theory the individual souls are not many as a matter of fact because it is the Self itself that is given the name of जीव, but it appears as many because the intellects or inner organs being different the semblances of the Self contained therein are different and the Self is not distinguished from them.

अज्ञानस्य तु.........भेदभावम्—The अन्तर्यामि or साक्षी or जगत्कारण is not however experienced to be different in each individual because

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the Self assumes those names on its being conditioned by Nescience which and the semblance in which are not separate in the case of each individual.

अस्मिंश्चपक्षे.........जहल्लक्षणैव—The author now proceeds to explain how the knowledge of the pure Self would arise according to this theory.

जहल्लक्षणा has been explained at p. 9 *supra.*

When the Supreme Spirit (तत्) is believed to be a semblance of Brahma contained in certain limiting agents and the individual soul (त्वम्) to be another semblance thereof contained in certain other such agents what one has to do in arriving at the true meaning of the sentence तत्त्वमसि is to give up completely the ordinary connotations of the words तत् and त्वम् *i. e.* to resort to जहल्लक्षणा because the semblance of Brahma in the one cannot be identical with its semblance in the other and understand that the Brahma whose semblances they are is the same.

साभासस्योपाधेर्वाच्यार्थांशस्य हानात्—Owing to the destruction of the primary sense portion which is the limitations together with the semblance.

The वाच्यार्थांश of the word तत् is Nescience together with the semblance of Brahma therein and that of the word त्वम् is the inner organ together with the semblance of Brahma therein. These have to be given up completely and the लक्ष्यार्थांश which is pure Brahma in each case is to be taken.

आभासस्यापि.........अनिर्वचनीयत्वात्—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha the आभास here is to be understood in the sense of चिदाभास together with the उपाधि. This is different by nature from जड and अजड and hence अनिर्वचनीय.

संक्षेपशारीरकम्—This is a work on the Adwaita philosophy by Sarvajñātma Mahāmuni, a pupil of Deves'wara *i. e.* Sures'warāchārya, the author of the Vārttika referred to above, who is believed to have flourished about 900 A. D. as already mentioned at *p. 40 supra.* It is a work in 4 Adhyāyas (chapters) treating of the same subject as the *S'ārīraka Bhāshya* of S'rī S'ankarāchārya with this difference that whereas in the latter there are several passages treating of the worship of Brahma in its several qualified aspects in addition to those treating of the knowledge of unqualified Brahma,

in the former the discussion is confined only to the unqualified Brahma. That is the reason why it is called *S'aṁks'epa S'ārīraka*[1].

साभासाज्ञानवाची.........तत्र पक्षे—The महावाक्य that is considered in this verse is अहं ब्रह्मास्मि.

The gist of the verse as read with the remaining portion given in foot-note 4 is that if the word ब्रह्म were to be indicative of Nescience together with the semblance of Brahma therein, then the word अहम् would be indicative of the ego and in that case there would be जहती लक्षणा. There is no obstacle in the Self being indicated by that kind of लक्षणा as quite other things connected with those mentioned are indicated by it in the sentences 'This ship cries', 'Iron burns', 'This is a serpent-rope in front of you.'

न चाभासस्यैव.........बद्धत्वाभ्युपगमात्—The author hereby answers two possible objections to the आभासवाद. One of them is that what is bound is the semblance of the Self while what is free from bondage is the Self and hence the substratum of the two is not one and the same but each has a different one and that being so, the bound individual soul would not strive to become free. The second is that since the semblance is also unreal like the bondage it would also be destroyed along with the latter by the rise of knowledge; it is however against nature for anybody to attempt to bring about one's own destruction. Both of them are answered by the statement केवलचैतन्यस्यैव &c.

In this theory the साक्षीचैतन्य itself becomes reflected and seeing that reflection liable to changes, believes itself to be such and feels miserable. That belief itself is bondage and its cessation final absolution. Hence there is neither a difference of substratum nor the possibility of an attempt to bring about one's own destruction.

अयमेव हि.........संसार्यात्मदर्शनम्—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha नः—अस्माकम् stands for भासकचिद्रूपाणाम् and अनर्थः means बन्धः (bondage) though ordinarily it means a calamity.

The compound संसार्यात्मदर्शनम् has been solved by him as संसार्यात्मना-संसारिरूपेण-आभासतादात्म्यविशिष्टतया दर्शनम्-प्रतीतिः. Hence the meaning

1. *Kās'i Sanskrit Series, No. 18. Vol. I. p. 2.*

of this line is:—This itself is the bondage of the Self that it appears as involved in the worldly phenomena.

P. 28. तेन.........न किञ्चिदसमञ्जसम्—On this authority one can say that the pure Self's being reflected is itself its bondage and its cessation final absolution.

अथवा.........जहदजहल्लक्षणैव—In order to meet the objection that the जहल्लक्षणा is not approved by the Bhāshyakāra, the author suggests an alternative view that even in this theory the Self as undistinguished from its semblances may be taken to have been expressed by the terms तत् and त्वम्. In that case portions only of the primary senses thereof would have to be excluded and so there would be जहदजहल्लक्षणा.

आभासवादः—Semblance-theory *i. e.* a theory which explains the Supreme Soul and the individual souls as semblances of Brahma.

अज्ञानोपहितम्—Qualified by ignorance.

अन्तःकरण.........जीवः—Mark the difference that the Supreme Soul is the बिम्बचैतन्य qualified by ignorance while the individual soul is the प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्य, the reflection being in ignorance not pure and simple but as limited by the inner organ and the impressions of past experiences contained therein.

विवरणकाराः—The author of the *Vivaraṇa.* For information as to this work and its author *vide p. 40 supra.*

अज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यम्—Mark that in the view of this writer even the Supreme Soul is not pure चैतन्य but as it is reflected in ignorance. The pure चैतन्य which is qualified by ignorance becomes neither the Supreme Soul nor the individual soul. It is therefore said further up that it remains pure.

सङ्क्षेपशारीरककाराः—The author of *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka.*

For information as to this work and its author *vide p. 40 supra.*

अनयोश्च.........जीवनानात्वम्—In this theory there is a plurality of individual souls because there is a difference in the intellects.

Although the word बुद्धि has not been used in the statement of the view of Prakās'ātmā as to the nature of the individual soul, this reason is not improper because it is only a product or one aspect of the अन्तःकरण which is mentioned therein.

प्रतिबिम्बस्य च.........तत्त्वमादिपदेषु—It may be recalled that while proving that Brahma is being reflected, the author has already stated that the adherents of the आभासवाद believe the reflection to be false while those of the प्रतिबिम्बवाद believe it to be true. (*Vide p.* १६ *and the Notes thereon at pp. 66–67 supra*).

प्रतिबिम्बवादः—Reflection–theory *i. e.* a theory which explains the Supreme Soul and the individual souls as reflections of Brahma.

P. 29. अज्ञानविषयीभूतं.........इति वाचस्पतिमिश्राः—Vāchaspati holds that Brahma is not reflected in Nescience but becomes its subject only for the purpose of being the Supreme Being and its support for being an individual soul.

For information as to Vāchaspati and his works *Vide pp. 28, 37 and 40 supra.*

अस्मिंश्च पक्षे......जीवनानात्वम्—Since the Spirit becomes the support of ignorance in order to become an individual soul, ignorance must be different in the case of each individual for otherwise the apparent difference between individual souls cannot be accounted for.

प्रतिजीवं च.........जगदुपादानत्वात्—The world of each individual again is different according to this theory because the pure Brahma remains unaffected and it is the individual soul *i. e.* Brahma which has become the support of ignorance which is different in the case of each that is the cause of the phenomena.

To be the support of ignorance and to become qualified by it mean the same thing.

प्रत्यभिज्ञा–Recognition.

ईश्वरस्य च......उपचारात्–The Supreme Being is by courtesy spoken of as the cause because He is the substratum of the individual souls together with the phenomena and individual ignorances. Since in this theory the Supreme Being does not Himself create anything it is only by courtsey that He is spoken of as the cause of the phenomenal world. Such courtsey is shown to Him because He is the substratum of the individual souls &c.

The above explanation is based on the commentary of Abhyankara who treats the expression सप्रपञ्चजीवाविद्याऽधिष्ठानत्वेन as a

Karmadhāraya compound. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha takes it as a genitive Tatpurusha. According to him therefore the meaning is that the Supreme Being is by courtesey spoken of as the cause because He is the substratum of ignorance together with the phenomena which forms the limitation of the individual soul. This explanation does not seem to be correct because according to the अवच्छेदवाद the जीवs are many and अविद्या differs with each of them and each जीव has his own seperate creation.

अयमेव चावच्छेदवादः—And this itself is known as the Limitation-theory *i. e.* the theory which explains the Supreme Soul and the individual souls as the results of limitations attaching to Brahma.

Abhyankara has at p. 48 of his commentary discussed these three theories together and shown that they are open to many objections.

मुख्यो वेदान्तसिद्धान्त एकजीववादाख्यः—The three theories above set forth are propounded by the followers of S'ankarāchārya who differed from him in some minor particulars. His own theory is known as the एकजीववाद (One-Soul-theory) or दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद (Theory of Idealism).

In that theory the Supreme Being is either the Self which being qualified by ignorance becomes the disc or which remains pure *i. e.* unqualified by ignorance and the individual soul is either the Self reflected in or qualified by ignorance.

दृष्टिसृष्टिवादः—According to this theory, the phenomenal world has no existence apart from the minds of the individual souls. It is believed by them to exist on account of ignorance and will cease to exist on the removal thereof. This is explained further on in the text.

Opposed to this is the सृष्टिदृष्टिवाद, the theory of Realism, according to which the phenomenal world appears because it exists apart from the individuals who witness it.

For an elaborate discussion of these two theories *Vide Madhusūdana's Adwaitāsiddhi, Parichchheda I.*

दृश्यं सर्वं प्रातीतिकम्—All objects of perception exist because of (our) belief (in their existence).

The word प्रातीतिक is derived from the word प्रतीति meaning belief based upon knowledge derived from the means of proof.

According to the Vedāntins there are 3 varieties of truth, namely, (1) प्रातीतिक or व्यावहारिक *i. e.* that which exists only because we believe in their existence as the objects of this world owing to their existence being proved by the means of proof; (2) प्रातिभासिक *i. e.* that which is a truth only in appearance not in reality as the objects appearing in dreams and (3) पारमार्थिक *i. e.* that which is the real truth which is Brahma or the Self. All these varieties of truth are opposed to भ्रम or मिथ्याज्ञान (delusion or erroneous knowledge) which arises when a rope is mistaken for a snake in darkness or a mother-of-pearl for silver in bright sunshine from a distance.

For a more detailed exposition of this subject *Vide Anant Krishna S'āstrī's Introduction to the Adwaitaratnaraks'aṇam of Madhusūdana Saraswatī.*

देहभेदाच्च जीवभेदभ्रान्तिः—The जीव's are not really distinct but they are falsely believed to be so on account of the distinctness of bodies which are objects of perception and as such exist only in one's imagination and hence there is in fact one जीव only.

उपबृंहित—Increased or supplemented. It is a past participle of बृंह् with उप.

दार्ढ्य—Steadiness.

शुकादीनां......अर्थवादः—As for the story of the liberation of S'uka and others it is only a eulogy (of श्रवण &c.). The story of S'uka, the son of Veda Vyāsa is briefly this:-Once the God S'iva was imparting the knowledge of Brahma to Pārvati while both were sitting together on the Kailas Mt. The God had ordered at that time all the living beings to be expelled from the mountain but one parrot whose presence in the foliage of a tree was not noticed happened to overhear it and put a question after the instructions had proceeded to a certain extent. This revealed its presence to the Gaṇas of S'iva who chased it and killed it. That parrot's soul entered the womb of a nymph with whose beauty Veda Vyāsa (Bādarāyaṇa) had become infatuated. The nymph would not be delivered for 12 years because the parrot's knowledge of Brahma had remained incomplete by the curse of S'iva. After the father imparted the remaining knowledge he was born and immediately on birth renounced the world inspite of the protestations of his affectionate parents.

Purushottama adds the name of Pralhad after that of S'uka as being one of the persons included in the term आदि.

Our author says that this story is not literally true but is an invention of the poet-philosopher made for the purpose of extolling the good effect of listening to a discourse on Brahmavidyā.

Abhyankara is of opinion that this remark has been added to contradict the view that when one soul is liberated all are liberated. I do not think that this opinion is borne out by the context, for the author has referred to the stories of S'uka and others because he had previously stated that final absolution took place after one passed through a course of study, meditation &c. So far as I know the said stories were intended to convey the idea that some highly developed souls are born with the knowledge of Brahma acquired in the pre-natal stage and referring to them the author says that they are not literally true but are intended to serve the purpose above-mentioned.

महावाक्ये च.........उपस्थापकम्—This remark has been added to obviate the objection that if the individual soul is the cause of the world then the word तत् in the sentence तत्त्वमसि cannot be understood to mean the Supreme Being who is the cause of the Universe.

अनन्तसत्यादिपदवत्......लक्षणयोपस्थापकम्—Just as the words अनन्त, सत्य etc. in the sentence सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म lead to the knowledge of that Being by indication in view of other texts such as तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः &c. so here too the word तत् would be understood by indication to mean the Supreme Being who is the cause of the Universe.

Summary—In order to explain how one and the same Brahma can be both the Supreme Being and the individual soul the author has mentioned four different theories known respectively as the (1) आभासवाद (Semblance-theory); (2) प्रतिबिम्बवाद (Reflection-theory); (3) अवच्छेदवाद (Limitation-theory) and (4) एकजीववाद (One-Soul theory) or दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद (Theory of Idealism).

It is not necessary to re-iterate even in brief what is the Supreme Being and what the individual soul according to each theory is because the language in which these theories are set forth is simple enough. But the attention of the reader deserves to be drawn to the facts that there are points of resemblance between

the आभासवाद and प्रतिबिम्बवाद and between the अवच्छेदवाद and एकजीववाद and that all the Vedāntins of the S'ankara school agree in the main doctrine of Adwaitism but differ amongst themselves in explaining away an experience which while it cannot be gainsaid is according to them not right but mistaken knowledge.

ननु वस्तुनि विकल्प.........इति चेत्—The author introduces this objection in order to enable him to state further that these theories being equally authoritative any of them can be accepted.

The वस्तु here is the जीवेश्वरविभागः which is a thing which cannot be brought into existence by human efforts.

According to Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda the objector says that the different views with regard to a thing which can be accomplished by human efforts are likely to be true on account of differences of times and subjects but they are not likely to be true in this case because the thing here is not capable of being accomplished by human efforts. Abhyankara on the other hand introduces this objection by saying that a thing that is established can be of one definite nature only and that it cannot be said that it may be of this sort or that sort and that even if it is said so, one explanation must be true and the others false.

विकल्पः—Doubt.

किं हेयं किमुपादेयम्—What should be shunned and what should be accepted.

अतात्त्विकी सा कल्पना—That conjecture is unsound.

The distinction between जीव and ईश्वर is based upon the Scriptures while the doubt whether this is a post or a man or a demon arises in the human mind. Hence the objector says that your analogy does not hold good.

नूनमतिमेधावी भवान्—Really you are very intelligent.

This is said in derision. What is really meant is that the objector is a dunce.

अद्वितीयमात्मतत्त्वं......शास्त्रस्य—This proposition has already been established. (*Vide* p. ३).

अनूद्यन्ते—Are repeated or corroborated.

The root herein is वद् with अनु as in अनुवादः.

फलवत्संनिधावफलं तदङ्गम्—In the proximity of that which is with a purpose that which is without a purpose is its auxiliary.

This seems to be a rule of interpretation. I have not been able to trace it anywhere in the Pūrvamīmāñsā Sūtras.

फलवत् means a thing which can yield a fruit independently of anything else. अफलम् is its opposite.

The meaning is that in the presence of a thing of the former class, that of the latter class becomes subsidiary to it. Thus the human body becomes a means for the realization of the true nature of the Self. The gist of the two sentences अद्वितीयात्मतत्त्वं &c. and जीवेश्वरविभागादिकल्पनास्तु &c. is that the Scriptures are primarily devoted to an exposition of the true nature of the Self which is one without a second but that does not preclude them from referring at times to other minor subjects such as the division of it into जीव and ईश्वर and they do so because such subjects are helpful at times in ellucidating the main point.

घटादिद्वैतज्ञानस्य.........प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमाच्च—Moreover even the authoritativeness of the knowledge of duality such as a pot &c. is admitted when the portion of it which is the non-dual Sat only is unknown.

The idea underlying this statement is that each object consists of two portions, namely, (1) the Sat i. e. existence or permanent portion which is common to everything and (2) the Asat portion i. e. the peculiar name and form which distinguish that object from others of its own and other classes and are transitory. Hence when an object is percieved, it is the Sat portion thereof that is cognized and it is only due to the cognition thereof not to that of the Asat portion that the object is said to have been percieved. Hence the knowledge of an object is the knowledge of the Self as limited by the object and therefore even the knowledge of duality can be said to be the means for the attainment of right knowledge.

ज्ञानाज्ञानयोः......तत्राप्यज्ञानव्यवहारोपपत्तेः—The underlying idea herein is this:—As there cannot be the knowledge of one thing and ignorance of another and there cannot be the ignorance of an inert substance owing to there being no means to establish it and there being no purpose in doing so, it must be concluded that it is said that there is the ignorance of a substance only because there is that of the Spirit as limited by the substance.

It is easily intelligible that there can be knowledge and igno-

rance about one and the same entity. It is also be plain that according to the Vedānta doctrine, the Self alone is the reality and therefore there can be knowledge and ignorance about it only not about the non-selfs. In common parlance however it is said that there is the ignorance of a non-self like a pot when as a matter of fact there is that of the Self as limited by the pot, a non-self.

प्रामाण्यस्य चाज्ञातज्ञापकरूपकत्वात्—A thing is said to be a means of proof if it serves to lead to the knowledge of a thing that is unknown.

अन्यथा स्मृतेरपि तदापत्तेः—Recollection is not considered to be a means of proof because there can be recollection only of a thing previously known. It is not fresh knowledge but only a revival of knowledge previously acquired. If a means of proof were not held to impart a knowledge of an unknown thing recollection also would have to be deemed a means of proof.

वेदान्तेषु............अयमेव परिहारः—There are several Upanishad texts such as जीवेशावाभासेन करोति, रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव, ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशौ, अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते which are mutually contradictory and therefore support the views of several other philosophers. In their case the test that is applied is whether they do or do not purport to impart a knowledge of a thing which is unknown and which would remain uncontradicted by other means of proof.

वार्त्तिककारपादाः—The revered author of the Vārttika (on the Bhāshya of S'rī S'ankarāchārya on the Brihadāraṇyakopanishat) *i. e.* Sures'warāchārya.

P. 31. यथा यथा.........सा च व्यवस्थिता—The meaning of this verse is that all those methods by which men (aspiring for final absolution) become convinced (of the true nature) of the Self are good (*i. e.* authoritative) and they are adjusted with the main doctrine.

Nārāyana Tīrtha explains the word व्युत्पत्तिः as दृढबुद्धिः (conviction) and Abhyankara explains प्रत्यगात्मनि व्युत्पत्तिः as आत्मतत्त्वावबोधः (realization of the true nature of the Self). As there is no difference between conviction and realization both these explanations must be deemed to be correct.

Nārāyaṇa derives the word प्रत्यगात्मा as प्रति जडादि प्रातिकुल्येनाञ्चति प्रकाशत इति and explains it as जीवेशजगद्व्यावृत्तोऽखण्डैकरसरूपः (One who being

different from the individual souls, the Supreme Soul and the worldly phenomena, is of the nature of one undivided Essence).

Similarly he derives the word प्रक्रिया as प्रक्रियते व्युत्पाद्यतेऽनया and explains it as अभेदसाधनसम्पत् जीवेशविभागादिव्यवस्था [the arrangement as to the division (of Brahma) into the individual souls and the Supreme Soul &c. (which leads to) the perfection of the means towards the realization of a non-distinction (between them)].

साध्वी means good *i. e.* authoritative so far as the man who has an eye to the main aim, namely, final absolution, is concerned. Nārāyaṇa and Abhyankara have adopted the other reading given in foot-note 2, namely, सा चानवस्थिता instead of सा च व्यवस्थिता. The former has again explained the word अनवस्थिता as meaning अप्रतिष्ठिता (devoid of stability) or स्वांशे प्रामाण्यरहिता (devoid of authoritativeness with regard to the particular point dealt with therein) and Abhyankara as meaning अनिश्चितैकप्रकारा (not of one fixed character). The latter is required to add that it does not matter even if they are not such.

Brahmānanda and Purushottama have passed over this verse altogether.

श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थविरुद्धम्—(That which) is opposed to the meaning which has become the purport of the Vedic texts.

The purport of the texts according to the Vedāntins lies in imparting the knowledge of the identity of the individual souls and the Supreme Soul.

If there is anything in any met[illegible] opposed to this purport it must be rejected.

शतशः—Nārāyaṇa says that this [illegible]ssion has been used owing to the same point having bee[illegible]de clear in the other works of the author, namely, *Adwaitas[illegible]dhi*, *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, *Adwaitaratna (-raks'aṇam)* and others.

तस्माच्च किञ्चिदेतत्—Since all the means of knowledge should lead to the conclusion about the Self being without a second, all talk about the authoritativeness or otherwise of the portion speaking of the difference between the individual souls and the Supreme Soul is immaterial or vain.

Summary:—Since the author has given several views as to how the one Self becomes both the individual souls and the Supreme

Soul, a doubt as to which of them is the authoritative one is likely to arise. It is raised in this form that since the division is an accomplished fact there should be no room for alternative views as to how it takes place and so it must be determined which of the above views should be rejected and which accepted. The answer to it is that the said fact does admit of doubts just as in ordinary intercourse one and the same thing is seen by one man as a post, by another as a human being, and by a third as a monster. And there is no difference between this illustration and the thing to be proved because the latter is also a well-known fact and has been referred to by the Scriptures because it is useful in imparting the knowledge of the reality. Even if a thing is proved to be imaginary the Scriptures may refer to it for in the proximity of that which has a purpose underlying it, that which has none becomes its auxiliary. It is not that all knowledge of the so-called duality is useless, because even when its knowledge is said to take place, that whose knowledge really takes place is the Sat portion of it without which the object cannot be said to be in existence at all. Similarly the previous ignorance is also of that portion not of the Asat portion because there cannot be the knowledge of one thing and the ignorance of another. The author of the Vārttika has also said that all methods which lead to the knowledge of the Essence are good and can be adjusted *i. e.* to say that it does not matter that so far as the particular point dealt with therein they differ. Hence the doubt is immaterial.

तदेवं.........संसारोपलब्धिः—Thus the individual soul becomes subject to transmigration owing to his being overpowered by limitations.

परमेश्वरस्य तु.........सर्वज्ञत्वादिकम्—While the Supreme Being acquires omniscience &c. by bringing the limitations under His control.

उपाधिवशित्वात्—This expression has been explained by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as meaning **वशीकृतमायत्वात्.** (owing to His having brought His illusive power under His Control), and by Brahmānanda as meaning **श्रुत्यादिसिद्धेनोक्ताभिभूतत्वाभावेन विशिष्टत्वात्** (owing to His being characterized by the absence of the aforesaid quality of being overpowered which is proved by Vedic texts &c.). This is not a very intelligible explanation, nor does it seem to give the correct idea as to why Brahma becomes the Supreme Being for Brahma

does not become the Ruler of the Universe simply by remaining unaffected by Nescience. Nārāyaṇa's explanation is more lucid.

इति सम्यगुपपद्यते व्यवस्था—In these two sentences the author winds up the discussion as to how one and the same Brahma becomes both the individual souls and the Supreme Soul which was commenced at p. २६.

ननु भवतु.........इति चेत्—The author now proceeds to explain how the same Brahma becomes the means of knowledge, thing to be known &c.

For the meanings of the words मान, मेय &c. *vide p. 57 supra.*

अनिर्वचनीयत्वेन विचारासहा—It has already been established (*vide p.* २३ *supra*) that Nescience is neither real nor unreal and therefore indescribable. It cannot therefore be proved to be either different from or identical with Brahma. This is what is meant by calling it विचारासहा.

आवरणविक्षेपशक्तिद्वयवति—The Nescience above spoken of possesses two kinds of powers, namely, (1) the power to cover up and (2) the power to give rise to the phenomena. The word आवरण has been explained by Brahmānanda as meaning नास्ति न भातीति व्यवहारः and the word विक्षेप as meaning आकाशादि कार्यम्. Nārāyaṇa explains the former word as meaning सतो नास्तीति धीः अस्तीतिव्यवहारप्रतिबन्धश्च. Thus according to him the आवरणशक्ति not only produces the impression that the real substance, namely Brahma, does not exist and make one act as if it did not exist but also prevents the rise of the notion that it exists and prevents one from acting upon such a notion. I think this is a more appropriate explanation for Nescience really does preclude one from believing that Brahma exists and acting upon such a belief, such is the chain of causes and effects!

सर्वगतं.........सूर्यमण्डलम्—This illustration establishes that a bigger object can be covered up or hidden from view by the intervention of a smaller one.

तत्र चक्षुष............प्रसङ्गात्—If it is believed that it is the eye that is covered up then the finger too would not be seen.

ततः सा........परिणमते—The Nescience above referred to after having covered over the Spirit, becomes transformed into the various objects of this universe by being joined to the bundles of acts of the individual souls conserved in the forms of impressions which are beginningless.

This method is explained in details while explaining the genesis of the Universe in the commentary on Verse VIII. (*vide p.* ४५ *infra*).

स्वगतचिदाभासद्वारा—Through the semblance of the Self contained therein.

Owing to the union of the Self with Nescience, it is reflected therein. Seeing its reflection, it believes that it is immersed in Nescience just as a man on looking at his reflection in a mirror believes that his face is inside the mirror.

चिदनुस्यूतम्—Permeated by or strung together with the Self.

The idea underlying the sentence is that Nescience becomes identified with the Self through its semblance contained therein and hence all its products also become permeated by the Self through that semblance.

चैतन्यस्य दीपवत्स्वसम्बद्धसर्वभासकत्वात्—Just as a lamp illumines everything to which its rays extend so the Self also becomes the cause of the manifestation of all objects because there is no object that does not come in contact with it.

P. 32. जगदुपादानचैतन्यम्—The Self which is the material cause of the universe.

This is proved by various Vedic texts such as यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्, सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत and others and the Sūtra जन्माद्यस्य यतः.

प्रमाणापेक्षामन्तरेणैव........सर्वज्ञं भवति—The Self itself being the illuminator of all objects does not require any other means to know them and knowing them becomes omniscient.

तेन तत्र न मानमेयादिव्यवस्था—Owing to the above reason there can be no arrangement as to the means of knowledge, thing to be known &c. with reference to the Supreme Being.

किन्तु जीवे........परिच्छिन्नत्वात्—The vision of an individual soul is circumscribed owing to the limitation of the intellect put upon him.

तेन चिदभिव्यक्ति.........न साङ्कर्यप्रसङ्गः—Owing to the above limitation, that individual soul only gets the experience of a particular object whose inner organ comes in contact with it and hence the other souls remain unaffected by that experience.

Here the तत् in तदेव stands for the object to be cognized and the तत् in तदवच्छिन्नः stands for the inner organ.

It should be remarked that for the rise of knowledge it is not enough that one's mind should come in contact with the object through any of the senses. It must also be in a fit condition to recieve the impression that may be created by the contact. That is the very reason why some persons see or hear things while others at the same place and at the same time do not. The reason is that their minds are distracted.

The साङ्कर्य (promiscuity) here meant is that of the experiences of different individuals.

एवमत्र प्रक्रिया—The author now proceeds to explain the process by which knowledge arises.

शरीरमध्ये स्थितः.........अविद्याविवर्तः—This is the author's definition of अन्तःकरण.

It is according to him a विवर्त (modification) of Nescience. It resides inside the body and pervades it throughout and is the direct product of the five subtle elements having at that time the predominance therein of the Sattavaguṇa.

It is believed that the Sattavaguṇa must be predominant then because there is a greater proportion therein of the portion of it which leads to knowledge. By saying that there must be its predominance the author implies that there are the other guṇas also therein which give rise to other sentiments such as desire &c.

The elements from which it is formed are believed to be the subtle and not the gross ones because it can go anywhere.

It is said to be a modification of Nescience because all products whatever are the outcome thereof. Hence that is its general cause only. Its particular cause is the five subtle elements with the predominance of the Sattwaguṇa therein.

दर्पणादिवदतिस्वच्छं—The quality of clearness is due to the mind being the product of the Sattwaguṇa portion of the subtle elements.

द्रुतताम्रादिवत्—Like molten copper &c.

Cf. मुषासिक्तं यथाताम्रं तन्निभं जायते तथा।
घटादि व्याप्नुयाच्चित्तं तन्निभं जायते ध्रुवम्[1] ॥

1 *Bhaktirasāyanam*, 1. 21. *Com. thereon at P. 26. of the Cal. Edition.*

Another simile employed to illustrate ths same phenomenon is that of water assuming the form of its receptacle. Thus in the *Adwaitasiddhi Parichchheda I*[1] it is said that the inner organ is like the eye which is made of light, that it having gone out through the senses, pervades the object connected therewith and assumes its form just as the water of rivers &c. having gone out through a water-course assumes the form of a water-basin round the trunk of a tree and yet keeps up its connection with its source. This action itself is called a वृत्ति. Cf. also वेदान्तपरिभाषा, अध्याय १ and *Manual of Hindu Pantheism* by *Jacob*, *p. 105*[2].

तस्य च सैरालोकादिवत्........उपपद्येते–Just as the sun-light becomes quickly contracted when it has to enter through a smaller aperture and expanded when it has to enter through a bigger one so the mind becomes quickly contracted and expanded according as the object to be cognized is small or big.

सावयवत्वात्—The mind is believed to consist of parts owing to its being the product of the five subtle elements.

देहघटयोर्मध्येऽपि.........अवतिष्ठते—The mind having completely pervaded inside the body and roundabout the pot remains connected with the body and the pot, like the eye.

Just as the eye does not become severed from the body while seeing a distant object like the sun or a mountain, so the mind too does not get disconnected from the body.

देहविषयमध्यवर्ती.........क्रियेत्युच्यते—The portion thereof between the body and the object being elongated like a staff which is known as वृत्तिज्ञान (knowledge produced by a modification of the mind) is called the act.

विषयव्यापकस्तद्भागो.........अभिव्यक्तियोग्यत्वमित्युच्यते—The portion of the mind which pervades the object is called the quality of being fit to become manifest which makes the object an object of knowledge.

तस्य चाभिव्यक्तस्य........व्यपदेशो भवति—Although it is the Self that becomes manifest in all the three parts, it receives three different designations owing to the portion of the mind which makes it manifest in each case being different.

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1. *Adwaitamañjari Series*, *Vol.* 1. *p.* 86.

2 "*The Pandit*", *Vol. IV*, *pp.* 341-43.

प्रमेयं तु.........अज्ञातम्—The thing to be known in each case is the Brahma or the Self contained in the object which is unknown.

It has been explained above that according to the Vedānta doctrine even when knowledge or ignorance of an object is spoken of, it is the knowledge or ignorance of Brahma that is to be understood because the ideas of knowledge and ignorance cannot be associated with the material forms of the objects. (*Vide p. 30 supra*). That exaplanation is based upon the theory that Brahma is the only reality and the present remark is quite consistent with that explanation.

तदेव च.........फलम्—The same being known becomes the fruit or result (of the act).

Summary—The fact that the same Brahma appears as the knower, the means of knowledge, the act of knowledge and the thing to be known is shown to be consistent with the Vedānta doctrine of there being only one Brahma without a second in this manner that Nescience has two kinds of powers, namely (1) that of covering up the Self and (2) that of creating the multiformed phenomena. By the first power, it first covers up the Self and then becomes transformed into the various objects of the universe in the order mentioned at pp. ५३-६० *infra*. As it has become identified with the Self through the latter's reflection therein, all its products also are permeated by the Self and since the latter is the illuminator of all objects whatever as a lamp is that of those that come in contact with it, it becomes the omniscient Supreme Being without the help of any means of proof. But as the individual souls are limited by their respective intellects or inner organs, those objects only are cognized by that particular soul whose inner organ fit for its manifestation comes in contact with them.

The process by which cognition takes place in the case of the individual souls is this:—The modification of Nescience which is the direct product of the Sattwaguṇa portion of the five subtle elements having gone out of the body through any of the sense-organs pervades the object to be percieved and assumes its shape just as molten copper assumes that of the mould into which it is poured while hot, it being capable of immediate contraction and expansion like the rays of the sun. Even while

it has thus gone out, the body does not become devoid of it. What happens is that one portion of it remains in the body, one goes out and envelopes the object and a third acting like a rod connects the body with the object. The first is called the knower, the second, the quality of being fit for manifestation of the object which makes it an object of knowledge, and the third the act of knowledge known as वृत्तिज्ञान. The object to be known is of course the Brahma-Chaitanya inside the object. Owing to the purity of these portions that Chaitanya becomes manifest therein. After manifestation it is known as the result of the act. Although the Chaitanya that becomes manifest in all the three parts of the inner organ is the same, it acquires three different names as above-mentioned owing to the parts of the inner organ in which it becomes manifest being different.

P. 34. अत्र च......इति विवेकः—The author now proceeds to explain what function the वृत्ति performs while making the Chaitanya in the object manifest. As there are the different theories as to the nature of the individual souls referred to at *pp.* २६-२९ *supra*, the functions would be different according to the nature of the soul in each theory. The author therefore says referring to those theories that in the case of the theory in which the soul is limited by the inner organ and that of that in which it is a reflection in Nescience and is present everywhere the function of the mind has for its objects the forging of a connection between the knowing-self and the object-self and the removal of the veil on the latter and in the case of the theory in which the soul being limited by Nescience is omnipresent but covered over the function of the mind has for its object only the breaking of the veil on an object-self as in that case the soul himself being the material cause of the universe is already connected with all objects.

It has already been said that knowledge is of the nature of a वृत्ति of the अन्तःकरण. Hence what is meant here is that in the former two cases knowledge performs the double function of forging a connection between the knowing-self and the object-self and of breaking the veil of ignorance over the former and in the last case the single one of breaking the veil of ignorance only.

सर्वगतः means attended by Nescience which has been identified with all its effects.

असङ्गः means devoid of identification with the objects such as a pot &c. This is due to the fact that in that theory the material cause of the world is Brahma who is different from the knowing-self.

आवृतः means having been the subject of the veil of ignorance by the limitation of the pot &c. in the form of the consciousness 'I do not know the pot.'

In the third case, there is no necessity of forging a connection between the knowing-self and the object-self because on the removal of the veil of ignorance knowledge arises automatically in the former, it being already connected with everything.

The views referred to in the first two cases are those of Prakās'ātmā, Sarvajña Muni and Sures'warāchārya and that in the last is that of Vāchaspati Mis'ra.

P. 35. ननु चिदुपरागा.........भानं स्यात्—By a reference to the previous paragraph of the text it will be seen that there is no case in which the वृत्ति has the single function of forging a connection and that there are two cases in which it has the double function of forging a connection and removing the veil. Hence it should be understood that the author has hereby referred to those two cases collectively by the one expression चिदुपरागा वृत्तिरिति पक्षे.

The objection stated in plain language is this:—A वृत्ति is required only to forge a connection between the individual's inner organ and an object not connected with it perpetually. The attributes and absence of attributes of the inner organ having that organ for their substratum are always connected with it. So too Brahma being omnipresent must be deemed to have been perpetually connected with all objects whatever. Hence there is no necessity to believe that the वृत्ति has in such cases to forge a connection between the inner organ and the objects i. e. the attributes and absence of attributes and Brahma.

न स्यात्, चैतन्यस्य.........अभावात्—The reply to that objection is this:—It should not be believed that the sole function of the inner organ is to become connected by its वृत्ति with the object and to establish a connection between the soul and the object through itself. It is also its function to make the object clear by removing the

veil of ignorance over the object after being connected with the latter, to carry its shape with itself and to make it manifest to the soul limited by it. You (i. e. the objector) have established a connection between the soul and the attributes and absence of attributes and Brahma. Hence in the case of illusory silver, only its connection with the soul is established without a वृत्ति of Nescience but the veil of ignorance over it cannot be destroyed and it cannot become pure without such a वृत्ति.

तदभावश्च......आवरणात्—Even though Brahma is by itself pure, there is the necessity in its case of the breaking of the veil of ignorance over it which can be done only by such a वृत्ति.

अनावृत्तेऽपि.........अस्वच्छत्वात्—Even though Brahma-Chaitanya i. e. the general Chaitanya residing in the object is uncovered in the case of silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl because the idea thereof is itself concieved on account of ignorance and is ignorance itself, still it not being clear a वृत्ति of ignorance is required to make it pure.

धर्माधर्मादौ तु अस्वच्छत्वादावृतत्वाद्वा—In the case of the attributes &c. on the other hand a वृत्ति is required not only to make them clear but also to break the veil of ignorance over them.

तेन......स्वतः—For these reasons where the object like Brahma is pure but covered over the knowing-self becomes connected with it by the वृत्ति which gives rise to knowledge and where it is uncovered yet impure as in the case of silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl, its connection is formed by a वृत्ति of ignorance. But in the case of pleasures, pains &c. where the Chaitanya is uncovered and pure there is no necessity of a वृत्ति. They become cognized by themselves i. e. without the intervention of a वृत्ति.

इति नान्तःकरण.........भानप्रसङ्गः—By these words the author winds up the whole discussion.

According to Nārāyana the expression धर्माधर्मादीनाम् is to be understood at the end.

I am of opinion that the words ब्रह्मणश्च should also be understood therein inasmuch as the objection was with regard to the realization of not only the attributes and their absence but also

of Bramha and it has been explained that there being no connection between the knowing-self and Brahma the realization of the latter does not take place without a वृत्ति and that connection takes place by the वृत्ति which gives rise to the realization of Brahma.

Summary—It has been explained at pp. ३२-३३ *supra* that knowledge takes place by means of a वृत्ति of the inner organ which consists of its going forth from the eye or any other organ of sense to the object to be cognized, its assuming the shape of that object just as molten copper assumes that of a mould into which it is poured and that done, what the वृत्ति does is to forge a connection between the knowing-self and the object-self and to break the veil of ignorance or simply to break the veil according as the knowing-self is believed to have been perpetually unconnected or connected with the objects of the world.

Now in the case of the former belief the objection is raised that even in that case the realization of the attributes and absence of attributes of the mind and Brahma should take place without the intervention of a वृत्ति because the attributes &c. are perpetually connected with the mind and the soul is a modification of Brahma itself.

To this the answer is that the realization thereof would not take place automatically on the breaking of the veil of ignorance over the object because there is no subsisting connection between them and the knowing-self. This reason is further explained in this way that the connection may not exist either because the object is covered over or because it is impure or because both these conditions exist. In the case of the attributes &c. both these conditions exist and in that of Brahma one, namely, being covered over. Hence, a वृत्ति is necessary in either case to forge a connection between them and the knowing-self. In giving this explanation it is incidentally explained that in the case of silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl though the object is uncovered, as ignorance does not require another ignorance to cover it up, a वृत्ति is required because the object is impure and that the realization of pleasures and pains takes place without the intervention of a वृत्ति because the object is both uncovered and pure.

नतु ब्रह्मणः.........सर्वज्ञत्वात्—To the statement made above that Brahma though pure is covered over and therefore requires a वृत्ति for forging a connection between it and the knowing-self, this objection is anticipated because it is not easily intelligible how Brahma which is omniscient as being self-resplendent without a blemish could have a covering.

सत्यम्.........व्यपदेशात्—The answer to that objection is that though Nescience one of whose attributes is to cover over objects does not affect the Supreme Being which would not otherwise be omniscient it does affect the individual soul who has become subject to it as being limited by the mind. Hence it is spoken of as covered over so far as the individual soul is concerned.

तस्माद्ब्रह्म.........आवरणभङ्गार्थैवेति—The above objection also being shown to be untenable, the author now reiterates what was stated at the beginning of the discussion as to the function of the वृत्ति by the remark अत्र च &c. (*vide p.* ३४ *supra.*)

According to the आभास and प्रतिबिम्बवाद's the material cause of the universe is Brahma. That is proved to be covered over and therefore in need of a वृत्ति not only for breaking the veil of ignorance over the object but also for establishing a connection between the knowing-self and the object-self. Hence in the case of those theories, the वृत्ति must be deemed to perform that double function. According to the अवच्छेदवाद the individual soul is himself the material cause of the phenomenal world and is therefore always connected with each object. Hence in its case, the वृत्ति must be deemed to perform the single function of breaking the veil of ignorance over the object.

ननु एके चैव............अज्ञानस्यैकत्वात्—This is an objection to the theory of knowledge itself of the Adwaitins as set forth at pp. ३२-३३. The reasoning underlying it is this:—According to you when it is said that there is the ignorance of an object, what is meant is that there is that of Brahma and similarly when it is said that an object is known, what is known is Brahma. Further according to your theory of knowledge, it takes place by the removal of the veil of ignorance over the object which according to your doctrine is Brahma itself and when that veil which is the same

everywhere is removed and Brahma has become known, there must be final absolution by the single act of knowledge of an object such as a pot.

P. 36. नानाज्ञानपक्षेऽपि......अज्ञानोपाधित्वात्—In the above objection it has been assumed that ignorance is one and the same everywhere. Now the objector goes further and says that even if it is assumed that the ignorance is manifold, still the objection holds good because though ignorance may be different in the case of each individual and it may be admitted that by a single act of knowledge of a pot by an individual all individual souls may not be freed from bondage still that particular individual must be because in his case the ignorance is one only.

न, उत्तेजकेन मणेरिव.........अङ्गीकारात्—There is a reference here to an ancient popular belief that when a particular jewel is placed in front of fire the latter loses for the time being its power of burning the objects coming in contact with it and that when again a particular stimulating plant is placed near it or when a particular stimulating incantation is recited the jewel becomes overpowered for the time being and consequently the power of fire to burn the objects coming in contact with it is revived.

In this analogy the अग्नि corresponds to the चैतन्य, the मणि to the आवरण and the अन्तःकरणवृत्ति to the उत्तेजक plant or incantation. So long as the वृत्ति is there it sterilizes the अज्ञान whose effect is to cover up as the उत्तेजक sterilizes the मणि. When it is not there अज्ञान is in full force as the मणि is all-powerful in the absence of the plant or so long as the incantation is not recited and therefore does its work which is that of making an existing visible thing appear as if it did not exist and were not visible, as the मणि does its, namely, that of sterilizing fire.

तथा च......आवरणमित्युच्यते—That being so, it is ignorance accompanied by the absence of a वृत्ति produced by a means of proof, which is capable of producing the consciousness that a thing which exists and is visible does not exist and is not visible, that is called a covering.

वृत्तौ जातायां.........अभिभूतमित्युच्यते—When a वृत्ति is produced by an appropriate means of proof, ignorance which though existing is as good as not existing owing to the absence of a limiting agent and is therefore incapable of doing its work, is said to have been overpowered by it.

So the answer to the above objection is that when the knowledge of an object such as a pot &c. is produced, ignorance is not completely destroyed or removed but is only temporarily overpowered by the वृत्ति and until it is completely destroyed or removed final absolution cannot take place even of the particular individual soul who knows the object.

नन्वेवं.........प्रसङ्गः—This explanation raises a further doubt as to whether when अज्ञान is only temporarily overpowered and not completely destroyed by a प्रमाजन्यवृत्ति, Nescience too would not be completely destroyed by ब्रह्मज्ञान and if it is not so destroyed then there would never be final absolution.

न, तत्त्वमस्यादि.........अन्यत्रादर्शनं चाकिञ्चित्करम्—The author's solution is that there is a difference between प्रमा and प्रमा. That which takes place in the case of the perception of an object is philosophically speaking not a प्रमा but a भ्रम and is a प्रमा only for the purpose of व्यवहार and would cease to be such when contradicted while that which takes place by the knowledge of a महावाक्य is the real प्रमा which would remain uncontradicted.

The expression स्वविषयप्रमात्वेनैव has been explained by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as अज्ञानविषयविषयकप्रमात्वेनैव (only by the right knowledge relating to that which is the subject of ignorance). Abhyankara solves the compound स्वविषयप्रमात्वम् as स्वमविद्या तस्या यो विषयः स विषयो यस्यास्तादृशी या प्रमा तस्या भावस्तत्त्वम्. This explanation though more prolix leads to the same meaning.

For a note on the word महावाक्यम् *vide p. 7 supra.*

स्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात्—The fact that S'uka, Vāmadeva, Janaka and others were actually freed from bondage is one additional and a stronger proof of the fact that freedom from bondage does take place on the removal of ignorance and the rise of the knowledge of Brahma.

अन्यथानुपपत्तेश्च सर्वतो बलवत्त्वात्—According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha

the Scriptures would be unauthoritative if freedom from bondage were not to take place in the case of one who strives for it. Brahmānanda says that the texts alluded to here are विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः and others of that type. Abhyankara says that they are सोऽविद्याग्रन्थिं विकिरति and others. Both these texts fall in the category of those which promise final absolution on the realization of the true nature of the Self.

अन्यथानुपपत्तिः is recognized as a sixth प्रमाण by both the schools of Mīmāṅsā. For its illustration *vide pp. 65-66 supra.*

अन्यथानुपपत्तिश्चेदस्ति......सर्वबलाधिका—This verse is found with a slight variation in *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khādya,* a work of S'rī-Harsha believed by Drs. Thebāut and Gangānāth Jhā to have been composed probably in the 8th century A. D.[1] The verse there reads:—

अन्यथानुपपत्तिश्चेदस्ति वस्तुप्रसाधिका ।
पिनष्टि दृष्टवैमत्यं सैव सर्वबलाधिका[2] ॥

The meaning of the verse given in the text is that if a fact is otherwise unaccountable and an inference drawn from it accounts for it, that is a sufficient answer to an objection that its parallel is not seen at other places because an inference drawn from circumstances is the strongest means of proof.

The term वस्तुप्रसाधिका has been explained by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as ज्ञानाज्ञानयोर्नाश्यनाशकभावज्ञापिका (leading to the knowledge of the relation of a thing to be destroyed and a destroyer between knowledge and ignorance). This is obviously wrong because the thing to be destroyed is अज्ञान and the destroyer is ज्ञान. He should have said ज्ञानाज्ञानयोर्नाशकनाश्यभावज्ञापिका. Even that too would not be the literal meaning but the purport of the expression only. The literal meaning thereof would be simply 'leading to the attainment of the object (in view).' अदृष्टिवैमत्यम् has been explained by the same commentator as दृष्टान्तादर्शनेन विवादम् and by Brahmānanda as अन्यत्रादर्शनेन विवादम्. Both mean the same thing as is mentioned above.

1. *Preliminary Note to the Translation of Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya in the 'Indian Thought Series', No. 4. Vol. I. (January 1907) p. 1.*

2. *Calcutta Edition p. 14.*

अथवा मूलाज्ञानस्यैव......घटादिविषयावरणानि—The author gives this alternative explanation also as to why by the knowledge of an object on one occasion ignorance either as to all other objects or as to one's true nature is not destroyed.

This explanation is based upon the belief that the ignorance with regard to each object is one of the numerous forms which the original ignorance assumes just as water assumes the forms of bubbles.

घटादिविषयावरणानि means घटादिविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणानि (coverings of the Self as limited by objects such as a pot &c.).

अज्ञानस्य...............न काचिदनुपपत्तिः—Each case of knowledge of an object implies a corresponding one of its previous non-existence. Hence there is a possibility of as many instances of previous non-existence as there are of knowledge.. In the above case ignorance of an object means nothing else but the previous non-existence of knowledge. Hence there are as many cases of ignorance as there are of knowledge. That being the case, it is no wonder that there should not be the total eradication of ignorance in general about all objects whatever or that as to one's true nature by the mere knowledge of one object on one occasion only and that there should be the destruction of the veil over that object only by the वृत्ति of the mind for the purpose of making it manifest to the knowing-self.

Summary—It is assumed in the first para. at p. ३५ that Brahma is at times covered over. So the doubt was raised how it could be covered over, being ever resplendent. This is answered by saying that it is said to have been covered over only with reference to the individual soul who has become subject to ignorance.

Further it is said there that what the वृत्ति of the mind does in each case is to lift the veil of ignorance over the object-self whether it forges a connection between it and the knowing-self or not. So an objection is raised here that if the veil of ignorance is broken in such a case why does not man become freed from the cycle of births and deaths. This fact is explained in two ways, (1) that what happens in the case of each act of knowledge of an object is not the complete destruction of the veil of ignorance but its being overpowered for the time being by the वृत्ति of the mind

just as a jewel having the power to sterilize fire is overpowered for the time being when a particular plant is placed near it or a particular incantation is recited in front of it and (2) that the cases of the ignorance with reference to the different objects like those of the previous non-existence of knowledge are modifications only of the original ignorance as bubbles arising out of the same storeage of water are of the water contained therein and in that case it is but meet that by the destruction of the veil over an object ignorance as to that object only should be destroyed and not the original ignorance which is the cause of births and deaths.

To the former explanation a side-objection is raised and that is that if at the time of the rise of knowledge ignorance were not destroyed but only temporarily overpowered by the वृत्ति, then it would not be destroyed even by the knowledge of Brahma. That is removed by saying that as the knowledge arising from the great sentences तत्त्वमसि &c. which remains uncontradicted by other means of proof unlike that arising from sense-perception is believed by all to put to an end to ignorance completely, as we know also by personal experience that it does, and as many a Vedic text would be without any meaning if it were otherwise, which is the strongest ground for believing that fact, the said objection is untenable.

P. 38. ननु, अनुमानादिभिः.........निवर्तते न वा—The author makes a digression here in order to put forward his own view with regard to an allied subject.

It has already been established that the veil of ignorance is removed by direct perception. He now raises a side-issue whether it is removed by other means of proof such as inference &c.

आद्ये साक्षात्कारि.........निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः—In the first case *i. e.* if it is believed that the veil is removed by other means of proof then a delusion of an object of direct perception as the yellowness of a conch which appears owing to a defect in the eye would be removed simply by the inference that a particular conch is white because it is a conch like other conches, *i. e.* to say, without medical treatment.

साक्षात्कारी भ्रमः means a delusion which makes a false thing

directly perceptible such the yellowness of a conch which appears owing to a defect in the eye of the seer.

अधिष्ठानाज्ञानोपादानकत्वेन.........निवृत्तेः—Every delusion has for its material cause the ignorance of the substratum just as a mistaken notion of the existence of silver has that of a mother-of-pearl. Hence if that ignorance is removed by an inference or by knowledge derived from one who knows the fact then the mistaken notion ought to be removed.

This has been added in order to support the above objection.

यौक्तिकज्ञानेन च.........न स्यात्—This is an additional reason in support of the objection.

यौक्तिकज्ञान is knowledge generated by reasoning.

साक्षात्कारार्थम् means 'for the realization of the Self'.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha says that this expression means 'for the sake of the direct knowledge known as ऋतंभरा प्रज्ञा'.

श्रवणमननादि means 'hearing, meditation &c.'

The ground of the objection is that if Nescience is removed by reasoning only there is no necessity to hear the Scriptures from a preceptor, to meditate over the meaning thereof and concentrate the mind thereon because the object of doing all that is to cause the removal of Nescience.

द्वितीये च.........विद्यमानत्वात्—If it is believed that the veil of ignorance is not removed by inference &c. then it cannot be said that there is fire on the mountain unless the ignorance as to its existence at that place is removed on the perception of smoke there, for the cause of the impediment is still there.

द्विविधमावरणम्.........उभयावच्छेदानुभवात्—The veil of ignorance appears in two different forms. In one form it resides in the Self as limited by the inner organ and makes things appear as non-existent. In the other it resides in the Self as limited by the objects of sense and tends to make things not visible. This is inferred from the fact that there arises the consciousness such as 'I do not know the pot' which consists of an idea of limitations being experiened on the knowing-self and the object-self.

Cf. जाड्यं जगत्यनुगतं खलु भावरूपं
मौढ्यं च पुंगतमिति प्रतिभाति तादृक् ।
जाड्यं च मौढ्यमिति चानुभवप्रसिद्ध-
मज्ञानमाहुरपवर्गपिधानदक्षम् ॥ सं. शा. १-३२२ ॥.

तत्राद्यं.........निवर्तते—The former of them is removed by that kind of knowledge which is common to things that are before one's eyes and those that are not.

For the removal of the ignorance residing in the knowing-self it is not necessary that there should be direct perception. A word of a man on whom we can rely or a sign of the existence of the thing is sufficient for that purpose. This is inferred from the experience that once it is inferred that there is fire on a mountain even though it is not actually seen or that there is a country like England, France, Japan or China even though one may not have actually gone to any of them, the belief that it does not exist does not again arise.

द्वितीयं तु.........निवर्तते—The latter kind of ignorance is removed by direct perception only.

यन्निष्ठं यदाकारं.........निष्ठत्वात्—There is a rule that knowledge destroys the ignorance with respect to that object and in that form with respect to which and in which form it is produced.

Knowledge produced by inference &c. consists of a change in the state of the mind preceded by a mental vision of a pot &c. and has no connection with any object outside it. It therefore destroys the ignorance as to its existence which existed in the mind. On the other hand knowledge produced by direct perception consists of a change in the state of the mind which is preceded by a connection formed between it through a sense-organ and the object. Hence it destroys not only the ignorance in the mind as to its existence only but also that as to its existence at a particular place in a particular form, by producing a mental image.

This sentence has been read differently by different persons. A different reading has been already noted in foot-note 3 at p. ३८.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha reads the first part of it as यदाश्रयं यदाकारं...... ...तदाश्रयं तदाकारं...नियमात् and instead of the second part he reads

the following two sentences, namely, परोक्षज्ञानस्य इन्द्रियविषयसन्निकर्षाभावेन ज्ञानस्यान्तःकरणमात्राश्रयत्वात्। अपरोक्षज्ञानस्यैव विषयव्यापारजन्यत्वेन विषयान्तःकरणोभयजन्यत्वेन तदुभयनिष्ठत्वात्. Abhyankara reads the first part of the sentence like Nārāyaṇa and as for the second also he reads the two sentences but with some variations which do not however make any material change in their meanings.

It may be noted that the expression परोक्षापरोक्षनिष्ठत्वात् means the same thing as उभयनिष्ठत्वात् and that it has therefore been used with reference to अपरोक्षज्ञान only which is being explained and that the words परोक्ष and अपरोक्ष have been used therein with reference to things not knowledge.

परोक्षज्ञानतो........अभानावृत्तिहेतुता—Purushottama says that this is a quotation from the *Vārttika* of Sures'varāchārya. So does Abhyankara. None of them has however given the number of the verse and the chapter in which it occurs. I have not been able to find it there but have found it in the *Pañchadas'i* as noted in the text.

Abhyankara has explained the word हेतुता to mean हेतुत्वम्. Nārāyaṇa has explained the expressions असत्त्वावृत्तिहेतुता and अभानावृत्तिहेतुता as नास्तीतिव्यवहारप्रयोजिकाऽविद्या and न भातीति व्यवहारप्रयोजिकाऽविद्या respectively. These are of course free renderings.

तेनानुमानादे........सोपाधिकसाक्षात्कारिभ्रमनिवृत्तिरिति—The author now winds up the discussion as to what the means of proof other than direct perception are able to do and what direct perception is able to do.

तस्मान्निर्धर्मक........अध्यास उपपद्यते—It is stated by the author at the commencement of the commentary on the first verse (*Vide p.* ८) that according to the view of the Aupanishadās the Self is really without any attributes but it partakes of those of being the doer &c. on account of Nescience. Having cleared off all doubts with respect to the theory of अध्यास which according to them is the cause of the Self partaking of those attributes, he reasserts that view in somewhat different words in the form of a conclusion.

तस्मात् here means 'since अध्यास is without any faults'.

The attributes above spoken of are those of Nescience and its

product the inner organ. These attributes are seen to attach to the Self which is without any attributes. That is अध्यास (mistaken knowledge). Such knowledge arises because of the mistaken identification of the Self with Nescience and the inner organ to whom they really belong. This is the way in which the conclusion is established.

P. 39. ननु त्वन्मते.........इति वक्तव्यम्—As against the above statement one doubt is likely to be raised and that is whether the attributes which belong to others, namely, Nescience and the inner organ, are experienced as residing in the Self though residing in the others or whether they are produced in the Self. If the first alternative is accepted then there is the possibility of the अन्यथाख्याति (experience of a thing as otherwise) being accepted. If on the other hand the second is accepted, then the main doctrine falls to the ground because it would then be accepted that they are produced in the Self just as they are produced in the inner organ. It cannot be said that there is a distinction between the two owing to the nature of the connection of each with the attributes because intimate connection being denied, connection everywhere means identification due to Nescience. If on the other hand, it is said that in the case of the one the attributes have a व्यावहारिक (phenomenal) existence and in that of the other प्रातीतिक (imaginary), then in asmuch as the attributes are experienced in two different forms there is a distinction between them. This objection is cleared off in this passage upto the expression द्वयाभावाद्वा.

The expression अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिः has been explained by Abhyankara to mean अनिर्वचनीयस्य ख्यातिः प्रतीतिः. He has further explained what is meant by it, by saying that the silver that appears in a mother-of-pearl is not real because on the rise of true knowledge it ceases to appear and that it is neither unreal because such a thing cannot appear to exist even through a fault. Hence such silver is incapable of being described either as real or unreal and therefore it is said to be indescribable, *i. e.* to say, of a nature different from the real and the unreal. For a comparison of this kind of ख्याति with the अन्यथाख्याति of the Naiyāyikās *vide Dās Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. pp. 485–89.*

तथा च......द्वेधाऽवभासः स्यात्—There is a sharp distinction between

things which have a व्यावहारिक (phenomenal) and those which have a प्रातीतिक (imaginary) existence. The former can be proved to be unreal only when the true nature of Brahma is realized while the latter can be proved to be such by the ordinary means of proof such as direct perception &c. The distinction between them would be of the same nature as that between the redness that is percieved in a जपाकुसुम and that in a स्फटिक placed near it.

Prof. Das Gupta has explained this distinction also in the passage above referred to.

न स्यात्,.........द्वयाभावाद्वा—The author's answer to the above objection is that such a dual appearance would not take place for two reasons, namely (1) that the Self and the mind being identified with each other the distinction between the two kinds of attributes cannot be percieved and (2) that the mind accompanied by all the attributes being identified with the Self it is not experienced that some attributes of a nature different from that of its own attributes arise in the Self.

तस्मादेकस्यैवात्मन.........न वा विरोधः—Having thus cleared off all possible objections to the one Self being the knower, the thing to be known &c. which he commenced to do with the words ननु भवत्त्वविद्यावशात् &c. (*Vide p.* ३१), the author now establishes that the objections that there is a self-contradiction in the Vedānta doctrine and that it is apt to be mixed up with that of the Bauddhās (*i. e.* the S'ūnyavādins) which were raised in the beginning (*Vide p.* १७) are not substantial.

अन्यापिव्यवस्थाः.........उपपादयिष्यन्ते—This has been said with reference to the portion of the commentary on Verse VIII wherein the genesis of the world, the states of the individual souls &c. are explained. (*Vide pp.* ५३-७६).

उपरिष्टात् means 'hereinafter'. It is the co-relative of अधस्तात्.

तस्माज्ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यात्मनः.........इत्यौपनिषदमतमेव प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम्—The author now winds up the whole of the discussion as to the meaning of Verse I which according to him is intended to establish that the view of the Aupanishadās is the best of those referred to in the Introductory Remarks at p. ८.

According to the views of the other philosophers the Self is identical with either the body or any of the organs of sense or the mind or its attributes. All these are liable to changes and are

objects of perception. On the other hand the pure Self believed in by the Aupanishadās remains unchanged even in the state of deep sleep. It is therefore that their view is stated to be the best.

Summary—It had been said in the preceding passage that liberation took place only on the eradication of ignorance by the acquisition of the knowledge of the sense of any of the महावाक्य's. With reference to that a query is raised here whether other means of proof such as inference &c. are or are not capable of eradicating the veil of ignorance. This is answered by saying that ignorance has two aspects, one consisting of grossness residing in the Self as limited by the objects of the world and the other of dulness residing in the individual soul, that corresponding to them two effects are produced, namely, non-manifestation in the former and ignorance as to the existence thereof in the latter and that the latter can but the former cannot be eradicated by knowledge produced by inference &c. It is also incidentally explained that when false knowledge is produced by an object of sense-perception, it can be eradicated only by direct perception not by inference.

Further according to the Vedānta doctrine the attributes of being the doer, enjoyer &c. belong to the mind not the Self yet they appear as belonging to the latter owing to its identification with the mind. With reference to that it may be said that those attributes must be said to be produced in the Self as indescribables owing to superimposition and when it is so said the attributes would be appearing in two different forms, an ordinarily real one called व्यावहारिक and an imaginary one called प्रातीतिक. But that objection is groundless because the attributes cannot be so distinguished either because the Self is identified with the mind or because what is superimposed is the mind together with the attributes.

The existence of the knower, the thing to be known &c. being thus shown to be consistent with the Adwaita doctrine there is no contradiction owing to the admission of a reflection &c. as the result of a beginningless superimposition of Nescience and no lapse into the doctrine of the Bauddhās owing to a difference in conditions being believed to be the cause of the separate existence of the knower, the thing to be known &c.

Grand Summary—It may be recalled that the Madhusūdana introduced the first verse of the Stotra by saying that a work of this nature was necessary because though it was a fact that the know-

ledge of the true nature of the Self arose from the Mahāvākyas, doubts were likely to arise in the minds of men with poor intellect. He then mentioned the views of the different philosophers from the Chārvākās down to the Aupanishadās and stated that S'ankarāchārya had composed the first verse in order to prove that the last alone was the correct one. He then explained how the different views above-mentioned could be deemed to have been referred to in the said verse and cleared off some objections which seemed to him likely to be raised against his interpretation and stated that the reason for the rejection of the other views was contained in the expression अनैकान्तिकत्वात् which meant being variable or destructible by nature. He then established that nature of the body &c. by reasoning. Thereafter he introduced the expression सुषुप्त्येकसिद्धः with the objection how the Self could be said to be immutable when it is our common experience that in deep sleep there is no consciousness though according to the Adwaitins the Self is of the nature of knowledge. Having then explained the meaning of that expression by saying that there was not the absence of the Self in the state of deep sleep in asmuch as it existed as the witness of that state, he established *seriatim* the following points either by reasoning or on the authority of certain Vedic texts, namely, (1) why it was necessary to believe in the existence of a witness apart from the knower; (2) whether there is any basis for such a belief; (3) why the immutable Self was believed to be the witness not the mind which made knowledge possible and (4) why the mind which was inert was believed to be the support of knowledge. (pp. ८ to १२).

The answer to the last point being that the mind acquired the power of being the support of knowledge owing to its taking a reflection of the Self due to its extreme purity like a mirror or to the तादात्म्याध्यास (mistaken identification) of the Self with it, that gave an occasion to establish the following further points, namely, (1) how a thing having no form and no limbs could be reflected; (2) even if it were possible whether there is any S'āstric authority for saying that the Self is in fact reflected and (3) whether the theory of अध्यास can be logically established.

The attempt to establish that theory extends upto the end of the commentary on that verse as several points of a polemical nature are established on raising them incidentally.

The line of reasoning adopted in doing so is that the common consciousness 'I am a man,' 'I am the doer,' 'I am the enjoyer' &c. is neither recollection nor right knowledge but a mistaken notion; that the cause of such a notion is beginningless ignorance which can neither be said to be real nor unreal and is therefore indescribable and is yet a positive entity not a mere negation of knowledge nor of the nature of delusion, doubt or a succession of either of them, that this ignorance is superimposed upon the Self and gives rise to the notion of the ego, that on the Self as superimposed by it are superimposed the attributes of the ego and the senses, that on the Self as superimposed by the latter, the gross body is superimposed and that the superimposition of the original ignorance is beginningless by itself but those of the others, *i. e.* the ego down to the gross body are related to one another like the seed and the sprout. (pp. १२. to २६).

The said theory being thus established, gave an occasion to clear up two other doubts, namely (1) how the one Self could be divided into जीव and ईश्वर and (2) how it could be divided into four parts which were necessary for each act, namely, the knower, the means of knowledge, the act of knowledge and the thing to be known.

In trying to clear up the first, he has set forth four theories which are known respectively as (1) आभासवाद, (2) प्रतिबिम्बवाद, (3) अवच्छेदवाद and (4) दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद or एकजीववाद and stated at the end that it matters very little which is accepted as satisfactorily explaining the phenomena in question because there is no difference between their exponents as to the main doctrine (pp. २६ to ३१).

While clearing up the second he explains the method by which knowledge arises and refutes certain objections which are likely to be raised by rival philosophers. (pp. ३१ to ३९).

Having done that he winds up the discussion for the time being by saying that other arrangements will be explained later on and reiterates the conclusion that the Self remaining unchanged in the state of deep sleep while the body, senses and mind being liable to changes and being objects of perception, the views of those philosophers who consider the Self to be identical with any of the latter are mistaken and that of the Aupanishadās the right one. (p. ३९).

Verse II. स्यादेतत्—It may be so.

This is one of the ways in which discussion on one topic being closed, that of another is commenced *e. g. vide S'ankara's Bhās'ya on the Brahmasūtrās II. 1. 25. & 31, II. 2. 3, 5 & 7*[1].

P. 40. आत्मनो निर्धर्मकत्वे......इत्याशङ्क्य—The doubt here raised is this:—If the Self is without attributes and all intercourse is based upon superimposition then the Vedic injunctions such as ब्राह्मणो यजेत and others would be rendered unauthoritative because the Self not being a doer or enjoyer would not proceed to any actions, and if the Vedas are rendered unauthoritative, the existence of Brahma cannot be proved as that is the only accepted means of proof for it and therefore to avoid that result you should admit that the knower &c. are real things.

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् is the third Sūtra of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya of the *S'ārīraka Sūtras.* It means that the Scriptures *i. e.* the Vedas are the source of knowledge of Brahma.

किं तत्त्वज्ञानात्पूर्वं.........ऊर्ध्वं वा—The above objection is met by asking whether you mean that the Vedas would be unauthoritative before the knowledge of that true nature of the Self arises or after it.

यावदविद्यानिवृत्तिव्यवस्थाया उपपादितत्वात्—It can be explained that upto the time of the eradication of Nescience all the differences must exist.

अविद्यावद्विषयत्वेन means 'having for their subjects things which are affected by Nescience'.

तद्दशायां बाधाभावात्—The means of proof such as direct perception, revelation &c. are not capable of being contradicted until one's ignorance is eradicated.

निष्प्रत्यूहम्—Without hindrance.

It is quite obvious that all the means of proof are concerned with finite objects whether they exist on the physical or metaphysical plane. They are therefore useful only so long as the original

1. *N. S. P. Edition, pp. 474, 479, 495, 496, 497.*

ignorance exists. The Vedas too being one of the means are useful only upto that stage and not further.

Purushottam has in this connection raised the point that the illustration ब्राह्मणो यजेत occurs in the कर्मकाण्ड portion of the Vedas while the existence of Brahma is to be proved from its ज्ञानकाण्ड portion and that it might therefore be argued that even if the former portion is proved to be unauthoritative the latter would not be and disposes of it by saying that the Vedas constitute one entire work and that therefore if one part thereof is proved to be unauthoritative, the whole must be deemed to have been proved to be such. He further points out that the Upanishads which constitute the ज्ञानकाण्ड contain several injunctions for performing Upāsanā. Hence if the above reasoning is sound, the portions thereof containing those injunctions would also have to be excluded. The result thereof would be that only a portion of a portion only of the Vedas would be authoritative. This involves the fault called अर्धजरतीयन्याय in logic.

द्वितीये त्विष्टापत्तिरेव—The alternative view is that the Vedas are not authoritative after the rise of the knowledge of Brahma.

This view is acceptable to the author as can be seen from the verse which follows.

वर्णाः—This is the nominative plural of the word वर्ण which is derived from the root वर्ण् 10 U. That root ordinarily means 'to paint, colour or dye' but in same cases it also means 'to exert oneself or to spread or expand or extend'. The ordinary meaning is not applicable when the word वर्ण is used with reference to the Brāhmaṇas, Kshatriyas and others because though the Brāhmaṇas Kshatriyas and Vais'yas had bodies of the same colour, their Varṇas were different. It is not right also to translate it by the word 'caste' because while the modern castes are water-tight compartments, the Varṇas were not as can be seen from the numerous instances of Vas'ishtha, Vis'wāmitra, and others and the elaborate rules of Dharmas'āstra given in Chapter X of Manu's Code. It is therefore proper to understand the root वर्ण् in the latter word to have been used in the sense of either 'to exert oneself or to spread or expand'. The first sense would fit in because though the Varṇas were not wholly based upon occupations as is commonly supposed, they did to a certain extent indicate occupations and

the Varṇa of a man proved to be an index to the way in which he exerted himself for his daily bread. The second sense would fit in still more than that because the Varṇas were capable of spreading or expanding with the spread or expansion of the Āryan race owing to the divisions having been based on the qualities inherent in the individuals and the actions that they did.[1] Chapter X of Manu's Code contains sufficient evidence of these Varṇas being elastic enough to embrace within their folds persons who whatever their parentage, possessed certain qualities and followed certain occupations. The fact that in course of time these Varṇas gave place to the castes in the modern sense is quite true. But that does not depreciate the value of the other fact that they were originally elastic. Hence the most appropriate sense of the root वर्ण् in the word वर्ण must be taken to be 'to spread' or 'to expand' and the latter word can best be translated as 'a class'.

The names of the Varṇas are ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय, वैश्य and शूद्र. Each Varṇa had its own specific charactaristics and specific duties were assigned to it in the organic structure of the Āryan society.[2] Even those duties were not so immutable like the laws of the Medes and the Persians but changeable according to exigencies. Thus a Brāhmaṇa could, if he was not literate enough to follow his own occupation of teaching the Vedas, bear arms or trade in all articles except certain prohibited ones such as cattle, liquors, oils &c. Similarly a Kshatriya could, if he had not sufficient physical strength or knowledge of archery, trade or cultivate lands[3] &c.

वर्णाश्रमाचारधर्माः—Out of the four classes into which the Āryan society had been divided, the first three were called the twice-born because in addition to their physical birth, they underwent a spiritual birth at the time of their being invested with the sacred thread which in the case of a Brāhmaṇa boy was done at the age of 5 to 8 years, in the case of a Kshatriya boy at that of 11 to 15 years and in that of a Vais'ya boy at that of 16 to 18 years. Since that birth they were said to have entered an order of Brahmachārīs *i. e.* celibrates whose duty was to study the Vedas and the sciences. The period for remaining in that order

1. *Bhagawadgītā* IV. 13.
2. *Ibid. XVIII. 40-45.*
3. *Manu X. 75-130.*

depended upon the course of study chosen and the capacity to observe the rules thereof prescribed by the Dharmas'āstra. The minimum was originally 12 years and the maximum 48 years. Thereafter one underwent an ablution-ceremony and entered the order of the Grihasthas (householders) on marrying a girl having the prescribed qualifications. This order had its own rules. After the desires to acquire wealth, fame and progeny subsided one could enter the order of the Vānaprasthas (hermits) whose chief rule was that one must live in a forest with one's wife and be completely self-dependent even in the matter of articles of food which must therefore be as simple and harmless as possible. The last order was that of the Sannyāsins (recluses) in which one had to cut off all worldly ties and remain aloof from the temptations of the world and devote oneself entirely to the realization of the Self. It seems that it was not compulsory for all the Brahmachāris to go through the orders of the Grihasthas and Vānaprasthas before being Sannyāsins at least since the time of S'ankarāchārya if not earlier than that for he himself never married but became a Sannyāsin at a very young age.

अत्र छन्द........लभ्यन्ते—Madhusūdana says that by taking the compound वर्णाश्रमाचारधर्माः as a *genetive tatpurusha* with two *dwandwas* concealed in it we get it to comprise the duties of the Varṇas and the Ās'ramas. Purushottama adopting that suggestion solves it as:—वर्णाश्च आश्रमाश्च, आचाराश्च धर्माश्च, वर्णाश्रमाणामाचारधर्माः वर्णाश्रमाचारधर्माः.

धारणा........मनसः स्थैर्यम्—Dhāraṇā is the steadiness of (one's) mind in Brahma, to the exclusion of external objects. The word धारणा is a technical term of the Yoga Philosophy employed to designate the sixth Anga of Yoga and the initial stage in contemplation.

In the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali (III. 1) it is defined as देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा. The word देश therein is expressive of a place. Anyone who has ever made efforts to concentrate the mind on the Essence can readily understand that the natural tendency of the human mind is to become occupied with thoughts about some external objects and that even when one is sitting in a quiet room and has closed one's eyes the impressions of objects previously experienced rise up to disturb the peace of mind which is essential for its concentration on the Essence. Arjuna when asked by S'rī Krishṇa in the *Bhagawadgītā* to practise Yoga for self-purification and

try to realize the happiness which arises from union with Brahma, refers to this tendency in the following graphic manner :—

योऽयं योगस्त्वया प्रोक्तः साम्येन मधुसूदन ।
एतस्याऽहं न पश्यामि चञ्चलत्वात्स्थितिं स्थिराम् ॥
चञ्चलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद्दृढम् ।
तस्याऽहं निग्रहं मन्ये वायोरिव सुदुष्करम् ॥ ६.३३-३४ ॥

S'ri Krishṇa admits that the mind is of such a nature and replies :—

असंशयं महाबाहो मनो दुर्निग्रहं चलम् ।
अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च गृह्यते ॥
असंयतात्मना योगो दुष्प्राप इति मे मतिः ।
वश्यात्मना तु यतता शक्योऽवाप्तुमुपायतः ॥ ६.३५-३६ ॥

This effort to turn one's mind back from the external objects to the Essence is called धारणा. As it is not easy to turn it at once to the abstract Essence the initial device is to concentrate it on some idol or picture of S'rī Krishna or Mahādeva or Gaṇapati or Parvati or Gāyatri or on Omkāra and once that is properly and distinctly impressed on one's mind one should try to realize its existence in every object that one sees and thereby realize the following ideal, namely,

अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम् ।
भूतभर्तृ च तज्ज्ञेयं ग्रसिष्णु प्रभविष्णु च ॥ भ. गी. १३.१६ ॥
समं सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्तं परमेश्वरं ।
विनश्यत्स्वविनश्यन्तं यः पश्यति स पश्यति ॥ सैव. १३.२७ ॥

Of course the Essence has no form and no limbs but as concentration is not possible on the abstract idea thereof this device has to be employed in the beginning of Yoga practice. S'ankara here says that one who has realized the Absolute does not stand in need of this means because it is like a sugar-coated quinine-pill which is required to be administered to the patients who would not take quinine in the powder-form or even in the simple pill-form or the kindergarten pictures and toys which are utilized in order to teach very young children. Ultimately of course the mind is to be fixed on Brahma to the exclusion of all external objects including representations or signs thereof as the commentator says,

ध्यानं.........चिन्तनम्—Concentration is contemplation of Paramātmā.

ध्यान is the seventh Aṅga of Yoga and the next stage after धारणा. In the Yoga Sūtras of Patanjali it is defined as तत्प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम्. धारणा is the effort-stage while ध्यानम् is the result-stage of the process above-described.

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः—Yoga is the control of the action of the mind.

The term योग is derived from युज् (7. U.) to join, unite or connect. Primarily therefore it means, 'union', or 'connection'. Here however it is used in the technical sense of deep and abstract meditation or contemplation of the Supreme Spirit which is accomplished by the control of the usual function of the mind. Patanjali's *Yoga Sūtras* contain very minute and elaborate rules by the observance whereof the mind can be turned away from the sense-objects and fixed in the contemplation of the Absolute.

The above definition of that term appears to have been taken bodily from those Sūtras (*Vide* I. 1. 2). Cf. also *Bhagawadgītā* VI. 10-32.

आदिशब्देन.........गृह्यन्ते—By the word आदि are understood श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यासन.

These are the technical terms employed by the Vedāntins whose method differs somewhat from that of the Rājayogis of the Pātanjala School. These terms are taken from the *Brihadāraṇyakopanishat* IV. wherein Yājñavalkya imparts the knowledge of the Self to his wife Maitreyī.

S'ankara says that to one who has known the Absolute the method prescribed by the Uttaramīmānsā School is also of no use, and rightly because a ladder is useful only for ascending to a loft and once it is reached it ceases to be of use because descending from it is never thought of as S'rī Krishṇa says in *Bhagwadgītā* XV. 6.

अनात्मा.........नास्तीत्यर्थः—In this sentence Madhusūdana gives the gist of the whole verse.

अनात्मा ordinarily means a non-self *i. e.* an object of perception or anything other than the Self including the mind and the

intellect. According to the commentator it is however figuratively used in the sense of Nescience which is the primary cause of all such objects. The अध्यास in the forms of the consciousness 'I am the body', 'This object belongs to me' &c. is born of that Nescience as explained at pp. २४-२५ *supra*. When that false knowledge is eradicated together with its source by the true knowledge of the Essence, all idea of distinctions vanishes.

P. 41. Verse III. वर्णाश्रमादिव्यवहारस्य......व्यतिरेकमाह—In as much as the worldly distinctions are born of false knowledge only, the author in order to impress their falseness says that they in fact do not exist philosophically by appealing to the experience of deep sleep.

वेदा......प्रमाणवाक्यानि—The Vedas consist of two principal parts, namely (1) that which aims at imparting the knowledge of those means *i. e.* the acts which are calculated to bring about welfare (to oneself) and misery (to one's opponents) and (2) that which aims at imparting the knowledge of Brahma. The first includes the Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas and the second consists of the Upanishads.

ज्योतिष्टोमादयः—Jyotishtoma, Dars'apūrnamāsa, Agnishtoma, Putreshti &c. are the names of the sacrifices which are the means for attainment of the specific fruits contemplated by men whose worldly desires are not satiated.

तीर्थं........कुरुक्षेत्रादिदेशः—For securing the desired fruits it is essential that the prescribed sacrifices should be performed at some holy place such as Kuruks'etra, Nimishāraṇya, Prayāga and others.

एवं पापकर्म........उपलक्षणीयानि—The means for sinful acts should be similarly understood.

The commentators are silent as to what is exactly meant by the word पापकर्म but from the explanation of this sentence given by Abhyankara it appears that they must be मारण, उच्चाटण, वशीकरण &c. which are treated of in the Atharvaveda. These acts are sinful because they involve the killing of animals for the propitiation of evil spirits, sitting in cemetries &c. and bring about no good to anybody but only misery to other human beings.

सर्वेषां........अविद्यमानतेत्यर्थः—All these *i. e.* parents, gods &c.

seem to exist because we identify ourselves with the physical body. The Self is not personally connected with them. Hence in the state of deep sleep in which it is unconnected with the mind and the senses they do not appear to exist.

P. 42. तथाच सुषुप्तिं प्रकृत्य श्रुतिः.........सर्वानर्थनिवृत्तिमनुवदन्ति—The author supports the above proposition by Vedic texts of which अत्र पिताऽपिता &c. is a type.

भ्रूणहा means 'the destroyer of a fœtus'.

According to *Manu Smriti X. 12* चण्डाल was the caste-name given to sons born to Brāhmaṇa women through intercourse with S'ūdra men and according to *Ibid* X. 18 read with 8 पुक्कस which is the same as पौल्कस was the caste-name given to sons born to S'ūdra women through intercourse with Nishādas *i. e.* sons born of intercourse between Brāhmaṇ men and S'ūdra women.

These being offsprings of प्रतिलोम marriages *i. e.* marriages between men of lower castes and women of higher ones were looked down upon by the Āryas though they did not disapprove of all inter-caste marriages as the Hindus now do.

A श्रमण means a member of the order of Sannyāsins.

A तापसः is a member of the order of Vānaprasthins.

अनन्वागतम् means 'unconnected'.

The gist of the text is that in the state of deep sleep, the soul becomes disconnected from bodies of all sorts and from all the good and bad acts which give distinctive caste-names and order-names amongst men and transcends all the sorrows or miseries of the heart.

The word शोक has here apparently the same meaning as that in the text तरति शोकमात्मवित्.

ननु.........शून्यतैव स्यात्—To the above proposition an objection is anticipated, namely, that if all phenomena ceases to exist then there would be left nothing else but a void which means a lapse into the doctrine of the Mādhyamikās.

निरस्तमतिशून्यात्मकत्वं यस्मात्तथा......अतिशून्यात्मकत्वम् means according to Abhyankara अतिशून्यस्वरूपत्वम् (the quality of being of the nature of

total voidness). The Self from which that is removed is called निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वं *i. e.* शून्यविरोधिस्वरूपं चैतन्यम्. The quality of being such would have to be described as निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वत्वम्. The second 'त्व'प्रत्यय is however omitted from the text for a reason which is explained in the next sentence.

भावप्रधानो निर्देशः—In the expression (निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वम्) the principal thing is the quality (not the possessor of that quality).

तस्य.........पुनरुत्थानानुपपत्तेश्च—The existence of the pure Self even in the state of deep sleep has to be assumed because a state presupposes the existence of a thing undergoing it and because if it is not presupposed then the return to the state of waking which does take place would be impossible, *i. e.* to say, that occurrence would remain unexplained.

अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा—Possessing the attribute of indestructibility.

मात्रासंसर्गः—This compound is made up of the word मात्रा and असंसर्गः, the अ in the latter having been dropped. Purushottam defines the word मात्रा as मीयते इति मात्रा and then says तेन असम्बन्धः इत्यर्थः. Brahmānanda also says मात्रासंसर्गः स्थूलकार्यासम्बन्धः. The word मात्रा can therefore be taken to mean the body and the senses which delimit the activity of the individual soul. For a similar use of this term cf. मात्रास्पर्शास्तु कौन्तेय शीतोष्णसुखदुःखदाः। (*Bh. Gītā.* II. 14).

यद्वै.........पश्यति—The explanation of this enigma is that in the state of deep sleep the Self witnesses everything but as it is not affected by the objects of perception owing to the temporary absence of the inner organ, it is not (as it were) seeing them.

स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन—On the analogy of the digging in of a post (which has already been fixed in the ground).

As a post though fixed in the ground is pushed inside and made doubly firm by spreading and pressing fresh earth so an argument is also put in another form and brought home by corroborative illustrations in order that there may remain no room for a misunderstanding.

Madhusūdana seems to refer to the first verse by his remark निराकृतमपि निराक्रीयते. (*Vide pp.* १२-१३ *supra*).

यद्वा.........तदात्मकत्वात्—This is an alternative dissolution of the

compound निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वात् occurring in the verse under consideration.

अशनाया generally means 'hunger' *i. e.* a desire to eat but here it means 'desire in general'.

The word निरस्त is here taken to mean '(Brahma) which transcends desire &c'.

The gist of the expression as here interpreted is that the Self is identical with Brahma which transcends desire &c., is without a second and transcends the void.

यदा पुरुषः.........वेदनान्तरम्—The gist of this text is that just as a man embraced by his beloved forgets all surroundings and internal sorrows being one with her for the time being so man being one with the प्राज्ञात्मा the presiding deity of deep sleep becomes oblivious of everything inside and roundabout his physical body.

P. 43. तेन जगत्कारणीभूत.........इति सिद्धम्—This is the conclusion drawn from the discussion as to the true nature of the individual soul extending from pp. ८ to ४३. Stated in plain English it is that the individual soul is devoid of misery because he is identical with Brahma who being the cause of the universe is omniscient, perfect as possessed of all powers and of the nature of bliss and knowledge.

PART II.

Determination of the Term 'Tat'.

P. 44. Verse IV. एवं तावत्........वादिविप्रतिपत्तयः प्रदर्श्यन्ते—It may be recalled that Madhusūdana had said at pp. ७–८ *supra* that though the knowledge of the true nature of the Self which frees the individual soul from bondage arises from the great sayings such as "Thou art That", "I am Brahma" &c., a work of a polemical nature such as the *Siddhāntabindu* is useful in that it serves to clear up doubts which are likely to arise in the mind of an aspirant owing to divergent views having been propounded by learned men and to dispel their ignorance. Such views have been propounded with respect to the senses of the terms त्वम् and तत् occurring in the *Chhāndogya* sentence तत्त्वमसि because the sense of a sentence is dependent upon those of the principal words occurring therein. Thereout Madhusūdana has discussed the divergent views as to the sense of the word त्वम् and established that the correct meaning of that word is the pure Self not the physical body &c. He now proceeds to discuss those as to the correct meaning of the word तत्.

जगत्कारणं च.........इति साङ्ख्याः—The Sāṃkhyas say that the cause of the Universe is Pradhāna, an inert substance.

It has already been explained at pp. 34–36 *supra* who the Sāṃkhyas are, what are the principal works in which their doctrine has been propounded and what is their view of the nature of the individual soul whom they call Purusha. Nothing has however been said there as to the cause of the universe which according to them is Pradhāna. This according to them is a positive substance quite independent of the Purusha and the primeval cause of the diverse phenomena including the bodies, organs of sense and minds. It consists of the three guṇas, Sattwa Rajas and Tamas which go to make up every substance in the universe, whether physical or metaphysical. When the universe is dissolved, they are in a state of equipoise. When on the other hand the work of creation begins, their equipoise is disturbed and they become mixed up in varying proportions and give rise to the varying phenomena by a process of evolution pursuant to an

inherent teleology which makes the Prakriti subservient to the diverse Purushas. The first evolute that is produced on account of this disturbance of the equilibrium of the guṇas is Mahat or Buddhi (cosmic intelligence). This product again becomes the parent of Ahaṁkāra (ego), the latter of the five Tanmātrās (subtle elements) and they again of the five Mahābhūtas (gross elements) on the one hand and the ten senses and the mind on the other. Thus the Prakriti and its products and the Purusha together make up the 25 Tattwas of the Saṃkhyās. The process of involution is exactly the reverse of this. That too commences in the interests of the Purushas *i. e.* to say, when it becomes necessary that they should cease to experience pleasure pain or dulness for some time. Though both these processes take place in the Prakriti it is by nature inert or lifeless. It is therefore compared to a blind man. The Purusha on the other hand is intelligence itself. There is no energy in him. He is therefore compared to a lame man. Such being their nature it is only when the Purusha the lame man sitting on the shoulders of Prakriti the blind one guides the latter that any action can take place.

For a more detailed exposition of this doctrine *Vide Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha of Mādhava* and *Dās Guptā's History of Indian Philosophy Ch. VII* pp. 238-58 and for a detailed refutation thereof by Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa *Vide Brahmasūtras* I. 5 to II. 2. 10 *and S'ankara's Bhās'ya thereon*[1].

पशुपतिरेव........स उपास्य एवेति पाशुपताः—The Pās'upatās are a sect of S'aivās and derive their name from Pas'upati, an epithet of the god S'iva whom they considered to be the highest deity. The etymological meaning of the latter word is 'The Lord of Pas'us' *i. e.* individual souls. The view of the S'aivites has been noticed here because they have a Dars'ana of their own known as the *Pas'upata-dars'ana* and even an Upanishad of their own known as the *Pās'upatabrahmopanishat.* That view is that Pas'upati is the cause of this universe. He is not unintelligent like the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas but is at the same time different from the individual soul and the Pās'a (fetter) that binds him, His powers of knowledge and action being unlimited and the latter's limited. Salvation according to the tenets of this sect is attained by the

1. *N. S. P. Edition pp. 161-502.*

worship of Pas'upati with intense devotion. This sect is referred to in the *Mahābhārata* and in inscriptions of the fifth century[1].

The modern Jangamās and Lingāyatās of Southern India seem to be an offshoot of this sect.

भगवान्वासुदेव.........इति पाञ्चरात्रिकाः—The Pāncharātrikās were a sect of the Vaishṇavaites. It is believed to be very ancient, the sage Narada being believed to be its founder[2] and the amplifier of the *Bhāgawat Purāṇa* which was narrated to him by Brahmā[3], and the teacher thereof to Vyāsa[4]. This sect is also referred to in the *Mahābhārata* and spoken of therein as being identical with the Pañchakālajñās[5]. They had an Upanishad of their own from the epic times[6]. The *Bhāgawat Puraṇa*, and *Mahābhārata* are believed by them to be of greater authority than even the Vedas. They believe Srī Krishṇa son of Vasudeva as the highest deity and the cause of the universe. The individual souls stand in relation to Him as sparks in relation to fire. They are freed from the cycle of births and deaths by intense devotion to Him to the exclusion of everything else. Even thereafter they do not lose their individuality but only live in constant company with Him.

परिणामी.........जैनाश्चिद्ण्डिनश्च—The Jainas do not as matter of fact believe in God. They do however believe that individual souls can by the practice of austerities and Yoga acquire the powers of omnis'cience, omnipresence &c. which are ascribed by the followers of the other religions to God. Their Tīrthankaras are such highly developed souls and the highest ideal of a Jaina is to attain to the state of a Tīrthankara. I believe Madhusūdana had that ideal in mind when he said that the Jainās believed that Īshwara was liable to transformation, eternal, omniscient and both separate from and identical with the individual souls.

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1. *Religions of India by Hopkins p. 482.*
2. *Prasthānabheda by Madhusūdana, Khadga Vilāsa Press Edition P. 13; Mahābhārata XII. 340. 8, 72.*
3. *Bhāgawat Purāṇa II. 7. 51-53.*
4. *Ibid. II. 9. 44.*
5. *Mahābhārata XII. 336, 337, & 339. Religions of India by Hopkins p. 413.*
6. *Ibid. XII. pp. 340 and 427 respectively.*

The last paradox is explained by Abhyankara in this way that the Arhat and the other Jīwas are identical from the point of view of चैतन्यत्व but separate as having individualities of their own.

The word त्रिदण्डिन् etymologically means one who holds a triple staff and hence a Sannyāsī. Here however that term is used in the plural number to denote a school of philosophers. Abhyankara says that they were theists in that they believed like the Naiyāyikas that there was an omniscient Lord of the Universe.

Hopkins says that according to Wilson the triple staff indicates control of word, thought and deed, and that these Tridandis are southern Vishnuites of the Ramanuja sect.[1]

आम्नायस्य क्रियापरत्वेन—Because the purport of the Scriptures is to refer to action.

This principle and its phraseology also have been borrowed from the *Pūrva Mīmāñsā Sūtra* I. 2. 1. which runs thus:—

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानां तस्मादनित्यमुच्यते ।

वाग्धेन्वादिवत्—As in the case of speech (being adored) like a cow.

There is a reference here to the text वाचं धेनुमुपासीत (बृ. आ. ५-८-१)

The theory of the Mīmāñsā school is that the purport of the Vedas is to refer to actions only and that every Vedic passage must therefore be so construed as to make it fall within the one or the other of the five classes into which the contents of the Vedas have been divided, namely, (1) विधि (injunctions); (2) मन्त्र (incantations); (3) नामधेय (names); (4) निषेध (prohibitions); and (5) अर्थवाद (explanatory or landatory passages).[2] If therefore any passage is construed to have for its object the imparting of the knowledge of Brahma that theory would be upset. The Mimāñsakās therefore say that the purport of such passages as यतो वा इमानि भूतानि &c. is not to impart the knowledge of the cause of the universe but to praise it in order to induce people to proceed to perform its उपासना (worship) which is a क्रिया enjoined by such passages as आत्मा वा अरे

1. *Religions of India p. 482.*

2. *Dr. Thebaut's Introduction to Laugākṣ'i Bhāskara's Arthasamgraha p. vii.*

द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः and others. That cause is either the atoms or the Jīva *i. e.* an inanimate or animate unit and that is enjoined to be worshipped under the belief that it is possessed of the qualities of omniscience &c. just as speech is enjoined to be worshipped like a cow.

As to the Mīmāñsakās and the literature of their school *vide pp. 30–34 supra.*

अस्ति.........जीवाद्भिन्न एवेति तार्किकाः—The Tārkikās otherwise called Naiyāyikās believe that there is an eternal, omniscient being who rules the universe not because the Vedas say so but because his existence can be inferred from his acts such as this earth, the heavenly bodies &c. He according to them is not identical with but essentially different from the individual soul.

For information as to the Tārkikās and the literature of their school and sub-schools *vide pp. 26–30 supra.*

क्षणिक सर्वज्ञ इति सौगताः—The Saugatās *i. e.* the Bauddhās like the Jainās and Mīmāñsakās do not believe in the existence of a creator of the universe in the sense in which other philosophers believe but hold that the cause of all phenomena whatever is momentary consciousness.

As to who the Saugatās are and what are the principal works of their school *vide pp. 22–25 supra* and for their doctrine and its refutation *vide S'ankara's Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtras II. 2. 18–32.*[1]

क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः.........इति पातञ्जलाः—Unaffected by sorrows, actions, their fruits and the latent desires, eternal, of the nature of knowledge, omniscient on account of its being reflected in the Sattwaguṇa portion of the Pradhāna and quite different from the Purusha who is subject to transmigration-such is the cause of the universe, say the Pātañjalās.

This definition of ईश्वर according to the Pātañjalās has been taken from *Yoga Sūtra* I. 24. क्लेश's (causes of trouble) are according to Patanjali five, namely (1) अविद्या, (2) अस्मिता (3) राग, (4) द्वेष, and (5) अभिनिवेश. अविद्या has been defined as the belief that things which are transient, impure, give pain and are

1. *N. S. P. Edition pp. 523. 58.*

non-selfs are eternal, pure, give happiness and are the Self. अस्मिता is the belief in the identity of the powers inherent in the seer and the seen, *i. e.* to say, the non-perception of the difference between the Self and the intellect. राग is attachment to the objects of sense and द्वेष its opposite *i. e.* to say, hatred. अभिनिवेश is the ignorance which causes the fear of death. कर्म means those actions which either are ordained or prohibited. विपाकाः are the fruits of actions which have to be endured. आशयाः are the impressions called latent desires which remain dormant in the mind till they are satisfied[1].

अद्वितीयपरमानन्द.........चेति औपनिषदाः—The Aupanishadās hold that Brahma is without a second and is supreme bliss only, that is the true nature of the individual soul and that when it becomes invested with omniscience &c. by Māyā, it becomes both the material and instrumental cause of the universe.

P. 45. औपनिषदपक्षस्य परिशेषेण तन्निर्णयाय—In order to determine that by the residue of the Upanishad school, *i. e.* to say, according to the view of that school which remains over on the refutation of these of the other schools aforesaid.

आदिशब्देनानुक्तानां सङ्ग्रहः—By the word आदि in the expression मीमांसकादेः are included those which have not been specifically mentioned in the verse, namely, those of the Tārkikās, Saugatās and Pātañjalās.

PP. 45–46. न तावदचेतनं जगदुपादानम्.........न साङ्ख्यमतं साधु—In this passage Madhusūdana justifies the view expressed by S'ankara in this verse by the words न साङ्ख्यम्. In doing so he mentions six reasons as to why the material cause of the universe cannot be an inert substance, like the Pradhâna of the Saṁkhyās and why the process of evolution can not have been as they believe. Those arguments stated in plain language are; (1) That the Chhāndogya text तदैक्षत &c. says that creation was made pursuant to a desire; (2) that another text अनेन जीवात्मना &c. of the same Upanishad speaks of the Self as having entered the elements and cleared up names and forms, (3) that it has been promised in the Muṇḍaka text यस्मिन्विज्ञाते &c. that by knowing the One, one would be conversant with everything and yet by the knowledge of Pradhāna, the Purushas who are not produced from it cannot be

1. *Yoga Sutras II. 3. 10.*

known; (4) that a third Chhāndogya text, namely ऐतदात्म्यमिदं &c. teaches nine times that there is no difference between the Self and Brahma; (5) that the varied creation of the universe cannot be accounted for if an inert substance like the Pradhāna were the cause of it owing to the Taittirīya text तस्माद्वा एतस्मात् &c. and (6) that there is no authority for believing in the Pradhāna, Mahat &c.

As stated at p. 136 *supra* the Saṁkhya view has been refuted by Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa in *Brahma Sūtra* I. 1. 5. to II. 2. 10 and his arguments have been elaborated by S'ankara in his Bhāshya thereon. Madhusūdana has picked up the main arguments there from and stated them here with this difference that while Bādarāyaṇa has said इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः and S'ankara commenting thereon has said प्रधानादितराणि यानि प्रधानपरिणामत्वेन स्मृतौ कल्पितानि महदादीनि न तानि वेदे लोके वोपलभ्यन्ते[1] (The entities other than the Pradhāna, namely Mahat and others which have been imagined in the Smriti[2] are not found either according to the Vedas or according to the popular belief to exist) Madhsūdana says that there is no basis for a belief in the existence of even the Pradhāna.

P. 46. ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं.........नवकृत्वोपदेशात्—The text ऐतदात्म्यमिदं &c. embodies the conclusion of the teaching imparted by the sage Uddālaka to his son S'vetaketu who having studied under another teacher for a number of years was found unable to answer a subtle question put to him by the former. That sage gives nine different illustrations in order to bring home to his son the great truth that the Self of which we are conscious as being present in our bodies is not in any way different from Brahma from which

1. *Brahma Sūtra II. 1. 2.* and *S'ankara's Bhāshya thereon at p. 436 of the N. S. P. Edition.*

2. The Smriti work here referred to is most probably the *S'ashtitantras'āstra* which is believed to have been composed by Kapila Muni for propounding the Sāṁkhya doctrine copies whereof are not now available. (*Vide Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. pp. 219-21*). It cannot be the Sāṁkhyakārikā of Īs'warakrishṇa because in his *Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra II. 1. 1.* S'aṇkara distinctly says that the initial word स्मृती in the preceding Sūtra स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् refers to a work of a Kapila Muni other than the Kapila of the name of Vāsudeva who chastised the sons of Sagara and that the expression अन्यस्मृति therein refers to the Smritis of Manu and others (*Vide N. S. P. Edition pp. 432-46*).

this universe has sprung and repeats the above formula after giving each illustration[1].

न च विधिशेषत्वात्........विधिशेषत्वस्य—The Mīmāñsakās say that no Vedic text establishes the true nature of Brahma because even the texts which seem to do so are auxiliary to the passages laying down injunctions for the performance of the उपासना of the cause of the world concieved as a deity as explained at pp. 138–39 *supra*. This writer says that this view is not a proper one because it is not proved that the former passages are auxiliary to the latter.

न चार्थवादाधिकरणन्यायाद्विधिशेषत्वम्, वैषम्यात्—The opponent may perhaps say that the fact may be deemed to have been proved according to the rule with regard to the अर्थवाद (laudatory) passages. This argument is refuted by saying that there is a dissimilarity between them.

It has been stated at p. 138 *supra* that the Mīmāñsakās divide all the Vedic texts into five classes the last whereof is that of the अर्थवाद's. In that class are included all those non-injunctory texts which do not directly refer to an act but have for their purpose the glorification of either a particular deity or the performer of the sacrifice. Thus for instance, the text वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता does not contain any injunction or prescribe any method of performance of an enjoined act but merely praises the Wind as the swiftest deity. It is therefore a laudatory passage. Such passages have according to the Mīmāñsakās no independent authority but are only subsidiary to the injunctive passages.

An अधिकरण is a complete argument dealing with any given question and is stated in the form of a quinquepartite syllogism, the 5 parts thereof being (1) विषय (subject or topic); (2) विशय (doubt); (3) पूर्वपक्ष (*primā facie* objection); (4) उत्तर (author's reply) and (5) निर्णय (conclusion).

The following couplet will, I hope, be helpful in bearing constantly in mind the names of the above component parts of an अधिकरणः—

विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरम्।
निर्णयश्चेति सिद्धान्तः शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम्॥

1. *Chhāndogyopanishat VI. 8. 7–15.*

Both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāñsa Dars'anas have been divided into several अध्याय's, each of the latter into several पाद's and each of the पाद's into several अधिकरण's. Each अधिकरण consists of one or more sūtras according to the nature of the point it deals with. Thus for instance, the first 4 अधिकरण's of the first पाद of the first अध्याय of the Uttara Mīmāñsa consists of one sūtra each, while the fifth has seven sūtras, the sixth has eight and so on.

The particular अधिकरण here referred to is that contained in the Pūrva Mīmāñsa I. 2. 1. and contains 18 sūtras.

वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता—This is a quotation from a Mantra of the Taittirīya Saṁhitā, namely II. 1. 1. 1. It runs thus:—

वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामो वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव स्वेन भागधेयेनोपधावति स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति भवति ।

स्वाध्यायविधिग्रहणान्यथानुपपत्त्या—The above and some other texts become purposeless unless they are construed to refer to the injunction स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः.

शब्दभावनेतिकर्तव्यतांशसाकाङ्क्षस्यविधेः—Of the injunction which stands in need of the part called इतिकर्तव्यता (method of performance) in the Verbal Bhāvanā.

A भावना has been defined in the अर्थसंग्रह as भवितुर्भावनानुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः (the peculiar activity of some productive agent which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to be). It is of two varieties, शाब्दी and आर्थी. The first has been defined as :—पुरुषप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः (the peculiar activity of some productive agent which tends to make a person act). In the case of a sentence belonging to worldly language such activity is the particular intention dwelling in the mind of the speaker but in the case of the Vedic sentences there being no speaker, it is believed to reside in the words characterized by optative terminations &c. It is for that reason that it is called the शाब्दीभावना.

Cf. also:—लिङ्लोडादिर्भावकस्तत्रभाव्या
नुष्ठेयेऽर्थेपुंस्प्रवृत्तिः प्रसिद्धा ।
लिङ्लोडादेःपुंस्प्रवृत्त्यंशनिष्ठो
व्यापारो यस्तं विदुर्भावनेति ॥ सं. शा. १.३८८ ॥

In the author's commentary on the *Bh. Gītā*, called गूढार्थदीपिका, he has made this clearer. He there says while commenting on

the term कर्मचोदना occurring in XVIII. 18. that चोदना means प्रवर्तना, अनुज्ञा or अनुमति and further states:—ते चाज्ञादयो ज्ञानविशेषा इच्छाविशेषा वा चेतनधर्मा एव लोके प्रसिद्धाः। वेदे तु विधिनाहं प्रेरितः करोमीति व्यवहर्तारो भवन्ति। तत्र स्वयमचेतनत्वादपौरुषेयत्वाच्च वैदिकस्य विधेर्न चेतनधर्मेणाज्ञानादिना प्रेरकता संभवति। अतः स्वधर्मेणैव साऽभ्युपगन्तव्या गत्यन्तरासंभवात्। स एव च धर्मश्चोदनाप्रवर्तनाप्रेरणाविधिरुपदेशः शब्दभावनेति चोच्यते।

This भावना has three constituent elements, namely (1) साध्य (result) (2) साधन (instrument) and (3) इतिकर्तव्यता (mode to be employed for achieving the result). The अर्थवाद passages are construed to supply this third element in the विधि.

संप्रदानभूतदेवता—The deity to whom the offering is made.

नष्टाश्वदग्धरथन्यायेन—On the analogy of the dead horse and burnt chariot.

What the writer means is that just as when in a battle one soldier has lost his horse and another's chariot is burnt they come to an understanding between themselves to yoke the horse of the latter to the chariot of the former and both occupying that chariot re-commence fighting so what is brought about by the अर्थवादाधिकरण is that the विधिवाक्य and अर्थवादवाक्य are shown to be reconcileable by saying that the latter supplies the deficiency of the इतिकर्तव्यतांश which is found in the former.

The meaning is that the विधिवाक्य being in need of an इतिकर्तव्यता and the अर्थवादवाक्य in that of a चोदना, the connection established between the two is not a natural one but one brought about by necessity.

For further information on this point see *Vedānta Maxims by Jacob. Vol. I.*

वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यज्ञानाच्च........नान्यशेषत्वसम्भावना—Having explained in the previous sentence what purpose an अर्थवादाधिकरण serves, Madhusūdana now explains that the Vedānta passages cannot be interpreted in the light of the principle underlying it because the highest aim of man, namely the attainment of the highest bliss and the total cessation of misery, being realized from the knowledge produced by these passages, they do not stand in need of anything and so it is impossible that they should be complimentary to any other passages of the Vedas.

प्रत्युत विषय एव.........भजन्त इति—The author goes a step further and turning the table on the opponent states that the passages laying down injunctions for doing acts become themselves ancillary to the Vedānta passages by serving to purify the mind which act is necessary before the light of the Self can become manifest.

For a more detailed discussion on this subject *vide Madhusūdana's Adwaitaratnaraks'aṇam,*[1] *S'ankara's Bhāshya on Brahma-sūtra I. 1. 4*[2] *and Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka I. 448-62.*[3]

तस्मात्प्रयोजनवद्बाधित............न मीमांसकमतसिद्धिः—According to the Aupanishadās, the existence of Brahma can be proved by only one means of proof namely, Vedic texts and there are certain texts which have no other purpose except that of proving the existence of Brahma, the cause of the universe. The Mīmāñsakās say that these texts must be construed as only ancillary to those laying down injunctions for the hearing, meditation and realisation of the cause which are after all acts, as no good purpose is served by holding that they are intended to impart the knowledge of the cause of the universe which is either the atoms whose existence can be proved by logic or the individual soul of whose existence every human being is conscious. Madhusūdana having established above that the Vedānta passages have an independent purpose of their own which cannot be accomplished by any other means of proof, now winds up the refutation of the Mīmāñsaka view by summing up the arguments against it in this sentence.

तार्किकादीनां च मतं.........इत्यादिश्रुतिबाधितं च—The view of the Naiyāyikās and others being that God is different from the individual soul and has knowledge as its attribute is here shown to be unauthoritative owing to its being opposed to the Vedic texts mentioned in this sentence.

The views of the Naiyāyikās, Pātañjalās and others are refuted at length in the first two Pādas of the second Adhyāya of the *Brahma Sūtras* along with that of the Sāṁkhyās and S'ankara has in his Bhāshya very elaborately expanded the Adhikaraṇas contained therein.

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1. *N. S. P. Edition pp. 1-2.*
2. *Do. pp. 100-55.*
3. *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series Vol.* XVIII. *BK. I. pp. 327-36.*

भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं.........इत्यादिश्रुतिबाधितम्—The views referred to herein are those of the Jaināş and the Yogachāra Bauddhās. These views also will be found set forth and refuted at great length in the second Pada of the said Adhyāya of the *Brahma Sūtras.*

अत्र च सर्वेषां.........इति हेतुः—The one reason for declaring all the above views to be false is विशुद्धात्मकत्वात्.

निर्विकल्पक.........इत्यर्थः—The above expression विशुद्धात्मकत्वात् means that the Self is of the nature of an undifferentiated, non-dual spirit.

अत्र हेतुः विशिष्टानुभूत्येति—The reason for saying that the Self is of the above nature is its विशिष्टानुभूति.

विशिष्टा.........तयेत्यर्थः—The above expression has been explained as an uninterrupted experience produced by such sentences as तत्त्वमसि which experience is of a special character in that it is of a nature different from that of the differentiated experiences.

P. 48. Verse V. ननु स य एषोऽणिमा.........इति पूर्वोक्तमेव द्रढयन्नाह— In the previous verse S'ankara has stated that the views of the philosophers who believe something else than Brahma to be the cause of the universe are unacceptable. In order to impress it upon the mind of the reader he in this verse says on the authority of some Vedic texts that Brahma knows no limitations due to space.

आराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोऽपि दृष्टः—An आर means 'a goad or an awl'. Hence आराग्रमात्रः means 'as big as the point of a goad or an awl'. The word अवरः has several meanings two of which seem appropriate here, namely 'a lower or inferior one' and 'biggest one'. Max Muller has in his translation in the Sacred Books of the East Series taken it to mean 'the former' while Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has explained it as न विद्यते वरो महान्यस्मादित्यपरिच्छिन्नः. Brahmānanda and Abhyankara also agree with him in saying that it is used here in the sense of अपरिच्छिन्नः.

वियद्व्यापकत्वात्.........इत्यादिश्रुतेः—It will he observed that Madhusūdana has given two alternative solutions of the compound. According to the first the Self is compared to space on the common ground of all-pervasiveness while according to the second it is said to be superior to it on the ground of having a wider field for its pervasiveness. It does not matter which solution is accepted because even in the case of the first it is not meant that space

and Brahma are co-extensive, the common attribute between them being all-pervasiveness only not co-extensive pervasiveness. Purushottama has made this clear by clearing up a doubt, namely whether space is eternal like Brahma.

जीवस्यापि.........व्यपदेशात्—Although the individual soul must be held to be big in size when it is understood to be the spirit pervading the whole body it is said to be of the size of the point of a goad on account of the superimposition of an attribute of a limiting agent. Similarly Brahma is said to be atomic in view of the attribute of the intellect.

Nārāyaṇa explains the text बुद्धेर्गुणेन &c. as आत्मनो गुणेनावरोऽपि बुद्धेर्गुणेनाराग्रमात्रो दृष्टः [though on account of its own qualities (it i. e. the Self) is the biggest it is seen to be as small as the point of a goad owing to the quality of the intellect (in which it is seen reflected]. This is in consonance with the Vedānta doctrine according to which the Self is itself unlimited but whenever it becomes manifest it is seen as a reflection in the intellect or the mind or the inner organ which is atomic.

शेषमतिरोहितार्थम्—The rest i. e. the portion of the verse following the expression वियद्व्यापकत्वात् has its meaning unobscure i. e. is clear. This is said because the expression अखण्डैकरूपः means nothing else than that the Self is an undivided whole. The fourth line is common to all the verses except the last and has already been explained at p. 5. *supra.*

P. 49. Verse VI. ननु, ब्रह्मणो.........पुरुषार्थप्राप्तिः—The objection is this:—According to the theory here propounded Brahma is the material cause of the universe and there is the identity of the cause and its effect; that being so, Brahma is identical with the varied world which is of the nature of misery; if the individual soul is identical with such Brahma, then the highest aim of man namely, the cessation of misery will not be attained by the realization of its true nature.

निखिल.........व्यपदेशात्—(Brahma) is spoken of as the cause because it is the substratum of the whole worldly delusion. Nārāyaṇa says that the सम्बन्ध referred to here is धर्मिसमसत्ताकसम्बन्ध (relation born of power similar to that of the धर्मि i. e. Nescience).

अनर्थलेशः—The faults and virtues which follow in the wake of superimposition.

P. 50. तेनाणु महत्.........द्रव्यत्वप्रतिषेधः—A द्रव्य (substance) has any one or more of the limitations of space and therefore of size mentioned here. These being incapable of being predicated of Brahma, the fact that Brahma is not a substance is said to have been declared hereby.

रूप्यत इति रूपं प्रमेयम्—A रूप is that which becomes manifest i. e. to say, it is a thing which can be logically proved to exist.

Cf. रूप्यन्त इति रूपाणि विषयाश्चेन्द्रियाण्यपि ।
(दक्षिणामूर्तिस्तोत्रवार्त्तिक. ६. ४.)

न प्रमेयमरूपम्—That which cannot be logically proved to exist is an अरूप. Brahma is an अरूप because its existence cannot be proved. According to the Vedānta doctrine its existence can be proved only by a शब्दप्रमाण and the Upanishad portion of the Vedas has that only as its aim (*Vide pp.* ४–५, ३६, ४० *and* ४६ *supra and Brahma Sutrās I. 1. 3*). That being the case the question naturally arises what is the scope of logical reasoning in philosophy according to that doctrine. The answer to it is supplied by Vyāsa in *Brahma Sūtras II. I. 11 and S'ankarāchārya's Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtrās II. 1. 6 and II. 1. 9*[1]. Cf. *also Manu Smriti XII. 105-06* quoted in the Bhāshya on the latter Sūtra.

श्रौतस्याप्यर्थस्य.........हेतुमाह—Having established that Brahma is devoid of all the faults of Nescience by the authority of the Vedic texts the author also proves the same fact by the logical reason that it is characterized by ज्योतिराकारकत्वम्.

स्वप्रकाशज्ञान.........जडत्वापत्तेः—This explains the term ज्योतिराकारकत्वम्. Its meaning is expressed by the words स्वप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वेनाप्रमेयत्वात् and the reason for Brahma being अप्रमेय is supplied by the words प्रमेयत्वे घटादिवज्जडत्वापत्तेः.

एतदप्रमेयं.........इत्यादिश्रुतेः—That the अप्रमेयत्व of Brahma is not a product of imagination but is supported by auth rity is proved by this text.

ध्रुवम् means steady or immutable[2].

Cf. अन्तवन्त इमे देहा नित्यस्योक्ताः शरीरिणः ।
अनाशिनोऽप्रमेयस्य तस्माद्युध्यस्व भारत ॥ भ. गी. २-१८ ॥

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1. *N. S. P. Edition pp. 444-45 and 448-49.*
2. *Ibid p. 449.*

PART III

Determination of the Sense of the Sentence Tattwamasi.

P. 51. Verse VII. ननु कस्य......उपदिश्यते—ब्रह्मभावः means identity with Brahma. The term उपदिश्यते is according to Nārāyana used in the sense of being made known by sentences such as 'Thou art that'.

ब्रह्मणोऽब्रह्मणो वा—Brahma here means according to him the pure Self who is the witness of all phenomena and A-Brahma means Māyā and its products.

न प्रथमः.........इति चेत्—If it is sought to be tought by those sentences that the pure Self is identical with Brahma, that is a waste of energy because what is an established fact need not be proved. But it might be urged that although the जीव may be identical with Brahma the teaching has its utility because the knowledge of the fact serves to remove the obstacle in the shape of Nescience which comes in the way of the realization of the truth.

It must be borne in mind that this is only a side-objection raised by the objector himself and what follows is an answer by him not by the author.

अविद्यानिवृत्ते.........प्रसङ्गात्—If the removal of Nescience is not of the nature of the Self i. e. to say, if it is different from the Self i. e. knowledge then there would be two separate entities which is not admitted by the author.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं......द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि—Brahma is not excluded by or absent from anything just as a pot is excluded by or absent from a cloth. That would be the case if there were a thing different from Brahma. Similarly there is no quality common to Brahma and anything else just as the quality of being a pot is common to several pots. That would also be the case if Brahma had its like. But if there were a thing different from it and there were a thing which had a quality in common with Brahma, then the word Brahma would be a misnomer because Brahma is one without a second. If it were said that the removal of ignorance means something different from knowledge, then the existence of Brahma as an absolute entity would not be established.

अभिन्नत्वे.........इत्युक्तम्—If on the other hand it is said that the removal of ignorance is the same as knowledge, then as already said, there is no necessity of teaching the identity of Brahma and the Self.

According to Abhyankara the line of reasoning here is this:—The text सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म says that whatever is of the nature of truth and whatever is of the nature of knowledge is Brahma. Hence whatever is different from Brahma must be an unreal and an inert entity. It is useless to say that such an entity is identical with Brahma. For such a proposition can never be established. The other alternative must therefore be taken to have been meant. But if the जीव is Brahma already nothing is gained by saying so. It may be urged as against this that the teaching serves to remove the veil of ignorance. But that proposition is not acceptable because the removal of ignorance is either something different from the Self i. e. knowledge or identical with it. If it is identical with it then as already said there is no necessity for its being taught. If not identical with it, then there comes in duality and Brahma as postulated cannot therefore be proved.

Here ends the main objection and what follows is the author's reply to it.

अत्र किं......प्रतीतितोऽपि—Out of the alternatives mentioned by the objector, the author admits the latter namely, that the identity of the non-Brahma is sought to be established to be untenable. But as regards the first he inquires whether the non-accrual of benefit by the teaching in question spoken of by the objector is पारमार्थिक or व्यावहारिक. For the true significance of these terms *vide pp. 94–95 supra* where it is also explained that प्रातीतिक and व्यावहारिक सत्य's mean the same thing.

अभिप्रैषि is derived from the root इ with the prefixes अभि and प्र meaning primarily 'to go near or approach' and secondarily 'to intend, mean, think of'. अभिप्राय is a name from this root.

तत्राद्यमिष्टापत्त्या परिहरति—Out of the above two, the first alternative is acceptable to the author because philosophically speaking the Self is the same as Brahma at all times. The ignorance-state of the former is only the result of the world-delusion and so on the rise of knowledge, the knowledge-state is substituted. Both are philosophically false but from the common sense point of view they are

real and so it cannot be said that the teaching is fruitless. In this verse, the author lays down that truth.

इष्टापत्ति means 'the accrual of that which is desired or acceptable'.

For a more detailed elucidation of the above truth *Vide S'ankara's Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra* II. 1. 14.[1]

उपदेशकरणं—A करण is a means by or medium through which a particular act is done.

Cf. अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्ता करणं च पृथग्विधम् ।
विविधाश्च पृथक् चेष्टा दैवं चैवात्र पंचमम् ॥ भ.गी.१८-१४ ॥

शिष्य उपदेशकर्म—कर्म ordinarily means 'an act' but it also means 'an object' as opposed to 'a subject' in grammar. It is in that sense that the said word has been used here. A disciple is said to be an object because the teaching of the Guru is intended to be imparted to him.

उपदेशक्रिया—The act of teaching.

अयं सर्वप्रमाण........नास्तीत्यर्थः—This worldly phenomena is believed to exist because its existence is proved by the means of proof such as perception, inference &c, Inspite of that it does not exist from the philosophical point of view.

द्वितीयं निराकरोति........स्वरूपेति—The second alternative is that the cessation of ignorance is not attended by even an imaginary fruit.

यद्यप्यविद्यानिवृत्ति........विज्ञानफलमनुभूयते—Although there is no room for the doubt as to whether the cessation of īgnorance means knowledge of the Self or something different from it, this much is certain that there does arise the fruit of realization in the shape of knowledge of one's true nature.

Abhyankara gives a very amusing illustration in order to explain this argument. It is this :—One Devadatta separated from his companions at evening time while passing through a forest. On the next day however he was seen by one of them sitting in his house. On his telling that fact to another companion the latter began to argue that it was not possible because Devadatta was lame and he could not have got a conveyance in the forest at night time. The other man however cut him short by saying

1. *N. S. P. Edition PP. 454-62.*

that it was no use drawing such a stupid inference when the fact was there that Devadatta had in fact returned and it must be believed either that he was cured of his lameness by some Yogi during the night or that he was brought by somebody with himself on his horse. Similarly he says that when it is an indubitable fact that knowledge of one's true nature does take place from the great sayings such as 'Thou art that' there is no room for the doubt whether the cessation of ignorance is the same as or different from the Self and that as a matter of fact it is the same as the latter and what takes place is merely the manifestation of that which is already there. Hence the one fact that one is freed is only as much true as was the other namely, that one had been bound. In comparison with the absolute truth both these events are the products of imagination born of ignorance but when the idea of being bound is there, knowledge arising from those sayings must arise in order to eradicate that idea. Hence for all practical purposes the teaching bears a tangible fruit in the shape of self-realization.

न चैतत्कथमिति........सहिष्णुत्वात्—It should not be asked how this could take place because there is no room for a doubt as all duality is then destroyed.

उपमर्द is a noun from the root मृद् U. 9. with उप meaning 'to crush, dash to pieces, destroy or kill'.

न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम—Nārāyaṇa Tirtha says that the word दृष्टे means प्रत्यक्षसिध्धे (in the world of direct perception) and the expression अनुपपन्नं नाम means युक्तिविरुध्धम् किञ्चित् (anything that is opposed to reasoning) and says that the gist of the sentence is that one should not raise a doubt which is opposed to our common experience. Brahmānanda says that our common experience is that whenever the right knowledge of a thing arises the wrong impression with regard to it born of ignorance is dispelled. Hence there is nothing wrong in saying that after the rise of knowledge of the true nature of the Self there is no room for a doubt.

This very sentence is found used by S'ankarāchārya in his *Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra IV. 1. 2*[1]. The subject under discussion there is whether it would be sufficient if the true nature of the Self is explained once only or whether it should be repeated. Bādarāyaṇa says that it should be repeated and supports

1. *N. S. P. Edition P. 933.*

his statement by an injunction relating to Upāsanā. S'ankara therefore anticipates an objection that even if repetition may be fruitful in the case of Upāsanā it cannot be so in the case of knowledge of the identity of Brahma with the Self and gives the answer thereto in the above words. Vāchaspati and Amalānanda discuss this point at great length in their commentaries *Bhāmati* and *Kalpataru* respectively.

P. 52. निरोधः—Destruction.

This word and the word उत्पत्तिः have been used with reference to the phenomenal world.

बुद्धः—Wise.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha reads बद्धः instead of बुद्धः and explains it as अनाद्यज्ञानवान्.

इत्येषा परमार्थता—This is the highest truth.

Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda say that it has been said इत्येषा परमार्थता instead of निरोधादिशून्यं परमार्थः because in the latter case the qualities of being devoid of destructibility, indubitability &c. would not be understood.

The gist of the verse is that all this is born of the notion of duality which is a delusion.

This verse is incorporated in the *Pañchadas'i* as VI. 235 and VIII. 71. It should be noted that this is not really a Vedic text but a Kārikā of Gaudapāda.

ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत्—Here अग्रे according to Nārāyaṇa means 'before the rise of knowledge', वा means 'even' not 'or' and इदम् means 'the Self who is the witness'.

The gist of the text is that the disciple on being tought that even before the rise of knowledge the Self was the same as Brahma, knew the Self as identical with Brahma and so everything became Brahma in his eyes.

From तथा च preceding the Kārikā upto सर्वं च द्वैतं वारयति there is one single sentence. It has been added in order further to support the statement न चैतत्कथमिति &c. The gist thereof is that these authorities say that the individual soul who was already of the same nature as Brahma became conscious of it by the knowledge of that fact and that duality does not exist as a matter of fact though it does for our daily intercourse.

Verse VIII. नत्वात्मनः.........व्यवस्था कथम्—If the self-luminousness of the Self is the same at all times a question naturally arises how does it undergo the states of waking, dreaming and sleeping. This verse contains an answer to that question.

लक्षणतस्त्रयाणामपि स्वप्नत्वे—The Vedāntins admit that in essential characteristics all the three states are of the same nature as the objects appearing in a dream are in comparison to those in that of waking, *i. e.* to say, comparatively false.

That is so because all of them are born of ignorance of one's true nature.

प्रतिभासतोऽविद्यात्मक.........व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः—Although they hold the above view, they do not ignore the fact that all sentient beings appear to undergo those three states and therefore they say that it is not inconsistent with their doctrine that there should be differences born of ignorance and appearing as if existing in the Self. This ignorance is neither of the nature of existence nor of that of non-existence. Hence it is not unlikely that differences should be existing in its products though not in the Self.

जाग्रत्—According to Abhyankara this word has been used in the sense of जागृतिः (state of waking).

स्वप्नकः—According to the same commentator this word has been used in the sense of स्वप्नः (state of dreaming).

विश्व, तैजस् and प्राज्ञ (which is the same as प्राज्ञकः) are the names given to the individual soul while in the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping respectively.

तुरीयः—The fourth.

The name given to the soul while in this unnamed state is the pure Self who is the witness of all phenomena, internal and external.

P. 53. अत्र.........निर्देशः—Here *i. e.* in this verse the states and their presiding deities are mentioned in the order in which they are absorbed. Thus the state of waking and the Vis'wa are absorbed in the state of dreaming and Taijasa respectively and the latter two in the state of sleeping and Prājñya respectively. It is therefore in that order that they are mentioned in the verse.

अस्मिन्मते—According to this *i. e.* the Vedānta view.

पदार्थौ द्विविधः दृक् दृश्यश्च—Madhusūdana now begins to explain the processes of evolution and involution according to the Vedānta doctrine.

Although as a matter of fact the Adwaita school does not admit of the absolute existence of any other thing except Brahma, it does admit the fact that in common exprience there is a variety of substances. Therefore in view of that experience Madhusūdana says that in the ultimate analysis it will be found that there are not seven substances as the Vais'eshikās say nor sixteen as do the Naiyāyikās but only two, namely (1) that which sees and (2) that which is seen, or the perciever and the percieved or the knower and the object of knowledge.

अन्येषां.........अन्तर्भावात्—This supplies the reason why not more than two substances are believed to exist.

तत्र—Thereout i. e. out of the two substances above-mentioned.

दृक्पदार्थः आत्मा.........साक्षी चेति—The seer is the Self itself. It is said to be पारमार्थिक because it does not cease to exist at any time and there never was a time when it did not exist. Although it remains the same throughout, it receives three different designations, namely, ईश्वर, जीव and साक्षी.

कारणीभूताज्ञानोपाधिरीश्वरः—ईश्वर has for His limitation the original ignorance.

प्रपञ्चितं चैतदधस्तात्—This (i. e. the causes due to which the same Self becomes ईश्वर and जीव) has been explained in details hereinabove.

अधस्तात् is the correlative of उपरिष्टात्. It refers to the explanation as to how the one Self recieves the designations of ईश्वर and जीव given at pp. २६ to ३१ *supra*.

अविद्या प्रतिबिम्बेश्वरपक्षे.........साक्षीत्युच्यते—It should be recalled that according to the author of the *Saṃks'epa S'ārīraka*, ईश्वर is a reflection of the Self in the original ignorance and that according to the author of the *Vivaraṇa* ईश्वर is the Self itself limited by that ignorance. Hence in the first view the साक्षी is the Self itself who is reflected while in the other view the साक्षी is the Self who is the common substratum of both the जीव and ईश्वर.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has explained the expression बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बमुखानुगतमुखस्वरूपवज्जीवेश्वरानुगतसर्वानुसन्धातृ चैतन्यम् as दर्पणस्थग्रीवास्थमुखयोरनुगतं यन्मुखं स्वं स्वरूपं मुखाकृतिः तद्वज्जीवेश्वरयोरन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नयोरनुगतं सर्वानुसन्धातृ चैतन्यम्. What he means to say is that just as there is one form of the face both in the reflection in a mirror and in the face on the neck so there is one Self both in the जीव and ईश्वर both of which are limited by minds, the former by the individual and the latter by the cosmic mind.

वार्त्तिककारमते........जीवेश्वरभेदेन दृशः—According to the view of the author of the *Vārttika*, ईश्वर Himself is the साक्षी and hence in the आभासवाद the दृक् appears in two aspects only, namely as जीव and ईश्वर.

तत्रेश्वरोऽपि त्रिविधः—From this kind of language it should not be understood that ईश्वर becomes divided into three parts. What is meant is that He manifests Himself or appears in three different aspects owing to the difference in the Guṇas of Nescience which form His limitation.

कारणीभूतसत्त्वगुणावच्छिन्नः—Limited by the Sattwaguṇa which forms the cause i. e. which is in a subtle state.

हिरण्यगर्भस्तु........ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते—Hiraṇyagarbha is not the cause of the (subtle) elements and is therefore not Brahmā. He is however called Brahmā in some places because he is the creator of the gross elements.

Abhyankara's note on this point is very ellucidating. It is this:—According to the Adwaita school generally speaking all the inert substances are but the limitations of the Spirit. Thereout the Spirit as limited by an individual inert substance i. e. the mind is called the individual soul while as limited by the cosmic mind it is called the Ruler of the Universe. These inert substances are either in the gross, subtle or undifferentiated state. The gross state is that which is formed by the quintupling of the elements and is visible to the senses. The subtle state is that which is formed of the unquintupled elements and which is the cause of the gross state. The undifferentiated state is that original ignorance which is the cause of the subtle state. The Spirit also as conditioned by the substances in these states recieves three names, Vis'wa, Taijasa, and Prājñya from the point of view of the individual and Virāt, Hiraṇyagarbha and Is'a from that of the cosmos. The last again recieves the designations, Brahmā,

Vishṇu and Rudra on account of the predominance of the one or the other of the three Guṇas. The Spirit which is free from these limitations is indicated by the great sentences अयमात्मा ब्रह्म, तत्त्वमसि and others. This being so the Hiraṇyagarbha who has the subtle elements for his limitations may transform the subtle into the gross forms but not the undifferentiated into the subtle. Hence he is not Brahmā i. e. the original creator of the whole universe.

Commenting on the word क्वचित् Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda quote the following Vedic text:—

स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते ॥
आदिकर्ता स भूतानां ब्रह्माग्रे समवर्त्तत ।
तस्मादेतत् ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते ॥

and the latter also quotes the following couplet from a lexicon:—

ब्रह्मतत्त्वं तपो वेदाः ब्रह्मा विप्रः प्रजापतिः ।

The celebrated Hiranyagarbha hymn in the Rigveda (X. 121) commencing with the line हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्ततात्रे in which each of the stanzas except the last ends with the line कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम may also be referred to in order to make this point clear.

एवं चैकस्यैव.........श्रीभारती भवान्याद्याश्च स्त्र्याकाराः—Purushottama and Abhyankara have passed over this remark with very short explanations but Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has commented upon it very elaborately giving quotations from some of the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagwadgītā*, *Brihannāradīya* and other works. He says in substance that the male forms, the four-handed Vishṇu, the four-faced Brahmā, the five-faced Rudra, and the female forms, Laxmī, Saraswatī and Bhawānī &c. are all said to be the manifestations of the One because the form of Vishṇu is stated in the *Purāṇas* to have performed acts appropriate to Rudra and the form of the latter is stated therein to have performed acts appropriate to the former and so on. So saying he quotes in support the following verse from the *Brihannāradīya*, namely

हरिरूपी महादेवो लिङ्गरूपी जनार्दनः ।
ईषदप्यन्तरं नास्ति भेदकृन्नरकं व्रजेत् ॥

and a text from an *Upanishad of the Maitrāyaṇīya S'ākhā* namely, that commencing with the word अथ यो ह खलु वास्य तामसोंशोऽसौ स ब्रह्मचारिणो योऽयं रुद्रो and ending with the words स वा एष एकस्त्रिधाभूतः.

Brahmānanda is very prolix on this point though the line of explanation taken up by him is the same as that of the former.

अन्ये च मत्स्यकूर्मादयो.........भक्तानुग्रहार्थमित्यवधेयम्—Nārāyaṇa commenting on the words लीलयाविर्भवन्ति out of this sentence says that what Madhusūdana wants to emphasize is that these incarnations are not born but become manifest out of the sweet-will of the Almighty and quotes the following verses occurring in the *Droṇa Parva of the Mahābhārata*:—

चतुर्मूर्तिरहं शश्वल्लोकत्राणार्थमुद्यतः ।
आत्मानं प्रविभज्येऽहं लोकानां हितमादधे ॥
एका मूर्तिस्तपश्चर्यां कुरुते भुवि मे स्थिता ।
अपरा कुरुते कर्म मानुषं लोकमाश्रिता ॥
अपरा पश्यति जगत्कुर्वाणा साध्वसाधुनि ।
शेते चतुर्थी त्वपरा वरार्हेभ्यो वरार्थदा ॥

He also explains that out of the well-known incaranations of the Almighty, call Him Vishṇu or S'iva or Parā Devatā or Parames'wara, some are Guṇāvatāras like Paras'urāma, Rāmachandra and others in which His powers are made manifest completely and some Añs'āvatāras like the Matsya, Kūrma, Hayagrīva and others in which His powers are made manifest only partially.

The word भक्तानुग्रहार्थम् has been added according to him to convey the idea that though the Almighty is able to do anything by His mere will, He assumes forms in order to do His intended acts in order that His devotees may be impressed the more by his exploits accomplished through those particular forms and might think of them often and often. He has further on digressed into explaining with the help of several illustrations what is the meaning of the word Bhakti, its different species &c. Brahmānanda too has discussed all these points very elaborately. Interesting as they are, they are not necessary for the purpose of ellucidating the remarks of Madhusūdana.

चिन्मयस्याद्वितीयस्य.........रूपकल्पना—In this verse चिन्मय means 'of the nature of knowledge alone', अद्वितीय means 'one who is without a second, and निष्कलम् means 'without limbs or parts'. The gist of it is that Brahma is of the nature of knowledge, without a second of its own or a different class, and without attributes, without limbs and without a body but it assumes forms for doing the acts of its devotees.

Abhyankara says that these forms are imaginary and having raised a doubt namely, how such imaginary forms could bring about the accomplishment of the purposes the devotees of Brahma have in view, removes it by saying that the purposes and the relation of a worshipper and the worshipped also being imaginary, that is not impossible. I am of the opinion that though what this commentator says is true as a matter of fact the proposition in support whereof this verse is cited being that the One assumes many and varied forms according to necessity, what is meant by ब्रह्मणो रूपकल्पना is the assumption of forms by Brahma not the imagination of its forms by the devotees, the genetive case of the word ब्रह्मन् being intended to be understood in the sense of the instrumental.

The other three commentators do not at all comment upon this verse.

स्वोपाध्यवान्तरभेदेन—On account of the subsidiary difference of his limitations.

What these limitations are is explained in the next three sentences.

अविद्यान्तःकरणस्थूलशरीरावच्छिन्नो..........विश्वः—Each individual soul experiences three states, namely, those of waking, dreaming and sleeping and on account thereof receives three different designations, namaly विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ respectively. Thereout the first is limited by the original Nescience called the कारणशरीर, the inner organ or the mind and the vital airs &c. called the सूक्ष्म or लिङ्गशरीर and the physical body called the स्थूलशरीर.

स एव स्थूलशरीराभिमानरहित........तैजसः—When the soul is in the state of dreaming he is limited by two bodies, namely the कारण and सूक्ष्म. For the time being he ceases to identify himself with the gross body.

शरीरान्तःकरणोपाधिद्वयरहितो........प्राज्ञः—When he is in the state of deep sleep he has one limitation only, namely the original Nescience limited by the impressions left on the inner organ.

The word प्राज्ञ has been derived either as प्रकर्षेण अज्ञः or प्रज्ञा आत्मस्वरूपसंपत्तिर्यस्य सः.


एतेषां च स्वतन्त्रोपाधिभेदाभावेन.........व्यवह्रियते—The above three, namely विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ are not essentially different because they are designations of the same soul given on account of the three states he is found to experience. However as his experience in the three states and his limitations therein differ, they have been taken note of by the Scriptures as subsidiary differences due to limitations.

The earliest work in which these designations are found mentioned is the *Māṇḍukyopanishat.*

साक्षी तु सर्वानुसन्धाता.........एकविध एव—Besides the above three there is a fourth designation, namely the साक्षी and that is given to that unchangeable principle in man which connects all the above three states and is present in all of them.

It should be remarked that it is the जीव who is said to have been undergoing the three states not the pure Self. This Self is termed the साक्षी.

Summary—Here ends the enumeration of the sub-divisions of the दृक्पदार्थ. As an aid to memory the following geneological tree would be useful.



The above sub-divisions of the दृक्पदार्थ hold good only so far as the views of the authors of the *Vivaraṇa and Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* are concerned. According to the author of the *Vārttika* it is divided into ईश्वर and जीव because according to it the ईश्वर is Himself the साक्षी.

अविद्या तद्व्याप्य.........प्रपञ्चो दृश्यपदार्थः—अविद्या is the original Nescience which is the root cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the worldly phenomenon. Tnis phenomenon is pervaded all over by it. In fact these cause and effect are so welded together that it is not necessary to treat them separately and therefore they are together called the दृश्यपदार्थ the phenomenon as opposed to the दृक्पदार्थ the noumenon.

तस्य चापारमार्थिकत्वेऽपि.........उपासनादावुपयोगात्—This phenomenon cannot be deemed to exist, philosophically viewed. Still all the same it is admitted to exist for the purpose of daily intercourse for otherwise all the Scriptures would be of no use and no soul would ever be freed from bondage because that would only occur if the prescribed course of meritorious actions, devotion &c., is followed and that would not be resorted to if the Scriptures which prescribe it were not admitted to exit and to be authoritative[1]. That being so, an explanation of the genesis of the phenomenon is not useless as that of the objects appearing in a dream.

P. 54. तत्र साभासाविद्या.........अव्याकृतमित्युच्यते—Defining the अव्याकृत out of the three kinds or rather aspects of the दृश्यपदार्थ, Madhusūdana says that this designation is given to the original Nescience containing therein a reflection of the Self together with the following three things, namely (1) the relation between it and the Self, (2) the division of the Self into जीव and ईश्वर and (3) the reflections of the Self in the individual ignorance.

Nārāyaṇa says that the word चिदाभासैः has been used in the sense of वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बादिरूपैरवान्तरैः. Brahmānanda says that though the आभास has already been mentioned once in the expression साभासाऽविद्या this additional word has been put in in order to bring out the fact that it and the mistaken identification of the Self with it are pervaded by ignorance. Can it not be that the आभास referred to in the expression साभासाऽविद्या is the reflection of the Self in the cosmic ignorance which engages itself in the work of creation, preservation and destruction of the universe while the आभास's referred to in the expression चिदाभासैः are the reflections thereof in the individual अन्तःकरण's which remain in the state of seeds even after involution? All these reflections whatever are distinguishable from the Self itself because while the latter is immutable at all times, the former are liable to changes and ignorance consists in the Self believing that the changes take place in itself as one would believe his face to be oblong-shaped on seeing it in a convex mirror. Therefore these reflections are not treated as parts of the दृश्यपदार्थ. Now the original Nescience together with the reflection of the Self therein is itself the primary cause of all the phenomena visible

1. This point has been thrashed out by Madhusūdana himself in the remarks with which the second verse is introduced. (*Vide pp.* ३९-४० *supra*).

and invisible and is beginningless. The other three substances which are included in the term अव्याकृत are not produced by it but still they are believed to be pervaded by it because they are liable to be removed on the removal thereof i. e. to say when once ignorance as to one's true nature is removed the relation between it and the Self, the division of the latter into जीव and ईश्वर and the reflections thereof in the अन्तःकरण's cease to exist of themselves without any further effort though they are not produced by ignorance but are beginningless.

Abhyankara says that the term चैतन्यतत्सम्बन्ध is a पूर्वपदद्वन्द्वगर्भ-तत्पुरुष i. e. to say a Tatpurusha compound the first member whereof namely, चैतन्यतत् is itself a Dwandwa compound and that the same is the case with the term जीवेश्वरविभाग. He also notes that जीव and ईश्वर themselves are included in the दृक्पदार्थ but the division of the Self into them is included in the अव्याकृत and that while the चैतन्य itself is included in, nay, is the दृक्पदार्थ itself, the अविद्या and the relation between the two are included in the अव्याकृत. Nārāyana and Brahmānanda also note the first fact in their commentaries.

सा च स्वयं जडाऽप्यजडेन........पञ्चमहाभूतानि जनयति—The word सा refers to अविद्या only. It is inert i. e. incapable of acting spontaneously. For goading it to action a spirit is required. The Self itself does not do that but its reflection in ignorance which possesses the characteristics of both the Self and ignorance, propels it to action and so with the help of the impressions of the actions of the individual souls in their past lives it produces the five elements.

I think the reading चिदाभासेनोज्वलिता पूर्वपूर्वसंस्कारजीवकर्मप्रयुक्ता which is found in some other editions is better than the one adopted in the text and have therefore interpreted the sentence as if the text had contained such a reading.

Purushottama notes that Madhusūdana has said that the five elements are of the same nature as sound, touch &c., not that they possess the latter as their attributes as the Sāṃkhyās opine. Nārāyaṇa, Brahmānanda and Abhyankara on the other hand say that since according to the Adwaita philosophy there is no distinction between an attribute and the possessor of an attribute, sound &c. are the subtle forms of space &c.

The elements here spoken of are the subtle not the gross ones.

तत्रपूर्वपूर्वभूत.........अनुप्रवेशः—The process here described is that ignorance transformed into space which is of the same nature as sound, produces wind and hence the latter acquires the attribute of space, namely sound along with its own namely, that of touch and so on and hence the attributes of all the five elements are contained in the earth, those of the first four in water, those of the first three in light, those of the first two in wind and its own only in space.

एवमन्धकारोऽपि.........चेति सिद्धान्तः—Madhusūdana here incidentally rejects the Naiyāyika and Vais'eshika view that darkness is not a positive substance but only the absence of light and asserts that it is a positive substance.

आवरणात्मा means आवरणस्वरूपः (of the nature of a veil or covering). It is for the very reason that darkness is of this nature that it is said to be चाक्षुषज्ञानविरोधी (opposed to occular perception).

आलोकनाश्यः means 'capable of being destroyed by light'.

संसारहेतुदेहानुपादानत्वाच्च.........इत्यविरोधः—This remark is meant to remove the objection that since darkness is not mentioned anywhere in the Upanishads it must not be a positive substance. The gist of the remark is that it is not mentioned in the Upanishads because the main aim of those works is to impart the knowledge of Brahma. In doing so it may incidentally refer to topics which may serve to turn the mind of the aspirant for knowledge from the material objects. One of those topics is the production of the human body. According to the Upanishad seers darkness is not a material cause of the body. Hence from the mere fact that it is not found mentioned in any Upanishad it should not be believed that the view that it is a positive substance is opposed to the Scriptures.

The root in the word आम्नायते is आम्ना 1. P. meaning 'to hand down traditionally or in sacred texts'. Hence the said word can be translated as 'mentioned in the Vedas'.

दिक्कालौ त्वप्रामाणिकत्वान्नोक्तौ—There is no authority for holding that the quarters and time are separate entities. It is therefore that Madhusūdana has omitted them.

कालस्त्वविद्यैव—According to the Adwaita doctrine time has no separate existence but is Nescience itself because time means a limitation, all limitations whatever are either Nescience itself or its products and this limitation is Nescience itself because the beginning of evolution itself is due to the limitation of the Self by Nescience.

In the Mahābhārata and some of the Purānas Kāla has been identified with God.

अयं चाव्याकृतपदार्थ ईश्वरोपाधिः—The अव्याकृत as above defined forms the limitation of the Lord of the Universe i. e. the limitation of the Self due to which it acquires the designation of the 'Lord of the Universe'.

P. 56. तानि च सूक्ष्माण्यपञ्चीकृतानि........मिलित्वा जनयन्ति—It will be explained later on that the five elements undergo a process called पञ्चीकरणम् in order that the gross forms may be produced. It consists of the division of each element into two equal parts, the sub-division of one of them again into four equal parts and the mixing together of each undivided half with the one-eighth part of each of the others. The state prior to their undergoing this process is the subtle one and in that state they are called the अमूर्त (intangible). In asmuch as they are the products of the same अव्याकृत, they have the Gunas Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas for their essence. With the predominance of the Sattwaguṇa thereout they having mixed together produce like a multi-coloured form, a pure substance which has for its essence two kinds of powers, known as the power of knowledge and the power of action.

तस्य च ज्ञानशक्तिप्रधानांशो......... इति द्विधोच्यते—The portion of that substance in which the powers of knowledge are predominant is known as the inner organ which is sometimes called the intellect and at times the mind.

In some treatises on the Vedānta philosophy मन, बुद्धि, चित्त and अहङ्कार are treated of as separate entities. But as a matter of fact they are the different aspects of the same inner organ. Thus S'ankara in his *Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra* II. 3. 32 says:—तच्चात्मन उपाधिभूतमन्तःकरणं मनोबुद्धिर्विज्ञानं चित्तमिति चानेकधा तत्र तत्राभिलप्यते । क्वचिच्च वृत्तिविभागेन संशयादिवृत्तिकं मन इत्युच्यते निश्चयादिवृत्तिकं बुद्धिरिति[1] ।

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1. N. S. P. Edition. P. 612.

क्रियाशक्तिप्रधानांशः प्राणः—Prāṇa is the vital breath. It is by its action that the different organs of the body are able to perform their respective functions.

स च पञ्चधा.........समान इति—Just as the inner organ has been given different names on account of the different functions it performs, so too the vital air has been given the different names mentioned in the text for the same reason. As for its different functions Nārāyana Tīrtha and Brahmānanda quote the following couplet which is likely to be a help to memory:—

हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिदेशगः ।
उदानः कण्ठदेशे स्याद्व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥

एवमेकैकभूतेभ्यो.........इन्द्रियद्वयं जायते—Just as the inner organ and the vital air which serve the whole body are produced from all the elements combined together, so the five different pairs of organs of sense and action which perform limited functions in the body are produced from each separate element.

It should be borne in mind that the organs here spoken of are not the physical organs which are merely outer shells but the kernels therein which are of a subtle nature and hence not visible to the naked eye.

अत्र तेजोमयी वाक्.........इति केचित्—Purushottama says that this is the opinion of the eastern people.

पादचिकित्सया च चक्षुषः स्वास्थ्यदर्शनात्—This refers to the ordinary experience that when oil is rubbed on the soles of the feet the heat felt in one's eyes subsides.

युक्तमुत्पश्यामः—उत्पश्य literally means 'looking upwards.' The use of that verb here can be reconciled on the supposition that the writer means that he having risen above the view referred to thinks it proper to hold that the senses of sight and motion are the product of the third element.

तेजोमयत्वश्रुतिस्तु.........व्याख्येया—Just as in the text अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः(छा० ७-९-२) the mind is said to be a product of food not because it is born of it but because it derives nourishment from it, so too the speech in the text in question is said to be a product of light because it derives nourishment from it. Hence the said text should not be taken in its literal but figurative sense like that relating to the genesis of the mind.

मनसश्च पञ्चभूतगुणग्राहकत्वेन......अन्यदेतत्—This is an answer to the objection that if the mind is not a product of the earth then it cannot comprehend an attribute of the earth. The gist of it is that although it is true that since as a matter of fact the mind comprehends the attribute not only of the earth but of the other elements as well and is therefore inferred to be a product of the five elements, still that has nothing to do with its being essentially a product of the earth as suggested by the text under consideration.

अन्यदेतत् means 'that is quite a different thing'.

एतेषामधिष्ठातारो देवा अपि ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिप्रधानाः—It is believed on the strength of a Vedic text that each organ of sense does its work not automatically but by virtue of some deities residing therein. And just as there are five organs of sense and five of action so too there are five deities having the power of knowledge predominant in them and five having that of action predominant therein. In fact these deities seem to be nought else than the personification of the divine forces by virtue whereof the organs perform their respective functions.

त्वकचक्षुषी.........गृह्णीतः—Out of the five organs of sense there are two, namely those of touch and sight which not only comprehend the attributes of the objects with which they come in contact but also the objects themselves. Thus for instance if a rose flower is brought before us, we can by the nose comprehend its smell only but by the eyes we can see not only its form but its substance also.

श्रोत्रमपि चक्षुर्वत्.........इति प्रत्ययात्—Just as the eye can see a distant object so the ear can hear a distant sound.

On a little reflection it will be understood that the sense of smell can also comprehend a distant object. Hence if as Madhusūdana says it is believed that the eyes and ears go out to a distance in order to comprehend objects it should also be believed the nose also similarly goes out for the same purpose.

If may be recalled that according to the Vedānta theory as explained at pp. ३२-३३ *supra* the knowledge of an object arises not because the organ of sight or any other organ goes out to the object and assumes its shape but because the inner organ or mind does so.

एतच्च सर्वं मिलित्वा.........इति चोच्यते—The लिङ्गशरीर is composed of

seventeen constituents namely, the five vital breaths, the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the mind and the intellect. Abhyankara says that these seventeen constituents are the five subtle elements, the vital breaths taken together as one, the inner organ and the ten senses. But that view does not seem to be correct. The subtle elements cannot be the constituents of the subtle body in their crude state because subtle though that body is it is in a comparatively more developed state than the subtle elements, several products thereof having entered into the composition of that body. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Brahmānanda are also of the same view as myself and the former has also refuted the other view which must have been advanced by other previous writers on the Vedānta doctrine[1].

This is called the लिङ्गशरीर because it is the perceptible sign of the existence of the Self so long as it is in the ignorance-state and undergoes births and deaths. The following explanation given by Nārāyaṇa may be borne in mind as an aid to memory :—

लिङ्गत्वं यावत्संसारकालमनपायितयात्माभिव्यञ्जकत्वम् । अभिव्यञ्जकत्वं त्वहमिति व्यवहारविषयताप्रयोजकत्वे सति भोगोपधायकत्वम् ।

It should be borne in mind that the constitution of the लिङ्गशरीर in the microcosm (individual body) is the same as that of that in the macrocosm (cosmos) and that the designation हिरण्यगर्भ is given to that aspect of it which is engaged in the work of knowledge and the designation सूत्र or सूत्रात्मा to that aspect of it which is engaged in action.

Cf. मयि सर्वमिदं प्रोतं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव.

(भ. गी. ७-७).

P.57. अथमूर्तः पदार्थ.........जीवोपाधिरेव—It may be recalled that the दृश्य पदार्थ was said to undergo three different states अव्याकृत, अमूर्त and मूर्त. Thereout the अव्याकृत is the undifferentiated state which was described at p. ५४ *supra* and the description of the अमूर्त the intangible though differentiated state which was commenced at p. ५६ ends here.

It should to be borne in mind that while the अव्याकृत is the उपाधि of the ईश्वर the अमूर्त is the उपाधि of the जीव whether in the microcosm or the macrocosm. This means that even the हिरण्यगर्भ and सूत्रात्मा are जीव's.

1. *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series No. LXV. pp. 385-86.*

P. 58. तानि च तथाभूतानि......पञ्चीकृतानि भवन्ति—Madhusūdana now begins to describe the process of पञ्चीकरण (quintupling) of the five elements. This process takes place because the actions of the individual souls which may have become ready for yeilding fruits cannot yeild them unless on the one hand there is a seat or abode of enjoyment and on the other the objects of enjoyment, both of which are the products of the five gross elements in the ultimate analysis though the external forms thereof differ and the elements cannot become gross without undergoing the process above-mentioned.

तत्र च प्रत्येकं.........आकाशादिशब्दप्रयोगः—The process of पञ्चीकरण is this:—Each of the five elements is divided into two equal halves; thereout one-half of each is again sub-divided into four parts and the one-eighth part of each mixes with the entire one-half of each of the others so that the ultimate result is as follows:—

सूक्ष्म	आकाश	$\frac{1}{2}$	सूक्ष्म	वायु	$\frac{1}{2}$	सूक्ष्म	तेजस्	$\frac{1}{2}$
,,	वायु	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	आकाश	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	आकाश	$\frac{1}{8}$
,,	तेजस्	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	तेजस्	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	वायु	$\frac{1}{8}$
,,	जल	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	जल	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	जल	$\frac{1}{8}$
,,	पृथ्वी	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	पृथ्वी	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	पृथ्वी	$\frac{1}{8}$
स्थूल	आकाश	$\frac{8}{8}$=१	स्थूल	वायु	$\frac{8}{8}$=१	स्थूल	तेजस्	$\frac{8}{8}$=१

सूक्ष्म	जल	$\frac{1}{2}$	सूक्ष्म	पृथ्वी	$\frac{1}{2}$
,,	आकाश	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	आकाश	$\frac{1}{8}$
,,	वायु	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	वायु	$\frac{1}{8}$
,,	तेजस्	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	तेजस्	$\frac{1}{8}$
,,	पृथ्वी	$\frac{1}{8}$	,,	जल	$\frac{1}{8}$
स्थूल	जल	$\frac{8}{8}$=१	स्थूल	पृथ्वी	$\frac{8}{8}$=१

Although there are portions of the other elements in each of the gross ones, they receive their respective designations because of the preponderating one-half portion thereof.

अत्र त्रिवृतं........वियदधिकरणन्यायेनैव निराकृता:—This is an answer to the possible objection that there are in fact three elements only namely light, water and earth and that the subtle ones become gross on the sub-division of one-half of each of them into three parts and the combination of a one-sixth part of each with the entire half of each of the others.

This process is technically called त्रिवृत्करणम् for a reason which is obvious from the above explanation.

त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् is the latter part of Sūtra 20 of Pāda 4 of Adhyāya 2 of the *Brahma Sūtras* which is as follows:—संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्. Therein संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिः means नामरूपव्याकरणम्.

वियदधिकरणम् is the argument or syllogism as to space contained in *Brahma Sūtras* II. 3. 1 to 7. What that argument is has been explained by Madhusūdana himself in this very passage.

त्रयाणां तेजोबन्नानां सृष्टिश्रवणेऽपि द्वयोरुपसंहारः—Although the *Chhāndogya* text speaks of the creation having been made from the three elements, light, water and earth, the remaining two elements, namely air and space are to be understood as having combined with the three for the purpose of evolution.

तेजोबन्नानाम् is the genetive plural of तेजोबन्न *i. e.* तेजः, अप् and अन्नम्.

तेजसः प्राथम्यधर्मापेक्षया.........बलीयस्त्वात्—In the *Chhāndogya* text the word तेजः occurs first. Its being the first is therefore a पदार्थधर्म. On the other hand आकाश and वायु are पदार्थ's. The argument here advanced therefore is that the पदार्थ's mentioned in the *Tāittirīyaka* text have a greater force than the पदार्थधर्म inferred from the *Chhāndogya* text.

छान्दोग्ये एकविज्ञानेन.........अवश्यं वाच्यत्वात्—The passage of the *Chhāndogya* in which this promise is held forth occurs in Ch. VI. I. which introduces the instructions imparted by the sage Uddālaka to his son S'wetaketu. Therein the former asks the latter whether he had learnt from his teacher that on knowing which everything becomes known and on the latter replying that he had not, proceeds to impart to him a knowledge of the nature of Brahma and of the identity of the Self with it, impresses it upon him by giving several illustrations and explains why it is that everything becomes known on the rise of the knowledge of Brahma.

The argument here is that if the promise is to be deemed to have been fulfilled, the elements आकाश and वायु cannot be deemed to have been left out of account in the genesis of the world mentioned in the *Chhāndogya* because those elements being inert substances cannot have any other entity except Brahma as their source.

अवयुत्यानुवादेन—Owing to a separate mention having been made.

P. 59. वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गः—An occasion to split up sentences of the same nature occurring in the various Upanishads which is not permissible according to the Mīmāñsā rules of interpretation.

पञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतानीति च भाष्यकारवचनम्—This statement is found in the Introduction to the *Pañchīkaraṇa* of S'ri S'ankarāchārya.

This point is found treated at great length by S'ankarāchārya in his *Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra* II. 3. 1-8. and by Vāchaspati and Amalānanda in their commentaries thereon. The commentaries of Purushottama and Abhyankara also on this passage are very illuminating.

इति दिक्—This is the method.

What Madhusūdana means is that he has indicated only the method by which such an objection can be refuted and not refuted it *in extenso.*

Summary—The objection to the theory of पञ्चीकरण is that since the *Chhāndogya* says त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकं करवाणि and the *Brahma Sūtras* say त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् and we find three elements only having combined together it must be held that there are three elements only not five and that there is a combination of three only. The author's reply to it is:—Just as there is the above *Chhāndogya* text, so there are other texts such that of the *Tāittirīyaka* namely, एतस्मादात्मन &c. So when we try to find out the theory contained in the Upanishads as a whole, the first two elements are drawn together. Secondly, the *Chhāndogya* text gives the first rank to the element of light. If that is adhered to then two elements are left out, i. e. to say, an attribute of an element gets priority over other elements which is against the established canon of interpretation. Thirdly, that there are two other elements, namely space and air, cannot be denied. If they exist and since the *Chhāndogya* says elsewhere that by the knowledge of Brahma everything becomes known, these two elements must be deemed to have evolved out of Brahma, for otherwise they cannot be known on the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahma. Fourthly, although five elements are believed to have combined together the fact of their being त्रिवृत् is established. If it is believed that the elements become त्रिवृत् only, then sentences of the same import would have to be split up which cannot be done according to the Mīmāñsā rules. Fifthly, the Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa being only of the nature of a repetition

of what the Upanishads say, is not competent enough to contradict the fact of the elements having become पञ्चीकृत which is established logically. Lastly, as for the experience as to the combination, there is surely that relating to the five elements, the author of the Bhāshya having said पञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतानि.

P. 60. तानि च पञ्चीकृतानि........भोगायतनमुत्पादयन्ति—The elements after they have become पञ्चीकृत are called मूर्तं as distinguished from the अव्याकृत and अमूर्तं explained above. They having combined together produce one effect which becomes the substratum of the senses and the seat of enjoyment and is called the body.

तत्र सत्त्वप्रधानं........तिर्यगादिस्थावरान्तं शरीरम्—The bodies which the gross elements produce vary according as the predominant quality thereof is the Sattwa, Rajas or Tamas. In those of the gods the first is predominant, in those of the human beings the second and in those of other sentient beings from the birds down to the trees &c., the third.

तस्य च शरीरस्य........भूतानां न विरुध्यते—Although all these bodies are made of the same five elements, the differences arise on account of the greater or less proportion of the one or the other of them.

एवं विषया अपि........सत्वरजस्तमोंशप्रधानाः घटादयश्च—It may be recalled that it has been said that the elements become gross in order that the body which is the seat of enjoyment and the objects of enjoyment may be produced. The production of the body having been described it is now said that the objects, namely the fourteen worlds having any of the three Guṇas predominant in them and the objects of this world such as the pot &c. are produced from the one or the other of the पञ्चीकृत elements.

The names of the fourteen worlds are सत्यं, तपः, जनः, महः, स्वः भुवः, भूः, अतल, वितल, सुतल, रसातल, तलातल, महातल, पाताल.

एतत्सर्वं ब्रह्माण्डाख्यं........चोच्यते—It has already been said in the beginning of this passage that the elements when पञ्चीकृत recieve the designation of the मूर्त. It is therefore natural that the products thereof should also be similarly designated. It is now made clearer that all these, namely the bodies, the fourteen worlds and the objects of this world which are inert are all collectively called the मूर्त and are also designated the ब्रह्माण्ड or विराट्.


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1. *N. S. P. Edition pp. 577–87.*

Just as the विश्व is the अभिमानी देवता of the human body in the जाग्रत् state, so the विराट् पुरुष described in the पुरुषसूक्त hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala of the Rigveda is the soul of this ब्रह्माण्ड or विराट्.

P. 61. अयमौपनिषदः.........लयक्रमः—The one that has been described above is the process of evolution according to the Upanishad school. That of involution according to the same school is the reverse of that.

Summary—The process above described can best be remembered if the following geneological tree is borne in mind:—



In addition to this it must be borne in mind (1) that the अव्याकृत is itself जड but becomes active on its being propelled to action by the impressions left by the actions of the individual souls which form part and parcel of it and the fruit of that action is the production of the subtle elements; (2) that there are two kinds of latent powers in the elements, namely, those of knowledge and action and hence when the former is in operation, the elements together produce the बुद्धि and मनस् and when the latter is in operation they together produce the पञ्च प्राणाः and that similarly, when the former is in operation they individually produce in order the senses of knowledge, namely,

hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell and when the latter is in operation they produce in order, the senses of action, namely, speech, giving and taking, motion, excretion and sexual enjoyment, (3) that the अमूर्त becomes developed into the मूर्त by the process of पञ्चीकरण above-described and (4) that the different bodies and the objects and regions are produced by the innumerable combinations of the gross elements in varying proportions so that in some the Sattwa, in others the Rajas and in yet others the Tamas of the three Guṇas appears to predominate.

लय as defined later in this same passage means 'the resting of an object in a subtle state inside its own cause' and not 'total destruction'. Unless it were so, fresh evolution would not be possible.

पञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूत.........स्वकारणे लीयते—Thus at the time of प्रलय what first takes place is that the मूर्तविश्व called विराट् which means the five gross elements and their products are absorbed one by one into its cause, namely the five अपञ्चीकृत subtle elements called हिरण्यगर्भ.

स एव दैनन्दिनः प्रलयः—This absorption of the gross into the subtle elements is known as the दैनन्दिनः प्रलयः.

As the दृश्यपदार्थ assumes the three states, अव्याकृत, अमूर्त and मूर्त during the process of evolution, so too it assumes those states in the inverse order during the process of involution. When the मूर्त is absorbed in the अमूर्त, the प्रलय that takes place is called दैनन्दिन, when the अमूर्त is absorbed in the अव्याकृत, the प्रलय that takes place is named प्राकृत and when the last is absorbed in the Almighty so far as a liberated individual is concerned the प्रलय that takes place is called आत्यन्तिक.

The literal meaning of the term दैनन्दिन is diurnal. This name is given to the absorption of the मूर्त into the अमूर्त because one day of the हिरण्यगर्भ is believed to have ended then.

Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda say that when this प्रलय takes place the regions called भूः, भुवः and स्वः are scorched up by heat emanating from the mouth of संकर्षण and the denizens of महर्लोक fly up to the जनलोक and hence at that time the said three regions are completely destroyed and the महर्लोक though not destroyed becomes devoid of all its inhabitants and when that takes place, the हिरण्यगर्भ who stays in the सत्यलोक has the experience of a night.

Cf. the following verses of the *Bhāgawat Purāṇa* which contain an elaborate though a slightly different description of the process of involution:—

धातूपप्लव आसन्ने व्यक्तं द्रव्यगुणात्मकम् ।
अनादिनिधनः कालो ह्यव्यक्तायापकर्षति ॥
शतवर्षा ह्यनावृष्टिर्भविष्यत्युल्बणा भुवि ।
तत्कालोपचितोष्णार्को लोकांस्त्रीन्प्रतपिष्यति ॥
पातालतलमारभ्य संकर्षणमुखानलः ।
दहन्नूर्ध्वशिखो विष्वग्वर्धते वायुनेरितः ॥
सांवर्तको मेघगणो वर्षति स्म शतं समाः ।
धाराभिर्हस्तिहस्ताभिर्लीयते सलिले विराट् ॥
ततो विराजमुत्सृज्य वैराजः पुरुषो नृप ।
अव्यक्तं विशते सूक्ष्मं निरिन्धन इवानलः ॥
वायुना हृतगन्धा भूः सलिलत्वाय कल्पते ।
सलिलं तद्धृतरसं ज्योतिष्ट्वायोपकल्पते ॥
हृतरूपं तु तमसा वायौ ज्योतिः प्रलीयते ।
हृतस्पर्शोऽवकाशेन वायुर्नभसि लीयते ॥
कालात्मना हृतगुणं नभ आत्मनि लीयते ॥
इन्द्रियाणि मनो बुद्धिः सह वैकारिकैर्नृप ।
प्रविशन्ति ह्यहंकारं स्वगुणैरहमात्मनि ॥ भा. पु. ११. ३. ८-१५ ॥

अव्याकृतस्य त्वनादित्वेन कारणत्वान्नलय.........आत्यन्तिकः प्रलयः—It has been said already at p. ५४ that the अव्याकृत being the *causā causans* is beginningless. It can therefore have no cause. That being so, there can be no such absorption of it in any other thing and hence so far as the समष्टि is concerned there never takes place a प्रलय causing the absorption of the अव्याकृत. But if so far also as the व्यष्टि is concerned this did not take place, there would be no final absolution. Therefore it is believed that when an individual acquires ब्रह्मज्ञान the अव्याकृत is not only absorbed in anything else but is completely destroyed so far as he is concerned. This is called आत्यन्तिकः प्रलयः. It is believed to take place because the अव्याकृत is an effect of ignorance and if that is destroyed the former must be.

सर्वं च सृष्टिप्रलयादिकं.........न तुच्छत्वप्रसङ्गः—It had been said while commencing the description of the evolution of the दृश्यपदार्थ that although it is an unreal substance from the philosophical standpoint it is believed to be real for the purpose of daily intercourse. This being the end of that description it is again explained that the creation, absorption &c. though unreal like the creation and

absorption appearing in a dream are capable of being experienced for the purpose of daily intercourse and therefore although the experience is illusory it is not altogether false. It is also explained here that the experience takes place because of the deep-rooted desires latent in the human heart.

यथा चैतत्तथा व्यक्तमाकरे—An आकर is a mine. So far as the Adwaita philosophy is concerned, *the Bhāshya of S'ri S'ankarāchārya on the Brahma Sūtras* is a mine of information and arguments. Therefore what is meant here is that this point is explained clearly in the said *Bhāshya.*

Nārāyana and Brahmānanda say that the passage of the *Bhāshya* referred to here is:—ननु भवन्मते जगतोऽसत्त्वेन तुच्छत्वमिति चेत् क एवमाह जगत्तुच्छमिति। आविद्यकत्वात्सदसद्विलक्षणमित्यस्मद्दर्शनम्। अथ पुनर्विद्योदये तुच्छमुच्यते, काममुच्यताम्। न त्वेतावता तत्पूर्वव्यवहारस्यानुपपत्तिः।

P. 62. एवं स्थिते जागरणादि व्यवस्थोच्यते—It having been explained how the enjoyer and enjoyed come into being, it now remains to explain what is meant by the state of waking, how the soul experiences pleasures &c. in that state and so on.

इन्द्रियवृत्तिकालीनार्थोपलम्भो जागरणम्—The state of waking means the perception of the objects of sense at the time when an organ of sense is in operation.

It has been explained at pp. ३२-३३ *supra* that knowledge takes place when the mind having gone out through any of the organs of sense to the object within its purview, assumes the form of that object and forges a connection between it and the organ and removes the veil of ignorance over the soul. The इन्द्रियवृत्ति here spoken of is the व्यापार (action) which takes place in the इन्द्रिय at such a time.

तत्र च मूर्तं विराडाख्यं.........जीवेनोपभुज्यते—It is while in that state that the individual soul called the विश्व enjoys the tangible world called the विराट्. That world becomes capable of being experienced by the six means of knowledge, namely प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, उपमान, शब्द, अर्थापत्ति and अनुपलब्धि.

स च देहेन्द्रियादिषु.........विष्लृ व्याप्ताविति च स्मरणात्—This is the definition of the word विश्व based on its etymology.

अत्र यद्यपि विश्वेन.........न तस्य अवस्थान्तरव्यापकत्वम्—It has been said in the beginning of this passage that the विश्व enjoys the मूर्त (tangible) objects. Here it is added that he gets an experience of

the अमूर्त and अव्याकृत also but that only by inference after the soul has returned to the waking state. Therefore the province of the विश्व cannot be said to extend to any other state besides that.

शुक्तिरजतादिज्ञानानां.........जागरणत्वोपपत्तिः—It has been said above that the objects of this world are experienced by the विश्व in the state of waking by the six means of proof. The superimposition of silver on a mother-of-pearl or that of a serpent on a rope does not however take place by any of the means of proof but through delusion. But that is not inconsistent with its taking place in the waking state because that state has been defined as the knowledge of an object at the same time as an operation of an organ of sense and even superimposition which gives rise to false knowledge is accompanied by an operation of an organ of sense though not in the right direction.

P. 63. एवं जाग्रद्भोगजनककर्मक्षये......विश्वोऽपि लीन इत्युच्यते—When the force giving rise to enjoyment fit for the waking state is in abeyance and that giving rise to enjoyment in the state of dreaming is active, when a Tāmasī Vritti called sleep overpowers the feeling of identification with the physical body and when all the senses become dormant through inaction, which is due to their having been deprived of the powers conferred on them by their presiding deities, the विश्व too is said to have become dormant.

तदा च स्वप्नावस्था—When what is above stated takes place there is what is called the state of dreaming.

तत्रान्तःकरणवासना.........अर्थोपलम्भः स्वप्नः—This is the definition of that state. Therein, there is the knowledge of objects which are not material as experienced in the state of waking but imaginary ones produced by the desires latent in the mind and that knowledge is not accompanied by an operation of any of the organs of sense because they are all dormant in that state.

तत्र मन एव.........कः पक्षः श्रेयान्—With regard to the fact that imaginary objects appear in dreams Madhusūdana mentions two views as to the source of those objects. One is that the mind itself appears in the forms of those objects and becomes known by the action of Nescience and the other is that Nescience itself becomes transformed into those objects and becomes known also by its own action and with a view to determine which is the better view asks the above question.

The other three commentators are silent as to whose these views are but Abhyankara says that the first is the Bauddha view while the second is the view of the Adwaita Vedāntins. In explaining the first he says that substances are of four sorts, namely (1) पारमार्थिक (philosophically real), (2) व्यावहारिक (real only for the purpose of daily intercourse), (3) प्रातिभासिक (imaginary with a substratum) and (4) बौद्ध (imaginary without a substratum). The substance of the first category is Brahma or Paramātmā. In the second fall those substances which are proved by the six means of proof to exist. These are the products of the original cosmic ignorance called मूलाविद्या. In the third are comprised those objects which though proved to be false by a means of proof were not without a substratum as a serpent superimposed on a rope. They are the result of तूलाविद्या (individual ignorance). The fourth category is made up of purely fantastic substances such as the horn of a hare which is a total impossibility and is not a product of anything but is merely a fantasy. He further says that it is stated in लघुशब्देन्दुशेखर-अर्थवत्सूत्र that according to the बौद्धदर्शन the words शशशृङ्ग, खपुष्प and others of that class have an inherent power to give rise to ideas of the horn of a hare, sky-flower etc. and that in view of the experiences of dreams it is necessary to assume such a fourth category of substances.

उत्तरः—The latter.

The author favours the latter view because he is an Adwaitin of the S'ankara school.

अविद्याया एव सर्वत्र.........मनःपरिणामत्वव्यपदेशात्—These are the two reasons for which the said view is favoured.

The compound अर्थाध्यासः has been solved by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as अर्थश्चासावध्यासश्च अर्थाध्यासः and by Abhyankara as अर्थस्याध्यासः अर्थाध्यासः. I think the latter solution is preferable because what is meant is that there is the superimposition of one object upon another. Thus there is अर्थाध्यास when रजत which does not exist there is superimposed upon a शुक्ति.

Similarly the compound ज्ञानाध्यासः should be solved as ज्ञानस्याध्यासः ज्ञानाध्यासः. Thus there is ज्ञानाध्यास when knowledge which cannot reasonably arise is superimposed upon the mind.

In all cases of अर्थाध्यास and ज्ञानाध्यास it is Nescience that is assumed to be the material cause and it is said to be a product of

the mind because the instrumental cause of the dream-phenomena is the latent desires pent up in the mind.

ननु, तदा मनसो.........तदान्तःकरणसत्त्वेऽपि प्रमात्रभावः—To the above view an objection is raised that if it is believed that it is Nescience that is transformed into the objects appearing in a dream, then the mind would not become an object but a subject and hence in the state of dreaming the Self would not be proved to be self-luminous. This is answered by saying that though there is the mind, there is no knower in the state of dreaming because the Self becomes the knower only when it is limited by a mind attended by a Vritti of an external organ of sense, and that such an action is not possible in that state because the external senses are all dormant therein.

P. 64. किमधिष्ठानं स्वप्नाध्यासस्य.........किं श्रेयः—Having explained that the dream-phenomena is the result of Nescience, the author now proceeds to determine what is the substratum thereof. This is absolutely necessary because Nescience by itself is incapable of producing even illusory forms without a substratum. Towards that end he introduces two current theories and raises the question which of them is the better and preferable one. One of them is that the substratum is the जीवचैतन्य *i. e.* the individual soul as limited by the mind and the other is that it is the ब्रह्मचैतन्य *i. e.* the Supreme Soul as limited by the original ignorance.

मतभेदेनोभयमपि—His answer is that both are good and therefore acceptable when examined from different standpoints.

तथाहि जाग्रद्बोधेन स्वप्नभ्रमनिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात्.........न मूलाज्ञानावच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमधिष्ठानम्—The author first proceeds to establish the first theory by proving that the second cannot be established. The line of reasoning by which that is done is this:—It is an admitted proposition that the false knowledge arising in a dream is removed by right knowledge produced in the state of waking. This can happen only on the knowledge of the substratum of the phenomena. If ब्रह्मचैतन्य were the substratum its knowledge alone would cause the removal of the delusion. That however is not possible so long as a man is in the state of worldliness and when the knowledge of that substratum arises there must take place the cessation of all duality whatever. Moreover there is a text of the *Brihadāraṇyaka* which says 'He (i. e. the individual soul), is the doer. This text would be meaningless if the ब्रह्मचैतन्य i. e. ईश्वर is believed to be

the substratum. Lastly, if it were so then the experiences of all individuals in dreams would be identical just as the sky and other objects of this world of which He is the substratum are exprienced by all alike.

P, 65. ननु, जीवचैतन्यस्य.........कथमधिष्ठानत्वम्—The author now considers some possible objections to the above theory. The first of them is how can the जीवचैतन्य be the substratum when he is admitted to be self-luminous owing to his being uncovered. He is said to be uncovered because it can never happen that one may cease to be conscious of oneself which must happen if the soul is covered over. Such a state is possible however if the Supreme Soul is believed to be the substratum because the original ignorance which is His limitation may for a time overpower the consciousness thereof.

तत्रापि स्वप्नाध्यासानुकूल.........अवस्थाज्ञानाभ्युपगमात्—The answer to the query is that even in that theory it is admitted that in the state of dreaming there is a peculiar kind of ignorance which is agreeable to the occurrence of the superimposition which takes place in a dream and inconsistent with the consciousness of the collection of the objects of the material world which we percieve in the waking state.

The existence of ignorance of a peculiar sort is inferred because in the first place the objects appearing in a dream being proved to be false in the waking state, that which gives rise to them must be a state of ignorance and secondly, the experiences of the waking state also being found to be the result of ignorance when viewed philosophically, the ignorance that is the instrumental cause of the dream-phenomena must be deemed to be of a nature different from that which is the cause of world-phenomena.

The word तत्रापि has been used here in the sense of 'even in the theory in which the जीवचैतन्य is the substratum of the dream-phenomena'.

स्वप्नदशायां च.........शय्यान्तरवत्—This is stated by way of an answer to an objection that though the dream-phenomena does not appear in the waking state, the world-phenomena does appear in the dreaming state and therefore the two sorts of ignorance cannot be said to be distinct. The gist of it is that though the consciousness 'I am a man' &c. does arise in a dream, the body &c. that appear

there are different from the material body &c. and are as imaginary as another bed which appears while sleeping in a material bed, *i.* e. to say, the subject as well as the objects appearing in a dream are imaginary.

भानसामग्र्यभावश्च तुल्य एव—The absence of the necessary materials is common to both the subjective delusion and the objective delusion occurring in a dream.

The reasoning in this passage being somewhat involved it is necessary to make it clear that the objection raised in the passage is that one can understand that the temporary occlusion of ब्रह्मचैतन्य may occur in order to give rise to the delusion of the dream-phenomena in asmuch as that चैतन्य is limited by the original Nescience but that it passes one's comprehension how such an occlusion may occur even in the case of the जीवचैतन्य since he is never covered over and is ever resplendent. The answer to it is that though the जीवचैतन्य is ever resplendent, it is assumed that in the state of dreaming it is attended by a peculiar kind of ignorance which is agreeable to the rise of the dream-phenomena and disagreeable to the rise of consciousness of the material objects and that even the subjective consciousness which arises in a dream is due to an imaginary body &c.

ननु, अहं मनुष्य.........कथमज्ञाननिवर्तकता—This is another objection to the said theory. The reasoning underlying it is that ignorance is dispelled by the knowledge of the substratum produced by a means of proof, that in this theory, it is the knowledge of the जीवचैतन्य limited by the mind that would dispel the ignorance giving rise to the dream-phenomena, that this knowledge would not be produced by a means of proof because a means of proof implies the existence of the Self as limited by the portion of the inner organ which acts as a rod between that organ and the object, and the knowledge 'I am a man' does not stand in need of an operation of the inner organ because therein the object to be cognized is one's own self and therefore it would arise without a means of proof.

अवस्थान्तरान्यथानुपपत्त्या.........जाग्रत्स्वापत्तेरिति चेत्—The objector anticipates the reply that in asmuch as it cannot be doubted that one was conscious of the waking state before that of dreaming, one must return to that consciousness whatever may be the logical way in which that fact may be explained, i. e. to say, whether the

consciousness of one's being a man &c. arises by वृत्तिज्ञान or by any other means. He refutes that reply by the rejoinder that in that case it must also be assumed that there arises in the state of deep sleep the knowledge which is competent to contradict the dream-experience but that cannot be done because in that case the state of deep sleep would be tantamount to that of waking.

साध्ववोचः, स्वप्नावस्थाज्ञानस्यैव.........न तत्र तद्बाधः—This is the author's reply to that objection. He means that the reply anticipated by the objector is correct so far as it goes but that the further argument based upon it is not sound. The gist of the answer is that since it is the overpowering influence of that ignorance itself which is the cause of dreaming that brings about deep sleep when it is accompanied by the absorption of the inner organ, it is not possible that there should be in that state knowledge competent enough to dispel that ignorance.

Abhyankara explains this by saying that the state of dreaming is like a twilight which occurs before sunrise and after sunset, that when it drifts into sleep as the twilight before sunset drifts into darkness, the ignorance which brought about the dream is not dispelled but is on the contrary increased and becomes all-powerful and that when on the other hand it drifts into the waking state like the twilight before sunrise, then the said ignorance is dispelled. He also says further that just as at daytime a mango tree appears clearly as such, that when there is ordinary darkness it appears as a tree only without the specific signs which distinguish that tree from the others of its class and that when there is pitch darkness even that generic form of the tree ceases to appear, so when a man is in the state of waking the inner organ is fully active, when the state of dreaming occurs that organ though not absorbed is inactive, and when the state of deep sleep occurs, it is totally absorbed and therefore ceases to make itself felt.

जागरणे तु.........न प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानमन्तरेण निवर्तते—The author now explains what is and what is not knowledge produced by a means of proof and how that is helpful in eradicating the delusion of the dream-state.

In doing so he states that the consciousness which arises on waking up and on feeling that one was dreaming though not produced by a means of proof is sufficient to contradict

the dream-experience because it is real, while the consciousness of being a man arises from a means of proof because the consciousness of manhood arises on seeing the physical body which is objectively perceptible like any other object. Thus the ignorance which is the cause of the dream-phenomena is removed by the rise of the consciousness 'I am a man' so far as it relates to one's state. As for the ignorance as to the particular objects of worldly experience such as a pot that is not removed simply by the rise of such a consciousness but requires an operation of the mind on those particular objects because there was in the dreaming state besides the general ignorance as to all the objects of the worldly phenomena, a particular ignorance as to particular objects.

The line of distinction here drawn is the same as that drawn at p. ३८ where the question under consideration is whether the veil of ignorance can or cannot be removed by inference.

P. 66. साक्षिणश्चाविद्यानिवर्तकत्वाभावो........धर्मिग्राहकमानसिद्धः—It has been said above that the Self who is the witness of all phenomena makes itself manifest on the return to the waking state. The objector is therefore imagined to argue that if this साक्षी is able to rouse self-consciousness, why should he not be able to dispel the ignorance as to external objects? The author's answer to it can be explained thus:—The existence of ignorance is proved by the consciousness 'I am ignorant.' This ignorance is not an object of objective perception but of subjective consciousness. This means that the existence of the perciever, the साक्षी, is also proved by the same means. And by the same means again is proved the inability of the साक्षी to dispel ignorance because the above consciousness itself shows that though the साक्षी has made himself manifest his manifestation is clouded by ignorance.

यावन्ति ज्ञानानि.........न स्वप्नाध्यासानुपपत्तिः—This is an answer to a further unexpressed objection that if once dream-delusion is removed by right knowledge, it should not occur again. The language of the text here is simple enough to require any explanation.

इति जीवचैतन्यमेव........न कोऽपि दोषः—Here ends the justification of the first theory that the जीवचैतन्य is the substratum of the dream-phenomena.

यदा पुनर्ब्रह्मज्ञानादेव........इति पक्षेऽपि न कश्चिद्दोषः—Now the author justifies the other theory. When the ब्रह्मचैतन्य is believed to be the

substratum of the dream-delusion, then there can be the eradication of ignorance once only and that can be by the knowledge of Brahma which also puts an end to all duality. Therefore the return to the state of waking which also is a state of the ignorance which is the cause of the dream-delusion is not possible. Hence in that theory there can only be the disappearance of that ignorance on the rise of the one which is prevalent in the waking state just as when the delusion as to a rope being a serpent disappears when that as to its being a stick arises.

It should be remarked that in this theory there is not the removal of the dream-delusion by the knowledge of the substratum, namely the ब्रह्मचैतन्य, which takes place once only in the case of each individual and for ever but the supplanting of one kind of delusion by another over the same substratum.

प्रतिजीवं स्वप्नाध्यास........मनोगतवासनानामसाधारण्यादेव—This is an incidental explanation given in order to clear up a doubt which may be raised with regard to the satisfactoriness of the theory. It is easily intelligible that since according to the Vedānta doctrine there is only one Self and the different individualities of the waking state are due to the inner organs enveloping it being different, the dream-experiences of the different individuals must be different owing to the latent desires lurking in those individual inner organs being different.

P. 67. मनोवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमेव........न काप्यनुपपत्तिः—This is a third theory as to what is the substratum of the dream-phenomena. Therein it is concieved that the ब्रह्मचैतन्य which is the disc that is reflected and is different from the जीव which is a reflection in अविद्या becomes the substratum of the dream-phenomena when limited by the mind. According to Abhyankara this is the view of the अवच्छेदवादी's while the first is that of the प्रतिबिम्बवादी's.

एतस्मिन्नपि पक्षे........अङ्गीकाराच्च काप्यनुपपत्तिः—To the above view an objection is likely to be raised, namely that though the ब्रह्मचैतन्य may be covered over as limited by the original ignorance it cannot be covered over as limited by the mind. That is anticipated and answered here. The gist of the answer is that just as in the first view the quality of covering over is possessed by a specific ignorance as to one's state so in this view also it is possessed by such ignorance and therefore in that view also there is nothing to make it untenable.

अत एव शास्त्रेषु.........तथा व्यपदेशः—According to Nārāyaṇa, the S'āstras referred to here are the *Bhāshya of S'aṅkarāchārya on the Brahma Sūtras* and other ancient works of authority. In those works this third view also is accepted at same places.

ननु, मनोऽवच्छिन्न.........बाह्यार्थाभावस्य समानत्वादिति चेत्—The author now removes an objection which can be raised against all the three views. But he treats the first and the third as if they were identical because although in the third the चैतन्य concerned is ब्रह्मचैतन्य not जीवचैतन्य, still when the former is conditioned by the individual mind it is as good as the latter. That is the reason why at the end of this passage it is said तस्मान्न पक्षद्वयेऽपि &c.

The objection is that in the case of the चैतन्य, whether ब्रह्म or जीव limited by the mind, being the अधिष्ठान, if the object is an elephant it would be identified with the Self and the consciousness 'I am an elephant' would arise just as false silver becomes identified with the mother-of pearl and the knowledge 'This is silver' arises. Similarly in the case of the ब्रह्मचैतन्य limited by the original ignorance, the knowledge of the existence only of an elephant would arise not that of its being a separate object as 'This is an elephant', the reason being that in both the cases an external object which can be designated as 'this' is absent.

न, आद्ये पक्षे अहङ्कारस्य.........तत्रभानाभ्युपगमात्—The answer is in the negative as to both the views though for different reasons. As to the first, the reason is that just as the mother-of-pearl limits the substratum of silver, the self-consciousness does not limit the जीवचैतन्य and hence no such false identification of the object of the dream with the substratum arises as in the case of the silver and the mother-of-pearl, the self-consciousness like the perception of the mother-of-pearl preventing the occurrence of the delusion. Such being the case, it is believed that the 'thisness' of the object which is not opposed to the delusion becomes apparent.

अन्त्ये तु.........कल्पित एव—In the latter view, i. e. that in which the ब्रह्मचैतन्य limited by the original ignorance is the substratum, the whole phenomena even in the waking state being imaginary everything in the dream-world too is imaginary and hence the form of the elephant and its objectiveness are both imaginary.

उभयाकारबाधेऽप्यधिष्ठान........न शून्यवादापत्तिः—When everything is imaginary, the existence of everything is likely to be contradicted also. There is however a distinction between this view and the Mādhyamika view that in the ultimate synthesis the void only remains, for in this view a positive entity, namely the चैतन्य, who is the substratum of all phenomena, survives.

जाग्रद्दशायामपि.........भावाभ्युपगमाच्च—As already said everything even in the waking state is imaginary. Hence even in that state when silver is mistakenly supposed to exist in place of a mother-of-pearl, an objective but imaginary piece of silver is believed to have been percieved in place of an objective but imaginary mother-of-pearl.

शुक्तीदमंशभानपक्षेऽपि.........किन्त्वधिष्ठानसत्यत्वम्—Even when it is believed that what appears objectively is the mother-of-pearl not silver, the cause of the false knowledge is not the reality of the objectiveness of that object but that of the substratum.

अधिष्ठानं च तत्र.........साक्षिचैतन्यं विद्यते एव—This is added as a reply to the objection that while in the case of the delusion as to the mother-of-pearl, there is the चैतन्य residing in it which is unknown, there is none in the case of the dream-phenomena. The साक्षीचैतन्य spoken of here is the same as the ब्रह्मचैतन्य which is the substratum according to this theory.[1]

Here ends the discussion as to what is the substratum of the dream-phenomena. To sum up, the author has here referred to three theories, namely, (1) that in which the जीवचैतन्य as limited by the mind is the substratum, (2) that in which the ब्रह्मचैतन्य as limited by the original ignorance is the substratum and (3) that in which the ब्रह्मचैतन्य as limited by the mind is the substratum, but he seems to be of the view that the first and the third theories are practically identical because the ब्रह्मचैतन्य in the third is of the same nature as the जीवचैतन्य in the first. Therefore there are in fact only two theories namely (1) that in which the जीवचैतन्य or ब्रह्मचैतन्य as limited by the individual mind is the substratum and (2) that in which the ब्रह्मचैतन्य as limited by the original ignorance is the substratum. Both of them are equally helpful in explaining the dream-phenomena, all possible objections thereto being easily removable. Therefore it matters very little which theory is accepted. From the facts however that the first theory is

1. *Vide pp.* २६-२७, ५३, *and* ६४ *Supra.*

more minutely discussed and it is repeatedly asserted in this work that the world-phenomena is real so far as our daily intercourse is concerned, I am inclined to believe that Madusūdana favours the first theory namely, that in which the जीवचैतन्य or ब्रह्मचैतन्य as limited by the mind is the substratum of the dream-delusion.

P. 69. अत्र च स्वाप्निक........तैजस इत्युच्यते—The word अत्र (here) means 'in the state of dreaming.'

पित्ताख्यतेजः........भासकत्वादिति वा—This is the etymology of the word तैजस्. The light that appears inside the body is a quality of the पित्त (bile) inside it. Without that light nothing would be visible in the state of dreaming and I believe even in the state of contemplation when the Yogis visualize the internal structure of the body, see distant events as if they were taking place before them, the presiding deities of the different organs &c.; and finally the Supreme soul in the special form which they revere, though there is no celestial body like the sun &c. inside their bodies.

Purushottama cites Yājnavalkya Smriti III. 77 in support of this proposition which runs as follows:—

पित्तात्तु दर्शनं पक्तिमौष्ण्यं रूपं प्रकाशिताम् ।
रसात्तु रसनं शैत्यं स्नेहं क्लेदं समार्दवम् ॥

एवं जाग्रत्स्वप्नभोगद्वयेन........विश्रामस्थानं सुषुप्त्यवस्था—Now Madhusūdana proceeds to explain what is the position in the case of the state of deep sleep. When it supervenes, the actions which were the causes of the states of waking and dreaming lie dormant for the time being and the inner organ including the desires latent therein as limited by the power of knowledge, simply survives in the form of the cause which gave birth to the man. That is the state in which the soul tired of the enjoyment of the objects appearing in the states of waking and dreaming takes rest.

न किञ्चिदवेदिषमिति........सुषुप्तिः—This is added in order to support the above description by appealing to the common experience of all men on rising up from that state, that one slept well and did not know anything i. e. to say, there was nothing else then except ignorance, the root cause of birth.

तत्र जाग्रत्स्वप्नभोग्यपदार्थे........वृत्तित्रयमभ्युपेयते—The author now proceeds to explain why such consciousness arises. Abhyankara

commenting on that explanation says that at the time of a Pralaya, Nescience remains in its original form only. When evolution commences the first Vritti that arises is that of ignorance. This Vritti is unqualified in all the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping, of each individual. Its presence is no bar to the rise of knowledge of the sense-objects in the waking state. It is not therefore sufficient to say that there is that particular Avidyā-Vritti in the last of those states. Therefore in order to explain the prevention of the rise of knowledge of the sense-objects it must be assumed that there is another specific Vritti of Avidyā in that state besides the original ignorance. Further from the common consciousness of a past state of sleep which arises on the return to the waking state, namely 'I slept well, I did not know anything' it is assumed that besides the ignorance there were the feelings of happiness and of witnessing the state of happiness. These two are also Vrittis of Avidyā. It is therefore said here that there are three such Vrittis namely, those of happiness, of witnessing the happiness and ignorance.

Purushottama commenting on this sentence says that Madhusūdana has said that there are three Vrittis only in view of the established practice of their school whereas as a matter of fact there is one Vritti only and that Madhusūdana himself has established that fact in his *Adwaitasiddhi* and he himself has expanded the former's arguments in his commentary on that work named *Siddhisādhaka*. Brahmānanda says that the three Vrittis are said to be different on account of three different forms which the Nescience assumes.

अहङ्काराभावाच्च नैका विशिष्टा वृत्तिः—As **अहङ्कार** (egotism) is the result of a particular Vritti of the inner organ and as that organ is dormant in deep sleep there can in that state be no Vritti of that organ and therefore no specific Vritti but a group of three Vrittis as stated above. The **अहमंश** in the consciousness 'I slept well; I did not know anything' comes in only on rising up, not as a thing which existed in the previous state but as one through which expression is given to those that existed. If it had been there then there would not have been the state of deep sleep.

अत एव वृत्तिरूपस्य........परामर्शानुपपत्तेः—The author now proceeds to distinguish the state of deep sleep from that of Pralaya (annihilation of the world). In both the states there is the want of

knowledge preceded by a Vritti. However, in the former there is the group of the three Vrittis of Avidyā which is the seed from which the consciousness that one slept well and that one did not know anything arises on waking up. It is supposed to exist because otherwise the rise of the said consiousness cannot be explained. In the latter there is nothing from which the existence of any such Vritti can be inferred.

अन्तःकरणोपरागकालीन.........स्मरणत्वानुपपत्तिः—It is not impossible to establish this as a case of recollection, although there is no specific reference to time and place, because there is the absence of experience gained at the same time as a connection of the inner organ, such a connection being absent in the state of deep sleep.

स्मरणे तत्तोल्लेखनियमाभावाच्च—Moreover it is not as a rule necessary that there should be a specific reference to time and place in each case of recollection.

जाग्रद्दशायामस्वाप्समित्यनुभवानुपपत्तेः—It is not possible that the experience of having slept well should arise in the waking state itself because deep sleep is not possible without the absorption of the mind which does not take place in a waking state. Therefore the consciousness in question cannot arise as the result of an experience in the waking state but only as the recollection of an experience had in the preceding state.

लिङ्गाभावेनाश्रयासिद्ध्या चानुमानस्यासंभवात्—Just as that consciousness cannot be the result of an experience in a waking state it cannot also be the result of an inference it being impossible to draw one owing to the absence of a लिङ्ग (middle term) and the fallacy called आश्रयासिद्धि (that in which the substratum is false).

Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda expanding this argument say that an inference could be drawn only in the following two ways namely, स्वप्नजागरयोर्मध्यकालः सुषुप्तिमान्, ज्ञानसामान्याभावात्, जन्यज्ञानसामान्याभावाद्वा. Thereout ज्ञानसामान्याभाव is not a हेतु because it is not proved and it cannot be found in the minor term. The other kind of inference also is not possible because there is no substratum there being no invariable rule that knowledge once acquired must be recollected and it being therefore impossible to assume that if knowledge had been acquired it would have been recollected.

It seems the word च after the word लिङ्गाभावेन in the text is superfluous. I have therefore ignored it here.

अहङ्कारस्तु.........स्मरणानुपपत्तेः—As already said अहङ्कार (egotism or self-consciousness) is a Vritti of the mind. It cannot therefore be present in the state of deep sleep one of whose characteristics is a total absorption of the mind. It is only on the return to the waking state that it springs up like effervescence from a stoppered bottle after the stopper is removed. It cannot be connected with the recollection because it was lying dormant during the state of sleep.

In view of this explanation the question naturally arises how is it then that a man feels on rising that he was sleeping. The answer to it is supplied by the following sentence.

मुखप्रतिबिम्बाश्रये दर्पणे.........न पुनरहं सुखीतिवदाश्रयतया—The answer above referred to is this:—The feeling that arises namely, 'I was sleeping' is similar to the feeling 'My face is red' which arises on seeing one's reflection side by side with the redness of a china rose in a mirror, not to the feeling 'I am happy'. The difference is that while in the former the अहङ्कार was not present at the same time as the state of sleeping, in the latter it is present at the same time as the enjoyment of happiness.

P. 70. स्मृतिसंशयविपर्ययाणां.........अविद्या एव कारणत्वात्—If अहङ्कार is not connected with the recollection what is it that gives rise to the latter? The appropriate answer to it is that recollection and even doubts and errors are the result of अविद्या and dependent upon the साक्षी. This inference is arrived at in this manner:—Knowledge is of two sorts, right and wrong. Right knowledge is that which is produced by a वृत्ति of the mind which cannot arise unless there is अहङ्कार. Conversely whatever is not the result of such a वृत्ति is not right knowledge. Recollection is not right knowledge because it is not knowledge at all. Doubts and errors though knowledge are not right knowledge. Hence all the three are not the result of वृत्ति's of the mind and dependent upon अहङ्कार. It is a fact however that they do arise. They can therefore be accounted for only on the hypothesis that they are the products of अविद्या which is the general cause of all the phenomena which cannot be accounted for otherwise and have the Self for their support.

अत एव अनाप्तवाक्यजन्य.........अन्तःकरणस्यासामर्थ्यात्—This is an incidental explanation of another psychical phenomena given in order to strengthen the above proposition.

An अनाप्तवाक्य means the word of a man who is not trustworthy.

The erroneous knowledge produced by such a word is परोक्ष as opposed to such knowledge produced by self-delusion because the word comes from the mouth of another individual.

The Vedāntins believe that such a delusion too is the result of a वृत्ति of अविद्या because though there is in that case a material for a वृत्ति of the अन्तःकरण, it does not arise because the material not being appropriate, i. e. to say, the word not being true, the अन्तःकरण is powerless to act.

In his commentary on this passage Abhyankara has raised certain other doubts and solved them. It is not necessary to mention all of them and their solutions here.

नामादिषु ब्रह्माध्यासस्तु.........मनोवृत्तिरेव कामादिवत्—In the previous sentence there is an explanation as to the false knowledge produced by the word of a man who is not trustworthy. In this sentence it is explained how the false knowledge which a Vedic text tries to produce by an injunction arises. The text referred to is नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत (छा. ७-१-५). There is no doubt that a name even of Brahma cannot be Brahma itself. Still just as a newly married couple is shown a star very near the north pole and told that it is the north pole because that star cannot be seen easily by many, so this text makes a near approach to truth when it implies that name is Brahma. Such kind of knowledge is obviously neither right knowledge nor totally false knowledge but all the same it is a वृत्ति of the mind different from both भ्रम and प्रमा like desire &c.

तदुक्तं 'अत एव चोदनाजन्यत्वान्मानसी क्रियैव सा, न ज्ञानमिति'—This is a quotation from the *Bhāshya of S'ankarāchārya on Brahmasūtra* I. 1. 4. This remark has been made by him while distinguishing ज्ञान from क्रिया[1].

एतेन तर्कस्यापि.........व्याख्यातम्—This explains why तर्क (abstract reasoning) is also a मनोवृत्ति.

व्याप्यारोपेण.........भ्रमप्रमाविलक्षणत्वात्—The most common illustration of an अनुमान is पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमात्. From this it is argued:—यदि वह्निर्न स्यात्तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यात्. Here the वह्न्यभाव which is proved by धूमाभाव is imposed on the पर्वत and thus connected with it though there is in fact smoke on the mountain. This is the result of the assumption of a false minor term. Such a reasoning is not ज्ञान produced by

1. *Vide N. S. P. Edition p. 129 where it is found with a slight variation.*

a मनोवृत्ति but a conclusion drawn from an independent मनोवृत्ति and is therefore different from भ्रम (erroneous knowledge) and प्रमा (right knowledge) because it is not based on any visible sign but on a hypothesis which is based on nothing else but a freak of the mind.

प्रसञ्जनम् means 'connecting'.

अत एव मनननिदिध्याससहिते.........तस्य चतुर्विधान्वयव्यतिरेकादितर्करूपत्वात्— The विधि referred to here is that inferred from the text आत्मा अरे श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (बृ. आ. ६-४-५).

अत एव means 'only when it is admitted that तर्क is of the nature of a particular independent operation of the mind which is different from knowledge'.

From the fact that it is only श्रवण that is said to be the designation of the वेदान्तवाक्यविचार it is to be understood that the विधि consists of श्रवण only while मनन and निदिध्यासन are only aids to it. That is so, because finally knowledge arises from प्रमा which takes place from the words of the महावाक्य's after all doubts &c. have been removed. According to Purushottama श्रवण here means अद्वितीये ब्रह्मणि निखिलवेदान्तानां तात्पर्यावधारणानुकूलो व्यापारविशेषो न श्रोत्रजन्यं ज्ञानम्. Nārāyaṇa and Abhyankara also agree with this view.

Out of the three kinds of तर्क, श्रवण leads to a belief in the identity of the individual soul and Brahma on the removal of प्रमाणगतासम्भावना (doubts as to the authoritativeness of the Upanishads); मनन leads to a conviction as to that identity on the removal of प्रमेयगतासम्भावना (doubts as to the truth of the sayings contained in those works) and निदिध्यासन leads to the realization thereof on the removal of विपरीतभावना (those impressions which may have been formed by the soul's identification with physical bodies in countless previous births).

वेदान्तवाक्यविचार means 'the discussion as to (the purport of) the Vedānta sentences'. This having been done by S'ankarāchārya in the *S'ārīraka Bhāshya*, Purushottama says that it must be understood that he has not denied that श्रवण has been ordained and that what he has denied is that the acquisition of ज्ञान has been ordained.

अन्वयः means तादात्म्यादिसम्बन्धः and व्यतिरेक is its opposite.

दृग्दृश्यान्वयव्यतिरेकः.........दुःखीपरमप्रेमास्पदान्वयव्यतिरेकः—These are the subject-matters of the four chapters of the *S'ārīraka Sūtras.* All the commentators have eleborately explained these तर्क's in their commentaries.

दृक् means 'the seer' and दृश्य 'the objects of perception.'

साक्षि is 'the witness' and साक्ष्य 'the phenomena to be witnessed.'

आगमः means 'creation', अपायः 'destruction' and अवधिः 'end or limit.'

दुःखी means 'miserable' and परमप्रेमास्पद 'the abode of the highest joy.'

अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तान्वयव्यतिरेकः.........इत्यभियुक्ताः—The above four तर्क's serve to establish that Brahma is eternal joy. But they do not establish that it is above limitations and therefore it would be destructible. This fifth तर्क is therefore resorted to in order to establish that fact.

अनुवृत्तत्वम् means 'being followed' or 'not being the counter-part of absolute non-existence'. This quality belongs to Brahma not to Māyā. व्यावृत्तत्वम् means 'being excluded or not followed' or 'being the counterpart of absolute non-existence'. This quality belongs to Māyā not to Brahma. That being so when there is the absence of व्यावृत्तत्व there is अनुवृत्तत्व. That means that Brahma is not limited and therefore not destructible.

Nārāyaṇa and Purushottama are of the view that although the तर्क's mentioned here are five only they are not the only ones that are resorted to in the Vedānta philosophy but they are specifically mentioned as the characteristic features thereof. Abhynkara on the other hand holds that there are not even five but only the four तर्क's which are first mentioned and that the fifth being the basis of those four is implied in all of them. I am of the opinion that the latter is the better view because the singular number in the pronoun एतत् more fits in with its being construed to refer to the last तर्क only rather than to all the five and because the fifth has no specific place assigned to it in the *Brahma Sūtras* as each of the other four has.

वेदान्तानुकूलतर्क means 'such reasoning as would be helpful in arriving at the conclusions suggested by the purport of the Upanishad texts.'

चतुर्लक्षणी means चतुरध्यायी.

अभियुक्ताः means 'the adepts' (in the Vedāntas'āstra).

विस्तरस्तु.........अनुसन्धेयः—These तर्क's have been elaborately set forth in Madhusūdana's *Vedāntakalpalatikā*. Brahmānanda confirms this statement in his commentary. *No. 3 of the Princess of Wales Saraswatī Bhavan Text Series, Benares,* edited with an Introduction in Sanskrit, by Rāmājnā S'arma Pāndeya purports to be this work but I do not believe that it is the whole of it. In my opinion it is the first स्तवक only thereof for various reasons which will be found mentioned in the introduction to this work. Suffice it to say here that though there is a reference to these तर्क's at pp. 90-92 of the above edition the elaboration thereof spoken of by Madhusūdana and Brahmānanda is not to be found there.

Here ends the discussion as to the nature of the state of deep sleep and the subjects incidental thereto.

Summary—The state of deep sleep is the seat of repose of the individual soul tired of the enjoyment of the states of waking and dreaming. This takes place when the actions which are the causes of the two latter states are exhausted and the inner organ together with the latent desires limited by the power of knowledge rests in the form of the causal body and the state of deep sleep means nothing but the knowledge of the cause (*i. e.* Nescience) only. Of what kind is this knowledge? It is of the kind of a triple Vritti of Nescience in the form of one's being a witness, being happy and being ignorant of one's state. There is not any particular Vritti because the ego is absent. This definition does not extend to the absorption of the universe because therein there is no knowledge of the nature of a Vritti owing to the absence of a seed from which it could be assumed. In deep sleep on the contrary there is such a seed because on rising up one becomes conscious that one slept well and did not know anything. This consciousness arises from recollection only because in recollection it is not necessary that there should be any reference to time and place. This is not direct cognition because there is not knowledge arising at the same time as contact with the inner organ. Nor is it an inference because there is no middle term and hence no basis. As for the ego it is experienced only at the time of rising.

It having been absorbed is not experienced then. What takes place is the recollection of the Self as superimposed upon by the ego having been in the same predicament with it just as one's face is found to be red in a mirror owing to the redness of the china rose being superimposed upon it and therefore the consciousness that arises is not like that when one feels 'I am happy' which means that the state of happiness and the self-consciousness exist at the same time. This recollection like doubts, errors &c. is dependent upon the Self. Moreover since the ego is the support of knowledge produced by the means of proof such as direct congnition, inference &c., all its products are characterized by the quality of being right knowledge. This recollection is not knowledge at all. Hence the cause of the recollection is Nescience (erroneous knowledge) only because of its being unconnected with facts gathered by experience and being dependent upon one's mind only. It is therefore that room has been found in the Vedānta philosophy for the injunction as to study aided by contemplation and realization. According to that philosophy knowledge alone is sufficient to bring about final absolution. That is produced by the Vedānta sentences तत्त्वमसि &c. themselves. There can be no injunction with regard thereto. But study can be enjoined as it is not knowledge but a function of the mind different from right or erroneous knowledge. The above philosophy treats of four तर्क's namely, दृग्दृश्यान्वयव्यतिरेक, साक्षीसाक्ष्यान्वयव्यतिरेक, आगमापायितदवध्यन्वयव्यतिरेक, and दुःखीपरमप्रेमास्पदान्वयव्यतिरेक which are the subject-matters of the four chapters of the *Brahma Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. A fifth तर्क, namely अनुवृतव्यावृत्तान्वयव्यतिरेक is also resorted to in order to prove that Brahma is unlimited and therefore indestructible but the adepts are of opinion that it is implied in all the other तर्क's and therefore does not deserve to be classed separately. For a more detailed discussion of these तर्क's one must refer to the author's *Vedāntakalpalatikā.*

P. 74. तदेवं सुषुप्त्यवस्थायां.........प्राज्ञ इत्युच्यते—From what has preceded it is clear that the state of sleep is one of unqualified enjoyment because the inner organ having been absorbed, the joys and sorrows of the world which are never unmixed are all forgotten for the time being and the Self is therein accompanied by nothing else except ignorance of that blissful state but for which the Self would never like to exchange that state for that of waking as the former if not accompanied by it would be its state of absolute

purity. But on account of that ignorance it is not the pure state of the Self but one of the phases of its worldliness and therefore when it is in that state it is given a different designation, namely प्राज्ञ.

प्रकर्षेणाज्ञत्वात्.........प्रकृष्टज्ञत्वाद्वा—In the state of सुषुप्ति the soul is limited by अवस्थाज्ञान in addition to मूलाज्ञान which exists in all the states of worldliness. It is hence said that there is प्रकर्षेणाज्ञत्वम्. On the other hand, the absence of connection with the mind and the body and senses which are the cause of misery makes a very near approach to the state of the highest bliss. Hence it is said that there is प्रकृष्टज्ञत्वम्.

For a very detailed exposition of this state see *Brihdāraṇyaka* (IV. 3) *Chhāndogya* (VI. 8) and *Mānḍukya together with the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda and S'ankara's Bhāshya thereon.*

तदानीं चान्तःकरणस्य.........न वा सार्वज्ञ्यापत्तिः—In that state again, there is the absorption of the inner organ but inasmuch as there is the limitation caused by the impressions formed thereon there is not the absence of जीवत्व and therefore not the attainment of omniscience.

ईश्वराभेदप्रतिपादनं च.........तद्भेदेन प्रमातृभेद एव—The *Chhāndogya* contains (VIII 3. 2) the text:—प्रजा अहरहर्ब्रह्मगच्छन्त्योऽपि न विन्दति. There are similar texts in other Upanishads also tending to establish the identity of the individual with the Supreme Soul when the former is in the state of सुषुप्ति. The author says that this identity has been spoken of figuratively on account of the individual soul being then freed from identification with the body, senses &c. Moreover as the संस्कार's which are the instrumental cause of the effects which depend upon the साक्षी such as recollection &c. are not also the material cause thereof the pure Self is the common साक्षी of all the individuals in their state of deep sleep in which the संस्कार's survive though the inner organ is absorbed for the time being. On the other hand in the जाग्रत् state the inner organ is present and is the material cause of the effects dependent upon the प्रमाता such as perception &c. and therefore the प्रमाता's differ in the case of each individual.

साक्षिण एव च.........न प्रतिसन्धानुपपत्तिः—It is because the साक्षी himself becomes the प्रमाता in the जाग्रत् state, being then qualified by certain

conditions, that a restoration of connection with the previous experiences does not become impossible.

प्रतिसन्धानम् primarily means 'joining together' or 'uniting'. Hence here it must be taken to mean 'the restoration of connection with' or as the commentators say 'recollection of' (the past experience).

मातृमानप्रभेदेऽपि ....न तथात्मनः—The prose order of these verses would be as follows:—**यस्मात् बाह्यार्थवत्साक्षी मातृमानप्रभेदेऽपि प्रतिदेहं न भिद्यते ततः स आत्मेत्युच्यते। यद्वत्प्रमात्रादेः मिथः व्यभिचारः स्वसाक्षिकः न तथात्मनः सर्वमात्राद्यभावार्थसाक्षित्वात्।** The meaning thereof is that it is because the **साक्षी** does not like the objects of perception differ with each individual though the knowing-self and the means of proof do, that he is called 'the Self,' for in the manner in which the mutual changes of the knowing-selfs &c., are witnessed by the Self, those of the Self would not be, it being itself the witness of the non-existence of all the knowing-selfs &c.

The etymology of the word **आत्मा** is **अतति सर्वं व्याप्नोतीति आत्मा.** Hence its etymological meaning being that which pervades everything, the idea of a plurality of selfs is excluded.

इति वार्त्तिककारपादैर्व्यवहारदशायां........केषाञ्चिद्व्यामोहमात्रमित्यवधेयम्—The argument is that when the author of the *Vārttika* denies that there is a plurality of **साक्षी**'s even in the waking state, it is the height of infatuation to postulate that there is their plurality in the state of deep sleep and therefore the above proposition that there is only one **साक्षी** for all in that state is unassailable.

P. 75. **ननु दुःखमहमस्वाप्समिति........दुःखानुभवोऽप्यस्तु**—It is natural to suppose that pain also should be experienced in the state of deep sleep as pleasure is because just as sometimes one rises up with the consciousness 'I slept well', at sometimes one also rises up with the consciousness 'I slept with difficulty'.

न, तदानीं दुःखसामग्रीविरहेण तदभावात्—The author says in the first place that it is not possible because there is nothing there from which pain could be felt.

सुखस्य चात्मस्वरूपेन नित्यत्वात्........इति प्रत्ययोपपत्तिः—It is strange that though **सुख** and **दुःख** are correlatives the first should always be felt in deep sleep and the second never. The author therefore accounts for it by saying that the former being the nature of

the Self is experienced when everything else is absent and the latter not, because the consciousness of the body, senses and mind which are the sources of pain is not there. But it cannot be gainsaid that pain is experienced at times in the state of deep sleep. He therefore opines that such an experience may be due to the uncomfortableness of the bed or some similar cause.

अथवा अवस्थात्रयस्यापि.........दुःखमुपपद्यते—This is another possible explanation. According to Purushottama it is based upon the view of Sures'warāchārya, very often referred to herein as the author of the *Vārttika*, expressed in the *Vārttika on the Jyotirbrāhmana* which forms part of the sixth Adhyāya of the *Brihadāraṇyakopanishat*. Abhyankara says that the said Brāhmana occurs in the fourth Adhyāya of that Upanishad. A reference to the text published by the Nirṇaya Sagar Press shows that the latter is correct.

P. 75-76. **तथा हि प्रमाज्ञानं जाग्रज्जाग्रत्.........मूढोऽहमासमिति परामर्शः**—As appears clearly from the details that are given the view seems to be that each state has three sub-states.

जाग्रज्जाग्रत् means the perfectly waking state in which there is no trace of any of the other two. Similarly **स्वप्नस्वप्नः** means the perfectly dreaming state and **सुषुप्तिसुषुप्तिः** means the perfectly sleeping state. The other two phases of the states have traces of the one or the other of the remaining two. Thus in **जाग्रत्** there may be a trace of either **स्वप्न** or **सुषुप्ति**, in **स्वप्न** that of either **जाग्रत्** or **सुषुप्ति** and in **सुषुप्ति** that of either **जाग्रत्** or **स्वप्न**. They are therefore imperfect states.

According to this explanation therefore the recollection of pain during the state of deep sleep may arise on waking up from a state of **सुषुप्तिस्वप्नः**.

यथा चैतत्तथा वासिष्ठवार्त्तिकामृतादौ स्पष्टम्—It is clear that the **वार्त्तिकामृत** referred to here is the *Vārttika of Sures'warāchārya* spoken of above. The **वासिष्ठ** that is referred to may be the *Yogavās'ishṭha Rāmāyaṇa*. The commentators are silent as to its identification. The editor of the recent Benares edition notes that this expression does not occur in two of the Mss. collated by him[1]. That however seems to be the result of an oversight of their copyists because it is found in all the other printed editions and in all the Mss. collated by me.

1. *Kās'i Sanskrit Series No. LXV. p. 439, foot-note 1.*

एवमध्यात्मं विश्व.........अधिभूतं तमोगुणः—So far the author has established that the three states, जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and सुषुप्ति and their presiding spirits विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ are of the nature of Nescience as stated in the first two lines of the verse. These relate to the microcosm only. But he has also incidentally mentioned the corresponding states of the macrocosm and their presiding spirits. So long as these are looked upon as separate entities no spiritual good would accrue. Therefore in order that it may accrue he first describes how they should be grouped together. The three groups in which all of them fall are called (1) अध्यात्म i. e. one relating to the individual, the word आत्मा therein having the connotation of 'the self' as the word is used in ordinary parlance; (2) अधिभूत i. e. one relating to the group of external objects including those above and below the earth and (3) अधिदैव i. e. one relating to the gods who preside over the three Guṇas which govern the former groups. The products of Nescience above-enumerated can therefore be classified as follows:—

अध्यात्मम्	अधिभूतम्	अधिदैवम्
विश्वः जाग्रत्	विराट् सत्त्वगुणः	विष्णुः पालनम्
तैजसः स्वप्नः	हिरण्यगर्भः रजोगुणः	ब्रह्मा सृष्टिः
प्राज्ञः सुषुप्तिः	अव्याकृतम् तमोगुणः	रुद्रः प्रलयः

एवमध्यात्माधिभूताधिदैवानामेकत्वात्.........अन्तःकरणशुद्धिद्वारा क्रममुक्तिश्च—This explains why the grouping has been made. Those groups are denoted respectively by the three syllables अ, उ and म् of Oṁkāra. The Upāsanā (worship or contemplation) thereof as one, consists in thinking that there is no distinction between each वाच्य and its वाचक, and between the first group which is an effect and the second which is the cause thereof and between the second which is an effect and the third which is the cause thereof. By such Upāsanā, one attains to the region of Hiraṇyagarbha and to gradual absolution through the purification of the heart.

Cf. S'ankara Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra I. 3. 13[1].

1. *N. S. P. Edition p. 289.*

एतत्सर्वोपाधिनिराकरणेन.........साक्षादेव मोक्षः—As opposed to the क्रममुक्ति above-mentioned there is the सद्योमुक्ति (immediate absolution). That kind of absolution can be attained by the knowing of the साक्षीचैतन्य alone to the exclusion of all these limitations i. e. all the three states of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul and the presiding deities of those states.

It seems from this that according to the Vedānta doctrine the apparently easier way to attain to final emancipation is that of knowledge of the true nature of the Self. What one has to do is simply to acquire the knowledge of the साक्षिचैतन्य from any of the वेदान्तमहावाक्य's, meditate upon it and realize it. But it deserves to be noted that one does not become fit for instruction in this esoteric philosophy unless he has prepared himself for it by the acquisition of all the four साधन's which are विवेक, वैराग्य, शमदमादिसंपत् and मुमुक्षुता. Mere मुमुक्षुता is of no avail because until the mind is cleared of all the dross that has collected therein for countless ages, which can be done by वैराग्य and शमदम &c. true knowledge cannot arise. Moreover none is likely to be turned away from the pleasures of the world unless he has विवेक i. e. has learnt to distinguish between the Self and the non-selfs. This विवेकबुद्धि arises on doing निष्कामकर्म (works without thinking of their results). Thus S'ankara says:—

साधनान्यत्र चत्वारि कथितानि मनीषिभिः ।
येषु सत्स्वेव सन्निष्ठा यदभावे न सिध्यति ॥
आदौ नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः परिगण्यते ।
इहामुत्र फलाभोगविरागस्तदनन्तरम् ॥
शमादि षट्कसम्पत्तिर्मुमुक्षुत्वमिति स्फुटम् ॥

(वि. चू. १८-१९).

स्ववर्णाश्रमधर्मेण तपसाहरितोषणात् ।
साधनंप्रभवेत्पुंसां वैराग्यादिचतुष्टयम् ॥

(अप. ३).

Vide also S'ārīraka Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra I. 1. 1. and Vāchaspati's gloss thereon[1]. From the fact that Madhusūdana has not touched the subject of अधिकार in any portion of this work it should not for a moment he believed that he held any other view because he was a staunch follower of S'ankarāchārya and because in the introductory passage to his *Bhaktirasāyanam*

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1. *N. S. P. Edition. pp. 71-73.*

he has distinctly stated that the Vedāntas'āstra can be studied and its truth realized only by those who possess the necessary qualifications and in the first Stabaka of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* which bears the sub-title ससाधनापवर्गनिरूपणम् he has after setting forth the view of the Upanishad school as to the nature of final absolution stated:—तस्य (आत्मनः) स्वरूपे साधनानपेक्षत्वेऽपि व्यञ्जकतया वेदान्तमहावाक्यकरणकस्तत्स्वरूपसाक्षात्कार एव प्रतिबन्धचतुष्टयरहितः साधनं मोक्ष इत्युपचर्यते[1], and proceeded to explain what those four obstacles are and how they can be removed and at the end of that Stabaka again he has wound up the discussion as to the power of the Vedic words by saying that the undifferentiated direct knowledge produced by the Vedic texts produce the desired effect after the obstacles are removed by reasoning and that there is a particular order in which one fault after another is removed and then set forth that order[2] and lastly while setting forth the final conclusion he has again stated:—तस्माच्छमादिसम्पन्नेन परिव्राजकेन मुमुक्षुणा गुरुमुपाश्रित्य चतुर्लक्षणमीमांसया विचार एवानुष्ठेयः फलपर्यन्तमिति विचारमेव विभज्य प्रदर्शयामः[3]. For one therefore who is a sincere seeker after truth, the path is not so easy as it appears to be at first sight. As S'rī Krishṇa says[4] it may require numerous births to realize the great truth contained in the Upanishads which are the foundation of the Adwaita philosophy. One who from mere reading, which as explained before[5] is not even श्रवण in the technical sense, allows himself to be misled into thinking that he has realized the truth and is therefore no longer bound by the law of Karma, becomes on the contrary more entangled in the net of अविद्या and by becoming a worse sinner than he would otherwise have been, brings the वेदान्तशास्त्र into contempt.

तदेवं त्रयाणामप्यवस्थात्रयसहितानां......... तुरीयाख्योऽहमस्मीत्यर्थः—Resuming the thread the author says that the meaning of the verse is that the विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ and the three states जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and सुषुप्ति being of the nature of Nescience and being unreal substances owing to their being objects of perception the substratum of egotism is the pure साक्षी who is unaffected by any of them and who is called the तुरीय (fourth).

1. *Princess of Wales Saraswatī Bhavan Text Series No. III. p. 6.*
2. *Ibid. p. 91.*
3. *Ibid. p. 92.*
4. अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम् (भ. गी. ६-४५).
5. *Vide p. 191 supra.*

एवं व्यवहारतः सर्वव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः........ न काप्यनुपपत्तिः—It may be recalled that Madhusūdana had introduced this verse with the query 'If the Self is self-luminous and therefore ever resplendent how can the states of जाग्रत् &c. be accounted for[1]?' Having explained how these states arise and how their presiding spirits come into being, he now winds up the discussion by saying that from the point of view of our ordinary intercourse every state can be statisfactorily accounted for but from the philosophical view-point the Self does not undergo any change of state and therefore the Vedānta doctrine is unassailable.

प्रपञ्चितम्—Explained in details.

वेदान्तकल्पलतिका—This is the same work that is referred to at p. ७० *supra.*

I have not been able to find any discussion on the three ignorance-states of the individual soul in the first Stabaka of that work which has been edited from Benares. I did find an allusion to the dream-phenomena at p. 62 of that edition but it cannot be the portion of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* referred to here because the allusion is only a casual one made in the course of a statement of an objection to the theory that once the beginningless ignorance which is the cause of bondage is removed, there is no fear of its recurrence, and because there is no attempt made at that place to reconcile the changes of states which we daily experience with the immutability of the Self spoken of by the Adwaitins. I am therefore of opinion that the reference here made is to some other Stabaka of that work which I have not as yet seen.

P. 77. Verse IX. ननु, जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यवस्थासहितानां........साक्षिणः सत्यत्वमाह—The unreality of the three presiding spirits of the waking, dreaming and sleeping states together with that of those states being established, it may be argued that the Self who witnesses them should also be unreal. This verse is therefore added to establish that the witness thereof is real.

बाधावधित्वात्भ्रमाधिष्ठानतया........अनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थः अपिशब्दः—The first word in the verse is अपि. With reference to it the author says that it has been used in order to indicate collectively the unmentioned reasons such as बाधावधित्वात् and others.

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1. *Vide p.* ५२ *supra.*

बाधावधित्वम् means 'the quality of being the place where all contradiction terminates'. Thus when it is said नेदं रजतं किन्तु शुक्तिः there is the बाध of रजत and the शुक्ति becomes the अवधि of that बाध. When however you say नेति नेति you deny that Brahma is like any known object. You cannot positively define it because it is unlike any known object and it is beyond the power of speech to define it. Therefore it is the end of all contradictions.

भ्रमाधिष्ठानतया ज्ञातत्वम् means 'the being known as the substratum of the (worldly) delusion'. The Self is known as such because there can be no delusion without a substratum and it is proved that the world is a delusion.

तद्बाधग्राहकाभावः means 'the absence of any one who can know that it *i. e.* the Self is contradicted'. It is said that there is the absence of such a one for if there is any then the thing contradicted cannot be the Self it being the only residue after everything else has vanished.

परिच्छिन्नत्वतुच्छत्वयोः समव्याप्तत्वात्—परिच्छिन्नत्वम् means 'the quality of being circumscribed or limited' and तुच्छत्वम् 'the quality of being unreal'. These terms are co-extensive because of the text अथ यदल्पं तन्मर्त्यम्.

सर्वं खल्विदं.........व्यापकत्वोपचारात्—Since Brahma has been said in this text to be the Self of everything that exists, it must be unlimited by time and space. It being so, it may be believed that आकाश and वायु are also the selfs of everything because they too are all-pervading but that is not correct because आकाश had a cause, namely हिरण्यगर्भ and there was a time when it was produced and therefore it was so far limited and similarly वायु had आकाश for its cause and it too is therefore limited. Still these are said to be all-pervading because the other elements are less pervading than them. Thus their all-pervasiveness is relative only while that of Brahma is absolute.

ननु सर्वव्यापकत्वेन.........हितत्वप्रयोगादिति—A thing can be an object of man's attainment only if it is either the means to the total extinction of misery or the attainment of positive bliss. Since the Self is all-pervading and therefore eternal and is also a positive substance it cannot be the former. It cannot also be the latter because bliss being ephemeral the eternal Self cannot be identical with it. This

objection is answered by saying that there are Vedic texts which speak of the Self as being an object of man's attainment.

तदेतत्प्रेयः पुत्रात्प्रेयो.........परमानन्दत्वोपदेशात्—This contains a refutation of the reason assigned for the objection, based on certain Vedic texts which speak of Brahma as the highest bliss.

तस्य च नित्यत्वेऽपि.........तदुत्पत्तिविनाशोपचारः—Hereby the author explains why if the Self is eternal and therefore ever free it is said that मोक्ष (liberation) has taken place or that it has ceased to exist. The knowledge of one's true nature arises according to the Adwaita school from the Mahāvākyas. Of course knowledge there does not simply mean knowledge of the meaning of the words but of the purport of the sentence as a whole and that too not a mere intellectual understanding but the realization of the truth contained therein. When such knowledge arises, it is said that the man is liberated. So long as it does not arise he is said to be bound. As a matter of fact Brahma or Ātmā is ever free but the consciousness of its being so is not always present. Therefore when it is present the man is said to be liberated, otherwise he is said to be bound. This consciousness is a function of the mind not of the Self. It is therefore said that the Self is not concerned with either freedom or bondage.[1]

अध्यस्तस्य प्रपञ्चस्य.........दुःखाभावरूपत्वेनापि तस्य पुरुषार्थता—Having established that final absolution is an object of man's attainment if it is believed to be of the nature of positive bliss, the author now establishes that even if it is believed that it is of the nature of the absence of misery still it is an object to be striven for. The argument is that the worldly phenomena which is the cause of all misery is mistakenly supposed to exist in Brahma. Brahma is therefore the substratum of that phenomena. Hence where there is the absence of that phenomena or misery there is Brahma, *i. e.* to say, the absence of misery itself is Brahma. Hence when man strives for the cessation of misery he automatically acquires the true knowledge of the Self. Thus it is that even in this case final absolution is an object of man's attainment.

P. 78. ननु, मोक्षे सुखं संवेद्यते न वा—Whether man becomes conscious of happiness while in the liberated state, is a question which deserves to be thrashed out when the nature of that state is being discussed. The author has therefore raised it here.

1. *Vide the verse from the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda quoted at p.* ५२.

नाद्यः, तदानीं देहेन्द्रियाद्यभावेन........वैष्णवंमन्यानामुद्गार इति चेत्—This objection has been anticipated in order to introduce the expression स्वतःसिद्धभावात् which contains the answer of S'ankara to that query. It is a double-edged sword thrust at the Adwaita doctrine. One edge is that if you say that one becomes conscious of happiness in that state that cannot be proved because consciousness becomes manifest through the body, senses &c. and connection with them is not supposed to exist in that state; further if it is believed that the consciousness does exist inspite of the absence of any vehicle of manifestation, the consequence would be that it would have to be assumed that such a consciousness exists even in the state of worldliness. The other edge is that if the contrary is believed then the attainment of final absolution ceases to be worthy of being striven for by man because nothing is worthy of being striven for unless one becomes conscious of it and that it is for that very reason that a school of philosophers who believe themselves to be Vaishṇavās say that the position of a man in the state of final absolution is like that of sugar which does not know its own sweetness and that as its enjoyers do know it the best state to be striven for is that of living in the presence of Vishṇu as a Dāsa (servant).

The school of philosophers here referred to is that of the followers of Madhwāchārya.

यद्यपि संसारदशायां........न व्यञ्जकापेक्षा—This refutes the reason given in the objection that there being none to make the consciousness manifest, it cannot arise. It is only an amplification of the expression स्वप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वात्.

The root in प्रथते is प्रथ् 1 A. meaning 'to become famous, or spread abroad or appear or become manifest.'

P. 79. ननु सुखस्य स्वप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वेऽपि........तथा च कथमद्वैतवादः—This is a further objection against the Adwaita doctrine. The gist of it is that although happiness may be the same as knowledge which does not require anything else to make it manifest, it cannot be identical with the Self because ज्ञान is an act which is dependent upon something else and because in fact one feels 'I know', not 'I am knowledge'.

अनन्याश्रयत्वात्—This is an answer to the above objection. It is

made clear further on what is meant by it and why this knowledge is not dependent upon anything else.

यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म.........जानामीति तदाश्रयत्वप्रतीतिः—According to the texts here quoted the Self is itself self-resplendent knowledge and bliss. But one feels 'I know', *i. e.* to say, that knowledge is something external to the Self and depending upon it because on the Self being falsely identified with the inner organ a superimposition of knowledge takes place upon a Vritti of that organ.

धात्वर्थत्वमुत्पत्तिविनाशवत्त्वं.........न द्वैतापत्तिः—What is an act indicated by the root-meaning and what is produced and destroyed is a Vṛtti of the inner organ. The Self which is knowledge in the form of consciousness, being the substratum of everything including that organ itself, is not dependent upon anything at all and hence there is no danger of duality stepping in in the Adwaita doctrine. What is meant is that the changes, namely the so-called production and destruction of knowledge, take place in the inner organ whose Vritti is a means towards the manifestation of the knowledge *i. e.* the Self which already exists and which never ceased or will cease to exist at any time.

तेन ज्ञानसुखात्मक.........जगदसत्यमिति सिद्धम्—This sentence gives the purport of the verse as a whole.

Verse X. ननु, सर्वस्य जगतस्तुच्छत्वे.........निषेधानुपपत्त्यैव न जगतस्तुच्छत्वम्—Upto the ninth verse S'ankara has described the Self in view of the जीव and जगत् i. e. relatively. In this verse he ignores them altogether and describes it absolutely as far as language can go.

The objection here raised is that the existence of a thing is required to be denied only if it is established at some time. The horn of a hare never exists, existed or will exist and therefore it is not necessary to deny its existence. Such being the case, and S'ankara having established in the last verse that the world is unreal it follows according to the objector, that it cannot be absolutely unreal even from the philosophical stand-point.

P. 80. एकमद्वितीयमितिपदद्वयेन.........धर्मधर्मिभावादिभेदाभेदप्रतिषेधात्—This is said with reference to the text एकमेवाद्वितीयम् which follows the text सदेव सोम्य &c. Therein the word एक has been used to exclude the possibility of there being anything of the same class as सत्, and the word अद्वितीय has been used to exclude that of anything

of another class. Besides these there is a third word in the text, namely एव. This excludes the possibility of there being any internal difference such as is spoken of by the other Vedānta schools. Although they admit that all this is Brahma they further say that the world and the individual souls exist inside it, that the former is an outcome of its infinite powers and the latter are related to it as sparks are to fire and that therefore Brahma is a धर्मि (possessor of an attribute) and its सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व and सर्वज्ञत्व &c. are the धर्म's residing therein, that Brahma is an उपास्य (object of worship) and the individual soul an उपासक (worshipper) and so on. Such धर्मधर्मिभाव &c. and therefore भेदाभेदत्व also are excluded by the term एव and therefore this text establishes the existence of the absolute Brahma. The expression न चाशून्यम् has been based only upon the exclusion of the भेदाभेद by the term एव in the said text.

द्विधा इतं द्वीतं, तस्य भावो द्वैतम्—This is the etymology of the word द्वैत.

इत is a past participal of इ 2. P. 'to go', or 'to go to or be reduced to a particular state'. Hence द्वीतम् means 'reduced to twoness or duality' and द्वैतम् means 'the idea of being reduced to twoness'. Thus when one regiment is divided into two, it is said to have been द्वीता and similarly when at the beginning of a Kalpa the sole reality चित् (Spirit) becomes manifest in two forms जीव and ईश्वर it is said to have been द्वीतम् or द्विधाभूतम्. The idea of being such is called द्वैतम् or द्वैतभावः.

तदुक्तं वार्तिके.........द्वैतमुच्यते—This is the first half of the verse occurring in the *Vārttika*. Its second half is:—

तन्निषेधेन चाद्वैतं प्रत्यग्वस्त्वभिधीयते ।

सलिल एको.........अद्वैतः—The word सलिलः in this text has been explained as सलिलवदाचरतीति सलिलो निर्मलः. Here मल means Nescience or its products. Therefore the purport of the text is that the Self is pure, one without a second. Abhyankara says that this text can be construed to describe the Self while in the sleeping state because in that state Nescience is dormant and therefore the Self is pure and quite alone. I doubt very much whether this interpretation can be correct because even though there is no other object in the state of sleep still there is Nescience and the Self is therein affected by it and therefore it cannot be said to be pure. Moreover the context here shows that the text has not been used to support any view as to the condition of the Self in the state of deep sleep.

प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्यैव लाघवत्वेन.........निषेधोपपत्तिः—This explains how the denial of existence of the world-phenomena can be logically proved.

A. प्रतियोगि means 'a counter-part'. लाघव is a technical term of the न्यायशास्त्र made use of when what is actually proved is less than what is required to be proved with respect to a subject in hand. It is a दोष (fault). द्वैत is said to be अनिर्वचनीय (indescribable) i. e. neither सत् (existing) nor असत् (non-existing). It is just like silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl and has therefore प्रातिभासिक (phenomenal) existence only which disappears on the rise of the true knowledge of the substratum. The only difference between the two instances of delusion is that the silver appears in a mother-of-pearl on account of तूलाविद्या (individual ignorance) while the world-phenomena appears in Brahma on account of मूलाविद्या (the ignorance which is the root-cause). The द्वैत being thus indescribable is capable of being experienced by the six means of proof. That is the reason why it is necessary to deny its existence philosophically.

तर्ह्येतादृश आत्मा.........प्रतिपाद्यताम्—The objector would say that if that is so then the Self should be proved by pointing a finger, i. e. to say, as the subject of a result arrived at by a means of proof.

किमाक्षेपे ?—Purushottama alone of the four commentators explains this expression. His explanation is:—वाग्विषयत्वं नास्तीत्यर्थः. Further while introducing the remark अद्वैतकत्वेन वागविषयत्वात् he says एतदेवाह. It therefore appears that according to him the expression किमाक्षेपे means that the Self cannot be described in words. I am of opinion that that is not the literal meaning of the expression but its purport. The literal meaning thereof so far as I can gather is 'with reference to what (shall I speak of it)'? Since a definition means the description of an unknown thing in terms of a known one which is similar to it and there is nothing similar to Brahma or the Self in terms whereof it can be described, it must be said that Brahma cannot be defined or in other words, that there are no words which can give an adequate idea of Brahma.

P. 81. अद्वैतकत्वेन वागविषयत्वात्—The term अद्वैतकत्वम् here can best be translated as 'uniqueness'. It is because Brahma is unique that it cannot be the subject of speech.

अवचनेनैव प्रोवाच—This text contains a contradiction in terms

Still it is a recognized fact that there is a voice of silence which in certain circumtances appeals to the human heart more loudly than spoken words.

वागविषयत्वे कथं.........सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धमिति—If Brahma is not a subject of speech, the question naturally arises how can the Vedānta texts impart knowledge thereof. The answer to it is that though Brahma or the Self is not itself a subject of speech, the texts are able to remove ignorance by giving rise to a state of mind in which one thinks of nothing else but Brahma. It is to supply that answer that the epithet सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धम् has been used.

Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda commenting on this expression say that the authoritativeness of the Vedānta texts consists in their being instrumental in giving rise to right knowledge in the shape of a state of mind in tune with Brahma, not in their being instrumental in bringing about a fruit relating thereto and in support of that view quote the following couplet:—

फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम् ।
ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशार्थं वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वमिष्यते ॥

Abhyankara makes this distinction clearer. He says that when an object becomes known two kinds of व्याप्ति's take place, namely one that of the बुद्धि or वृत्ति which dispels the ignorance with reference to the particular object, and the other that of the चिदाभास which is also known as a फलव्याप्ति and whose function is to make the object which is inert, manifest and that when Brahma is to be realized, the first is required because there is ignorance to be dispelled but not the second because the thing to be known is self-resplendent. This explanation is based upon the following couplets taken from the *Pañchadas'ī*:—

बुद्धितत्स्थचिदाभासौ द्वावपि व्याप्नुतो घटम् ।
तत्राज्ञानं धिया नश्येदाभासेन घटः स्फुरेत् ॥
ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशाय वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता ।
स्वयं स्फुरणरूपत्वान्नाभास उपयुज्यते ॥ (७. ९१-९२).

S'ankara has discussed this point in his *Bhāshya on Brahma Sūtra I. 1. 4*[1] and drawn the conclusion that the purpose of the Scriptures is not to prove that Brahma is such and such but

1. *N. S. P. Edition pp. 124-25.*

only to show that it is the Self itself and not an object of perception and thereby to remove the distinction between the knower, the thing to be known, the act of knowledge &c. which is brought into existence by Nescience.

The paradoxical texts which follow are to be interpreted in the light of this distinction. Thus in यस्य मतं &c. अमतम् means 'known as not being the subject of the fruit of an external means of proof' and मतम् means 'revealed as the last resort by the self-luminous Self' and so also with respect to the terms अविज्ञातम् and विज्ञातम्.

यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतम्—That which one cannot think of by the mind but by which according to the wise the mind gets the power of thinking of objects of this world (is Brahma).

नेदं यदिदमुपासते—Not this which the people worship objectively *i. e.* God who is believed to be possessed of certain qualities.

तदेवं वेदान्तवाक्यजन्याखण्डाकारवृत्त्या.........कृतकृत्यो भवतीति सिद्धम्—Madhusūdana now winds up the whole discussion by reiterating the final conclusion which is that on the removal of ignorance by an uninterrupted Vritti produced by the Vedānta sentences, all the miseries which are imagined on account of it are eradicated and one having become of the nature of the supreme bliss, has his life's purpose served.

At the end of his commentary Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha gives the purport of the whole work which is in substance this:—Brahma itself which transcends all limitations and is as a matter of fact devoid of all distinctions of colour or mode of life does the appropriate acts through beginningless ignorance assumed by itself by assuming the forms of the Supreme Soul and the individual souls, having previously appeared as bound to each body by the notions of *meum and teum* and subsequently appears as liberated by knowledge produced from the Scriptures, that as a matter of fact it was neither bound nor did it become free because the ignorance which is the cause of bondage is indescribable, and as ignorance being imaginary cannot exist without its substratum, all the things which are spoken of as the individual souls, the universe &c. are Brahma itself and nothing else, that to believe otherwise would be contrary to reason and the Vedic texts and that therefore the

theory as to duality and as to its being real is an outcome of the infatuation of some deluded persons.

P. 82. न स्तौमि तं.........स्तौमि सुरेश्वरं च—Here S'ankara and Sures'wara, the authors of the *S'ārīraka Bhāshya* and the *Vārttika* respectively are praised in preference to Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa because the latter could not properly knit together the meanings of the different Vedic texts though he had in his hands a thread in the form of the *Brahma Sūtras,* while the former could though they had no such thread. It is so done because it is a well-known fact that S'ankara has more successfully than Bādarāyaṇa carved out in his *Bhāshya* a consistent doctrine from the Upanishads and because Sures'wara following S'ankara has also successfully done so in the *Vārttika.*

There is in this verse a figure of speech called व्यतिरेक based upon a pun on the word सूत्र which means 'a laconic sentence' as well as 'a thread', the word अर्थ which means 'a substance' such as a pearl as well as 'the meaning of a word' and the word बन्धनम् which means 'bringing about a logical connection &c.' as well as 'binding'.

It should be observed that Madhusūdana has not here censured Vyāsa but has only said that he eulogises his more immediate masters S'ankara and Sures'wara. He means thereby that though all are worthy of reverence, he is inclined to praise the two to whom he is more indebted than to the third.

लघुरपि बह्वर्थवह.........गुणिनां विनोदाय—One who goes through this work carefully is sure to be convinced that Madhusūdana has not made an empty boast in saying that this digest though small in size is pregnant with a great meaning.

A चिन्तामणि is a philosopher's stone which is believed to yield whatever the man possessing it desires for.

A निबन्ध is a digest, i. e. to say, a work in which what is contained in the previous treatises on the same subject is put together in a systematic way, i. e. a compendium. Thus the मयूख's are digests in asmuch as they bring within a narrow compass the provisions of the Dharmas'āstras contained in the several Smritis.

A मुनि is one who is in the habit of thinking deeply and hence a sage or a philosopher.

A गुणिन् is one who is possessed of merits *i. e.* meretorious.

यदत्र सौष्ठवं.........तन्ममैव गुरोर्न हि—Mark the absence of self-conceit in the author. He gives credit for whatever elegance there is in this work to his preceptor and takes the blame for whatever defects there are in it, on himself. This shows that a true Adwaitin is not a haughty but an extremely humble man.

बहुयाचनया मया.........तदुदाराः सुधियो विवेचयन्तु—Mark the epithet अल्पः applied to the word निबन्धः. It conveys the same meaning as the word लघुः in Verse 2. Both these expressions are intended to imply that this work is not as extensive as it should be.

बहुयाचनया means 'at the earnest importunity'.

बलभद्र was the name of one of the pupils of the sage Madhusūdana. Brahmānanda says that he was a Brahmachārin attending on him. Purushottama says that his surname was Bhattāchārya, that he was a pupil thoroughly devoted to Madhusūdana and well-versed in the Vedāntic lore.

अदुष्टम् and दुष्टम् mean गुण and दोष respectively.

The root in विवेचयन्तु is the same as that from which the word विवेक is derived, namely विविच् 3. 7. U. which means 'to separate, discern, discriminate, or judge or decide'. Hence उदाराः सुधियो विवेचयन्तु means 'let the magnanimous intelligent men decide'.

परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्य—A परिव्राजक means a Saññyāsin i. e. one who having renounced the world has entered the fourth order prescribed by the Dharmas'āstras. A परमहंस is a Saññyāsin who has attained the highest water-mark of self-control. It is the recognized designation of a sub-order of the Saññyāsins. When one enters that order one is not bound to follow the strict discipline as to carrying a staff, going through a course of meditation at regular intervals, observing caste rules &c. which all Saññyāsins are generally bound to follow[1]. An आचार्य is a teacher or spiritual guide. The ordinary definition of an आचार्य is this:—

1. The rules of this order are given in *Jābālopanishat*, *Ārunyupanishat* and several *Sūtras*, *Smritis* and *Purāṇas* and are discussed at great length in the portions of the *Vedāntakalpataru* and *Parimala* under *Brahma Sūtra III. 4. 20* (*N. S. P. Edition pp. 885-90*).

उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयेद्विजः ।
सकल्पं सरहस्यं च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥ मनुस्मृति. २-१४० ॥

Such आचार्य's are generally householders. But even those Sañnyāsins who propound or even teach any particular doctrine are also called आचार्य's at least ever since the time of S'ankara. It is in the latter sense that the word has been used here. Thus the phrase in question means 'a teacher of the Paramahaṁsa order of Sañnyāsins'.

TRANSLATION.

Now (is commenced) the Sidhāntabindu.

INTRODUCTION.

Having bowed to Vis'wes'wara, the preceptor of the universe (and) a fresh incarnation of S'rī S'ankarāchārya,[1] I make some effort for the edification of those who are averse to the study of the Vedānta-scriptures.

Verily, the revered and illustrious S'ankarāchārya, who was desirous of liberating from bondage all the individual souls either directly or through a succession (of teachers)[2] has, on this subject, promulgated the *Das'as'lokī* for the purpose of imparting in brief the knowledge of the Self who is by nature eternal, pure, intelligent and free, on distinguishing it from the non-selfs. (P. १).

If it is argued:—Verily, everybody having discriminated his self which is the seat of egotism from the non-selfs which are the seats of objective knowledge, becomes conscious of it in the form 'I exist' and experiences pain; hence in asmuch as an exposition of the true nature of the Self would impart a knowledge of that which is known and is without any purpose, it is useless—that is not correct because though the body, the organs of sense[3] and the mind are the seats of objective knowledge owing to their characteristic of being made manifest by the Spirit, they become the seats of egotism through illusion and are therefore not distinguished from it and consequently the qualities of being miserable &c. are imposed upon the Self although it is completely[4] pure. That (illusion) is removed

1. The first two lines of this verse have been translated on the assumption that the word विश्वेश्वर is a proper noun and refers to the spiritual preceptor of Madhusūdana Saraswatī. If it is understood to be a common noun meaniug 'the Lord of the Universe' the obeisance would be to him in his new incarnation of S'ankarāchārya.

For a fuller explantion of the two constructions *vide* the notes at pp. 2–3 *supra.*

2. For the alternative interpretations of the terms इह and साक्षात्परम्परया वा *vide* the notes at pp. 3–4 *supra.*

3. If the reading given in foot-note 1 at page २ is preferred the words 'the vital breath' would have to be added after the word 'sense' in the translation.

4. This word may be omitted from the translation if the reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page is preferred.

along with its root by the knowledge of the identity of Brahma and the Self acquired from the Scriptures only. Thus the exposition of the nature of the Self is not useless in asmuch as it imparts the knowledge of that which is unknown and is with a purpose. (P. ३).

And what leads to the right knowledge of that true nature of the Self is the principal sentences of the Upanishads namely, "Thou art that" (Chhān. VI-8-7) "I am Brahma" (Brih. I-4-10) and others. A sentence again imparts knowledge only through the knowledge of the senses of the words (occurring therein). And since the senses of the words 'Tat' and 'Twam' which would accord with (the purport of) the sentence in hand cannot be determined otherwise, they too like those of the words 'Yūpa' (a post) and 'Āhavanīya' (a sacrificial fire) must be determined by (a reference to) the Scriptures only. From them (we gather that) the Vedic texts relating to creation &c. such as "That from which these beings are born, that owing to which after having been born they live". (Tai. III-1) and others confer a primary sense on the word 'Tat' and (those such as) "(Brahma is) truth, knowledge and infiniteness" (Ibid. II-1) and others, a secondary sense (thereon). Similarly the texts relating to the states of waking, dreaming and sleeping &c. such as "As to that, just as a big fish moves along both the banks (of a river)"[1] (Brih. IV-3-18) and others confer a primary sense on the word 'Twam' and those such as "He who consisting of knowledge is this Spirit of Light inside the Prāṇas (vital airs or sense-organs) and the heart" (Ibid. IV-3-7), "Thou couldst not see the seer of the sight" (Ibid. III-4-2) and others, a secondary sense (thereon). Thereby, there arises room for the recollection by implication in the sentences "Thou art that" and others, of the pure individual soul and Brahma whose knowledge had previously been acquired from the subordinate sentences, owing to the failure of an agreement of the primary senses (of the said words). And since it is admitted that one has the experience in the state of deep sleep of the undifferentiated Spirit who is the witness (of all phenomena) the words 'truth', 'knowledge' &c. which have been used with the desire of imparting the knowledge of Brahma who is without a second, revive the impression as to that portion only there and

1. The words "moves along both the banks (of a river)" may be omitted from the translation if the reading given in foot-note 2 at p. ४ is preferred.

then[1] because their purport lies in the pure Self although they have the power to impart the knowledge of the Self as qualified by limitations, because the senses of words being subservient to the purport (thereof) people desire for (the rise of) undifferentiated recollection even from words such as a Ākās'a (space) and others. By this (reasoning) the cognizance of knowledge and the knower (as separate entities) at (the time of) the knowledge of the meaning of the principal sentences is avoided. Moreover (the possibility of) an undifferentiated state of trance is established by the Vedas and Smritis.[2] And owing to (Brahma being characterised by) the quality of being outside one's ken and (the individual soul by) that of duality, one's purpose is not served merely from the knowledge of the senses of the words 'Tat' and 'Twam' only. And there does not occur the fault of repetition because of the cognizance of a difference between the primary senses (of the words).[3] And owing to the identity of the secondary senses there is a continuity of sense. Moreover the undifferentiatedness of the recollection produced by the words which accords with the undifferentiated sense of the sentence is not, like the experience itself, inconsistent.[4] In the case of there being a differentiated sense of the sentence, the presence of differentiated senses of the words is a means (to the end in view). In the present case the knowledge of the sense of the sentence is undifferentiated because that alone is capable of removing ignorance owing to its being the right knowledge.[5] Hence unless there is anything limiting the rise of the secondary sense, that sense cannot fail to arise, for what is to be achieved by the expressive and indicative senses is only the presence of such senses of the words (occurring in a sentence) as would fit in with the sense of the sentence in hand. (PP. ४-५).

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1. If the reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page is adopted, the translation would be:—"......revive the impression as to that itself" the word तत्र being then taken to refer to तदंशः.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ५ is preferred the words "by the Vedas and Smritis" would have to be omitted from the translation.

3. For the sense of this sentence if the reading वाच्यार्थभेदावभासात् is preferred *vide* the note at p. 14 *supra*.

4. The reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page does not seem to fit in with the context.

5. The same remark applies to that given in foot-note 3 at the same page so far as the word प्रमातृत्वेन is concerned. Moreover the causal form निवर्तन is more grammatical than निवृत्ति which denotes the act only.

If it is argued :—Verily then since the senses of the words arise and that of the sentence is comprehended from the Upanishad sentences themselves and since, they being themselves authoritative, the removal of ignorance and its products is secured thereby, where is the necessity of reasoning ?—(we reply :—) True, although the Upanishad sentences give rise to an undifferentiated realization of the Self owing to their being authoritative by themselves, still in as-much as it (*i. e.* the realization) is not able to dispel the ignorance of men of poor intellects owing to there being the obstruction in the form of doubts generated by the diverse views of learned men and as on the other hand on doubts being removed by reasoning ignorance is dispelled without exception, reasoning is commenced with a view to set at rest the diverse views of learned men which are the seeds from which doubts spring forth.

PART I.

DETERMINATION OF THE SENSE OF THE TERM 'TWAM'.

Thereout the diverse views as to the sense of (the term) 'Twam' are being mentioned first. Although the sense of (the term) 'Tat' has been honoured (with priority) as being the subject of the purport of the Scriptures, that of (the term) 'Twam' is still more honoured owing to (the individual soul) being (made) the partaker of the final absolution which is the fruit (of a study) of the Scriptures.

As to that, the Chārvākās hold that the import of (the term) 'Twam' is the four primary elements themselves, transformed as the body,[1] others hold that it is each (of the senses) such as the eyes &c., others again that it is (they) taken collectively, some that it is the mind and others that it is the vital breath. The Saugatās hold that it is the momentary concious-ness (and) the Mādhymikās that it is the void. The Digambarās hold that (the thing indicated by that term) is different from the body and the senses but of the size of the body, the Vais'eshikās Tārkikās and Prābhākarās that it is the doer (and) the enjoyer (but) inert (and) all-pervading, the Bhāttās that it is inert (yet) of the nature of knowledge, the Sāṁkhyās and Pātañjalās that it is the enjoyer only (and) of the nature of knowledge, pure and simple (and) the Aupanishadās that although it partakes of the qualities of being the doer &c. on account of Nescience it is philosophically speaking devoid of attributes and of the nature of the highest bliss and knowledge alone. A doubt being thus raised by the diverse views of learned men as to (the nature of) the Self which is a spirit and whose existence is generally proved by the notion of the ego the revered Āchārya has, in order to determine the particular seat of the notion of the ego, said :—(P. ८).

I am neither the earth nor the water nor the light nor the air nor the space nor any organ of sense nor their aggregate because they are variable by nature while (the Self) is that whose existence is proved

1. It seems that this is the original prinicipal view of the school while the four that follow are those of the later scholiasts for information as to whom *vide* the notes at pp. 20-22 *supra*.

by the unique experience of deep sleep. I am that one, auspicious and pure, who remains over. (1).

(Here) *Aham* (means), 'the seat of the consciousness 'I', *Ekah* (means) 'without a second,' *Avas'ishtah* (means) 'uncontradicted even on the contradiction of all duality', *S'ivah* means 'of the nature of supreme joy and knowledge', that itself being of the nature of auspiciousness (and) *Kevalah* (means) 'devoid of attributes'. Thereby it is meant that the view of the Aupanishadās that the seat of the consciousness 'I' is (the one) without a second who is uncontradicted by any of the means of proof and is supreme joy and knowledge,[1] is the better one (? best). The Āchārya desiring to refute the views of the other learned men with a view to establish that fact, first refutes the view that the body is the Self by (the words) *Na bhūmir na toyam na tejo na vāyur na kham.* Therein, the word *Aham* is everywhere related to each (particle) '*na*'. It should be understood that there is the absence of mutual identification such as that that which is the earth cannot be the 'I' and that which is the 'I' cannot become the earth.[2]

Although the opponent does not admit that each of the earth &c. is the Self but believes that their aggregate alone is, still the author being of the opinion that in asmuch as in his doctrine the existence of a whole substance is not admitted and it is not believed that there is such a relation as *Saṁyoga* (union) &c., because in that case (the existence of) a fifth element would have to be admitted, and as there is not anybody who would bring about a combination, no combination is possible, has refuted the doctrine of the physical body being the Self by denying (its identification with) each element (P. ९).

And though in the view of those who believe that the four elements are the essence, space which is admitted to exist in the form of an absence of a covering and is steady and unreal,[3] is not

1. The word सन् occurring in the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ९ deserves to be ignored as it does not fit in well with the context.

2. Tue reading adopted in the text is preferable to that given in foot-note 3 at the same page because the word भूमि is a noun of the feminine gender and अहम् a pronoun referring to the speaker who is supposed to be a male.

3. The reading given in foot-note 1 at p. १० is not acceptable as according to the Chārvāka view आकाश is स्थिर and असत् (*vide* Brahmānanda's commentary in the *Kās'ī Sanskrit Series No. LXV, pp. 118-19*).

the material cause of the body, still in asmuch as in the view adopted (in this work) it is real owing to its having been admitted to be the material cause of the body[1] it is likely that the idea of being the Self may be applied to it. It is therefore that (the view that) it (is the Self) is refuted. Or it may be that there is the refutation of the view that the body is the Self upto (the words) *Na vāyuh* and that (the words) *Na kham* contain (a refutation) of the view that the void is the Self, because (the word) *kha* is indicative of the void.

(The word) *Nendriyam* contains a refutation of each of the senses being the Self (and the words) *Na teshām samūhah* that of the elements combined together (and) transformed into the body, a whole substance, and of the senses combined together. The difference is that in the first instance each element was refuted without admitting a combination whereas now they are refuted even on admitting a combination. By the refutation of the elements there has (also) been made that of the vital breath and the mind which are their products (and) by the refutation of the mind there has (also) been made that of the momentary consciousness which is a Vritti of the mind, and is distinct from the body and possessed of the qualities of being the doer, enjoyer &c. because in the view of the author it is believed that knowledge, desire happiness &c. are dependent upon the inner organ because of the Vedic text "All this beginning with the desire, thought[2] &c. is but the mind". (Brih. I-5-3.). By that (way of interpretation) the fact that the various objects commencing with the body and ending with the mere enjoyer believed by the various learned men (to be the Self) are not the Self is declared. The author has stated the reason for it by the expression *Anaikāntikatwāt* which means 'owing to variableness or destructibility'. It may be explained thus:—The Self being unlimited by space and time whatever is limited thereby is a non-self like a pot &c. It is not possible to know its[3] destruction and previous non-existence because the non-selfs are inert. Whatever is different from the Self cannot be the Self, it being possible to explain the (varied) pheno-

1. If the reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page is preferred the translation would be:—"it is admitted to be the material cause of the body owing to its being real".

2. The word 'thought' may be omitted from the translation if the reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page is adopted.

3. I. E. of the Self.

mena on the admission of a difference between the inner organs on which pleasures and pains depend, though the Self may be one. There is a contradiction in saying that the Self knows its own non-existence because there would be the non-existence of the knower at the time when the thing to be known may be there and there may be the absence of the thing to be known when there is the presence of the knower. Moreover there would be the destruction of a thing which has been accomplished and the accrual of the fruit of an act not done. Hence it[1] cannot have destruction and previous non-existence. Further there is no possibility of absolute non-existence of the Self which is of the nature of Sat (existence) because it persists everywhere. Lastly, Dwaita (duality) being unreal its existence can be proved[2] only as having acquired identity with the Sat which is its substratum on which it is superimposed like silver on a mother-of-pearl. It is therefore impossible that there should be the absence of its identification with it (i. e. the Sat) at any time. Hence the Self is not the counter-part of non-existence while the body, senses &c. are the counter-parts of non-existence. Therefore they are not selfs but indescribable substances imagined by Nescience, which is beginningless and indescribable, to exist in the Self which is of the nature of self-luminous knowledge although it is without a second. That is the secret of the (Vedānta) doctrine.[3] (PP. १०-११).

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1. Here the word 'it' denotes the Self.

2. The word सिद्धत्वात् which is not found in Ms. क is absolutely essential in order to make out an intelligible meaning.

3. Almost each sentence occurring in this passage and its place in the link of reasoning have been explained in the notes at pp. 50-55 *supra*. Still it would not be superflous to add here a short note on the passage as a whole in view of the fact that this is one of the few passages in the text containing involved reasoning expressed in the highly technical language of the Nyāya system.

The whole passage has been intended to explain why the body, senses &c. are variable or destructible by nature and therefore cannot be the Self either individually or collectively. Towards that end it has been said in the first instance that they are non-selfs because the Self being unlimited by space and time, whatever is limited by them as the body &c. are, cannot be the Self. Now to be unlimited by time and space is to be indestructible. If a thing is indestructible it should not have any of the four अभाव's, namely प्रागभाव, प्रध्वंसाभाव, अत्यन्ताभाव and अन्योन्याभाव. From तद्ध्वंसप्रागभावयोश्च to न तस्य ध्वंसप्रागभावौ it is established that the Self cannot have the first two अभाव's. That portion contains a somewhat involved reasoning which has been sufficiently made clear in the *Summary* given at p. 53 *supra*. By that reasoning it is established that the Self is not limited by time because anything that is limited by time must be non-existent at

Having raised the doubt, namely:—Verily, you believe that the Self is of the nature of knowledge but in deep sleep there is no knowledge since one who has arisen from deep sleep recollects that he was completely senseless (as) he did not know anything and so how can it be said that it is invariable?—the author has said *Sus'huptyekasiddhah* in order to remove it. The meaning (thereof) is this:—The Self being the witness of the state of deep sleep there is not its absence in that state for otherwise it is impossible that recollection that one was senseless should arise (and that is proper) because though the knower, the means of knowledge, the act of knowledge and the thing to be known vary, the one who is the witness of their presence and absence remains invariable at all the three times.

If it is argued:—Verily, the knower is the support of knowledge. He himself is the doer (and) the enjoyer and the cause of the manifestation of everything (i. e. to say) himself and things distinct (from him) like a lamp. That being so, it does not stand in need of a witness like a pot &c—(we reply :—) that is not correct because being liable to changes (the knower) cannot be the witness of his own changes. It is not possible that an object of knowledge should be the knower and the knower being a product is an object of knowledge. Therefore the one who is immutable is alone the witness of everything (P. १२).

If it is argued:—Verily, one immutable, absolute witness is not respected owing to his not having been proved by any means of proof—that is not correct because the Upanishads, the king of authorities, have installed him alone as the witness of everything by saying "Everything shines after Him who alone shines; all this shines by His light." (S'wet. VI-14; Mund. II-2-10; Kat. II-5-15);" "Thou couldst not see the seer of the sight" (Brih. III-

some time and must cease to exist after some time. The sentence सद्रूपस्य &c. establishes that it cannot have अत्यन्ताभाव and the succeeding one beginning with द्वैतस्य मिथ्यात्वेन and ending with तत्तादात्म्याभावानुपपत्तिः establishes that it cannot have अन्योन्याभाव or भेद. These two sentences together prove that the Self is unlimited by space because a thing that is limited by it is bound to be non-existent at one place when it is at another place and to be distinguishable from another which exists along with it at the same place. The Self not having these four अभाव's its existence is of a nature different from that of the ordinary existence which is the counter-part of non-existence i. e. to say, such existence as may cease to be at some time or some place *e. g.* that of the body &c. Any one or more of them cannot therefore be the Self.

The last sentence in the passage has been added merely to explain their origin and nature.

4-2); "He is the unseen seer; there is no seer other than Him" &c.

If it is said:—Verily, this is a great jugglery that the king of authorities should make the immutable, who is not the support of right knowledge, the witness of everything, on leaving aside the things other than him which are the support of right knowledge; alright, it is a jugglery being a wanton freak of Nescience like a dream but how can an object of perception being inert like a pot &c. be the support of right knowledge?—that is not correct because (that object) being very pure like a mirror &c. it has the attribute of taking a reflection of the spirit or because it is mistakenly identified with the latter.[1] (P. १३).

If it is argued—Verily, how can the Self who has no form and no limbs have a reflection?—(we ask:—) what is there in it which cannot be established? (There is in fact nothing) because the causes of delusion are diverse. Though the form of the china rose is without form and without limbs its reflection is seen in quartz &c. Even sound is found to have a reflection called an echo. (And) it is not shown how those reflections differ from the universally admitted reflection (of a face in a mirror &c)[2].

If it is said that even then[3] there can be a reflection of only such an object as can be perceived by a sense-organ, that is not correct because (that rule) is (seen to be) departed from. Thus the sky though it is not cognizable by a sense-organ and though it is visible (only) to the witness[4] becomes reflected in water &c. Otherwise the experience of extreme depth would not take place even in water which is knee-deep. (It might be asked) why does not a blind man see the reflection (of the sky). (To that our reply is that) in asmuch as the sky is reflected along with its appearance and the clouds an eye is needed for its cognizance. By this (explanation) the presence and absence of the eye at the same time

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1. Even if the reading given in foot-note 4 is preferred to that adopted in the text there would be no difference in the translation as both the words mean the spirit or the Self.

2. For understanding this argument *vide* the notes at p. 63 *supra*.

3. This means that even though it is a fact that in order that a thing may be reflected it is not necessary that it should have a form and limbs there is room for the following objection.

4. I. e. to say, the Self who is in witness of all phenomena whatever.

as those of such delusions as 'The sky is blue' &c. are explained[1] because there the sky together with its appearance is the substratum (of the delusion). It should therefore be understood that it is the reflection of an object of sight that is in need of a form.

However if you ask what is the authority for the Self being reflected, listen:—The Vedic texts "(The Self) became like unto every form in order to reveal that (true) form of it" (Brih. II-5-19); "The Māyā (divine power) makes of it the individual souls and the Supreme Soul by means of its reflections (Nri. Utta. 9); "(The Self) appears as one and as many like the moon in water" (Brah. Bin. 12), and others and the necessary implication contained in the following texts relating to entering[2] such as "That (Brhama) is this (Self who) has entered here"[3] (Brih. I-4-7), "It having torn off this very suture of the skull entered (the body) through it" (Ait. I-3-12), "Having created it it entered that very (organism)" (Tai. II-6-1) and others, and the Sūtras of the great sage[4] such as "Moreover it is reflection alone" (Brah. Sū. II-3-50), "It is for this very reason that it is likened to the sun &c." (Ibid. II-3-50) and others are the authorities for saying so. (PP. १४-१५).

And the adherents of the Pratiblmba-vāda (reflection-theory) say that that reflection is true out and out and those of the Ābhāsa-vāda (semblance-theory)[5] say that it is false out and out. It is quite a different thing that there is no difference of views as to the true nature (of the Self). As for its being of a nature different from the material (substances) that is established by Vedic texts and by (human) experience. Therefore the fact that it is the inner organ which becomes the knower through a mistaken identification (by the Self of itself) with (its) reflection, is established.

(But it may be objected:—) Verily, superimposition itself

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1. This means that the delusion takes place when we look at the sky but not at other times.

2. I. e. to say, the texts which speak of the Self having entered the human body.

3. I. e. to say, the body.

4. This is Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa, the author of the *S'ārīraka Sūtras.*

5. The word भास in the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. १६ after the word आभास is obviously superfluous and seems to have crept into Ms. through an oversight.

cannot be established. For either the non-self would be suprimposed on the Self or *vice versâ*. (Of these) the first cannot be the case because it is impossible that it (i. e. the Self) should become the substratum owing to its being always manifest without any general or special characteristics, and being devoid of similarity &c. Nor can the second because it (i. e. the non-self) is believed to be unreal. If an unreal substance is believed to be a substratum there is the possibility of the theory of voidness (being advocated). If on the other hand it is believed to be real it would not be eradicated and (in that case) there is the possibility of there being no final absolution for truth is never eradicated and if it is eradicable at all, (it would not at least be eradicable) by the knowledge of the delusion.[1] Moreover Vedic texts such as "On the realization of that Supreme Spirit the fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are dissolved, and all his past actions perish when he has beheld Him who is (both) high and low" (Mund. II-2-8), "By knowing Him alone one passes over death; there is no other way to salvation" (Swet. III-8), "One who knows the Self swims across (the ocean of) misery" (Chhān. VII-I-3) and others while showing that all the misery is eradicated by knowledge, imply that it is unreal and other Vedic texts such as "One alone without a second" (Chhān. VI-2-1), "All else than this is misery" (Brih. III-4-2.), "There is in it no diversity whatever" (Ibid. IV-4-19), "Next follows the teaching (of Brahma) by 'no', 'no' (Ibid. II-3-6) and others establish its unreality expressly. Moreover its unreality can be inferred like that of silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl from its being an object of sense-perception. Further as the existence of a non-self is established only when the Self is superimposed there must be the superimposition of the Self, and owing to the possibility of similarity of faults &c. in the Self on account of its superimposition on the non-self there must be the superimposition of the non-self. Thus there is the possibility of faults such as self-dependence &c. By this reasoning, the objection that there is no room for alternatives owing to the superimposition of the Self and non-self having been imagined by Nescience is removed, because even the existence of ignorance in the self-

1. If any of the readings given in foot-note 2 at the same page is preferred the words "of the delusion" would have to be omitted from the translation and in the case of the first thereout the parantheses would have to be removed.

resplendent Self cannot be established. For it too is either superimposed or not superimposed. Thereout in the former case, how is it that there is no possibility of faults such as self-dependence &c.? In the latter, in asmuch as it would cannot be eradicated there is the possibility of there being no final absolution. And if everything has its root in superimposition the distinctions such as mistaken knowledge, right knowledge &c. cannot be established. Moreover there would be a contradiction in one and the same Self appearing as the means of knowledge, the thing to be known, the act of knowledge and the knower and if it is believed that there is no contradiction there would be established the view of the Bauddhās.[1] (PP. १६-१७)

To this we reply as follows:—In the first place, the consciousness 'I am a man', I am the doer', 'I am the enjoyer' &c. is an established fact to all men. And that consciousness is not recollection because of its becoming manifest subjectively and because of its being preceded by a non-cognition of a difference (between the Self on the one hand and manhood, doership &c. on the other). Nor it is right knowledge because of its being contradicted by Vedic texts and by arguments. Thus the Vedic texts "He who consisting of knowledge is this Spirit of Light inside the sense-organs and the heart (Brih. IV-3-7), "This Self is Brahma" (Ibid. II-5-19), "Brahma is truth, knowledge (and) infiniteness" (Tai. II-1), "Brahma is wisdom (and) bliss" (Brih. III-9-28), "The Self which is devoid of (all) sin" (Chhān. VIII-7-1), "The Brahma which is directly before (oneself) (is) the Self which is inside everything" (Brih. III-4-1), "He who overcomes hunger, thirst, sorrow, passion, senility and death" (Ibid. III-5-1), "Whatever he sees there, that he is not followed by, for this spirit is without attachment to anything" (Ibid. IV-3-15) and others show the Self as being of the nature of a non-doer, a non-enjoyer and the highest bliss. The arguments are:—(The above-mentioned consciousness cannot be right knowledge) because (the body, senses &c.) being liable to changes are limited (by time and space) and must therefore deemed to be non-selfs (and so incapable of knowing themselves). If it is believed that they can know themselves, there is a contradiction of a subject and an object and the relation between a seer and a thing to be

1. The whole of this passage contains a statement of objections. The author's reply thereto which follows extends upto the end of p. ३९.

seen cannot be established. Moreover the relation between an attribute and the possessor of an attribute cannot be established whether on assuming a difference or non-difference. In the view in which knowledge is impermanent, too much would be proved if it is assumed that each case of knowledge has its individual difference, destruction, previous non-existence, intimate connection, category &c., and too little would be proved if it is assumed that they are the same in each case for the difference between knowledge and knowledge becomes manifest only on one's bringing into prominence the difference between their limitations *e. g.* knowledge relating to a pot, knowledge relating to a piece of cloth &c. If on the other hand it is assumed that knowledge everywhere is of one nature only, the manifestations of its production and destruction can be established even by its being the subject of the connection (of knowledge) with the subject (of knowledge) which has necessarily to be assumed. If it is assumed that the difference of one pot from another becomes manifest automatically without the knowledge of the attendant circumstances, then it would be impossible to comprehend their counter-parts, and space, time and the quarters would also be diverse. If the qualities of being the doer &c. are assumed (to exist in the Self) there is the possibility of (the soul) never being freed. If it is not believed to be self-luminous there would be darkness in the (whole) universe. It being the abode of extreme love, it is of the nature of joy. Hence the Self is devoid of attributes, eternal, self-luminous and of the nature of joy[1]—and others. (PP. १८-१९).

Therefore, it being established by the method of exclusion that this (consciousness) is a delusion some adequate reason also must be thought out for it. When it is thought out it is (found) proved by the same means as the thinker to have been superimposed on the Self and it is nothing else but the indescribable ignorance whose existence is proved by its manifestation to the witness in the feeling "I am ignorant." And this is not of the nature of non-existence because it has already been said that knowledge being eternal its non-existence cannot be established. If the knowledge and absence of knowledge are said to relate to the knower and his

1. The reasoning in this passage is very elliptical. It is not therefore possible for one to get an exact idea of the connection between the different sentences occurring therein, without deep reflection. The notes at pp. 74-80 *supra* will be found helpful in doing that.

counter-entity there comes in a contradiction in terms. Nor is it of the nature of a succession of errors, or of doubts or of the impressions left by either of them because of the directness (of the cognition), it being impossible to know directly those of the successions of errors, doubts and impressions left by them which may have passed away or those which may not have occurred already and because it (i. e. the cognition) is of the nature of a covering and is the cause from which errors &c. result. Moreover, the Self being free from changes, the inner organ &c. being produced therefrom (i. e. from ignorance), and there being the Vedic texts:—"To the inherent power of the deity which is hidden by its own qualities" (S'wet. I-3) which speaks of (the divine power as) possessed of qualities and there being the (further) Vedic texts such as:—"Know the power of illusion to be the primordial matter and the possessor of that power to be the Great Lord" (Ibid. IV-10), "The Lord assumes a multiplicity of forms through His powers of illusion" (Brih. II-5-19), "Because they (i. e. the beings) are covered over by untruth" (Chhan. VIII-3-2), "They are covered over by hoar-frost" (Tai. Saṁ. IV-6-2-2), "And further at the end there is the cessation of (this) universe which is an illusion" (S'wet. I-10) and others, the cause of the superimposition of the Self and the others is nothing else but the ignorance which is unreal, is capable of being spoken of by the terms 'Māyā' and 'Avidyā' and of being eradicated by the knowledge of the essence.[1] In this conclusion there is no possibility of faults such as self-dependence &c. they being avoided by (believing ignorance) to be beginningless, for being beginningless it could not have been produced (at any particular time) and the one who knows it is the self-luminous Self. (PP. २२-२३).

Thus occurs the superimposition of ignorance (on the Self). On the Self as qualified by it, there occurs the superimposition of the ego and on (the Self) as qualified by that there occurs the superimposition of the attributes of the ego such as desires, doubts

1. The reading given in foot-note 1 at p. २३ can be made to yield any sense only if the words मायाऽविद्या are understood to have been used in the sense of मायाऽविद्यारूपम् and अनिर्वाच्यम् is understood to be an additional epithet of अज्ञान meaning 'indescribable'. The translation of this part of the sentence in that case would be:—"the cause of the superimposition of the Self and the others is nothing else but the ignorance which is (of the nature of) illusion and Nescience, is indescribable, unreal and capable of being eradicated by the knowledge of the essence".

&c.[1] and of the attributes of the sense-organs such as blindness, deafness &c. The conclusion (of our school) is that the sense-organs being indirectly (connected with the Self) they are not superimposed on the possessor of the attributes[2] who is directly connected (with the Self). On (the Self) as qualified by them there occurs the superimposition of the gross body which assumes the form (of the feeling) "I am a man" by bringing into prominence the possessor of the attribute.[3] It is not a superimposition (of the thing) by its form as in the feeling "I am the body" because such a consciousness does not arise. On (the Self) as qualified by that there takes place the superimposition of the attributes of the body such as fatness &c. On (the Self) as qualified by them there takes place the superimposition of the attributes of external objects such as the sufficiency or otherwise of sons, wives &c. In the same manner the Self too becomes superimposed, by virtue of contact, on the objects beginning with the ego and ending with the body. And the proportion of love (for the object superimposed upon) varies with that of the obstruction in the way of superimposition. Thus it has been said in *Vārttikāmrita*[4]:—

"A son is dearer than wealth, the body dearer than a son, the organs of sense dearer than the body, the inner organ dearer than the organs of sense and the highest Self dearer than the inner organ."

Here the word 'Pinda' means the gross body, (and) the word 'Prāṇa', the inner organ. The dearerness of the organs of sense than the body is proved by the experience that the eyes are seen to be closed when the edge of a weapon or a continuous shower of

1. If the reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page is preferred the translation would be:—"On the Self as qualified by that there takes place the superimposition of the attributes of the ego such as desires, doubts &c. (and) on the Self as qualified by them there takes place that of the attributes of the sense-organs such as blindness, deafness &c.

2. The धर्मि here is the Self as qualified by the ignorance and the ego.

3. If the reading धर्मपुरस्कारेणैव which is given in foot-note 3 at p. २४ is preferred, the translation of this portion of the substance would be:—"by bringing into prominence the attribute". I have preferred the other reading because what really comes into prominence in the consciousness "I am a man" is not an attribute of manhood but of the one who possesses it.

4. As to what this work is *vide* the notes at p. 86 *supra*.

rain &c. falls (on oneself). Hence there being the superimposition of each on the other, superimposition is of the nature of a knot of the Self and the non-selfs. Since there would be the non-manifestation of the other if the superimposition of any one of them (only) is believed, there is necessarily mutual superimposition like the simultaneous delusion as to a substratum (in the form) "These are a colour and silver" there being the rule that what appears in delusion is only that which is superimposed (Saṁ. S'ā. I-36). Moreover as the Self which is the end of all contradictions would remain over there is no danger of the theory of voidness (being advocated) for superimposition is of the nature of an appearance of a mixture of truth and untruth. Therefore each of these successive superimpositions of the ego &c. which has its root in each preceding one is beginningless like the seed and the sprout. And the superimposition of Nescience is beginningless by itself (PP. २४-२५).

If it is argued:—Verily, if superimposition were beginningless, (its) quality of being produced by mental impressions owing to its being of the nature of recollection which is spoken of by the author of the *Bhāshya* while saying:—"Superimposition is of the nature of recollection, it being the perception of a thing formerly seen at another place" (S'ā. Bhā. 17-18) would be contradicted—that is not correct because that (statement) is intended to apply to a superimposition of effects, while the definition (of superimposition) is contained only in (the words) *Paratra Parāvabhāsah* which is common to both (the kinds of superimposition). Or the author of the *Bhāshya* having said (previously):—"Having mixed together truth and untruth" (Ibid. 16) the definition according to the view of our school is:—"Superimposition is the appearance of a comingling of the true and the false substances". Thereby the definition would not fail to extend even to the superimposition of the cause. And it having been said that the superimposition of effects is beginningless like the seed and the sprout in the form of a current, no fault (is committed).

The (fact of) superimposition being thus established the arrangement as to the Self though one being the individual soul and the Ruler (of the Universe) &c. and that as to its being the means of proof, the thing to be proved &c. with regard to every act can be established. For the revered author of the *Vārttika* says that the Self

being conditioned by ignorance and having[1] attained identification with ignorance is spoken of as the Inner Ruler, the Witness, and the Cause of the Universe owing to its not having been distinguished from its own semblance (in the ignorance) and (the same) being conditioned by the intellect and having attained identification with it is spoken of as the individual soul, the doer, the enjoyer and the knower owing to its not having been distinguished from its own semblance (in the intellect). And owing to the intellect in each body being distinct the semblance of the Self contained therein is distinct. Hence the Self too which is not distinguished from it appears as distinct (in each individual). On the other hand ignorance being at all places devoid of distinctness, there is no distinctness in the semblance of the Self contained therein and hence the witnessing-self contained therein and not distinguished from it never appears to be distinct. This is (the distinction).

And in this view there occurs only the 'Jahat Laks'aṇā' (indicative indication) of the words 'Tat', 'Twam' &c.[2] because the primary sense portion, namely the limitation together with the semblance, is destroyed owing to the semblance also being indescribable by reason of its being of a nature different from the inert and the non-inert. Thus it has been said in the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka*[3] (I-169):—

"If again the word 'Brahma' were to denote ignorance together with the semblance, the word 'Aham' would denote the ego and in that view there would occur the 'Jahat Laks'aṇā' (indicative indication)."

Moreover it should not be said that the semblance alone having become bound and the absolute Self being free, bondage and freedom have different receptacles and that it cannot be established that one would proceed to encompass one's own destruction, because the absolute Self itself is believed to have been bound through its semblance. Thus it has been said by the revered author of the *Vārttika*:—

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1. For an explanation as to what this expression exactly means *vide* the note at p. 9 *supra*.

2. The reading तत्त्वमस्यादिपदे given in foot-note 3 at p. २७ yields no sense as तत्त्वमसि is not a पद but a वाक्य.

3. For information as to this work and its author *vide* the note at p. 90 *supra*.

"That one subject to transmigration should have self-realization is itself a fault in our eyes" (Brih. Bhā. Vā. II-4-138).

Hence bondage means that the pure Self has a semblance and freedom that it (i. e. the semblance) has ceased is exist. Thus there is nothing (in this view) that is not intelligible. Or even the Self undistinguished from its semblance may be (taken to be) the sense of words 'Tat' and 'Twam.' Hence a portion of the primary sense not being abandoned, there occurs the 'Jahadajahat Laks'anā'[1] according to this view. Hence there is no fault whatever (in this view). This very view is referred to as the Ābhāsa-vāda (Semblance-theory).

The view of the revered author of the *Virarana*[2] is that the Self which serves as the disc being conditioned by ignorance is the Ruler (of the Universe) while the same reflected in ignorance as limited by the inner organ and the impressions thereon is the individual soul.[3] The view of the revered author of the *Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka* is that the Self reflected in ignorance is the Ruler (of the Universe) and the same reflected in the intellect is the individual soul, while the Self which serves as the disc as limited by ignorance is pure.[4] And in these views, there is a diversity of the individual souls owing to the diversity of intellects. And owing to the reality of the reflection there is 'Jahat Laks'aṇā' only of the words 'Tat,' 'Twam' &c. This itself is spoken of as the Pratibimba-vāda (Reflection-theory). (PP. २६-२८).

The revered Vāchaspati Mis'ra is of the view that the Self as having become the subject of ignorance[5] is the Ruler (of the Universe) and the same as having become the support of ignorance is the individual soul. In this view again, there is a distinctness in the individual soul owing to that in ignorance; the worldly

1. For an explanation as to what this Laks'aṇā is *vide* the note at p. 9 *supra*.

2. As to what this work is and who is its author *vide* the notes at p. 40 *supra*.

3. If the reading given in foot-note 4 at p. २८ is preferred the following words would have to be added after the words "individual soul", namely:—"and the Self which serves as the disc as unconditioned by ignorance is pure."

4. The part of this sentence beginning with "while the Self which serves &c." would be required to be omitted from the translation if the reading given in foot-note 4 above-mentioned is preferred.

5. If the reading अज्ञानविषयीकृतम् which is given in foot-note 1 at p. ३२ is adopted the translation would be:—"as having been made the subject of."

phenomena is different with each individual because the individual soul himself is the material cause of the universe by virtue of his being conditioned by his own ignorance; and recognition takes place through extreme similarity[1]; and the Ruler (of the Universe) is spoken of as the cause owing to His being the substratum of the individual ignorance together with the worldly phenomena.[2] And this itself is the Avachchheda-vāda. (Limitation-theory).

The principal doctrine of the Upanishads known as the Ekajīwa-vāda (One Soul-theory) is that the Self which serves as the disc as conditioned by ignorance is the Ruler (of the Universe) and the same as reflected in ignorance is the individual soul or that the pure Self unconditioned by ignorance is the Ruler (of the Universe) and the same as conditioned by it is the individual soul. It is this very (Vāda) that is spoken of (at times) as the Drishti-sris'ti-vāda[3] (Illusion-theory). And in this theory the individual soul himself is the material and instrumental cause of the universe by his having been subjected to his own ignorance and everything that has an objective existence is imaginary; the illusion consisting of the difference between individual souls is due to the difference in their (physical) bodies, and final absolution takes place of that one only on self-realization brought about by the steadiness of study, meditation &c. supplemented by the preceptor, Scriptures &c. imagined by himself (to exist). As for the emancipation of S'uka and others (from the moment of their births), it is a mere eulogy. The subsidiary distinctions such as that the word 'Tat' in the principal sentence establishes (the sense of) the Self unconditioned by ignorance like the words 'Ananta', 'Satya' and others (in the subordinate sentences) by Laks'aṇā (indication) should be made out personally (by the students). (P. २९).

If it is argued:—Verily, there being no possibility of doubts in the thing itself, how can (all) the mutually inconsistent views

1. If the reading सादृश्यात् which is given in foot-note 2 at the same page is adopted the word 'extreme' would have to be omitted from the translation.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page is adopted, the translation would be:—"and recognition takes place owing to the Ruler (of the Universe) being the substratum of the worldly phenomena and the individual ignorance".

3. For an explanation as to the literal meaning of this term and its full import *vide* the note at p. 94 *supra*.

be authoritative? Therefore, (it should be determined) what is there in these views that is worthy to be discarded and what is worthy to be accepted—(we reply:—) Who said that there was no possibility of doubts in the thing for we see that doubts such as whether this is a post or a man or a giant &c. do arise with reference to a thing. If it is said that the said conjecture has no basis of truth in it, it being but a product of the human intellect while this arrangement as to the division into the individual soul and the Ruler (of the Universe) &c. is based upon the Scriptures—(we reply:—) Indeed, you are very intelligent. The principal thing to be proved by the Scriptures is the true nature of the Self who is without a second because it is the fruit and is unknown. As for the assumptions of the division into the individual soul and the Ruler (of the Universe) &c. though they are mere products of the human intellect they are alluded to by the Scriptures because they are helpful in imparting a knowledge of the essence. It is possible that Vedic texts should allude even to things which are proved by delusion there being the rule that in the vicinity of a thing which is fruitful, that which is fruitless becomes its auxiliary. By this (reasoning) the contradiction[1] of the knowledge of the non-dual by that of the dual is avoided. Moreover (that contradiction is not possible) because even the knowledge of a dual (substance) like a pot &c. is believed to be authoritative owing to the non-dual portion thereof, which is Sat (existence) only, being unknown.[2] (That is so) because there is a rule that there can be knowledge and ignorance with reference to an object which is their common resting-place and because it not having been admitted that there can be ignorance with reference to an inert substance because of the absence of a means of proof and a purpose, it can be said that there is ignorance thereof also only on account of the ignorance of the Self as limited by it and because the authoritativeness (of a thing) consists in its being the imparter of the knowledge of a thing that is unknown[3] for otherwise recollection

1. The reading बोधः instead of बाधः which is given in foot-note 2 at the same page cannot be correct as the context shows that the author means to establish that there can be the knowledge of the non-dual from that of the dual.

2. The reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page does not deserve to be adopted because no sense can be made out of the sentence with it.

3. If the reading given in foot-note 4 at the same page is preferred the translation of this part of the sentence would be:—"And a means of proof is authoritative only on account of its quality of being the imparter of the knowledge of a thing that is unknown."

also would have it.[1] In all the cases of contradiction in the Vedāntas this alone is the way to remove it. Thus the revered author of the *Vārttika* has said:—

"All those methods by which men become convinced[1] (of the true nature) of the Self, should be known to be good and consistent[2] (with the main doctrine)."

And we have proclaimed it a hundred times that one must necessarily avoid inconsistency with the meaning which may be the subject-matter of the purport of (any) Vedic texts. Hence this (objection) has no substance in it.

Then in this manner the arrangement is well established by holding that the individual soul becomes transmigratory owing to his being overpowered by limitations while the Highest Lord (of the Universe) being the controller of the limitations acquires omniscience &c.

If it is said:—Verily, let there be an arrangement as to the division (of the same Self) into the individual soul and the Lord (of the Universe) &c.by the power of Nescience but how can there be an arrangement as to the means of proof, the thing to be proved &c, with reference to each act—we reply (as follows:—) Nescience, though circumscribed on account of its being an object of perception and destructible, incapable of standing the test of reason owing to its being indescribable and possessed of a twofold power of enveloping and distracting, covers over the all-pervading intelligent Self just as a finger placed in front of one's eye covers over the solar disc. If there (i. e. in the illustration) the eye alone is believed to have been covered over, there would be the possibility of even the finger not being percieved. Moreover distraction is not possible unless the substratum is covered over. Thereafter it being propelled by the actions of the individual souls (lying dormant) in the form of the impressions left in each previous existence becomes transformed into the whole universe. It having acquired an identity with the spirit through its semblance all its products become

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1. If the reading पुंस: is preferred the words "one becomes" may be substituted for the word "men become" in the translation.

2. If the reading स्थिरस्थिता is preferred the translation would be:—"and to have a fixed place (in the Vedānta doctrine)." If on the other hand the reading अनवस्थिता is preferred it would be:—"and they are not definite." In the latter case the meaning would be that one is not bound to adopt a particular method but one may choose any that satisfies one.

necessarily permeated by the spirit through its semblance[1]. On that happening, the Self who is the material cause of the universe making everything manifest at all times even without standing in need of any means of proof becomes omniscient because the Self like a lamp possesses the quality of making manifest everything connected with it[2]. Hence in its case there is no arrangement as to the means of proof, the thing to be known &c. On the other hand, in the case of the individual soul, he having been separated owing to his being circumscribed by the intellect, that individual soul alone has the experience of a particular object at a particular time, the inner organ limiting whom being fit for the manifestation of the Self comes in contact with that object at that particular time. Hence it is that there is no possibility of a confusion (of the experiences of the individual souls).

The *modus operandi* in this case is this:—A modification of Nescience called the Antahkaraṇa (inner organ) residing in the body and pervading it throughout, which is a product of the five subtle elements having therein at that time the predominance of the Sattwa (guṇa), being extremely clear like a mirror &c., having gone out (of the body) through the eyes &c. and pervaded the appropriate objects such a pot &c. assumes the forms of those individual objects like molten copper[3] &c. And like the solar light it is capable of speedily contracting and expanding. And it being possessed of parts becomes transformed and having thoroughly pervaded inside the body and the pot &c. remains even unimpaired like the eye between the body and the pot also. Thereout the portion of the inner organ limited by the body called the ego is spoken of as the doer, the portion thereof which

1. The reading given in foot-note 3 at p. ३१ is obviously faulty and no sense can be made out of it unless instead of सर्वमायाद्वारा we read सर्वं मायाद्वारा but even then the meaning that would be conveyed would be:–"all its products also become necessarily permeated by the spirit through illusion" and such a meaning is not consistent with the reason given in the preceding portion of the sentence and the Vedānta doctrine generally.

2. The reading given in foot-note 4 at the same page is obviously faulty as the expression स्वयंबद्धसर्वभासकत्वात् conveys no intelligible meaning.

3. In the *Adwaitasiddhi* of this anthor another illustration of this action has been given and that is that the Vritti of the inner organ is like the water of rivers or tanks which being carried through a channel to an adjoining field encircles the trunk of a tree requiring water and assumes the form of a water-basin around it and remains connected with the main source through the channel.

remains like a rod between the body and the object and is known as the Vritti-jnyāna[1] (knowledge arising from an operation of the inner organ) is spoken of as the operation and the portion thereof pervading the object is spoken of as the quality of being fit for manifestation of the object[2] which confers upon it the quality of being the object of knowledge. That tripartite inner organ being extremely clear the Self becomes manifest therein. Though the Self which has become manifest is one (only) it is given three (different) designations owing to the difference between the portions of the inner organ which are the media of its manifestation. (Thus) the portion of the Self circumscribed by the doer-portion (of the inner organ) is (spoken of as) the knower, the portion thereof circumscribed by the operation-portion (of that organ) as the means of knowledge and the portion thereof circumscribed by the fitness-for-manifestation-portion (of that organ) residing in the object as the act of knowledge. As for the thing to be known it is the Brahma-chaitanya (i. e. the Supreme Soul) residing in the object, in the state of being unknown. That itself when known (becomes) the fruit (of knowledge). (PP-३०-३३).

And here, in both the views, namely, that in which the individual soul is circumscribed by the inner organ and that in which that soul is a reflection in Nescience, all-pervading and unattached, the Vritti of the inner organ has for its objects the forging of a connection (of the object-self) with the knowing-self and the breaking of the veil over the self inside the object. And[3] in that in which that soul being circumscribed by Nescience and all-pervading is covered over, the Vritti has for its object the breaking of the veil because that soul being the material cause of the universe is connected with everything[4]. This is the distinction. (P. ३४).

1. The reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ३३ is incorrect as the expression वृत्तिज्ञानाख्य like the expression अहङ्काराख्य in the preceding sentence must be in the same gender as the word भाग which is a noun of the masculine gender.

2. The expression कर्माभियोग्यत्वम् though not incorrect does not seem to be appropriate as the author is here explaining technical terms and this is not one of them like अभि-व्यक्तियोग्यत्वम् which has been adopted in the text.

3. This sentence is taken from the other Mss. though not found in क because the context leaves no doubt as to its being in the original text.

4. The first view here referred to is the Pratibimba-vāda of the authors of the *Vivaraṇa and Saṁks'epa S'ārīraka*, the second the Ābhāsa-vāda of the author of the *Vārttika* and the third the Avachchheda-vāda of the author of the *Bhāmatī or Vāchaspatya.*

(It may be argued:—) Verily, in the view that the Vritti has for its object the forging of a connection with the spirit[1] the knowledge of the attributes and the absence of attributes &c. and of Brahma ought to take place without the intervention of a Vritti because they are themselves connected with the inner organ-(we reply:—) it ought not to take place because the spirit is not there in harmony with those particular objects. And that want of harmony in the Brahma-chaitanya (i. e. the Supreme Soul who is the substratum of the object) even when it is pure (i. e. fit to be connected with the knowing-self) is due to a veil of Nescience, when it is unenveloped as in silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl &c[2] it is due to impurity (i. e. unfitness to be connected with the knowing-self), while in the case of the attributes and absence of attributes &c., it is due either to its impurity or to its being enveloped. Hence when it is enveloped though pure the harmony with the object is brought about by a Vritti[3] generated by a means of proof. When it is impure though unenveloped as in the case of silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl &c. the harmony with the object is brought about by a Vritti of Nescience. When however it is unenveloped and pure as in the case of pleasure, pain &c. it is brought about automatically. And hence there is no possibility of the knowledge (of the attributes &c) merely on account of there being a connection with the inner organ.

Verily, how can Brahma which is omniscient owing to its being self-luminous without a blemish have a veil (over it)[4]? True, it is spoken of as covered over though it is omniscient owing to its being the illuminator of everything coming in contact with it, because it becomes the subject of the ignorance of the individual soul who is limited by the inner organ. Therefore in the view in which Brahma is the material cause (of the universe) there is a Vritti which has for its aims the forging of a connection with the spirit and the breaking of a veil and in that in which the individual soul is the material cause (thereof) there is a Vritti which has for its aim the breaking of a veil only.

1. It must be borne in mind that the word चित् here stands for the प्रमातृचैतन्य not the शुद्धचैतन्य.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ३५ is preferred the word '&c.' would have to be omitted from the translation.

3. The reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page is incorrect because it does not fit in with the context.

4. This is a statement of an objection. What follows is an answer to it.

Verily, if the breaking of the veil were to take place by one single act of knowledge such as that of a pot &c. there would be the possibility of immediate liberation because ignorance is one only. Even in the view that ignorance is manifold (the result would be the same) owing to one individual soul having (only) one ignorance as his limitation[1]. No, because it is admitted that the veil is overpowered (for the time being) by a Vritti just like a jewel by the stimulating herb or incantation.[2] That being so, it is ignorance, accompanied by the absence of a Vritti of the inner organ produced by a means of proof, which is capable of giving rise to the consciousness that a thing does not exist and does not appear though it does exist and does appear, that is spoken of as the veil. On the rise of the Vritti however the ignorance, being as good as not existing though in fact existing, owing to the absence of a limiting agent,[3] is not able to do its work. It is therefore spoken of as having been overpowered.

Verily, if it were so there would not be the eradication of Nescience even by the knowledge of Brahma and hence there would not be final absolution[4]. No, because it is believed that the eradication of Nescience does take place from (i. e. on the acquisition of) the knowledge of the sense of the sentences such as "Thou art that," Nescience can be eradicated only by the right knowledge regarding the subject thereof[5] and the knowledge arising from the sense of the principal sentences is alone the right knowledge owing to the fact that its subject remains uncontradicted (by anything). As for (the other means of proof

1. Upto this point there was the statement of an objection. What follows is an answer to it.

If the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ३६ is preferred the words "one individual soul" would have to be put in parentheses.

2. This simile will be found fully explained at p. 112 *supra.*

The reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page does not appear from the context to be correct.

3. The other reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page is obviously faulty. The word अज्ञानलक्षण in the reading in ख given in the same foot-note does not seem to be necessary and therefore cannot be deemed to have existed in the original text.

4. This is an objection. What follows is an answer to it.

5. The word विषय seems to have been unnecessarily repeated in ख. The reading given in foot-note 5 does not therefore seem to be correct.

such as) direct perception &c. their subjects being contradicted they are (the means to the attainment of) mistaken knowledge. Still on account of their capability (to lead to right knowledge) for the purpose of daily intercourse they are spoken of as authoritative. Moreover it is immaterial that the eradication of ignorance by knowledge is not found at other places (i. e. in the case of the other means of proof) because that is proved by (our) own experience and because inference from circumstances[1] is the strongest of all (the means of proof). Thus it has been said (in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*):—

"If an inference drawn from circumstances leads to the attainment of the thing (which though experienced cannot otherwise be accounted for), the contrary view based on its non-perception (at another place) is refuted thereby,[2] that being the strongest (proof) of all".

Or the veils over the objects such as a pot &c. may be (believed to be) but the different phases of the original ignorance. It being admitted that there are as many (instances of) knowledge as there are of ignorance owing to ignorance being in the place of the previous non-existence (of knowledge) there would be the eradication of one (case of) ignorance only by one (of) knowledge and hence there is nothing that cannot be established even by (the proof of) the destruction of the veil by the knowledge of a pot &c. (PP. २५-२६).

(If it is argued:—) Verily, does the veil disappear (on the rise of knowledge) from inference &c. or not? In the former case, there is the possibility of the removal of the delusion which is visualised such as that as to the yellowness of a conch &c. by an inference &c. as to whiteness &c. because delusion having for its material cause the ignorance of the substratum, it must be removed on the removal of the latter. Moreover the removal of Nescience from Brahma, being effected by knowledge produced by reasoning, there would be no necessity of study, contemplation &c. for the realization (of the Self). In the latter case on the other hand, it

1. For the nature of this means of proof *vide* pp. 65-66 *supra*.

2. If the first reading mentioned in foot-note 6 at the same page is preferred, the translation would be the same. If on the other hand that occurring in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* and mentioned in the same footnote is preferred, the translation would be:—"the contrary view based on direct perception (which is another means of proof) is refuted thereby.

would not be possible to infer fire &c. because of the presence of a thing causing obstruction (in the way of drawing an inference)[1]—we reply:—A veil is of two sorts, one residing in the witness as limited by the inner organ and bringing about the non-existence (of an object) and the other residing in the Brahma-chaitanya (*i.e.* the Supreme Soul) as limited by the object and bringing about the non-perception (of the object), because we experience a limitation in both in the form "I do not know the pot". Thereout the first is removed simply by the right knowledge which is common to both indirect and direct (experience) for once an inference such as one relating to the existence of fire &c. (at a particular place) is drawn, the conviction[2] that it does not exist, does not arise, while the second is removed by direct perception only because there is the rule that knowledge can dispel the ignorance residing in that object in which it resides and in that form in which it is produced (and direct knowledge[3]) resides both

1. Upto this there is the statement of an objection. What follows is the author's reply thereto.

2. The word for 'conviction' in the text is प्रत्ययः. In the reading given in foot-note 1. at page ३८ the word प्रतीतिः occurs instead of that. It too means 'settled belief, conviction &c.'

3. The expression in the text which has been translated by the words 'in which it resides' is यन्निष्ठम्. In the first reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page the expression that occurs instead of that is यदाश्रयम् which means 'upon which it depends'. The underlying idea in both the expressions is the same, namely that knowledge and ignorance must have a common substratum. The same remarks apply to the correlative expressions तन्निष्ठम् and तदाश्रयम्.

The difference between the reading adopted in the text and the second one given in the same foot-note is that instead of the word ज्ञानम् the word वृत्तिः occurs in the latter. If that reading is preferred, the word Vritti (mental operation) would have to be substituted for the word 'knowledge' in the translation. There would not be much difference in the meaning of the sentence thereby because since according to the Vedānta doctrine knowledge is the result of a Vritti it matters very little whether we say that it is a particular Vritti which destroys the ignorance with respect to a particular object or that it is the knowledge thereof which destroys it.

A reading different from that adopted in the concluding portion of this sentence in the text has been given in foot-note 3 at the same page. If that is preferred ,the following words would have to be substituted in the translation for the words commencing with 'and the veil &c.', namely:—"And since an indirect Vritti does not possess the quality of being residing in an object owing to its consisting merely of a rousing of the inner conscience and a direct Vritti resides in both because it is produced both by the object and the inner organ &c."

The other readings which are found adopted by two other commentators are mnetioned in the Notes at p. 119 *supra*.

in things beyond direct contact (such as the mind &c.) and in those which are in such contact (such as the objects of this world).[1] It has therefore been said (Pañchadas'ī VII. 45):—

"The quality of being the cause of a notion of non-existence can be destroyed by indirect knowledge and that of being the cause of a notion of non-appearance by direct knowledge".

Hence in asmuch as the destruction of the veil of non-existence takes place from an inference &c[2], that (expression) is used in connection therewith. On the other hand the removal of a delusion which is visualized, together with the limitation thereof is removed by the removal of the veil of non-perception. That is the difference. Therefore although the Self is devoid of attributes the superimposition thereon of those of Nescience (in the form of its product) the inner organ such as the qualities of being the doer, enjoyer &c, is established on account of its false identification with them. (P. ३८).

Verily, since the Ânirvachanīya-khyāti[3] (appearance of an indescribable substance) is accepted in your doctrine it should be said that the attributes of the inner organ such as that of being the doer &c., which are superimposed upon the Self, are generated therein as indescribables. If that is agreed to, the manifestation of (the attributes such as) the being the doer, the enjoyer &c, would be

1. If the reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page is preferred the following part of a sentence would have to be substituted in the translation for the latter part of this sentence beginning with the words "and direct knowledge resides &c.", namely:—"and because an indirect Vritti does not reside in an object owing to its consisting merely of the waking up the inner consciousness, while a direct Vritti, having been formed by both the object and the inner organ, resides in both of them".

2. If the reading given in foot-note 4 at the same page is preferred the translation would be:—"Hence in asmuch as the destruction of the veil of ignorance takes place (thereby) that expression is used in (the case of) inference &c.

3. For the full significance of this expression *vide* the note at p. 120 *supra*. Besides this and the अन्यथाख्याति referred to there there are three other ख्याति's, namely, सत्ख्याति, असत्ख्याति and आत्मख्याति advocated by other schools of Indian philosophers out of which the last which is advocated by the Bauddhās and which differs slightly from that of the Vedāntins is the most important one. The meaning conveyed by it is that this worldly phenomena is nothing else but the Self which is of the nature of a momentary consciousness and that therefore it has no existence at all apart from that of the Self.

twofold, they being distinguished as those which have an existence for the purpose of daily intercourse (like the objects of this world) and those which have an imaginary existence only (like a serpent appearing in a rope)[1]. It would not be (so), because of indiscrimination which is due to a belief in (their) identification or because there is the absence of twofoldness owing to the inner organ qualified by all its attributes being itself superimposed upon the Self. Therefore, it being possible to explain the arrangement as to the functioning of the one Self only as the knower &c, by virtue of the distinction between its limitations, there is no danger of the stepping in of the doctrine of the Saugatās nor that of a contradiction.[2] Other arrangements also will be established in clearer terms hereafter. It is therefore established that the doctrine of theAupanishadās that the Self who is of the nature of knowledge remaining unchanged in the state of deep sleep and the body, senses &c, undergoing changes and being objects of perception, the beliefs of the different learned men that any of the latter is the Self are mistaken, is alone the authoritative one. (1).

It may be so. The Self being devoid of attributes and the arrangement such as that of the knower &c. having its root in superimposition, there is the possibility of the S'āstric injunctions such as "A Brāhmaṇ should perform sacrifices" &c, being unauthoritative and it cannot be established that the Self who is not the doer and the enjoyer should proceed to act. And when the Vedas are unauthoritative, from what can the existence of Brahma also be proved, it being capable of being known only through them owing to the rule (contained in the Sūtra):—"Owing to the Scriptures being its source"? That being so, the reality of the arrangement such as that of the knower &c, must be admitted for (establishing) the authoritativeness of the Vedas. Having raised such a doubt (the author proceeds to solve it thus:—) Does the unauthoritativeness arise before the knowledge of the essence or after it? Thereout as to the former (case, we say that)

1. The first class of objects are the products of the primeval ignorance proved by the six means of proof and disproved on the rise of the knowledge of their essence while the second are the products of individual ignorance and are disproved by the one or the other of the six means of proof.

Upto this point there is a statement of an objection. What follows is the author's reply thereto.

2. For understanding the propriety of this remark *vide* p. 121 *supra*.

in asmuch as we have established (the existence of) the arrangement upto the time of the removal of Nescience, all the means of proof are authoritative without hindrance because they are not contradicted in that state owing to their having for their subjects those which are affected by Nescience. As for the latter on the other hand, that is just what we desire. So he (i. e. the author) has said :—

> **Neither the castes nor the rules of conduct and duties of the castes and orders of society nor even the concentration of the mind (on Brahma), the contemplation (of Paramātmā), (and) trance[1] &c. are for me. Owing to the eradication of the mistaken belief such as I and mine which has a non-self for its basis, I am that one, auspicious and pure, who remains over. (2).**

The meaning of the verse (is this :—) The *Varṇas* (castes) are the Brāhmaṇas, Ks'atriyas, Vais'yas and S'ūdras. The *As'ramas* (orders of society) are the Brahmachārins (celibates), Grihasthas (householders), Vānaprasthas (forest-dwellers) and Bhiks'us (mendicants). The *Achāras* (rules of conduct) are the (internal) purification (of the body), ablution &c. The *Dharmas* (duties) are (the observance of) celibacy, service of (one's) preceptor &c. Here, by taking (the compound *Varṇās'ramāchāradharmāh* as) a genitive Tatpurusha embodying therein a couple of Dwandwas we get the rules of conduct and the duties of the castes and even the rules of conduct and the duties of the orders of society. *Dhāraṇā* is the steadiness of the mind on Brahma[2] on excluding (all) the external objects (from it). *Dhyāna* is the contemplation of the Supreme Soul. *Yoga* is the control of the action of the mind.[3] By the word *Adi* are included (the processes of) study, contemplation &c. As the reason for the unreality of all(of them) at a time subsequent to (the rise of) knowledge

1. The word 'Yoga' has been translated by the word 'trance' on the authority of Vyasa's commentary on Yoga Sūtra I-1-1 (योग: समाधि:).

2. If the reading referred to in foot-note 1 at p. ४० is preferred the words "on Brahma" would have to be omitted from the translation.

3. The reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page would, if preferred, make no difference in the translation because the compound adopted in the text when solved comes to that.

(the author) has said:—*Anātmās'rayāhammamādhyāsahānāt.* The meaning thereof is this:—The *Anātmā* is the Nescience which is opposed to the Self. The mistaken belief which underlies the notions of 'I' and 'mine'[1] (and) which is *Tadās'rayah* (i. e. to say) has that for its material cause, being eradicated even together with its root, by the knowledge of the essence, the arrangement as to the castes, the orders of society &c. which is an outcome thereof does not exist. This is the meaning. (2). (PP. ३९-४०).

The arrangement such as that of the castes, the orders of society &c. having its root in false knowledge only, (the author) has in order to impress its unreality firmly, said that there being the absence thereof (i. e. of false knowledge) in the state of deep sleep there is the absence (of the arrangement) (by the following verse):—

> **They say that in deep sleep, there is neither a mother nor a father nor the gods nor the worlds nor the Vedas nor sacrifices nor places of pilgrimage. Being of such a nature that extreme voidness is excluded from me, I am the one, auspicious and pure, who remains over. (3).**

The meaning of the verse (is this):—*Mātā* means the woman who gave birth. *Pitā* means the man who was the cause of birth. The *Devas* are Indra and others who are fit to be propitiated. The *Lokas* are Swarga &c. which are (attained as) the fruits of propitiating them (i. e. the gods). The *Vedas* are the authoritative sayings which expound the means for the attainment of supernatural welfare and misery and which expound Brahma.[2] The *Yajñas* are the Jyotishtoma and others which are instrumental in (the attainment of) Swarga &c. The *Tīrthas* are the Kurukshetra and other regions which are instrumental in the performance of sacrifices. In the same manner the things which are instrumental in the performance of sinful acts are to be understood to have been implied. The meaning is that all (these) having the identification

1. The reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page is not preferable because it would then mean that in the author's view what is destroyed is only the notion of "mine" not also that of 'I' which cannot be true.

2. The reading given in foot-note 3 at p. ४१ seems to be a corrupt form of that found adopted in the Poona edition which is वेदा लौकिकप्रमाणाप्रतिपन्नहिताहितसाधनताप्रतिपादकानि ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकानि च प्रमाणवाक्यानि. Therein लौकिकप्रमाणाप्रतिपन्नहिताहित means 'welfare and misery not attained by the ordinary means of proof.'

(of oneself) with the body as their root[1] have no existence in its absence owing to want of connection with the Self. And so referring to the state of deep sleep Vedic texts such as, "Here a father becomes a non-father, a mother a non-mother, the Devas non-Devas and the Vedas non-Vedas, and a thief becomes a non-thief, a destroyer of a fœtus a non-destroyer of a fœtus, a Chāndāla a non-Chāndāla, a Paulkasa a non-Paulkasa, a S'ramaṇa a non-S'ramaṇa, (and) a Tāpasa a non-Tāpasa.[2] (Then) one is not followed by merits, not followed by demerits, for one has then transgressed all the sorrows of the heart" (Brih. IV-3-22) and others, say that in the absence of identification (with the body) all the miseries disappear.

Verily, in the absence of all arrangement there would be voidness only. (The author being of opinion that) it would not be, has said:—*Nirastātis'ūnyātmakatwāt.* (That compound can be solved thus:—) *Nirastam* (is removed) *Atis'ūnyātmakatwam* (extreme voidness) *Yasmāt Tat* (that from which) *Tathā* (such-that). The principal thing indicated (in that expression) is existence (a positive entity) because that serves to establish the state of deep sleep and because a return to the waking state cannot otherwise be proved. And from such Vedic texts as, "Verily, my beloved, this Self is imperishable, of an indescribable nature" (Brih. IV-5-14), "For, there takes place the severance of its connection with the material elements", "And when it is said that there (i. e. in deep sleep), he does not see, he does not see even though seeing" (Ibid. IV-3-23), "The sight is inseparable from the seer, because he is imperishable for he has then no second, whom he can see distinct from himself" (Ibid) and others, (it appears that) the spirit which is the Self is not reduced to voidness in the state of deep sleep. This is the meaning:—This (objection) though refuted (once) is again refuted on the analogy of the digging in of a post (which has already been fixed in the ground).[3] Or (that compound may be solved as) *Nirastam* (i. e.) removed from hunger &c. *Adwitīyam*

1. If the reading given in foot-note 4 at the same page is adopted, the translation would be:—"The connection of all beings with merits and demerits having its root in their identification with the body they (i. e. the merits and demerits) have no existence &c."

2. The terms occurring in this text will be found explained in the Notes at p. 132.

3. For an explanation as to what this न्याय is *vide* p. 138 *supra*.

(without a second) *Atisūnyam* (transcending the void) *Yad Brahma* (Brahma which is)[1] *Tadātmakatwāt* (being of that nature). And so, there are the Vedic texts:—"When my dear (boy) man sleeps, then he becomes united with the True One" (Chhān. VI-8-1.), (and) "So just as a man when embraced by his beloved woman, does not know anything either inside or outside himself, even so this spirit when embraced by the Prājna-ātmā (the presiding deity of deep sleep) does not know anything either inside or outside himself. "(Brih. IV-3-21). Therefore it is established that the individual soul being identical with Brahma which is the cause of the universe, omniscient, omnipotent (and therefore) perfect and of the nature of bliss and knowledge is necessarily untransmigratory. (3). (PP. ४१-४३).

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1. The reading given in foot-note 2 at p. ४२ as it is, yields no intelligible meaning unless it is corrected into अतिशून्यं निर्धर्मकम्. That done, the meaning would be that अतिशून्यम् means निर्धर्मकम् (devoid of attributes).

PART II.

DETERMINATION OF THE SENSE OF THE TERM 'TAT'.

Then in this manner the sense of the term 'Twam' has been ascertained by (the preceding) three verses after refuting the different views of learned men. Now, that of the term 'Tat' is to be ascertained[1] in the same manner. The different views of learned men in connection therewith which are to be refuted are being set forth. Verily, the identity of the individual soul with Brahma cannot be established[2]. For, the existence of Brahma, the cause of the universe which is the primary sense of the word 'Tat' is established by sentences such as "In the beginning, my dear, there was Sat only" (Chhān. VI-2-1) and others. But as to the cause of the universe, the Saṁkhyās[3] say that it is the Pradhāna, an inert substance. The Pāśupatās[4] say that Paśupati alone is the cause of the universe. He though a spirit is distinct from the individual soul and He alone is to be worshipped. The Pañcharātrikās[5] say that the revered Vāsudeva, the Lord, is the cause of the universe, that from Him is produced the individual soul called Saṁkarshaṇa, from the latter the mind (called) Pradyumna, from that the ego called Aniruddha, and that therefore the individual soul being an effect there is not the complete identity of Brahma (i. e.) Vāsudeva with him. The Jainās and Tridaṇḍins[6] say that (the cause of the universe) is liable to changes (yet) eternal, omniscient and (both) distinct (from) and identical (with the individual soul). The Mīmāñsakās[7] say that there is no Brahma endowed with ominscience &c. because the aim of the

1. If the causal form which occurs in the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ४४ is preferred the translation would be:—"should be got ascertained". It is not however an appropriate reading as the causal form has not been used in the preceding sentence with which this is connected.

2. The prefix अभि which occurs in the second reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page would, if added, make no difference in the translation.

3. For information as to this school of philosophers *vide* pp. 135–36 *supra*.

4. For that as to this school *vide* pp. 136–37 *supra*.

5. Information as to this school will found at p. 137 *supra*.

6. As to the views of these schools *vide* pp. 137–38 *supra*.

7. Information as to this school and its principal works will be found at pp. 30–34 *supra*.

Scriptures being to refer to actions their purport does not lie in it (i. e. Brahma) but the cause of the universe, namely, either the atom &c. or the individual soul, is to be worshipped as endowed with the qualities, omniscience &c. just as speech is directed to be worshipped) like a cow &c.[1] The Tārkikās[2] say that there is an omniscient Ruler (of the Universe) who is eternal and is endowed with knowledge &c. and (whose existence) is inferred from visible signs in the form of (his) acts such as the earth &c. and he is necessarily different from the individual soul. The Saugatās[3] say that (the Ruler of the Universe) is momentary and omniscient. The Pātañjalās say that (the Ruler of the Universe is a Purusha) who is untouched by the causes of trouble, actions, fruits and latent desires, of the nature of eternal knowledge, and omniscient owing to his being reflected in the Sattwaguṇa, a portion of the Pradhāna and quite different from the transmigratory Purusha (i. e. the individual soul).[4] The Aupanishadās[5] say that Brahma is only supreme joy which is (the) without a second, that that is the true nature of the individual soul and that it being qualified by omniscience &c., by illusion becomes the material and instrumental cause of the universe. (P. ४४).

The sense of the term 'Tat' being thus doubtful owing to the conflicting views of learned men, the Revered (Āchārya) has in order to determine it by the residue of the view of the Upanishad school, said:—

Neither the doctrine of the Sāṁkhyās nor that of the S'aivās nor that of those Pāñcharātrikās, nor that of the Jainās nor that of the Mīmāñsakās and others (is sound) because (Brahma is proved) by a special realization to be of the nature of extreme purity. I am that one, auspicious and pure, who remains over. (4).

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1. For understanding the full significance of this allusion *vide* p. 138 *supra*.

2. Information as to what this school is and what is its principal literature will be found at p. 139 *supra*.

3. That as to those of this school will be found at pp. 22-25 *supra*.

4. All the technical terms occurring in this sentence will be found explained at pp. 139-40 *supra*.

5. The Aupanishadas are the followers of the Upanishad school believed to have been founded by Bādarāyṇa Vyāsa. Information as to them will be found at pp. 38-41 *supra*.

By the word *Ādi* are included other (doctrines) not mentioned (in the text). So then, the non-self is not the material cause of the universe, because the Vedas teach by the text "He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth" (Chhān. VI-2-3), that the creation was preceded by a desire, because it has been stated in the text "Having entered (these elements) with this living Self let me reveal names and forms" (Ibid. VI-3-2) that the living principle (in man) is the Self, because it has been promised in the text "That through which, if known, everything becomes known" (Mund. I-1-3) that on the one being known everything will become known and it is impossible to know by the knowledge of the Pradhāna, the Purushas who are not of the same nature as it, because the identity (of the individual soul with the cause of the universe) has been tought nine times by the text "All this has this as its Self. That is the true one. That is the Self. Thou art that" (Chhān. VI-8-7) and because if the non-Self were to be the cause of the universe, it would be impossible to establish the varied arrangement (of the universe) owing to there being another text namely :—"From that i. e. from this Self sprung forth the space" (Tait. II. 1) and lastly because there is no authority for a belief in (the existence of) Pradhāna, Mahat &c. Therefore the Sāṁkhya view is not sound. In the same manner, the views of the Pāśupatās, the Pāñcharātrikās and the Jainās are improper because they are contradicted by Vedic texts and reasoning. Further, the Mīmāñsaka view that the Vedic texts (which appear to establish the existence of Brahma) being complementary to those which lay down injunctions do not establish the existence of Brahma, is not sound because the complementariness of those texts to those which lay down injunctions is not established. It should not be said that their complementariness to the injunctive texts is established by the rule contained in the syllogism as to the explanatory passages because there is a want of similarity (between them). For in that syllogism it has been determined on the analogy of the killed horse and burnt chariot that the texts such as "The wind, is, verily, the swiftest deity" (Tai. Saṁ. II-1-1-1) and others, which by themselves do not establish a sense with a purpose, being inexplicable otherwise than by being understood to refer to the injunction as to the study of one's Veda and therefore assumed to have for their aim a sense with a purpose, would,

through the praise of the deity to whom the offering is to be made &c., supply that element of the injunction which it stands in need of, namely, the *modus operandi* in the Verbal Bhāvanā and that there would, in that manner, be a concordance between the senses of (the texts of) both (the classes).[1] On the other hand since there occurs the attainment of the aim of man, namely, the acquisition of supreme bliss and the total eradication of misery, directly from the knowledge produced by the Upanishad sentences it (i. e. that aim) does not stand in need of anything and therefore there is no (room for) the assumption that (the text relating to it) is complementary to others but on the contrary (those relating to) the injunctions become themselves complementary to the former through (their work of) the purification of the inner organ (which is a condition precedent to the rise of knowledge). Therefore the Upanishad texts being with a purpose, being uncontradicted and being the means for the knowledge of a thing which is unknown are themselves authoritative and therefore Brahma does exist and hence the Mīmāṅsaka view is not established. The view of the Tārkikās and others is contradicted by the Vedic texts "Thou art that" (Chhān. VI-8-7.), "I am Brahma" (Brih. I-4-10), "This Self is Brahma" (Ibid. II-5-19), "Brahma is truth, knowledge and infiniteness" (Tai. II-1) and others and is also negatived by such texts as "Brahma is one alone without a second" (Chhān. VI-2-1), "There is in this no diversity whatever" (Brih. IV-4-19) and others. The views that Brahma is both different from and identical (with the individual soul) and that it is transient are negatived by such texts as "(Brahma is) all-pervading and eternal like space" and others. And here the reason for declaring the views of all (the above philosophers) to be unsound is (contained in the expression) *Visuddhātmakatwāt* which means 'owing to its being of the nature of the undifferentiated non-dual spirit'. The reason for its being so (is again contained in the expression) *Visishtānubhūtyā* which means 'by the uninterrupted experience produced by such sentences as "Thou art that" and others which is *Vis'ishta* (i. e. to say) different from the differentiated experiences (relating to worldly objects). Thereby it is established that

1. All the technical terms which occur in this passage will be found explained in details at pp. 142–44 *supra*.

Brahma is all-pervading, non-dual and of the nature of supreme bliss and knowledge. (4). (PP. ४५-४६).

Having raised a doubt, namely:—Verily, Brahma being known to be atomic from the texts–"That which is this atomic essence" (Chhā. VI-8-15), "Smaller than the small" (Tai. Āra. X-12-1, Ka. I-2-20 ; Swetā. III-20) and it being identical with the atomic individual soul whose (existence) is established by such Vedic texts as "The Purusha of the size of a thumb" (Ka. II-4-12), "A lower one of the size of the point of a goad is also seen" (Swetā. V-8) and others, it cannot be all-pervading—and being of opinion that the Vedic texts:—"This immortal Brahma itself is in front, Brahma in the rear, Brahma has spread towards the south and towards the north, below (our feet) and over (our head); this universe is Brahma itself; this (Brahma) is the most excellent (Mun. II-2-11), "The Brahma who is far and near, is not to the east nor to the west (of anything) nor inside or outside (anything)[1] (Brih. II-5-11)—and others establish the existence of Brahma without any qualifications whatever, (the author) has, while confirming only what has been stated before, said:—

And (Brahma is) neither above nor below, neither inside nor outside, (neither in) the middle nor athwart (and) neither in the eastern nor in the western direction. Being all-pervading like space it is of the nature of an undivided whole. I am that one, auspicious and pure, who remains over, (5).

The meaning of the verse is this:—*Viyadvyāpakatwāt* (may be taken to mean) 'owing to (its) being pervading like space' because of the Vedic text "(He) is all-pervading and eternal like space" or 'owing to (its) being more pervading than space' because of the Vedic texts—"Greater than space" (S'ata. Brā. X-6-3-2) "Greater than the great" (Ka. II-20) and others. (It is said so) because though even the individual soul is great owing to his being understood to be the spirit pervading the whole body, he has been said to be of the size of the point of a goad

1 Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has in his commentary (*Vide Kās'i Sanskrit Serie, No. LXV. p. 331*) explained the word अपूर्वम् as meaning 'without cause's अनपरम् as meaning 'without effects', अनन्तरम् as meaning 'devoid of attributes which cause a division, and अबाह्यम् as meaning 'devoid of such limitations as time &c.'

on account of the superimposition thereon of the attributes of its limitation and he has been said to be atomic in view of his being smaller than Brahma owing to there being the Vedic text "Though it is of an unlimited size by its own nature it appears to be of the size of the point of a goad on account of an attribute of the intellect". (S'wetā V-8). The meaning of the remaining portion (of the verse) is not obscure. (5). (P. ४८).

Having raised a doubt, namely:—Verily[1], Brahma being the material cause of the universe and there being no distinction between the cause and the effect and Brahma being (thus) of the nature of misery owing to its not being distinct from the varied world the individual soul cannot achieve the highest object of man's efforts by being identical with it—and being of opinion that Brahma has been stated to be the cause because it is the substratum of the whole worldly delusion by virtue of its being self-resplendent and of the nature of the highest joy and that it having no connection with that which is superimposed upon it,[2] there is not an iota of misery therein, (the author) has said:—

(Brahma is) neither white nor black nor red nor yellow, neither small nor large, neither short nor long. It is incapable of being known in that manner owing to its being of the nature of light (knowledge). I am that one, auspicious and pure, who remains over. (6).

Kubjam (means) small (and) *Pīnam*, great. Therefore there having been a negation of the four kinds of measure, namely, small, great, short and long, there is the denial of Brahma being a substance[3]. That which becomes manifest is a *Rūpa* (i. e. to say) a thing which can be known. A thing which cannot be known is an *Arūpa*. Thereby (i. e. by that expression) all the categories such

1. If the reading given in foot-note 4 at p. ४९ is preferred, the words "it may be so but" would have to be added in the translation after the word "Verily".

2. The reading given in foot-note 5 at the same page would even if preferred make no difference in the meaning of the sentence and therefore the translation would even in that case be the same.

3. The reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ५० is not acceptable because what is to be denied is not a द्रव्य but the fact of Brahma being a द्रव्य and hence the termination त्व is absolutely necessary.

as a substance, an attribute, an action &c. which are believed by the various learned men (to be identical with Brahma) are denied. Thus, the Vedic texts "(Brahma is) not big, not small, not short, not long (and) not red (like fire &c.)" (Brih III-8-8) and others such as "(Brahma is a thing) which cannot be heard, cannot be touched, cannot be percieved, is imperishable, cannot be tasted also and is eternal and cannot be smelt" (Ka. I-3-15) establish the true nature of the Highest Self as being free from all blemish. In order to determine by logical reasoning the meaning which is arrived at even from the Vedic texts (the author) has stated the reason in the expression :—*Jyotirākārakatvāt* which means that (.Brahma is Arūpa) because it cannot be known owing to its being of the nature of knowledge which is self-resplendent. If it were capable of being known, it would get inertness like a pot &c. And it is such also because there are such Vedic texts as "This (Brahma) is incapable of being known and is eternal" (Brih. IV-4-20) and others. (6). (PP. ४९-५०).

PART III.

DETERMINATION OF THE SENSE OF THE SENTENCE 'TATTWAMASI'.

Verily, whose being of the same nature as Brahma is being tought, whether of Brahma or of non-Brahma? It cannot be that of the latter as it is inert and unreal. Nor that of the former because (in that case) the teaching (itself) would be (rendered) meaningless, the fact of its being of the same nature as Brahma being self-evident. If it is argued that though the individual soul is by himself of the same nature as Brahma, the impediment in the form of Nescience is removed by the knowledge (of its being of that nature), (we reply:—) No, because if the removal of ignorance is (something) different from (the realization of) the Self, there would be duality[1] and consequently there would arise the contingency of Brahma not being proved. So it has been said in the Vārttika (Bṛih. Bhā. Vā. II-4-14).

"An entity that is neither excluded nor followed by anything else is called Brahma. If there were a second entity it would be difficult to bring out the sense of (the word) Brahma from this."

If it (i. e. the removal of ignorance) were not something different (from the Self), it has (already) been said that there would be the meaninglessness of the teaching.[2] As to this, (it may be asked:—) Do you opine that there is the absence of a fruit from a philosophical view-point or even in appearance? Thereout (the revered Āchārya) refutes the first in such a manner as to establish what is desired (in the first two lines of the following verse:—)

There is (in fact) neither the preceptor nor the Scripture nor the pupil nor the teaching. Neither is there (in fact, what you call) 'Thou' nor (what you know as) 'I' nor this phenomena. The teaching of

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1. If the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ५२ is preferred, the translation of this part of sentence would be:—"it would be inert and so there would be lifelessness".

2. From the commencement down to this point there is a statement of the view of an opponent. What follows is the author's reply thereto.

one's true nature dces not admit of any alternatives. I am that one auspicious and pure, who remains over. (7).

S'āstā means 'the preceptor who does the (work of) teaching'. *S'āstra* means 'the means (used) for teaching'. *S'ishya* means 'the person who is tought'. *S'ikshā* means 'the act of teaching'. *Twam* means 'the hearer'. *Aham* means 'the speaker'. *Ayam* means 'that which is established by all the means of proof.' *Prapañcha* means 'the phenomena such as the body, the senses &c'. The meaning is that (all of them) do not exist from a philosophical view-point. (The author) refutes the second (alternative) by the expression *Swarūpa. &c.* The meaning thereof is this:—Although it is not possible to prove (the accrual of) any fruit whatever when a doubt is raised as to whether the removal of ignorance is (identical with) the Self or the non-Self still one realizes the teaching as one's true nature which is the fruit of wisdom.[1] It should not be doubted how this could be because (the Self) does not admit of any alternatives owing to the destruction of all duality. Nor is there anything in the world of perception which is opposed to this (reasoning). And so the Vedic texts:—

"There is neither destruction nor is there creation. One is neither bound[2] nor is one striving (for freedom). Neither is one desirous of liberation nor is one a liberated one. This is the highest truth". (? Gau. Kā. II. 32).

"Verily in the beginning this was Brahma. That became conscious of itself only in the form 'I am Brahma'. From it sprang all that" (Brih. I-4-7)—and others show that the individual soul who was even formerly of the nature of Brahma becomes of the nature of Brahma by knowledge, and exclude all duality. (7).

If it is argued:—Verily, the self-luminousness of the Self being equal at all times how can there be the (varied) arrangement as to the states of waking, dreaming, sleeping &c. It should not be said that the arrangement takes place merely by delusion for if

1. If the reading given in foot-note 2 at p. ५१ is preferred the word 'wisdom' in the translation would have to be substituted by the word 'knowledge'.

2. The word in the text which is translated by the word 'bound' is बद्धः. The Poona and Benares editions of this work read बुद्धः instead of that. If that is preferred the word 'wise' would have to be substituted for the word 'bound' and the word 'wisdom' for the word 'freedom' in the translation.

that were so, there would be the danger of all (the states) being of the nature of dreams—(the author's reply thereto is:—) No, although in essential characteristics all the three are of nature of dreams, phenomenally the arrangement can be established owing to there being the possibility (therein) of peculiarities which have Nescience for their essence and owing to their being attended by peculiarities by their being of a nature different from the unreal. Philosophically however there is no arrangement whatever. He has therefore said;—

> **Neither the state of waking nor that of dreaming nor that of sleeping belongs to me. Neither am I the Vis'wa nor the Taijasa nor the Prājña. The three (states and their presiding spirits) having Nescience for their essence (the Self is) the Turīya (fourth). I am that one, auspicious and pure, who remains over. (8). (PP. ५१–५२).**

The order of precedence mentioned here is that in which (the states and the presiding spirits) are absorbed. For so, substances are of a twofold nature, Drik (the seer)[1] and Dris'ya (the object to be seen), for the substances assumed by the other learned men are included therein. Thereout, the substance called the Drik is the Self. He is the only reality. Though[2] of one nature always, it becomes threefold by virtue of the distinctions between its attendant circumstances, namely, as the Ruler (of the Universe) the individual soul and the witness (of the three states of the individual). Thereout the Ruler (of the Universe) has for His attendant circumstance the ignorance which is the root-cause while the individual soul has for his attendant circumstance the ignorance as limited by the inner organ and the impressions (of actions) thereon. This has already been explained in details hereinbefore. In the view in which the Ruler (of the Universe) is a reflection in Nescience, the spirit which serves as the disc and in the view in which the disc is itself the Ruler (of the Universe), the spirit, which is followed by the individual soul aud Ruler (of the Universe) like the form of the face which is

1 दृक् literally means 'sight'. But in common parlance what is opposed to a दृश्य पदार्थ (objective substance) is the द्रष्टा (seer). It is therefore the said word has been rendered thus.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ५३ is adopted the words 'omnipresent and' would have to be added after the word 'though' in the translation.

followed by the face which is the disc and that which is the reflection, is called the witness (of the phenomena). In the view of the author of the *Vārttika* however the Ruler (of the Universe) being Himself the witness (of the phenomena) there is only twofoldness of the Drik owing to the distinction between the individual soul and the Ruler (of the Universe). Thereout (i. e. out of the three above-mentioned), the Ruler (of the Universe) has also three aspects which are distinguished as Vishṇu, Brahmā and Rudra owing to the distinction between the three attributes of Nescience which is his limitation. (Thereout) Vishnu who is limited by the Sattwaguṇa which is the cause, is the preserver of the universe and Brahmā who is limited by the Rajoguṇa which is the cause, is the creator. As for the Hiraṇyagarbha, he not being the cause of the (subtle) elements is not Brahmā, still being the creator of the gross elements he is at times spoken of as Brahmā. Rudra who is limited by the Tamoguṇa which is the cause, is the destroyer. In the same manner the one alone assumes the male forms such as the four-handed, the four-faced, the five-faced and others and the female forms such as Laxmī, Saraswatī, Pārvatī and others. And it should be known that the other numberless incarnations such as the Matsya, (fish) Kūrma (tortoise) and others become manifest through sport only for favouring devotees, for there is the Vedic text :—

"Brahma who is spirit all over, without a second, and without a body assumes forms for (doing) the acts of its worshippers". The individual soul also has three aspects, which are distinguished as Vis'wa, Taijasa and Prājña, owing to the subsidiary distinctions between their limiting agents. Thereout the Vis'wa who is limited by Nescience, the inner organ and the gross body is the presiding spirit of the waking state. The same when free from identification with the gross body and limited by the (first) two limiting agents is (spoken of as) the Taijasa who is the presiding spirit of the dreaming state. When he is free from two limiting agents, namely, the body and the inner organ and is limited only by Nescience as limited by the impressions latent in the inner organ he is spoken of as the Prājña who is the presiding spirit of the state of deep sleep. Although there are no independent distinctions between them owing to the absence of such distinctions between their limiting agents, subsidiary distinc-

tions are drawn between them though they are identical (in essence), owing to there being distinctions between their subsidiary limitations. As for the witness who connects them all and is followed by all and is called the Turīya (fourth), he has one aspect only. There is no distinction therein at any time even on account of a distinction between limiting agents, because his limiting agent is of the same nature (always).

The substance which is a Dris'ya (object of perception) is the phenomena which has Nescience and its products which are pervaded by it as its essence. As to that, although it is philosophically unreal an exposition thereof is not useless like that of a substance brought into existence in a dream because its existence for the purpose of daily intercourse is admitted as being useful in worship &c. It too has three aspects, which are distinguished as the Avyākrita (Unmanifest), Amūrta (incorporeal) and Mūrta (corporeal).[1] Thereout what is called the Avyākrita is the Nescience, together with the reflection (of the Self) therein, which is of the nature of the latent power giving rise to the phenomena, both corporeal and incorporeal, owing to its being beginningless along with the Self, its connection with it (i. e. Nescience), the division of the Self into the individual soul and the Ruler (of the Universe) and the reflection (contained in Nescience), which are pervaded by it, because though they are not its products they are capable of being removed on the removal thereof. Though itself inert, it produces the five great elements known as the space, wind, light, water and earth which have for their essence, sound, touch, form, taste and smell respectively, on being propelled by the actions of the individual souls in the form of the impressions left in each previous (Kalpa) which are revived by the reflection of the Self which is not inert. Thereout the Nescience as reduced to the form of each previous element being the cause of each subsequent one,[2] the attribute of each previous element enters into each subsequent one. In the same manner, darkness also which is a positive substance only, is of the nature of a covering,

1. There is no other difference between the reading adopted in the text and that given in foot-note 1 at p. ५४ except that the positions of the word अमूर्त and मूर्त are interchanged in the latter. That is not however correct because the incorporeal substance is chronologically anterior to the corporeal.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page is preferred the word 'effect' may be substituted in the translation for the word 'one.'

is opposed to knowledge produced by the eyes and is capable of being destroyed by light, quickly comes out of and disappears in the Nescience itself like a big flash of lightning &c. This is the settled belief. And this (view) is not opposed (to the Scriptures) because (darkness) is not mentioned in the order of creation in the Vedas owing to its not being the material cause of the body which is the cause of transmigration. As for the quarters and time they are not mentioned because there is no proof as to their (separate) existence. It is possible to explain how the space itself gives rise to what is spoken of as the quarters and there is also the Vedic text "The organ of hearing from the quarters." (Brih. III. 2-13). As for time, it is Nescience itself because the latter alone is the support of everything. And this Avyākrita (unmanifest) substance is the limitation of the Ruler (of the Universe). (PP. ५३-५४).

And those five subtle elements not become quinquepartite called the Amūrta (incorporeal substance) which have for their essence, the attributes Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas, owing to their cause being one, having combined together produce by the predominance of their Sattwa portion a pure substance like a variegated form, which has for its essence the powers of cognition and action. The portion of it in which the power of cognition is predominant is the inner organ. It is spoken of in two (different) ways as the intellect (and) the mind. The portion of it in which the power of action is predominant is the vital breath. That again has five varieties which are Prāṇa (the air that is inhaled), Apāna (the air that is exhaled), Vyāna (the circulation in the body), Udāna (the cerebral circulation) and Samāna (the abdominal circulation). Similarly one pair of senses, distinguished *inter se* by the powers of cognition and action, is produced from each element,[1] i. e. to say, the senses of touch and speech from space, that of touch and the hands from the wind, the eyes and feet from light, the senses of taste and excretion from water and the nose and the sense of procreation from the earth. In connection with this, some say that the sense of speech is a product of light owing to there being the Vedic text "Speech (comes) of light" (Chhān. VI-5-4) while the foot is a product of space. We on the other hand consider it proper that speech should be (deemed to be)

1. The reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ५६ does not seem to make out an intelligible meaning for there can be no reason why each pair of senses should be deemed to have been produced twice.

a product of space because like the ear it is a sense making sound manifest and that like the eye the foot also should be a product of light because the eyes are seen to return to their normal condition by a treatment of the feet. As for the Vedic text speaking of (speech as) being a product of light it should be explained as being auxiliary to that (relating to the eating of gold, a product of light), like the one which speaks of the mind as having been born of food (i. e. the earth) though it is (obviously) a product of the five elements. That the mind is of the nature of the five elements[1] owing to its being determined to be possessed of them by virtue of its being capable of knowing the attributes of (all) those elements, is quite a different thing.[2] The presiding deities also of these (senses), who have the powers of cognition and action predominant in them, are the quarters and fire, wind and Indra, the sun and Vishṇu, Varuṇa and Mitra and the As'wins and Prajāpati. Thereout (i. e. out of the products enumerated above) the conglomerate of the powers of knowledge is the inner organ and that of the powers of action, the vital air. The five senses of cognition which comprehend sound, touch, form, taste and smell (respectively) are those which are called the ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose[3]. The skin and eyes comprehend also the substances in which the attributes capable of being comprehended by them reside. The ears also like the eyes comprehend sound on going out on a conviction arising that a sound comes from a distance. The five senses of action which give rise to sound, the act of taking, motion, excretion and (sexual) pleasure respectively are called the speech, hands, feet, the organ of excretion and the organ of generation. All these having coalesced (make up) the Linga (subtle body) having seventeen constituents. And

1. The second reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page deserves to be ignored because no intelligible sense can be made out of the sentence with it.

2. The second reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page cannot yield any sense unless the word पञ्चभूतात्मकत्वम् is read in it. If that is done, the only difference in the translation would be that the words "the attributes of" would have to be put in parantheses. It would not do to delete them because what the mind camprehends primarily is the attributes of the elements not the elements themselves. The third reading given in the same note would if adopted involve no change in the translation because the meaning is the same whether the word इति is followed by the word अन्यत् or the words अन्यदेतत्.

3. These are not the physical organs but the subtle ones which work through them.

that is called the Hiraṇayagarbha in view of the predominance of the powers of cognition and the Sūtra in view of that of the powers of action. This Amūrtā (incorporeal) substance being a product is a limitation of the individual soul only (both) in the microcosm and in the macrocosm. (PP. ५६-५७).

And those elements so transformed, being incapable of creating enjoyment without (the mediation of) the (gross) body, the receptacle of enjoyment and the objects of enjoyment, become quinquepartite for the purpose of being gross, being propelled to do so by the actions of the individual souls. And therein (i. e. in that process) each of the five elements is (at first) divided into two parts, (then) one part thereout of each becomes (sub-) divided into four parts and (then) each of those four (sub-) parts enters into (i. e. combines with) the (other i. e. the undivided) halves of the four elements other than itself and so the words space &c are used (with reference to the elements), though one-half of each combines by (the process of) becoming quinquepartite with the one-eighth parts of the others, because of the greatness (of its part in comparison with that of each of the others).

Those who in this connection hold that there takes place a tripartite division and combination only because there are the Vedic text "Let me make each of them tripartite" (Chhān. VI-3-3), and the *Sūtra* "(As for the revealing of names and forms, on the other hand, that is the work) of Him who made them tripartite, for it has been tought"[1] (Brah. Sū. II·4-20) and because (our) experience too points to a combination of three (elements) only, are ruled out by the very principle contained in the syllogism as to space. For there are the texts such as "From that very Self sprang space, from space the wind" (Tai. II·I-I) and others in the Taittirīyaka and in the Chhāndogya the (said) two (elements) are drawn in, though it is tought that the creation took place only from the three (elements), light, water and earth, because the substances space and wind have a greater force than an attribute of a substance, namely, the first place of light, and because it having been promised in the Chhāndogya that by the

1. The full Sūtra of which a portion only has been quoted in the text is:—संज्ञामूर्तिकॢप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्. The whole of it has been translated here, putting the portion of the translation corresponding to that of the Sūtra not quoted, in parantheses, as otherwise the meaning would not be clearly understood.

knowledge of the one, everything will become known, it should necessarily be said[1] that space and wind which are inert (substances) are the products of Brahma. There, though a combination takes place of (all) the five, a tripartite division and combination can be established by a separate mention. If on the other hand it is believed that only a tripartite division and combination takes place, there would be an occasion to split up sentences (of the same nature). As for the Sūtra "(As for the revealing of names and forms, on the other hand, that is the work) of Him who made them tripartite, for it has been so tought" (Brah. Sū. II-4-20), it being a recital, is not able to contradict a quinquepartite division and combination which is established by reasoning. As regards the experience of a combination it is an unqualified one of the five (elements), in the body &c. and there is statement of the author of the *Bhāshya* "Five great elements made quinquepartite"[2]. Therefore enough of this thinking of the non-self. This is the method (of reconciling such apparently contradicting texts).[3] (PP. ५८-५९).

The five great elements become quinquepartite which are called the Mūrta (corporeal substance) having combined together produce one effect which is the abode of the senses (and) the seat of enjoyment. That itself is spoken of as the (physical) body. (This body has three varieties). Thereout the body of the gods has the element of *Sattwa* predominant therein, that of men has the (element of) Rajas predominant therein and that of those beginning with the brutes and ending with the immoveables has the (element of) Tamas predominant therein. Although this body is made up of the five elements, the deficiency or excess of the elements in some cases is not contradicted (thereby) as in the case of a form of varigated colours. In the same manner the objects of enjoyment also, which are produced from the one or the other of the elements become quinquepartite, are known as, the fourteen worlds in which either the Sattwa, Rajas or Tamas element is predominant[4] accor-

1. The reading given in foot-note 3 at p. ५८ would, even if adopted, involve no change in the translation.

2. For the source of this quotation *vide* the note at p. 170 *supra*.

3. The whole of Chapter II of the *Brahma Sūtras* is devoted to the reconciliation of such texts.

4. The reading given in foot-note 3 at p. ६० deserves to be ignored because no intelligible sense can be made out of the sentence with it.

ding as they are high up or down below or in the middle, and a pot &c. All this known as the Brahmāṇda is also spoken of as the Virāt (cosmos) and the Mūrta (corporeal substance). (P. ६०).

This is the order of evolution according to the Upanishad school. The order of involution is the reverse of that. The five great elements become quinquepartite and their product the Mūrta (corporeal substance) known as the Virāt (cosmos) are absorbed in their cause, the Amūrta (incorporeal substance) which is of the nature of the five great elements not become quinquepartite (and) is known as the Hiraṇyagarbha, one after another, beginning with the earth. That itself is the diurnal absorption. The Amūrta (incorporeal substance) again (is absorbed) in the Avyākrita (unmanifest substance) which is the limitation of the highest Lord. As for the Avyākrita on the other hand, its absorption never takes place because it being beginningless has no cause and because the definition of absorption is a repose in a subtle state in one's own cause. This itself is the Prākrita (of the primordial matter) absorption. On the other hand, the total extinction which takes place on the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahma, is the ultimate absorption. And that takes place only in the order of the causes, because an effect can be destroyed only on the destruction of the cause (thereof). And all (this), creation, absorption &c. though not philosophically true like the creation and destruction occurring in a dream, is capable of being dealt with (as if true) on account of the firmness of the latent desires and hence though there is illusoriness (about it) there is no possibility of its being unreal. And just as this is (stated here) so it has been (stated more) clearly in the mine (of the teaching of the Upanishad school).[1] (P. ६१)

Such being the state of facts (we) proceed to explain the arrangement as to the state of waking &c. The term '*Jāgaraṇam* means the comprehension of objects simultaneously with an operation of an organ of sense. In that state the Mūrta (corporeal substance) known as the Virāt (cosmos), which is an object of enjoyment and which is phenomenally real owing to its being capable of being dealt with by the six means of proof beginning with direct perception &c, is enjoyed by

1. This is the *Sārīraka Mīmāṁsā Dars'ana* or the *Brahma Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa.

the individual soul who is called the 'Vis'wa' (while in that state). He is called 'Vis'wa' because he enters, or pervades the body, senses &c,[1] there being the Smriti text "The root 'Vis'' is used to denote entering or the root 'Vishlri'[2] to denote pervading". In this connection (it should be borne in mind that) though the Amūrtā (incorporeal substance) and the Avyākrita (elementary substance) are cognized by the Vis'wa by means of an inference &c., still there being the rule that all that is phenomenally real is cognized by the Vis'wa only and because he is the presiding spirit of the limitation consisting of the gross body (it is assumed that he does not) pervade any other state. Though the knowledge of silver appearing in a mother-of-pearl &c. not having been produced by a means of proof, its subject-matter is not phenomenally real, its possibility in the state of waking can be established because it is produced simultaneously with an operation of the mind[3]. As for the method of the genesis of knowledge &c. it has already been described hereinbefore. (P. ६२).

Likewise, on the destruction of the actions which produce the objects of enjoyment in the waking state and on the quickening up of those which produce the object of enjoyment in the state of dreaming, the belief in one's identification with the gross body is removed by a Vritti of *Tamoguṇa* (dulness) called sleep and thereupon all the senses become absorbed by their ceasing to function owing to the want of favour of (their presiding) deities. And thereupon the Vis'wa is also spoken of as having been absorbed. And then there is (what is called) the state of dreaming. Therein the term 'Swapnaḥ' means 'the cognition of objects whose instrumental cause is the desires latent in the inner organ, at a time when there is the absence of an operation of any of the senses. And in that state according to some the mind itself assumes the illusory forms of objects such as elephants, horses &c. and is cognized by a Vritti of Nescience while according

1. The reading given in foot-note 3 at p. ६२ differs from that adopted in the text only in this that there is the word सर्वं before the word देह in the former. That word being however quite inappropriate in this context cannot have formed part of the original text.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 4 at the same page is preferred the word 'Visha' will have to be substituted for the word 'Vishlri' in the translation.

3. This is an incidental explanation of a phenomena which seems inconsistent with the definition of the state of waking above given wherein 'cognition' means 'right knowledge'.

to others Nescience itself becomes transformed into the objects of the dreaming state like the silver &c. appearing in a mother-of-pearl and is cognized by a Vritti of Nescience. Which view is the better one? The latter, because Nescience itself is everywhere fixed upon[1] as the material cause of the superimposition of objects and the superimposition of knowledge and they are at times spoken of as the products of the mind because they (i. e. the objects appearing in a dream) have the desires latent in the mind as their instrumental cause. If it is argued that in that case the mind not being believed to have become transformed into the objects of perception, it is possible for it to become the seer and thereby the self-luminousness of the Self would not be proved, (we reply,—) that is not correct, because the mind is not then capable of comprehending (objects) owing to the absence of a Vritti produced by an external organ of sense, there being a rule that the former has the capacity of comprehension only when there is the co-operation of the latter, and there is not the presence of the knower then, though there is that of the inner organ, because there is a rule that the Self becomes the knower only as limited by an inner organ accompanied by a Vritti of an organ of sense. (P. ६३).

(Further a question arises as to) what is the substratum of the false knowledge occurring in a dream? One class (of philosophers) is of the view that it is the spirit in its rôle of the individual soul as limited by the mind (and) another (class) that it is the spirit in its rôle of Brahma[2] as limited by the original ignorance. Which is the better view? Both (when looked at) from different view-points. For, it has been admitted that the dream-delusion is removed by knowledge arising in the waking state, and since the removal of delusion can taken place only on the (rise of) the knowledge of its substratum and if the Self in the rôle of Brahma were the substratum there would not be its knowledge in the transmigratory state, and since all duality would cease to exist on the rise of knowledge, there would not be the romoval of a dream (-delusion) by knowledge arising in the state of waking. Moreover there is the Vedic text:—"For he is the

1. Even if the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ६३ is preferred the translation would be same.

2. The word ब्रह्म has been used in this compound in the sense of the ईश्वर (Supreme Soul). Hence ब्रह्मचैतन्य meams the Supreme Soul who is the inner ruler of everything, animate and inanimate.

doer"—(Brih. IV-3-10) speaking of the individual soul as being the doer and (the dream-delusion) is likely to be common to everybody like the phenomena of space &c. (if the Supreme Soul were to be the substratum). Therefore the Self in the rôle of Brahma as limited by the original ignorance cannot be the substratum.[1] (P. ६४).

Verily, how can the Spirit in its rôle of the individual soul who is always manifest owing to its being unenveloped, be the substratum? True, (it is possible) because even there[2] it is admitted that there is a peculiar state of ignorance which is agreeable to (the rise of) the false knowledge in a dream and which obstructs the perception of the phenomenal body[3] and because it is also admitted that in the state of dreaming there occurs the perception[4] of another imaginary body giving rise to the consciousness "I am a man" like another bed giving rise to the consciousness "I am sleeping in a bed". As for the absence of the materials necessary for perception that is equal in both the cases[5].

If it is argued:—Verily, the knowledge of the phenomenal body (arising in the form) "I am a man &c" not having been produced by a means of proof, how can it have the power to remove ignorance? If it is assumed on the ground of a change of a state not being capable of being established otherwise, knowledge contradicting the dream-experience should be believed to exist in the state of deep sleep[6] also and that is undesirable for in that case it is likely to have the characteristic of the waking state—(we reply:—) Well said[7]! In asmuch as deep sleep consists only of

1. The reasoning in this passage will be found explained in simple language in the note at pp. 178-79 *supra*.

2. For the connotation of this word *vide* the note at p. 179 *supra*.

3. The word संघात has been explained in the note above-referred to to mean "the collection of the objects of the material world". Although it is capable of denoting that collection, the context here appears to point to its having been used in the sense of the physical body looked upon as a collection of sense-organs.

4. The context shows that the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ६५ cannot be correct.

5. The reasoning in this passage will be found explained in simple language at p. 180 *supra*.

6. The reading given in foot-note 3 at p. ६५ deserves to be ignored as it does not seem to be correct in view of the context.

7. If the second reading given in foot-note 4 at the same page is preferred the sentence "This is not a contradiction" would have to be substituted for the phrase "Well said". If on the other hand, the third one given there is preferred that sentence would have to be added after the said phrase.

the peculiar ignorance (resulting in) a dream accompanied by the absorption of the inner organ, that (ignorance) cannot be contradicted[1] in that state. In the state of waking on the other hand, since an experience to the effect that a totally false dream was seen arises, the knowledge "I" though not produced by a means of proof[2] is true and the knowledge of the body &c. is produced by a means of proof, and so the antagonism thereof to that peculiar ignorance (which causes dreams) is proved by experience. As for the ignorance relating to a particular object, that is not removed without (the intervention of) a Vritti produced by a means of proof. And as for the want of capacity of the witness to remove Nescience, that is proved by the same means by which (the existence of) the possessor of the attribute (namely, the witness) is comprehended, owing to the very fact of its being the means of proving (the existence of) Nescience[3]. Thus there is nothing in this view that is faulty. Moreover if it is believed that there are as many (separate instances of) ignorance as there are (of) knowledge, though there would be the removal of ignorance by the knowledge of the phenomenal body like (that of the delusion as to silver) by the knowledge of the mother-of-pearl, the occurrence of superimposition in a dream at some time again, like the delusion as to silver, can be established. Thus there is no fault whatever in the view that the Spirit in its rôle of the individual soul is the substratum (of the dream-delusion).

When on the other hand it is believed that the removal of ignorance can take place only on (the rise of) the knowledge of Brahma[4], the removal of the delusion of the state of dreaming by that of the waking state even in the absence of the knowledge of the substratum can be established like that of the delusion as to the serpent by that of a stick in a rope. Hence there is no fault

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1. The reading given in foot-note 5 at the same page deserves to be ignored for the same reason as that stated for ignoring that given in foot-note 3.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 6 at the same page is preferred the words "though produced by (something which is) not a means of proof" would have to be substituted for the words "though not produced by a means of proof" in the translation.

3. This remark will be found explained in simple language in the note at p. 182 *supra*.

4. In this view it is assumed that the eradication of ignorance can be said to have taken place only when one has realized the true nature of the Self or Brahma and that can take place once only because there is no possibility of the recurrence of ignorance after self-realization has once taken place.

whatever even in the view that the Spirit in its rôle of Brahma is itself the substratum of the superimposition occurring in a dream. As for that superimposition being peculiar with each individual, that is due to to the peculiarity of the desires latent in the mind (of each). (PP. ६५-६६).

Even in the view that the Spirit in its rôle of Brahma as limited by the mind is itself the substratum, there is nothing that cannot be established because the power of the peculiar ignorance to envelope (the soul) is admitted. It is for that very reason that it is so stated at certain places in the Scriptures.

If it is argued:—Verily, where the Spirit (in its rôle of Brahma) as limited by the mind is the substratum the cognizance of an elephant[1] would take place in the form 'I am an elephant' as being in the same predicament with the ego like that of silver in the form "This is silver" where it is in the same predicament with the mother-of-pearl, not in the form "This is an elephant" and even in the view that the Spirit in its rôle of Brahma (as limited by the original ignorance) is the substratum the cognition (of the elephant) would take place in the form of "An elephant" and not in the form "This is an elephant" because there too the absence of an external object which is the seat of the notion of thisness is similar—(we reply:—) No. In the first view there is no possibility of the delusion arising in the form "I am an elephant" as in the form "The mother-of-pearl is silver" because the ego has not there the quality of being the limiting agent of the substratum like the mother-of-pearl (and) because the knowledge "I" being antagonistic to the delusion like the knowledge "This is a mother-of-pearl" it is believed that cognition takes place of the portion of thisness only which is not antagonistic to it (i. e. the delusion). In the latter case on the other hand even the form "this" like the form "elephant" is imaginary only. Since the Self who serves as the substratum remains unnegated even on the negation of both the forms there is no possibility of the theory of voidness (stepping in). Moreover even in the state of waking what is believed to appear is only the imaginary thisness of silver which is of a nature different from that of the thisness of a mother-of-pearl, there being the rule that what appears in delusions is only that

1. If the reading given in foot-note 2 at p. ६७ is adopted the words "of an elephant" would have to be omitted from the translation and the word "only" would have to be added after the sentence "I am an elephant".

which is superimposed (Saṁ. S'ā. I-36). Even in the view that what appears is the thisness of a mother-of-pearl it is not the reality of the portion of thisness that is the instrumental cause of the delusion but that of the substratum. And it has already been established that even in this case the substratum which is the Self in the rôle of the witness, as in the other case the Self in the mother-of-pearl which is unknown[1], is necessarily present. Therefore there is nothing in (any of) the two views[2] which cannot be established. (P. ६७).

And in this state, the enjoyer of the objects of the dream-world is called the Taijasa because the light called bile is predominant therein or because he makes things manifest even without (the assistance of) a luminary such as the sun &c.

In the same manner, the resting-place of the individual soul tired by the enjoyment made in the states of waking and dreaming and having (his) inner organ together with (his) latent desires as limited by the power of cognition, resting in the state of the (original) cause, is the state of deep sleep. 'Sushupti' is the cognition of the cause only in the form "I did not know anything". It is believed that even though there is the absence in that state of the knowledge of the substances capable of being enjoyed in the states of waking and dreaming, there is a triad of Vrittis of Nescience which assumes the form of (one's being) a witness, of (one's) being happy, and of there being a state of ignorance. And owing to the absence of egotism there is not one specific Vritti for in that case there would not be the state of deep sleep. For that very reason there being the absence of cognition of the nature of a Vritti there does not take place the extension of (the above definition) to the state of Pralaya (absorption) for there is the absence of a seed for its assumption there, and in this case there is the recollection (of experience) by a man who has awakened from sleep in the form "I slept well; I did not know anything," such recollection being impossible unless there was (such) an experience. It cannot fail to be recollection though there is no reference to

1. The second reading given in foot-note 3 at the same page yields no sense as it is. If however the word अज्ञातम् therein is read in place of अज्ञानम् it can be adopted but thereby there would be no difference in the translation because the compound अज्ञातशुक्तिचैतन्यम् can be solved only as अज्ञातं शुक्तिचैतन्यम्.

2. The reason why the author has summed up the discussion on this subject by saying that there is no fault in any of the two views though appearently he has discussed three will be found explained at pp. 185-86 *supra*.

a specific time or place because of the absence therein of the quality of having been produced by experience contemporaneous with a connection with the inner organ and in the case of recollection there is no (invariable) rule that there should be a specific reference to time and place. And it cannot be established that one has the experience "I slept" in the state of waking. And there is also no possibility of (its being) an inference owing to (the fault called) Ās′rayāsiddhi (false substratum) which is due to the absence of a middle term.[1] As for egotism it is experienced only at the time of awakening. Its recollection cannot be established because it is not experienced in the state of deep sleep owing to its having been absorbed. The cognizance of the Self in the rôle of the witness which is dependent upon egotism (for manifestation) takes place by a case in apposition in the form "I was sleeping" owing to its being the substratum of recollection, like the cognizance "The face is red"[2] which takes place on the superimposition of the redness of the china rose on the mirror which is the substratum of the reflection of the face, and not as being dependent (upon something else) as (in the feeling) "I am happy"[3]. (Further), recollection, doubts and errors are as a rule dependent upon the Self in the rôle of the witness, and egotism being the support of knowledge produced by a means of proof, the power of being its effect is limited only by the quality of being knowledge produced by a means of proof, and (in the case of recollection &c.) there being the limitation of the quality of not being knowledge produced by a means of proof,[4] Nescience alone is the cause[5]. It

1. Even if the reading given in foot-note 2 at p. ६१ is adopted, the translation would be the same, the locative case being required to be taken to have been used in the sense of the instrumental.

2. If the reading given in the foot-note 3 at the same page is preferred the translation would be:—"The cognizance of the Self in the rôle of the witness takes place by a case in apposition as being dependent upon egotism &c."

3. The second reading given in foot-note 4 at the same page would, even if adopted, make no change in the translation, essential.

This is a somewhat clumsy sentence framed in the technical language of the Nyāya system. It and its connection with the previous one will be founp explained in simple language in the note at p. 189 *supra*.

4. If the reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ७० is preferred the translation of this part of the sentence would be:—"And owing to the fault of the absence of the quality of being knowledge produced by a means of proof".

5. The chain of reasoning with regard to the state of deep sleep extends upto this point only. The rest of this passage contains explanations of other psychical phenomena not connected with that state.

is for this very reason that the persons versed in the Vedānta lore believe that even the indirect delusion produced by the word of one who cannot be relied on is a Vritti of Nescience only. Although there is in that case the possibility of the existence of the materials which would give rise to a Vritti of the inner organ, that organ is powerless (to act) owing to an obstacle in the form of the absence of the quality of being knowledge produced by a means of proof. As for the superimposition of Brahma on names &c, it being dependent upon one's will is only a Vritti of the mind of a nature different from erroneous and right knowledge like desire &c. It has therefore been said,—

"For this very reason, it, having been produced by an injunction, is only a mental operation, not knowledge" (S'ankara on Brah. Sū. 1-1-4).

By this is explained even the fact of reasoning being a Vritti of the mind, for it, which is of the nature of connecting (a thing) with a major term by its superimposition on the middle term, is of a nature different from erroneous and right knowledge owing to its being dependent upon volition. It is only then that it can be established that in the discussion as (to the purport of) the Upanishads called S'ravaṇa (study)[1] accompanied by Manana (reflection) and Nididhyāsana (meditation) there is the possibility of the injunction "The Self should be studied, reflected over and meditated upon &c" because it is of the nature of a discussion as to the presence and absence of connection &c of four sorts, namely, the presence and absence of connection between the seer and the things to be seen, those between the witness and the things to be witnessed, those between the things that are liable to be created and destroyed and that which is their limit and those between him who is affected with misery (i. e. the soul immersed in worldliness) and the one who is the seat of the highest joy. The presence and absence of connection between that which is followed and that which is excluded, is the fifth. But the adepts say that this is implied in all the discussions which are helpful in (arriving at the conclusions suggested by the purport of) the Upanishad texts and which are expounded in the Mīmāñsā consisting of four chapters[2].

1. For the reason why the word श्रवण which ordinarily means 'hearing' has been translated here by the word 'study' *vide* the note at p. 191 *supra*.

2. This sentence has been differently interpreted by Nārāyaṇa and Purushottama on the one hand and Abhyankara on the other. It has been translated according to the latter's interpretation.

As for the details (thereof) reference must be made to (the appropriate portion of) the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*.(PP. ६९-७०).

Then in this manner there is the enjoyment of happiness in the state of deep sleep and its enjoyer, the presiding spirit of that state, is called Prājña from his being extraordinarily ignorant or from his being extraordinarily wise owing to the absence then of any particular limitation. And then, though there is the absorption of the inner organ there is a limitation caused by the impressions left thereon and hence there is neither the possibility of the absence of the quality of being an individual soul nor the attainment of omniscience. As for the propounding of (the soul's) identity[1] with the Ruler (of the Universe) that is spoken of on account of his being devoid of identification with the body, senses &c. And since the impressions (on the inner organ) do not enter into the category of the material causes of the acts dependent upon the witness owing to their being the instrumental cause (thereof), there is no distinction between a witness and witness though there is a distinction between them (*inter se*). On the other hand in the waking state, since the inner organ enters into the category of the material causes of the effects depending upon knowledge produced by a means of proof, there is a distinction between a knower and knower owing to that between them (i. e. the inner organs). And since it is the witness himself when qualified by an additional limitation that becomes the knower, a restoration of connection (with the past experience) cannot fail to be established. The revered author of the *Vārttika* having denied a distinction between a witness and witness even in the state of phenomenal existence (in the following verses, namely :—)

"It is because the witness does not differ like an external object with each body though the knowing-self and the means of proof do, that he is called the Self for in the manner in which the mutual changes of the knowing-self &c. are witnessed by the Self, those of the latter would not be (witnessed by anybody) because it is the witness of the absence of everything such as the knowing-self &c. which is an object" (Brih. Bhā. Vā. III. 4. 54-55)—

it should be understood that the assumption of a distinction therein

1. The second reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ७४ cannot be correct because the context shows that what should be explained here is the theory that in the state of deep sleep there is no distinction between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul.

in the state of deep sleep is nothing but the height of infatuation of some people (P. ७४).

(If it is argued:—) Verily, since some person at some time recollects "I slept painfully" there must be the experience of pain also in the state of deep sleep, (we reply:—) No, there is its absence owing to the dissociation (of the soul) then from the materials giving rise to misery. On the other hand, happiness being the true nature of the Self is eternal. And the conciousness "I slept painfully" can be proved by saying that there was pain when the bed &c. were not proper. Or the (experience of) pain can be established even in the state of deep sleep if it is admitted that all the three states have three varieties. For so, the knowledge arising from a means of proof is the waking state within the waking state. Erroneous knowledge such as that of silver from a mother-of-pearl is the state of dreaming within that of waking. The feeling of stupor[1] brought on by fatigue &c. is the state of deep sleep within that of waking. Similarly, the acquisition of incantations &c. in a dream is the waking state within that of dreaming. The consciousness "I have seen a dream" even in a dream is the dreaming state within that of dreaming. That something which is experienced in the state of dreaming but which cannot be narrated in the state of waking is the state of deep sleep within that of dreaming. In the same manner, even in the state of deep sleep the amiable feeling of the nature of happiness is the waking state within that state. It is thereafter that one recollects "I slept happily". The passionate feeling in the same state (*i. e.* that of deep sleep) is the state of dreaming within that of deep sleep. It is thereafter only that the recollection "I slept painfully" can be proved to arise. The feeling of dulness in the same state is the state of deep sleep within that of deep sleep. Thereafter the recollection "I was dead asleep" arises. As this is stated here (in brief) it is (made) clear in the *Vāsis'ṭha, Vārttikāmrita* and other works.

Thus the Vis'wa with reference to the individual, the Virāt with reference to the objective world, (and) Vishṇu with reference to the gods; the state of waking with reference to the individual, the act of preservation with reference to the gods (and) the

1. The second reading given in foot-note 3 at p. ७५ cannot be correct because absorption in any particular thing cannot be the result of fatigue and the like, and one in that state cannot be said to be sleeping while waking.

Sattwaguṇa with reference to the objective world. In the same manner the Taijasa with reference to the individual, the Hiraṇyagarbha with reference to the objective world (and) Brahmā with reference to the gods; the state of dreaming with reference to the individual, the creation with reference to the gods (and) Rajoguṇa with reference to the objective world. Similarly, the Prājña with reference to the individual, the Avyākrita with reference to the objective world (and) Rudra with reference to the gods; the state of deep sleep with reference to the individual, the absorption with reference to the gods (and) Tamoguṇa with reference to the objective world. Thus (the groups) with reference to the individual, the objective world and the gods being identical (by nature), the region of Hiraṇyagarbha is attained and liberation by stages (secured) through the purification of the inner organ, by the adoration of these, which are qualified (by limitations), together with the three parts of the syllable Om as being identical (in essence). On the other hand, direct liberation (is secured) by the knowledge of only the Self in the rôle of the witness on the negation of all these limitations. This is the distinction. Then in this manner all the three, Vis'wa, Taijasa and Prājña, together with the three states, being of the nature of Nescience are objects of perception and therefore unreal. And hence I am the unqualified absolute witness called the Fourth. This is the meaning. Thus all arrangements being phenomenally established and there being the non-existence of any state whatever philosophically, there is nothing that cannot be established. This has again been explained by us in details in the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and therefore we stop here. (8). (PP. ৩৫-৩৬)

Having raised the doubt, namely :—Verily, the presiding spirits of the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping, together with those states, being unreal, their witness also would be reduced to unreality as there is nothing special (in him)—the author has, by mentioning his special characteristics, stated his reality (thus) :—

Moreover (the Self) being (all-) pervading, it having been tought to be the (highest) object of man's attainment, it being of the nature of self-manifest knowledge, and not being dependent upon anyone else, the whole of this universe which is (of a nature) different from it is unreal. I am that one, auspicious and pure, who remains over. (9).

There being the Vedic text:—"All else than this is misery" (Brih. III-4-2) with reference to the witness spoken of in the text "Thou couldst not see the seer of the sight" (Ibid), the whole of the universe which is to be witnessed and is different from the witness is unreal, not however the witness. The word *Api* has the sense of the group of unmentioned reasons such as "owing to its being the end of (all) contradictions", "owing to its being known as the substratum of the delusion", "owing to there being none to comprehend its contradiction" &c. The author, being of the view that limitedness and unreality being co-extensive owing to there being the Vedic text "Verily, whatever is limited is mortal" the removal of unreality takes place on that of limitedness, has said:—*Vyāpakatwāt* (being all-pervading). (It is so said) because (Brahma) is unlimited by place and time owing to its having been tought to be the self of everything by the Vedic text:—"Verily, all this is Brahma"(Chhā. III-14-1) and because space &c. are spoken of as having pervasiveness on account of their relative greatness though they are limited by place and time. Having raised the doubt, namely:—Verily, the Self being eternal owing its being all-pervading and of the nature of existence it cannot be of the nature of the removal of misery. Nor can it be of the nature of happiness, for, happiness being transient it cannot be proved to be of the same nature as the eternal Self. That being so, liberation which is of the nature of the Self cannot in any case be an object of man's attainment—the author has said:—*Hitatwaprayogāt.* (Therein) *Hitatwam* means 'the quality of being an object of man's attainment'. (The Self is such an object) because from the Vedic text "This our Self which is nearer to us is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else" (Brih. I-4-8), "That which is the infinite is bliss" (Chhān. VII-23-1), "That itself is the supreme bliss" (Brih. IV. 3-33), "Brahma is wisdom and bliss" (Ibid. III. 9-28) and others we learn that it is of the nature of the highest bliss. And although it is eternal it is popularly spoken of as having been produced and destroyed owing to its becoming manifest by the different Vrittis of the inner organ produced by the properties (of substances). And the activity of one desirous of final absolution can be shown to be possible by a reference to the fact that its attainment takes place as it were on the removal of Nescience by knowledge alone, as if it, which was obstructed by ignorance, had not been attained. (Further) since it (i. e. the Self), being the substratum of the

phenomena, which is superimposed and is of the nature of misery, is itself the absence of (misery), it is an object of man's attainment even if it is of the nature of the absence of misery.

If it is argued:—Verily, does one become conscious of happiness[1] in the liberated state? The former cannot be the case because there is then none to make it manifest owing to the absence of the body, sense-organs &c. If its consciousness is believed (to exist) even in the absence of one making it manifest, such would be the case even in the state of worldliness. Nor can the latter, because in that case it (i. e. happiness) would be reduced to the position of not being an object of man's attainment, for it can be such an object only when it is capable of being known. Hence only, the effusion of those who believe themselves to be Vaishṇavās[2] that (the states of those who are conscious of happiness in the state of liberation and those who are not, are) like those of sugar and its enjoyers,[3]—the author has said that that is not correct by the expression *Swatahsiddhabhāwāt* which means 'being of the nature of self-manifest knowledge'. Although in the state of worldliness the Self does not become manifest as of the nature of the highest bliss owing to its true nature having been enveloped by Nescience, still on the removal of Nescience by the knowledge of the essence it becomes manifest of itself as of the nature of the highest bliss by its self-luminousness and so there is no need of an illuminator. (Further) the author having raised the doubt, namely:—Even if happiness is of the nature of self-manifest knowledge it cannot be the nature of the Self because knowledge being an act owing to its being of the nature of the meaning of a root must be dependent (upon something). Moreover one becomes conscious of it in the form "I know" not in the form "I am

1. The second reading given in foot-note 1 at p. ७८ would, if adopted, require this sentence to be translated as:—"Verily, does the consciousness of happiness exist in the liberated state or not?"

2. The sect of the Vaishṇavas alluded to here is that of Mādhwās. They say that it is not believable that the object of man's attainment should be the loss of one's individuality in Brahma because in that case one's position would be like that of sugar which does not know its own sweetness and that the more reasonable view is that one's object should be the attainment of the close proximity of Brahma so that one might be placed in the position of the enjoyer of sugar who becomes conscious of its enjoyment.

3. The reading given in foot-note 2 at p. ७८ is not acceptable as no meaning can be made out of it.

knowledge" and that being so, how can the Adwaitavāda (theory of non-duality) be established ?—has said that that is not correct by (using) the expression *Ananyās'rayatwāt* (owing to its being not dependent upon anything else). (It is so because) from the Vedic texts "That Brahma which is directly before (oneself) and which is the Self inside everything" (Brih. III-4-1), "Brahma is truth, knowledge and infiniteness" (Tai. II-1), "Brahma is wisdom and bliss" (Brih. III-9-28) and others, the Self is (known to be) of the nature of self-manifest knowledge and bliss only and owing to the superimposition of knowledge on a Vritti of the inner organ by its erroneous identification with the latter the consciousness that is dependent upon it (i. e. the inner organ) arises in the form "I know." And since the qualities of being of the nature of the sense of a root and of being produced and destroyed belong only to a Vritti of the inner organ, there is not the dependence upon another of the principal knowledge which is of the nature of intelligence owing to its being the substratum of everything and hence duality does not step in. That being so, it is established that the Self which is of the nature of knowledge and bliss is real and that the whole universe which is distinct from it is unreal. (9).[1]

(It may be argued :—) Verily, if the whole universe is unreal, then owing to its existence being denied, the true nature of the Self would not be established, for the existence of the horn of a hare is never denied, there being the rule that it is that which is proved at any time, that is denied (at another). And so, from the very fact that a denial cannot be established it follows that the universe cannot be unreal. The author has therefore said that that is not correct (in the following verse :—)

When there is not one itself how can there be two as distinct from it? Neither is there (its) absoluteness nor non-absoluteness, nor is it a void nor a non-void. (The Self) being by nature unique how

1. Nārāyana Tīrtha's commentary contains the reading ज्ञप्तिरूपसुखज्ञानस्य and it is explained therein to mean शुद्धचिद्रूपसुखाभिन्नज्ञानस्य (of knowledge which is not distinct from happiness which is of the nature of the pure Self). The editor of the *Kas'i Sanskrit Series*, No. LXV says in a foot-note at p. 452 thereof that two of the Mss. collated by him had also the same reading. Abhyankara too says in a foot-note at p. 147 of his edition in the Government Oriental Series, Class A that he had found this reading in two of the Mss. collated by him. If that reading is preferred, the translation of this part of the sentence would be:—"There is not the dependence upon another of knowledge which is identical with happiness which is of the nature of intelligence".

can I speak of that whose existence is established by all the Upanishads? (10).

(Here) *Ekam* means '(the means of) connecting (a thing) with the numeral expressing the idea of oneness'. *Dwitīyam* means '(the means of) connecting (a thing) with the numeral expressing the idea of twoness which is generated by a presupposition of that (i. e. the first)'. Hence, there being the absence of (something that can be called) one, how can there be a second? A second implies a third &c. also. (It may be objected:—) Verily, the oneness (of the Self) is established by the Vedic text "One alone without a second" (Chhān. VI-2-1). As to that the author has said that that is not correct by the phrase *Na vā kevalatwam* (neither is there absoluteness). *Kevalatwam* means 'oneness'. It too is excluded because of its quality of having been born of Nescience. If it is argued that if the oneness of the Self is not established by the Vedic text (above-mentioned) there ought to be its manifoldness owing to its being dependent upon the means of proof such as direct perception &c., that is denied by the phrase *Na chākevalatwam* (nor non-absoluteness). *Akevalatwam* means 'manifoldness'. (That is excluded) owing to there being the Vedic texts "There is in this no diversity" (Brih. IV-4-19), "One alone without a second" (Chhān. VI-2-1), "Next follows the teaching "no", "no" " (Brih. II-3-6) and others. If it is argued that in that case, owing to the denial of everything, it must be a void only, that is denied by the phrase *Na sūnyam* (nor a void). (It is so) because (the Vedic texts), having begun by saying "If one knows Brahma to be non-existing, he himself becomes non-existing (while) if one knows Brahma to be existing (the wise) know (i. e. infer) that he is existing" (Tai. II-6), "Brahma is truth, knowledge and infiniteness" (Ibid. II-1) (and) "In the beginning, my dear, there was Sat (existence) only" (Chhān. VI-2-1), have established the reality (of the Self) by such texts as "All this has that for its essence. That is the truth. That is the Self. Thou art that" (Ibid. VI-8-7) and others and because it is the substratum of all delusion and the end of all contradictions. (If it is said that) in that case it must at least have been possessed of the attributes of being the truth and being knowledge, that is denied by the phrase *Na chāsūnyam* (nor a non-void). (That is so) because although all distinctions are warded off by the two terms *Ekam* (one) and *Adwitīyam*

(without a second), the simultaneous distinction and want of distinction implied in such relations as an attribute and the possessor of that attribute &c. is warded off by the term *Eva* (alone). The reason everywhere (i. e. in the case of all these denials) has been stated in (the phrase) *Adwaitakatwāt*. That which is reduced to duality is called *Dwītam*; the quality of being so (reduced) is *Dwaitam*. Thus it has been said in the Vārttika:—"They call that *Dwītam* which has been reduced to duality. The quality of being so (reduced) is called *Dwaitam*". (Brih. Bhā. Vā. IV-3-1807). The literal meaning thereof is that that in which there is no *Dwaitam* (i. e.) the quality of having been reduced to duality is *Adwaitam*, owing to the Vedic text "The Seer is pure, one without a second" (Brih. IV-3-32). The meaning (of the first three lines of the verse taken together) is that the denial (above-spoken of) can be established because the dual substance is capable of being known by direct perception &c., owing to its being admitted to be indescribable for the reason that the knowledge of the counter-part (of a thing) becomes instrumental in producing a notion of its non-existence by proving too little. (If it is said that) in that case, the existence of such a Self may be established by pointing a finger at it, the author, being of the view that that cannot be done, has said:—*Katham bravīmi* (how can I speak of it?). The (derivative of the) word *Kim* has been used in order to hint at (a reply).[1] (He has said so because) there being the Vedic texts "He spoke of it without any words at all" (Nri. Utta. 7), "That from which speech together with the mind turns away without reaching it" (Tai. II-4), "Thou couldst not know the knower of knowledge" (Brih. III-4-2) and others, it is not a subject of speech owing to its being unique by nature. If it is objected:—How can the Upanishads be authoritative with respect thereto if it is not a subject of speech—the author, having in mind (the reply) that that is not correct because though the Self is not a subject of speech they (i. e. the Upanishads) do possess the quality of being the remover of Nescience by (giving rise to) a Vritti in tune with it (i. e. the Self), has said:—*Sarvavedāntasiddham* (established by all the Upanishads).

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1. This is the correct literal translation of the expression किमाक्षेपे as appears from its expanded form किंशब्द आक्षेपे found in this author's commentary on Bhagawad Gītā II. 21 (*Ānandās'rama, Sanskrit Series, No. XLV*, p. 52). The note thereon at p. 207 *supra* is therefore required to be corrected accordingly. The word कथम् is made up of क a derivative of किम् + थम्. (*vide Apte's Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary, p. 374*).

Thus the Vedic text "(The Self) is known to him who (says he) has not known it. He who (says he) has known it does not know it. It is not known to those who know it and known to those who do not know it" (Ke. II-3), "That which does not think by the mind (but) that by which, they say, the mind is thought, know that very thing to be Brahma, not this which the people worship" (Ibid. I-5) and others, point to the Self as not being a subject (of speech). Then in this manner, it is established that on the removal of Nescience by an uninterrupted Vritti produced by an Upanishad text (and consequently) of all misery brought into existence by it, one having become of the nature of the highest joy, has one's purpose in life served (10). (PP. ७७-८१).

I do not eulogise that Vyāsa who did not even with the Sūtras knit together properly the (whole) meaning (of the teaching of the Upanishads). (But) I eulogise[1] that Sankara and (that) Sures'wara who even without them knitted together the whole meaning thereof. (1).

This digest though small but bearing a great meaning[2] like a philosopher's stone has been prepared by the sage Madhusūdana for the amusement of the meritorious. (2).

Whatever merit there is in this (work) belongs solely to the preceptor, certainly not to me (and) whatever demerit there is in it belongs solely to me, certainly not to the preceptor. (3)

I have prepared this small digest for the sake of Balabhadra[3] at his earnest importunity. Let the magnanimous intelligent men discern what is faultless and what is faulty herein. (4).

Thus ends the work named *Siddhāntabindu* composed by the illustrious Madhusūdana Saraswatī, a disciple of the illustrious Vis'wes'wara Saraswatī, a peripatetic teacher of the illustrious order of Paramahaṁsas.

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1. The reading नौमि which is given in foot-note at p. ८२ cannot be correct because in that case the author would be deemed to have used the words न स्तौमि in the first line and the word नौमि in the second line though we would naturally expect him to have used the same verb in both in order to emphasis the comparison drawn in the verse between Vyāsa on the one hand and S'ankara and Sures'wara on the other.

2. If the reading given in foot-note 2 at the same page is adopted the translation would be:—"This digest though small but conferring much benefit &c."

3. As to who this Balabhadra is *vide* the note at p. 211 *supra*.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO THE NOTES.

N. B.—Words and expressions have been arranged herein in the order of their spellings in English irrespective of their pronounciations in Sanskrit. Thus, for instance, the word आभास would be found to precede the word अभाव because the transliteration of the former is Ābhāsa and that of the latter Abhāva and the letter 's' precedes the letter 'v' in English orthography.

The method of transliteration adopted herein is the same as in the Notes and Translation.

Alphabetical Index of Works Consulted and Referred to.

N. B.—The names here are arranged on the same principle as those in the similar Index to the Notes.

Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
Advaitaratnaraks'aṇam with an Introduction in Sanskrit by Anant Krishṇa S'āstri.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	1917
Advaitasiddhi with Laghuchandrikā.	Advaitamañjari Series, Kumbhakoṇam.	1893
Advaitasiddhi with Saralā, a Com. in Hindi and an Introduction in the same language.	Gujrāti Press, Bombay.	1924
Age of Madhusūdana Saraswatī, A Note on, by K. T. Telang; Journal of the B. B. R. A. S. Vol. X. No. XXX, pp. 368-77.	Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay.	......
Amarakosha with Saṁks'iptamāhes'warī.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	1927
Ānandamandākinī.	Kāvyamālā Series, Dwitīya Guchchha; Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	1886
Annals of the Bhāndārkar Oriental Research Institute, Vols. VIII, IX, XI & XIII.	Journal Department, B. O. R. I., Poona.	1928-31
Aparoks'ānubhūti of S'ankara edited with other minor works by Pandit Nathurām S'armā under the caption "As'ṭādas'a Ratno".	Sanātan Dharmaprasārak Manḍal, Ahmedabad.	1914
Āpte's Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary.	Poona.	1890
Arthasaṁgraha of Laugāks'i Bhāskara with an English Translation by Dr. Thebaut.	Sanskrit College, Benares.	......

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Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
Ashṭavikritivivriti by Madhusūdana Muni with a Com. by Satyavrata Bhattāchārya.	Satyatantra Press, Calcutta.	S. 1811
Bhagawadgītā with Gūḍhārthadīpikā and Subodhinī.	Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, Poona.	......
Bhagawadgītā with S'ankarabhāshya and the Com. of Ānandagiri and Parmārthaprapā.	Jagad-Hitechchhu Press, Poona.	1886
Bhāgawata Purāṇa.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	......
" "	Nityaswarūpa Brahmachāri of Vrindāvana.	S. 1855
Bhaktirasāyanam of Madhusūdana Saraswatī with a Com. on Ullāsa I by the author and on Ullāsas II & III by Dāmodar S'āstri with an Introduction in Sanskrit.	Achyut Granthamālā, Dwitīya Pushpa, Benares.	S. 1984
Brahmasūtra with Sārīrakabhāshya and the Comm. of Vāchaspati, Amalānanda and Appaya Diks'it and an Introduction in Sanskrit by Anant Krishṇa S'āstri.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	1917
Brahmasūtras, An English Translation of, by Dr. Thebaut.	Sacred Books of the East Series.	......
Brihadāraṇyaka-bhāshya-vārttika by Sures'warāchārya.	Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, Poona.	......
Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. Bengal, Part IV by Dr. R. L. Mitra. (Notices of Sans. MSS.)	... ...	......
Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., Indian Philosophical Systems by Fitzgerald Hall. (An		

Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems).	... ...	......
Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., India Office, Part IV.	... ...	......
Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., Mysore and Coorg by Lewis Rice.	... ...	......
Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., Raghunāth Temple Library, Jammu by Dr. M. A. Stein.	... ...	......
Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. Sanskrit College, Benares.		
Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., Triennial, Government MSS. Library, Madras. (Several Volumes).	... ...	......
Catalogus Catalogorum by Theodor Aufrecht Vols. I, II and III.	... ...	......
Daks'iṇāmūrtistotra of S'ankara.	... ...	......
Daks'iṇāmūrtistotra-vārttika of Sures'wara.		
Gauḍapādakārikā *Vide* Māṇḍukyopanishat.	... ...	......
Harilīlā by Vopadeva with the Vyākhyā of Madhusūdana Saraswatī with an Introduction in Sanskrit by Pandit Īs'warachandra.	Calcutta Oriental Series.	1920
History of Indian Literature by Dr. M. Winternitz. Vol. I., English Translation of, by Mrs. S. Ketkar.	Calcutta University.	1927
History of Indian Philosophy by Dās Gupta.	... ...	......

Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
History of Indian Philosophy by Rādhākrishṇan, Vols. I & II.	... ...	......
History of Sanskrit Literature by A. Macdonell.	William Heinemann, London.	1900
History of Sanskrit Poetics by P. V. Kane.	The Author, Bombay.	......
Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems by Fitzgerald Hall. *Vide* Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS.	... ...	......
Iśwarapratipattiprakāśa by Madhusūdana Saraswatī.	Trivendrum Sanskrit Series.	1921
Jīvanmuktiviveka by Vidyāraṇya.	Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, Poona.	S. 1811
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya by S'rī Harsha.	Sanskrit College, Calcutta.	1905
Krishṇakutūhala Nāṭaka, MS. No. 1629.	Sanskrit Library, Baroda.	S. 1711
Mahimnastotra of Pushpadanta with the Com. of Madhusūdana Saraswatī.	Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay.	1922
Māndukyopanishat with the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda and the Bhāshya of S'ankara on the latter.	Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, Poona.	......
Manusmriti with a Gujrāti Translation and Notes by S'āstrī Nathurām Haris'ankara and Pandit Prāṇjivan Harihar.	Gujrāti Printing Press, Bombay.	1906
Notices of Sanskrit MSS., Vol. IV, Bengal by Dr. R. L. Mitra. *Vide* Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS.	... ...	......

Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
Organization of the Sannyāsis of the Vedānta by J. N. Farquhar; Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, pp. 479-86.	Royal Asiatic Society, London.	......
Pañchadas'ī with the Com. of Rāmakrishṇa.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	1926
Pañchīkaraṇa of S'ankara.	... ...	......
Prasthānabheda of Madhusūdana Saraswatī.	Khaḍga Vilās Press, Bānkipur.	......
Prasthānabheda of Madhusūdana Saraswatī.	Vāṇī Vilāsa Press.	......
Pūrvamīmāṅsādars'ana.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	S. 1960
Pūrvamīmāṅsā System, A Brief Sketch of, by P. V. Kane.	The Author, Bombay.	1924
Rigveda, Hymns from, by Peter Peterson, revised and enlarged by S. R. Bhāndārkar.	Bombay Sanskrit Series.	1905
Saṁks'epas'ārīraka with Sārasaṁgraha, a Com. by Madhusūdana Saraswatī, Vols. I & II.	Kās'ī Sanskrit Series.	1924
S'āṇḍilyasūtra edited by Cowell.	... ...	......
S'ankarabhāshya on the Brahmasūtras. *Vide* Brahmasūtras.	... ...	......
Sarvadars'anasaṁgraha by Mādhava.	Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, Poona.	......
S'āstradarpaṇam by Amalānanda.	Vāṇī Vilāsa Press.	1913
S'āstradīpikā by Pārathāsārathi Mis'ra with a Com. by Rāmakrishṇa.	Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series, Benares.	1900
Siddhāntabindu, Text of.	Amalner Philosophical Institute, and Gujrāti Press, Bombay.	1924

Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
Siddhāntabindu, Text of.	Bābu Gowinda Dās Gupta, Benares.	S. 1944
,, ,,	Mysore Government Oriental Series, Bangalore.	1899
,, Translation of, with an Introduction by P. M. Modi of Sāmaldās College, Bhāvanagar and a Foreword by Dr. Zimmermann.	Āryasudhāraka Press, Baroda.	1929
,, With Binduprapāta, and an Introduction in Sanskrit by Mm. Vāsudev S'āstrī Abhyankar.	Government Oriental Series, Class A., Poona.	1928
,, With Laghuvyākhyā and Bindusaṁdīpana, Comm. by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Purushottama Saraswatī respectively, edited by Mahādev Gangādhar Bakre.	News (Gujrāti) Printing Press, Bombay.	1929
,, With Laghuvyākhyā and Nyāyaratnāvalī, the latter, a Com. by Brahmānanda Saraswatī.	Kās'ī Sanskrit Series, Benares.	S. 1985
,, With Nyāyaratnāvalī.	Advaita Mañjarī Series, Kumbhakoṇam.	1893
Siddhāntales'asaṁgraha of Appaya Diks'īt with a Com. by Swayaṁprakās'ānanda Saraswatī.	,,	1894

Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
Tarkasaṁgraha, a work of the Vais'eshika school edited by Mehendale.	... ...	......
Tattwadīpanam by Akhaṇḍānanda Muni	Benares Sanskrit Series.	1901
Tattwakaumudī by Vāchaspati Mis'ra edited by Dr. Gaṅgānāth Jhā with an English Translation.	Theosophical Publication Fund, Bombay.	1906
Tattwapradīpikā of Chitsukhāchārya with a com. by Pratyagrūpa.	Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay.	1915
Upanishads, A Collection of 108 (?109), together with the S'antipāṭha of the Principal Ten.	Tattwavivechak Press, Bombay.	S. 1817
Upanishads, A Collection of 28 consisting of the Is'a and other Principle Ones.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	1910
Upanishads, Translation of, with Introductions and Notes by Max Muller.	Sacred Books of the East Series, Vols. I & XV.	......
Vedāntakalpalatikā of Madhusūdana Saraswatī with an Introduction in Sanskrit by Rāmājñya S'arma Pāndey.	Princess of Wales Saraswatī Bhuvan Text Series.	1920
Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda with the Comm. of Nrisiṁha Saraswatī and Rāmatīrtha, edited with an Introduction in English by Col. Jacob.	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.	1925
Vivekachūḍāmaṇi of S'ankara, edited along with other minor works by Pandit Nathurām S'armā under the caption "Ashṭādas'a Ratno".	Sanātan Dharmaprasārak Manḍal, Ahmedabad.	1914
Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha by Vidyāraṇya.	Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares.	1893

Name of the Work.	*Name of the Publisher.*	*Year of Publication.*
Yājñavalkyasmriti with Mitāks'arā.	Vyankates'wara Press, Bombay.	1900
Yajurveda Saṁhitā (Taittirīya)	... ...	......
Yajurveda Saṁhitā (Vājasaneyi) with the Bhāshyas of Uvata and Mahīdhara.	Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay.	1912
Yogasūtras of Patañjali with the Bhāshya of Vyāsa, the Tīkā of Vāchaspati and the Vritti of Bhojadeva.	Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, Poona.	1919

N. B.—I have not been able to mention the name of the publisher or the year of publication or both in the case of some of the works because they were not before me when this list was prepared.

List of Corrections (English Section).

Page.	Line.	Printed Reading.	Correct Reading.
2	9	profounded	propounded
8	4	पशु बध्नाति	पशुं बध्नाति
25	3	S'ankar's Bhāshya	S'ankara's Bhāshya.
27	4	the figure 2 over the word 'philosophy'	the figure 1
34	21	PP. 12–13 *supra*	PP. 31–33 *supra*
40	20	S'rihars'a	S'rī Harsha
43	31	admissious	admission
59	2	its	his
65	17	विवस्वानपोभित्त्वा	विवस्वानापोभित्त्वा
79	16	wish	love
94	last	based upon knowledge derived from the means of proof.	based upon imagination.
105	1	ths	the
108	16	no	one
140	27	Pradhâna	Pradhāna
141	8 (foot-note 2)	स्मृती	स्मृति
154	23	तैजस्	तैजस
160	25	it	him
164	13	भिलित्वा	मिलित्वा
165	11	उदात्तः	उदानः
186	10	तैजस्	तैजस
191	14	वेदान्तवाक्यविचार	वेदान्तविचार
223	21	Pratiblmba-vāda	Pratibimba-vāda
225	4	would cannot be	would not be
	27 foot-note 1	the figure 2	the figure 1
228	„ 3 line 3	have	had and *add* at the end of the note:–See

Page.	Line.	Printed Reading.	Correct Reading.
			however the note on this expression at p. 85 *supra*.
251	foot-note 1 line 1	*Serie* ,,	*Series*
,,	,, ,, ,, 2	cause's ,,	cause,
270	,, 3 ,, 4	founp ,,	found

16 line 23 *insert* the word 'the' *after* the word 'by'.
87 ,, 10 ,, ,, 'to' ,, ,, 'referred'.
166 ,, 32 ,, ,, 'that' *before* ,, 'the'.
262 ,, 14 ,, ,, the ,, ,, 'statement'.
95 ,, 5 ,, ,, or प्रातीतिक *after* ,, प्रातिभासिक.
101 ,, 25 ,, words 'is concerned', before the word 'they'.
207 ,, 34 ,, ,, 'See also the foot-note at p. 279' at the end.

241 foot-note 1 line 5 *add* the word 'of' *after* the word 'up'.
35 last line *delete* ,, 'that'.
95 2nd ,, ,, the words 'प्रातीतिक or'.
148 foot-note 2 ,, the whole.
135 heading, *insert* ,, **"of the sense"** between the words **"Determination"** and **"of"**.

147 last but 1 line, ,, ,, "अनर्थः here means" after—.
150 lines 27-28 *delete* the portion of the sentence commencing from 'where'.

231 for the first line and the second upto the word 'eyes' *substitute:*—"This itself is the bondage of the Self that it appears as involved in worldly phenomena".

243 *put* * on the word 'castes' in line 8 and *add* the following foot-note:— *The word वर्णाः has been translated here according to the usual practice. See however the note thereon at pp. 126–27 *supra*.



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This book has been set as a text-book by several Universities including Benares, Bombay, and Patna.

2. **Naranārāyaṇānanda:** a poem on the Paurāṇic story of Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa's rambles on Mount Girnar, by Vastupāla, Minister of King Vīradhavala of Dholka, composed between Samvat 1277 and 1287, *i.e.*, A.D. 1221 and 1231: edited by C. D. Dalal and R. Anantakrishna Sastry, 1916 .. .. .. *Out of print.*

3. **Tarkasaṅgraha:** a work on Philosophy (refutation of Vaiśeṣika theory of atomic creation) by Ānandajñāna or Ānandagiri, the famous commentators on Śaṅkarācārya's Bhāṣyas, who flourished in the latter half of the 13th century: edited by T. M. Tripathi, 1917. *Out of print.*

4. **Pārthaparākrama:** a drama describing Arjuna's recovery of the cows of King Virāṭa, by Prahlādanadeva, the founder of Pālanpur and the younger brother of the Paramāra king of Chandrāvatī (a state in Mārwār), and a feudatory of the kings of Guzerat, who was a Yuvarāja in Samvat 1220 or A.D. 1164: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1917 .. .. .. *Out of print.*

5. **Rāṣṭrauḍhavaṁśa:** an historical poem (Mahākāvya) describing the history of the Bāgulas of Mayūragiri, from Rāṣṭrauḍha, king of Kanauj and the originator of the dynasty, to Nārāyana Shāh of Mayūragiri, by Rudra Kavi, composed in Śaka 1518 or A.D. 1596: edited by Pandit Embar Krishnamacharya with Introduction by C. D. Dalal, 1917 1–12

6. **Liṅgānuśāsana:** on Grammar, by Vāmana, who lived between the last quarter of the 8th century and the first quarter of the 9th century: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1918 0–8

7. **Vasantavilāsa:** an historical poem (Mahākāvya) describing the life of Vastupāla and the history of

Rs. A.

Guzerat, by Bālachandrasūri (from Modheraka or Modhera in Kadi Prant, Baroda State), contemporary of Vastupāla, composed after his death for his son in Samvat 1296 (A.D. 1240): edited by C. D. Dalal, 1917 1–8

8. **Rūpakaṣaṭkam :** six dramas by Vatsarāja, minister of Paramardideva of Kalinjara, who lived between the 2nd half of the 12th and the 1st quarter of 13th century: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1918 2–4

9. **Mohaparājaya :** an allegorical drama describing the overcoming of King Moha (Temptation), or the conversion of Kumārapāla, the Chalukya King of Guzerat, to Jainism, by Yaśaḥpāla, an officer of King Ajayadeva, son of Kumārapāla, who reigned from A.D. 1229 to 1232: edited by Muni Chaturvijayaji with Introduction and Appendices by C. D. Dalal, 1918 .. 2–0

10. **Hammīramadamardana :** a drama glorifying the two brothers, Vastupāla and Tejaḥpāla, and their King Vīradhavala of Dholka, by Jayasiṁhasūri, pupil of Vīrasūri, and an Ācārya of the temple of Munisuvrata at Broach, composed between Samvat 1276 and 1286 or A.D. 1220 and 1239: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1920 .. 2–0

11. **Udayasundarīkathā :** a romance (Campū, in prose and poetry) by Soḍḍhala, a contemporary of and patronised by the three brothers, Chchittarāja, Nāgārjuna, and Mummuṇirāja, successive rulers of Konkan, composed between A.D. 1026 and 1050: edited by C. D. Dalal and Pandit Embar Krishnamacharya, 1920 .. 2–4

12. **Mahāvidyāviḍambana :** a work on Nyāya Philosophy, by Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra who lived about A.D. 1210 to 1274: edited by M. R. Telang, 1920 2–8

13. **Prācīnagurjarakāvysaṅgraha :** a collection of old Guzerati poems dating from 12th to 15th centuries A.D.: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1920 2–4

14. **Kumārapālapratibodha :** a biographical work in Prākṛta, by Somaprabhāchārya, composed in Samvat 1241 or A.D. 1195: edited by Muni Jinavijayaji, 1920 7–8

15. **Gaṇakārikā :** a work on Philosophy (Pāśupata School), by Bhāsarvajña who lived in the 2nd half of the 10th century: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1921 1–4

16. **Saṅgītamakaranda :** a work on Music, by Nārada: edited by M. R. Telang, 1920 2–0

17. **Kavīndrācārya List :** list of Sanskrit works in the collection of Kavīndrācārya, a Benares Pandit (1656 A.D.): edited by R. Anantakrishna Shastry, with a foreword by Dr. Ganganatha Jha, 1921 0–12

18. **Vārāhagṛhyasūtra :** Vedic ritual (domestic) of the Yajurveda: edited by Dr. R. Shamasastry, 1920 .. 0–10

19. **Lekhapaddhati :** a collection of models of state and private documents, dating from 8th to 15th centuries A.D.:

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edited by C. D. Dalal and G. K. Shrigondekar, 1925 2–0

20. **Bhaviṣayattakahā or Pañcamīkahā:** a romance in Apabhraṁśa language, by Dhanapāla (*circa* 12th century): edited by C. D. Dalal and Dr. P. D. Gune, 1923 6–0

21. **A Descriptive Catalogue of the Palm-leaf and Important Paper MSS. in the Bhandars at Jessalmere,** compiled by C. D. Dalal and edited by Pandit L. B. Gandhi, 1923 3–4

22. **Paraśurāmakalpasūtra:** a work on Tantra, with commentary by Rāmeśvara: edited by A. Mahadeva Sastry, B.A., 1923 .. .. *Out of print.*

23. **Nityotsava:** a supplement to the Paraśurāmakalpasūtra by Umānandanātha: edited by A. Mahadeva Sastry, B.A., 1923. Second revised edition by Swami Tirvikrama Tirtha, 1930 5–0

24. **Tantrarahasya:** a work on the Prābhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṁsā, by Rāmānujācārya: edited by Dr. R. Shamasastry, 1923 1–8

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